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ABSTRACT!
This thesis explores the concept of a human-centred Identity Management 
System (IDMS), and how it can be implemented by organisations. The review of 
the literature on previous approaches to identity (i.e. privacy, trust, and 
usability) reveals that claims of IDMS being ‘human-centred’ are rhetorical; in 
reality, organisations’ administrative convenience is prioritised over the needs of 
individuals who are treated as purely functional components within the IDMS 
ecosystem.  
The research conducted to build a human-centred identity concept involved 
three separate studies, each approaching the question of identity from a 
different perspective. Study 1, the system study, focused on the design of IDMS 
and its impact on individuals’ everyday lives. A total of 14 different past and 
present N-IDMS implementations were analysed using thematic coding. The 
result of the study was the development of a framework that expressed a system 
in terms of a set of structural and metrical design properties, and how these can 
shape the individuals’ lived experience of identity.  
Study 2, the individual study, explored individuals’ perceptions and initial 
acceptance of N-IDMS. Grounded Theory analysis was applied to the data from 
15 focus group discussions (groups consisted of 3 participants who were all 
either of British, Indian, or Bruneian nationality). The study revealed that 
individuals’ decision to accept an IDMS are influenced by their situation 
perception, system judgment, and concerns. These findings were further refined 
through the use of a survey study. The individual study also explored the impacts 
of National Culture on individuals’ perception of an IDMS. 
Finally, the third study took an organisation-centric approach, through the 
analysis of documentation and interviews on the current N-IDMS 
implementations in 3 different countries (UK, Brunei, and India). Exploring 
identity as a strategic resource, the study developed a set of organisational 
requirements around the identity creation and identity application processes, 
which have an influence the design of the IDMS. 
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The main contribution of this thesis is the development of a unified framework 
that provides a complete narrative of the identity situation, from planning and 
design to individual perceptions, as well as the impacts on the lived experience. 
The findings of this research have been validated through the use of expert 
evaluations, which have found the framework to be complete and useful for both 
practitioners and researchers. 
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Glossary("!The$Identity$Ecosystem!
The following is a brief overview of the terms used throughout this thesis. While 
Identity Management Systems can be quite diverse, the structure and definitions 
of here are based on the cases reviewed in this thesis.  
 
Figure 1 Identity Ecosystem 
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Table 1 Glossary of terms used in this thesis 
Term Definition 
Identity A set of information and attributes about an individual 
that is collected and stored, linked to an identifier(s) 
that sufficiently identifies the individual within a set of 
individuals. 
Identity 
Management 
System (IDMS) 
A mechanism that allows for the creation, 
administration, access, and use of identity. 
General Population All the people that act within the context of the IDMS; 
this includes people who operate in the context, but 
may not be enrolled within the IDMS. 
Target Population The section of the general population is required to 
enrol with the IDMS so as to continue to operate within 
the context. 
Individual A single person from the target population that has 
enrolled with the IDMS. 
Organisation The entity that is in charge of planning, developing, 
running, and maintaining a particular IDMS. 
Relying Party An entity that requires access to the IDMS. 
Human Centred 
IDMS 
An organisations implementation of an IDMS that 
views individuals as major stakeholders, and therefore 
addresses their concerns and negative perceptions, 
while also accounting for the lived experience. 
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Chapter(1:(Introduction(
“The explosive entry of technology into every aspect of life has 
changed how people live, how they work, how companies do business 
– and how governments serve their people.” (Silcock, 2001) 
Identity is a construct that underlies the mechanisms, which enable or prevent 
individuals’ from performing any action in a social environment. As such, many 
organisations seek to obtain - explicitly or implicitly - reliable proof of 
individuals’ identities, enabling them to ensure effective policing of their rules 
and policies. Ashbourn (2000) describes how administrators in ancient Egypt 
used anthropometric techniques to identify workers claiming their food rations 
to prevent them from collecting rations more than once. Anthropometric 
techniques were also used in France as a means of identifying recidivists, so 
authorities could give them harsher sentences than first time offenders (Caplan 
& Torpey, 2001). Today, individuals’ possess various forms of identity 
documents, such as passports and driving licenses that are accepted as official 
proofs of identity.  
But with the increasing spread of IT systems, there is a growing disembodiment 
of identity processes; interactions between individuals and organisations that 
were previously conducted face-to-face, and that admitted the use physical 
documents as evidence, are now mediated through information and 
communication technology (Giddens, 1991; Lyon, 2005). Identity has entered 
the digital arena, enabling organisations to re-embed individuals into 
relationships that no longer involve face-to-face transactions.  
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1.1 E"Commerce!and!Identity!
“If I have 3 million customers on the Web, I should have 3 million 
stores on the Web.” (Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, in Schafer, 
Konstan, & Riedl, 2001) 
The embrace of the digital representation of identity has empowered 
organisations to utilise and manage identity in new ways; “an electronic-based 
society has dramatically reduced the cost of collecting, storing and processing 
individuals' personal information. As a result, it is becoming more common for 
businesses to profile individuals in order to present more personalised offers as 
part of their business strategy” (Camenisch et al., 2005). For example, 
recommender systems allow businesses to offer customers personalised product 
or service recommendations based on the customers’ personal identity profile 
(Resnick & Varian, 1997; Schafer et al., 2001). In the same vein, identity has 
been utilised to generate trust on the Internet. A reputation system is an identity 
platform that enables customers to rate entities they might come into contact 
with, which can “assist other parties in deciding whether or not to transact with 
that party” (Jøsang, Ismail, & Boyd, 2007).  1.2 E"Government!and!Identity!
Digital identity is not only utilised within commercial enterprises, but is also 
being adopted by governments in pursuit of goals in the digital arena. E-
Government is seen by many as a mechanism to revolutionise the way 
governments function; current efforts to make use of technology aim to shed the 
traditional one-to-many model of government, and migrate to a more efficient 
and personalised online medium (Layne & Lee, 2001; Silcock, 2001). Identity is 
the key element that will drive personalisation, as well as enabling the security of 
online transactions.  
“A key theme for coming decades in all our case study countries will 
be identity management, as more advanced online governmental 
interactions with citizens and businesses rely on the transfer of 
personal data.” (Dunleavy, 2006) 
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Governments’ desire for efficiency is enabled by the mobility and transferability 
of digital identities. Citizens interact with the government at various levels and 
through various agencies, typically requiring the citizen to manage a unique 
identity with each government body: paying taxes requires an individual to 
establish a relationship with the tax department, registering a recently bought 
car requires interaction with the vehicles department, while receiving health 
care requires the public to establish an identity with the health agency. However, 
as services are being moved to an online medium, governments are exploring 
new identity designs that better support their goals (Lips, 2007). 
One of the goals of e-Government is to create a joined-up government (Tony 
Blair, 1999), which “denotes the aspiration to achieve horizontally and 
vertically coordinated thinking and action” (Pollitt, 2003). This should enable 
better information sharing between government agencies, as well as making it 
“possible to offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented access to a set of 
related services” (Pollitt, 2003). It is often considered inefficient and 
troublesome to require that citizens have to establish separate identities with 
each service, and doing so may also lead to “a problematic patchwork of identity 
one-offs” (Cameron, 2005). An integrated or centralised identity management 
system (IDMS) is seen as an essential step in delivering joined-up government. 
Governments are also interested in the potential administrative cost savings that 
can be brought about through the use of centralised IDMS. For example, in 
extending the concept of the UK Transformational Government initiative, better 
management of citizen information was identified as an important aspect of 
development. It has been estimated, that improved identity management in the 
Revenue and Customs department resulted in an estimated £100 million of 
savings each year (Varney, 2006).  
  18 
Therefore, in support of their e-Government goals, governments around the 
world are pushing for the implementation of national identity management 
systems (N-IDMS) (London School of Economics, 2005). An N-IDMS is a 
nationwide identity scheme, in which all citizens will typically be assigned a 
unique identity number; this may be further supported by the distribution of 
identity cards to all citizens, as well as the implementation of a centralised 
database that holds citizens’ personal information (e.g. name, address, date of 
birth). A citizen can then use this as a proof of identity when interacting with 
public and private sector organisations. Countries that already possess paper-
based N-IDMS are now moving towards a digital platform in their quest for 
more efficiency, while countries that currently do not have an N-IDMS are 
attempting to introduce one. 1.3 National!Security!and!Identity!
In addition to aiding e-Government development goals, the push for N-IDMS is 
also fuelled by the climate of insecurity. The terrorist attacks on September 11th 
1999 sparked a worldwide security concern; the attacks were followed by huge 
media coverage that blew the situation out of proportion (Schneier, 2003). But 
for governments, the feeling of insecurity caused by the extensive media 
coverage provided a catalyst for the introduction of an N-IDMS. For example, 
the governments of the United Kingdom, United States and Philippines have all 
cited the implementation of N-IDMS as a strategy in battling terrorism (Lyon, 
2007).  
Another of the security benefits of an N-IDMS is that proponents believe that it 
can reduce illegal immigration (Lyon, 2009). Recent statistics show an estimate 
of about 30 to 40 million illegal immigration worldwide (Papademetriou, 2005). 
In the UK alone, the government published a report claiming a figure of 430 000 
illegal immigrants, while the size of the illegal population in the US is believed to 
be as large as seven million (Woodbridge, 2005). Both governments have cited 
illegal immigration as a factor in introducing an N-IDMS. This is also true for 
many other governments such as Spain, Malaysia, Hong Kong, etc. (London 
School of Economics, 2005; Lyon, 2007).  
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Governments also tend to argue that N-IDMSs will aid in the reduction of fraud. 
The British government has reported that instances of identity fraud in the UK 
have risen by over 500% since 1999, to a figure of 135,000 recorded cases 
(Burnham, 2006). The total estimate of the cost that this has on the UK 
economy is somewhere in the region of £1.7 billion (Identity Fraud Steering 
Committee, 2006). Australia’s efforts, among others, have typically been driven 
by its concerns for benefit fraud (London School of Economics, 2005). 1.4 Acceptance!of!IDMS!
While many governments claim that an N-IDMS will make government more 
efficient, help fight crime, reduce fraud, battle illegal immigration, and combat 
terrorism (Lyon, 2009), some countries have experienced backlash from citizens 
when attempting to introduce such schemes. For example, the British and 
Australian government have recently scrapped plans to introduce nationwide 
identity schemes, while the plans in the United States for an N-IDMS are facing 
an uncertain future (BBC, 2010a; Lyon, 2009; Tanner, 2007). Japan and Taiwan 
have also faced resistance from the public (BBC, 2002; Chuang, 2003).  
Not only governments that are facing public opposition, but private entities as 
well. Blizzard, a popular game publisher, recently back pedalled on its 
controversial plans to use a Real ID system, which forced players to post forum 
comments under their real names (BBC, 2010b). Within 24 hours of the 
announcement, the Blizzard forums had received over 1000 highly critical 
comments; three days later the total number of comments amounted to 50,000, 
which is when Blizzard announced that it would not follow through with its Real 
ID plans (Shiels, 2010). Phorm, a personalised online advertisement platform, 
suffered from some public disapproval, and was the subject of legal proceedings 
by the European Union (Waters, 2009). Facebook, a popular social networking 
platform, has also been at the centre of controversy, early on with its news feeds, 
and recently with its release of personal information to third party developers 
(Beaumont, 2010).  
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1.5 Problem!Statement!
Typical approaches to identity research have focused on the technical security 
aspects of identity systems, resulting in technically dominant paradigms that do 
not fully account for the underlying human factors; the identity field is “almost 
exclusively tackled from within a technical domain by experts with a dominant 
background in a technical discipline” (Lips, Taylor, & Organ, 2005). This 
technology-centred approach comes at the expense of the human aspects, and 
therefore do not address the underlying concerns of the identity itself.  
A broader view is required in order to identify the human factors that might 
affect identity systems. For example, what is the lived experience of constantly 
being asked to constantly prove one’s their identity to others (see Chapter 5)?  
Does the perceived seriousness of a societal problem affect individuals’ 
intentions to adopt an IDMS (see Section 6.3.1)? 
This is no trivial task, as identity concerns stem from a complex interaction of 
various concepts (Figure 2). At the core of this vortex is the multi-facetted nature 
of identity itself; while most people understand the concept of identity, an 
agreed definition, from both a layman and research perspective, is difficult to 
establish (Camp, 2004a). 
 
Figure 2 Related IDMS disciplines and their interactions 
Privacy Trust 
Security 
Identity 
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Privacy and trust form another part of the complex interaction. IDMS involve 
the collection, storage, and use of personal information; it is this aspect of IDMS 
that can raise concerns, as systems may be collecting irrelevant information, 
which may be sensitive in nature and potentially impinge on an individual’s 
“right to be left alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). This is also where trust issues 
also come into play, mediating for the uncertainty created when collecting and 
using personal information (Riegelsberger, Sasse, & Mccarthy, 2005). Therefore, 
building up trust may alleviate the privacy concerns raised when dealing with 
identity. 
However, interactions between identity, privacy, trust, and security are more 
complex than that which is has been alluded to above; all these concepts interact 
with each other in highly unpredictable ways. The kind of identity information 
being collected and used will have an impact on the security mechanisms that 
are required to protect it. The security systems implemented will determine the 
protection offered on the information collected, hence potentially affecting the 
level of privacy concerns. The amount of privacy offered will affect the trust 
subjects have in the system.  
Furthermore, while security determines actual privacy levels, it might have little 
impact on individuals’ privacy perceptions, which may be affected by the amount 
and type of personal information required. Privacy perception is also driven by 
trusting behaviour, which again might shift with regards to the identity 
information; for example our study in Chapter 6 found that information quality 
affects individuals’ system judgement on the effectiveness of the IDMS in 
helping the organisation to fulfil its goals (see Section6.3.2). All the elements are 
tightly wound together, each dependent on the other. It is this constant ebb and 
flow of the elements in an IDMS and their emergent properties that make it 
difficult to balance, and hence problematic to design and implement. 
1.5.1 Limitations(of(Current(Approaches(
A review of published literature shows that research into the non-technical 
aspects of IDMS largely focuses on privacy and trust. However, these approaches 
are insufficient to understanding all the human factors involved, failing to link 
concerns directly to the concept of identity (Rahaman & Sasse, 2011). Most 
research in the privacy and trust field view identity as a peripheral component to 
the investigation thus, leading to an incomplete representation of identity 
concerns. 
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1.5.1.1 Privacy+research+
Privacy is a multi-dimensional concept, and as such there are various 
interpretations of its meaning. However, looking at the nature of IDMS and its 
information collection practices, privacy research tends to focus on the issue of 
information privacy (Smith, Milberg, & Burke, 1996). This form of privacy 
focuses on the concerns that people may have involving the collection of 
personal information. Informational privacy studies are widely accepted in 
computer literature, and thus have a large empirical base for support.  
However, when considering the reach of identity systems today, the information 
privacy boundary is no longer sustainable. Privacy is still a concern, but it moves 
from the points of specific informational details to include the broader outcomes 
that privacy breaches bring; it moves to the “lived experience of identity” 
(Rahaman & Sasse, 2011). Therefore, a more encompassing view of privacy is 
required to generate a full picture of concerns in regards to IDMS. 
Furthermore, information privacy research results in theoretical ‘human-
centred’ solutions in the forms of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (Section 
3.2.4), as well as influencing the development of laws and rules that are centred 
on the concept of confidentiality (Section 3.2.3). These approaches typically 
tackle the area from an organisational perspective, with the aim of promoting 
business through the “free and uninterrupted (but responsible) flow and uses of 
personal data” (Cavoukian, 2009). This results in utilitarian models that 
typically empower organisations to collect a greater amount of personal 
information rather than specifically addressing the underlying privacy concerns 
related to identity. 
1.5.1.2 Trust+research+
As with privacy, trust is a multi-facetted concept, and its definition varies 
between different research disciplines. In the Theory of Planned Behaviour and 
the Theory of Reasoned Action, a model was developed with elements that can 
be used to predict behaviour (Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). These 
models of behaviour have been used to develop several trust models that are 
currently used to assess trusting intentions in relation to e-Government and e-
Commerce contexts (Carter & Bélanger, 2005; Davis, 1985; McKnight, 
Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002a; Venkatesh & Davis, 2010).  
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These models of trust have proliferated in the computer science literature, 
especially in e-Commerce. However, the trust models do not identify how trust is 
shaped by the design of the system itself; the main focus is the generation of 
trust through general attitudes and beliefs, rather than the specific design issues 
that trigger trust concerns in the first place (Rahaman & Sasse, 2011). In order to 
implement more trustworthy identity systems, an understanding about how 
IDMS design can influence individuals’ trusting intentions is required. 
1.5.1.3 Organisational+research+
While privacy and trust cover individual perspectives of IDMS, the organisation 
implementing the identity system is also an important consideration. It is the 
organisation that determines the eventual design of the system, and therefore its 
implications for individuals. Furthermore, approaching organisations as large 
network of “Human Activity Systems” (Checkland & Scholes, 1990) adds further 
relevance of organisational research when taking a human centred approach to 
identity. 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence in the literature of this approach being 
taken. While Kubicek & Noack (2010a) detail a framework outlining an actor-
centred political process that leads to the form and structure of upgraded N-
IDMS in Europe, other common organisational approaches tend to focus on 
identity as a mechanism with which to access resources (for an example, see 
White, 2008). These views are too limited because identity is no longer just a 
medium with which to access information, but an item of strategic interest itself; 
examples range from using identity in the backend for personalised advertising 
(see Phorm in Section 5.3.3), to identifying terrorists (see UK N-IDMS in Section 
7.2.2), as well as using a child database to predict future criminals (see 
Contactpoint in Section 2.3.4.2). Research needs to accommodate this growing 
importance of identity within organisations. 1.6 Research!Question!and!Aims!
The research presented in this thesis seeks to go beyond the traditional 
perspectives of trust, privacy, and organisational paradigms. This thesis 
approaches the problem situation by investigating the core component of IDMS; 
i.e. the identity itself. With this in mind, the overarching research question can 
be surmised as: 
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What are the human factors that influence identity, and how does it 
affect the development, implementation and use of Identity 
Management Systems? 
This thesis seeks to develop a holistic understanding of the how people relate to 
an IDMS. Therefore, guided by the overall research question, this thesis aims to: 
1. Identify the relationship between the individual and the IDMS. 
a. How does the implementation design of the IDMS affect the lived 
experience? 
b. How does an individual perceive and make judgements about an 
IDMS? 
2. Identify the relationship between the organisation and the 
IDMS. 
a. What are the organisations identity requirements? 
b. What factors affect the organisations design of an IDMS? 
3. To identify and develop a framework for the overall 
relationship between the individual, the system and the 
implementing organisation. 
1.6.1 Research(Scope(
This thesis is focused on developing a better understanding of human-centred 
IDMS; it is a substantive contribution, and does not seek to develop a new 
identity system or specific technology. The emphasis of this research is on the 
individuals and organisations involved in the development and use of an IDMS, 
and not on the detailed security or technical aspects of the system. 
Furtherore, the scope of this research is limited to that of national government 
implementations. The government of Brunei Darussalam sponsored the PhD 
grant; their main interest lies in the development of countrywide systems, and 
this thesis aimed to provide knowledge on how an effective and acceptable N-
IDMS can be developed. However, the results of the thesis are believed to be 
generalizable to non-government IDMS, and this thesis briefly explores the 
applicability of some the findings in these scenarios (see Section 5.3.1). 
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1.7 Research!Approach!
The phenomenon under investigation takes place in a complex socio-technical 
space. Current claims of ‘human-centred’ IDMS are largely rhetoric, and are 
based on assumptions and ideas that have not been tested in practice. Therefore, 
the research takes on an exploratory nature - it approaches identity from a new 
perspective, and that has not been explored in the available literature. The aim 
of the research presented in this thesis is to develop a new descriptive theory 
that captures the impact of system design on individuals’ lived experience, 
individuals’ perceptions of an IDMS, as well as organisations’ strategic 
considerations when implementing an identity system. 
 Based on the aims of this thesis, the research is broken down into three different 
studies: 
1. System Study. This research investigates how the design of an IDMS 
may influence the lived experience of individuals. 
2. Individual study. This phase of the research investigates individuals’ 
perceptions of identity systems. The intention of the work is to uncover 
how individuals assess IDMS, and how it may eventually determine 
his/her willingness to accept an IDMS.  
3. Organisation study. Finally, the thesis investigates organisational 
needs in the process of developing and implementing an IDMS. Viewing 
identity as a strategic resource, this research explores the relationships 
between the organisation’s identity requirements, and the system design. 
The main contribution of this thesis is an in-depth narrative of the identity 
situation, integrating 3 different but related perspectives. Bringing together the 
frameworks developed in the system, individual, and organisation studies, this 
research produced a unified framework that outlines the human factors that 
influence the development, implementation, and use of IDMS. 
1.7.1 Methodology(
Given that the focus of the investigation is on exploration and discovery, the 
research here utilised qualitative methods to develop a theory that emerges from 
the data. Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Punch, 
1998) analysis techniques were applied throughout the thesis, while data 
collection methods varied between each study. 
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The system study used Historiography (Berg, 2001) to identify secondary 
sources of information that outline various past and present implementations of 
N-IDMS, and the corresponding outcomes. Research on the individual 
perspective made use of focus groups in order to elicit discussions and uncover 
individual concerns when encountering N-IDMS. Finally, the government study 
analysed interviews and official government documents to uncover 
organisational considerations when planning and running an identity system. 
The organisation study used a case study research design; three different 
countries were identified for investigation, which covered diverse situations and 
constraints, while still maintaining comparability. The countries and systems 
identified are: 
1. Brunei. The government of Brunei has been running an N-IDMS since 
1949. It updated its infrastructure in 2000, when it implemented a multi-
function smart card system. The identity systems have always been well 
received by the public, but its multi-function feature is currently under-
utilised. 
2. United Kingdom. The British government has had two short-lived 
experiences with N-IDMS in the past. A recent effort to implement a new 
system faced mass opposition, and has recently been scrapped. 
Government arguments for the new system generally fall under the 
branch of national security.  
3. India. The government is currently in the process of implementing an 
N-IDMS. Little public opposition to the system has been identified. The 
government claims that its motive for implementation of an N-IDMS is 
the difficulties that the general public (especially the poor) face in 
proving their identity; individuals are thus are left without any access to 
required services.  1.8 Contributions!
The major contributions of the thesis are: 
1. The development of a unified framework that captures a multi-
stakeholder view of IDMS design and its implications. This 
includes: 
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a. A set of structural and metrical design properties that in 
combination can be used to narrate the individuals’ lived 
experience of identity 
b. A framework that captures individuals’ initial perceptions and 
willingness to accept IDMS, and how it is mediated by system 
judgement, situation perception and security concerns. 
c. A framework that describes organisations identity requirements 
and how it influences the information and technologies chosen 
for implementation. 
This is supported by several minor contributions, including: 
2. Guidance for practitioners to implement more effective 
human-centred IDMS: 
a. To ensure that the system is fit-for-purpose, by designing the 
system according to organisations’ identity requirements. 
b. The continuous engagement with all relying parties to elicit their 
goals and accessibility requirements, which need to be built into 
the IDMS. 
c. To look beyond the organisation, and include individuals into the 
design process, addressing individuals concerns, as well as 
ensuring that the lived experience created does not derail the 
purpose of the system. 
d. A method of possibly capturing the economic benefits for 
pursuing a human-centred IDMS design.  
3. The identification of potential areas of research: 
a. The research presents a new approach to identity within HCI; 
researchers are encouraged to look beyond usability issues, and 
explore the lived experience. 
b. Privacy research could gain from moving beyond the 
informational privacy domain, to focus on an inclusion of the 
implications and consequences of privacy breaches.  
c. Trust research should investigate the effects that specific context 
and design of a system (as opposed to general attitude constructs) 
can have on individuals’ intentions, and thus trusting intention. 
d. Research would also benefit from an exploration of culture and its 
effects on trusting behaviour.  
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1.8.1 Publications(
The research conducted here has resulted in the publication of several papers. 
These are detailed in Table 2, along with the chapters that they correspond to. 
Table 2 Papers published, and the chapters they correspond to 
Publication Chapter 
Rahaman, A., & Sasse, M. 2010. A framework for the lived experience of 
identity. Identity in the Information Society. 3(3):605-638.  
6 
Rahaman, A., & Sasse, M. 2011. Trust in national identity management 
systems: exploring citizen risk perceptions. Presented at the IDTrust 2011 
symposium, NIST, Gaithersburg 
7 
Rahaman, A., & Sasse, M. Designing National Identity: an organisational 
perspective on the requirements for a National Identity System. Submitted for 
publication to ICDS 2012.  
8 
1.9 Thesis!Structure!
Chapter 2 provides a review of 14 past and present IDMS implemented by 
governments. From medieval wanted lists to modern day eID systems, the 
chapter identifies the main catalysts and motives that drive the development of 
IDMS. The chapter also examines the effectiveness of each system, as well as 
overall outcomes of each implementation. In conclusion, the chapter draws 
several insights from the review: 
1. The impact of identity and IDMS on behaviour 
2. The influence of culture on perception of identity 
3. The importance of a clear purpose 
4. The setting of policies to support the purpose 
Chapter 3 reviews the current research literature on identity, privacy and trust. 
Cultural studies are also reviewed, as well as the literature relating to 
organisations and N-IDMS. The chapter ends by identifying the limitations and 
gaps that this thesis will address: 
1. A limited view of identity as an authentication mechanism, ignoring the 
growing use of identity as a strategic resource being accessed. 
2. The focus on informational privacy and its confidentiality paradigm, 
forgoing the larger implications of identity and information on the lived 
experience. 
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3. The development of trusting intentions built on abstract trusting bases, 
thus not accounting for how the design of the system can influence risk 
perceptions. 
4. A lack of published research on the impact of national culture on the 
willingness of individuals to accept IDMS. 
5. Organisations tend to short-circuit identity debates, typically falling back 
on certainties of technologies, instead of ensuring systems that are fit-
for-purpose. 
Chapter 4 details the methodology used in the thesis. The research approaches 
the subject matter from different perspectives, each using different methods and 
data sources according to the line of investigation pursued.  
Table 3 List of studies, and the respective methods used 
Study Data Source Method of Analysis 
System study Historiography Thematic Coding 
Individual study Focus Groups 
Survey data 
Grounded theory 
Structural Equation Modelling 
Organisation study Interviews 
Publicly available 
documentation 
Grounded theory 
 
Chapter 5 details the first study conducted, i.e. the system study. Based on the 
systems reviewed in Chapter 2, the focus of this study is on identifying how 
system design can affect individuals’ lived experience. The study produced a set 
of structural and metrical IDMS design properties that affect the lived 
experience; the structural properties focus on the flow of information within the 
identity ecosystem, while the metrical properties revolves around the qualities 
of the information that make up the identity.  
Chapter 6 shifts attention onto individuals’ perceptions of IDMS. Analysing 
data collected from focus groups, this study developed a framework that 
captured individuals’ concerns when encountering new systems, and thus its 
effect on their intention to adopt. A survey based on these individuals’ 
perceptions was developed and distributed. The results were then analysed and 
used to confirm and streamline this framework. The major constructs are: 
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1. Situation perception. Individuals’ perceptions of the problem that the 
IDMS is supposed to address. 
2. Concerns. Individuals’ concerns over the security of the 
identity within the system. 
3. System Judgement. Individuals’ views on the effectiveness of the 
system in tackling the stated problem. 
Chapter 7 presents the final study in this thesis, the organisation study. 
Analysing current implementations of N-IDMS in Brunei, UK, and India, the 
results of the study produced a framework that outlines organisations’ identity 
requirements, and the factors that affect the eventual design of the IDMS. The 
framework highlights the importance of purpose in defining the organisations 
identity requirements over identity creation and identity use. 
Chapter 8 presents a synthesis of the three studies into a single unified 
framework. Going back to the data, relationships between the three frameworks 
are identified. Ultimately, the organisation’s purpose and requirements will 
determine the structural and metrical design of the IDMS, which in turn will 
influence individuals’ perception, and the eventual lived experience.  
Chapter 9 details the verification of the research findings. Using expert 
evaluations of the unified framework, experts generally agree that the research 
being conducted is important, detailed, and overall useful to both practitioners 
and researchers 
Chapter 10 provides a simple illustration of how organisations can use the 
framework to produce true human-centred IDMS. This chapter also examines 
the use of the framework constructs to determine the economic impacts of a 
human-centred system. 
Chapter 11 concludes the thesis by outlining the contributions of the thesis that 
encourage researchers to move beyond traditional paradigms in the field. The 
practical implications for organisations’ practices are also reviewed. 
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Chapter(2:(History(of(NGIDMS(
“Registration and documentation of individual identity are essential if 
persons are to count in a world increasingly distant from face-to-face 
encounters characteristic of less complex societies.” (Caplan & Torpey, 
2001) 
Many countries today are currently investing in their N-IDMS infrastructure, 
migrating from old paper-based systems to digitally based implementations. 
While investigations into current efforts may reveal a wealth of useful 
information, history itself can shed light on the state of identity today. Delving 
into the history of identification techniques and applications reveals a long 
evolving set of schemes that were implemented for various purposes and with a 
wide-ranging set of consequences; as Caplan & Torpey (2001) point out, “the 
history of identifying practices has multiple origins and paths.”  
The purpose of this chapter is to uncover, through the review of secondary data 
sources, the stated purpose of the IDMS, and comparing it to the recorded 
outcomes and public reaction thus determining areas of further research. 
The following review is not limited to the notion of N-IDMS as ID cards for the 
whole population, but also covers other forms of government IDMS, such as 
passports and criminal systems. Further, the systems chosen for review (see 
Table 4) were selected to ensure that the review covered the major developments 
of government identity technologies in each of the themes uncovered; for 
example in the area of crime, this review followed the introduction of 
anthropometry, to dactyloscopy, as well as DNA. It should also be noted that the 
review was limited to the availability of secondary sources that could be used in 
the review; for example, language was a major barrier identified, limiting the 
sources of information to English based material. 
The review takes a thematic approach, by first highlighting the evolution of 
administrative process, followed by a review of important historical concepts 
that led to the eventual implementation of government IDMS (see Section 2.2). 
This is then compared and contrasted to a review of current themes that are 
affecting systems today (see Section 2.3). Where relevant, strands of surveillance 
theory are introduced to promote a more complete and rounded understanding 
of identity and government. Additionally, details of past and present 
identification schemes are provided as examples of each theme.  
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2.1 Representation!of!Identity!through!Time!
Identification is a dialectic process. It involves the transfer of information from 
one party to another; it is “an assertion of a truth” (Cameron, 2005). This 
implies the use of a common medium and language by which this claim to truth 
is made, i.e. the representation of the identity. There have been two major shifts 
that have affected the medium in which identification takes place; the first is the 
shift from oral practices to that of written forms of identity; the second, and 
currently on-going, is that of written identity to digital representations. 
2.1.1 (Evolution(of(Administration:(Oral(Memories(to(Written(Proofs(
One of the most prominent forces that have led to the development of N-IDMS is 
the establishment of formal modes of government administration; of particular 
interest are the mechanisms that support the functioning of bureaucratic 
processes. The centralisation of government administration, as well as its 
migration from the use of spoken language to that of written records, is one of 
the major historical turning points that began to shift weight onto the usefulness 
of an identity system (Groebner, 2001). 
In England, the rise of literacy and its application in business began in the 
eleventh century. Clanchy (1979) illustrates the increasing dominance of written 
records during this period, by providing an account of the number of surviving 
records available today; documents dating back to the Anglo-Saxon era number 
about 2000, while records dating to 13th century England number in the tens of 
thousands. It was during this time that a shift from oral traditions based on 
memory to written documentation began to occur, the advantage of the latter 
being its ability to capture events. 
The rule of King William during the 11th century is commonly considered a 
catalyst for the uses of documentation (Yates, 1966). Through the codification 
and compilation of law, reliance on documentation slowly began to take root. In 
prior oral customs, objects were commonly used to represent ownership. For 
example, a sword passed down through the generations might have represented 
ownership of land (Clanchy, 1979).  
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However, these symbolic objects were not very robust, as their meanings could 
easily be lost when dependent on verbal transmission (Clanchy, 1979). Soon, 
written charters replaced the old methods, as documents are more capable of 
preserving memory reliably over time. This in itself represented a form of 
identity, one that identifies the named individual as the owner of the land or 
object in question. 
Soon, documentation, and hence written forms of identification, spread to all 
levels of community (Clanchy, 1979); government required the names of 
villagers in order to collect tax; individuals required testimonials of their 
trustworthiness to enter counties or villages, while other certificates of identity 
might offer a person entitlements or protection: 
“Miles Earl of Hereford to all his friends, French and English, of 
England and of Wales, greeting. You are to know that this Folebarba 
is my jester and my man. So I entreat all my friends that they look 
after him, lest harm happen to him. And if anyone does him good for 
love of me, I will know how to thank him.” (John et al. 1964 in 
Clanchy, 1979) 
As this brief discussion has illustrated, the evolution of oral memories to written 
administration triggered a change in identifying practices. Names came to be 
recorded in writing, charters to represent ownership, and certificates as 
testimonials of trust and warrants of identity. Slowly, the use of written 
documents was eventually ‘perfected’ and elevated to its modern incarnation 
that we are familiar with today (e.g. passports, birth certificates). The 
introduction of new identifying techniques over the ages was in part driven by 
the need to keep identity practices up to date with administrative processes and 
ambitions. 
2.1.2 From(Analogue(to(Digital(
Eventually, technology was employed in service of this written structure of 
administration. However, as interactions in society have remained relatively 
unchanged (i.e. they are still dominated by face-to-face communication), the use 
of technology has always been that of a support mechanism for the written 
practices. This is no longer the case as today’s advancement opens new corridors 
of communication and interaction. 
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On the premise of greater efficiency and productivity, governments are 
embracing technology (Layne & Lee, 2001), and in the process are progressing 
from the analogue written records of the past towards the digitalisation of data 
and information. Thus, the movement towards digital administration will bring 
with it a shift from written to digital identity. 
Many governments have already begun to make use of digital identity 
documents, such as passports. Recent passport standards published by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) have spurred several countries 
to introduce passports that include digital fingerprints and photographs. In the 
wake of this, countries have begun to place restrictions on non-digital passports 
in the form of visa requirements that typically capture the required information 
in machine-readable form. Already, certain privileges are being taken away from 
those who do not hold a digital form of identity; without a machine-readable 
passport or waiver, entry into a country can be denied.  
Words on paper are no longer sufficient for today’s governments as they begin to 
automate and interact through technology. In order to fully embrace and 
interact with the new digital administration, individuals need to be able to 
represent themselves in digital form. This is the shift that governments are now 
experiencing and, as a result, identifying practices are evolving along with it. 2.2 Historical!Catalyst!to!Identity!Systems!
The current state of identity is built on the foundation of previous experiences in 
the field. A review of the literature in this area reveals that the present identity 
situation has been shaped by the need of service provision, the development of 
nation states, the increase in migration, and the problem of crime. The following 
provides an overview of these catalysts to past identity systems. 
2.2.1 Service(Provision:(Benefit(and(Service(Claim(
Identity is a construct that connects an individual to a social order, and enables 
that individual to interact with other people and organisations; what an 
individual can and cannot do is dictated by who he/she is in a given society. 
Successfully assuming a false identity provides an imposter with access to all 
sorts of activities and resources that can be extracted from society (see Davis, 
1983; Finlay, 1988, for detail of the 12-year impersontation of Martin Guerre, 
and how he was able to participate in society).  
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Table 4 List of IDMS reviewed, the main information collected, the identity record, the purpose, and outcomes 
System Information 
Collected 
Identity 
Record 
Purpose Outcome 
Poor Laws and 
Badges 
Group 
Affiliation 
Tokens Provide proof to licensed beggars Poor refused to come forward, feeling shame, and to prevent their 
children from being taken away. 
Criminal Wanted 
Lists 
Clothes Document Identification of known criminals Criminals evaded identification by using disguises. 
Russian 
Passports 
Residence Document Track and restrict movement of locals Attempts to flee country. 
Passports Nationality Document 
Database 
To prevent or monitor the entry of dangerous 
foreign radicals into the country 
Continued enrolment, to gain protection overseas. 
French Nomad 
Law 
 Travel History 
Anthropometry 
Document Monitoring of unwanted members of the 
population 
Abandonment of nomadic lifestyle. 
 
ID Cards  
UK (WW! and 
WWII) 
Nationality 
Photograph 
Document Rationing food to public ID card schemes were rejected for their ‘prussianizing’ qualities. 
ID Cards  
UK (today) 
Nationality 
Photograph 
Document 
Database 
Aid in the fight against terrorism, crime, illegal 
migration, and benefit fraud 
Protest by privacy groups. 
ID card scheme decommissioned in 2010. 
ID Cards  
Nazi Germany 
(WWII) 
Nationality 
Photograph 
Document To track and monitor individuals Population was exposed to “paralyzing” surveillance. 
Aided in the genocide of Jewish population. 
ID Cards 
Germany (today) 
Nationality 
Photograph 
Document 
Database 
Support e-Government goals Dangers of function creep and privacy invasions have been raised 
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System Information 
Collected 
Identity 
Record 
Purpose Outcome 
Schengen Nationality 
Photograph 
Document 
Database 
Stimulate freedom of movement within 
European Union 
Free flow of movement between EU countries 
Bertillonage Anthropometry  
Photograph 
Verbal Portrait 
Database Identify recidivists for sentencing Revolutionised criminal identification, but suffered from issues of 
subjectivity, and could not be used on women or children. 
In Argentina, public rejected the procedure which damaged ‘honour’. 
Dactyloscopy Fingerprint Database Identify recidivists 
Forensic investigation 
Warnings from experts about its fallibility, leading to the imprisonment 
of innocent 
US Visit 
Programme 
Fingerprint Database Identify criminals and terrorists entering or 
leaving the country 
Drop in the number of visitors as people feel unwelcomed 
Retaliation by Brazilian government (US citizen fingerprints) 
UAE Iris Scan Iris Database Identify banned individuals from the country High success rate in preventing re-entry of banned individuals 
Criminal DNA 
Database 
DNA Database Forensic investigation Global controversy of such schemes, which is seen as a significant breach 
of privacy. 
Contact Point Contact history Database Protection children at risk, before harm is 
caused 
Concern about government’s ability to protect personal information. 
PKI and Digital 
Signatures 
Nationality Document 
Database 
Provide individuals access to online services Limited adoption by the public. 
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It is to this end that society attempts to bridge the gap of uncertainty that lies 
between the claimed identity and the true identity. The depth to which the 
identity mechanism attempts to close this gap is dependent on what is at stake. 
Taking an example from Camp (2004), money can serve as a loosely binding 
identification token; the money a person holds allows him or her to trade it in 
for a product or service of perceived equal value. In other situations, the 
entitlement to certain benefits may not be as loose, and it is in these situations 
where identification procedures are critical, as the identity is repeatedly called 
into question. 
As the need for more accurate and verifiable representations arose, more robust 
identity procedures were developed, which involved more secure forms of 
registration, identification, authentication, and authorisation. In the process, the 
issue became drawn into bureaucratic forms of identity that enabled the growth 
of formal modes of government.  
Drawing parallels with the field of surveillance studies, the rise of bureaucracy is 
theorised to inflate surveillance practices (Lyon, 2002). Surveillance activities 
are built on the files of information about individuals, which allow organisations 
to perform rationalised calculated actions. While the initial forms of identity do 
not represent a mature bureaucratic body, it did plant the seeds for such 
officialdom.  
2.2.1.1 $Ancient$Egypt$and$the$distribution$of$allowance$
According to Ashbourn (2004), identity played a key role in the administration 
of food to the work force involved in the construction of the pyramids. To claim 
the entitled food allowance, each member of the workforce was required to 
present himself to the administrator in charge, state his identity verbally, and 
put forward his claim; food would be provided to an individual once the 
administrator was satisfied with the authenticity of an individual’s claim. 
However, it was not unheard of for individuals to attempt to obtain the 
allowance more than once. An identity scheme was needed to prevent these false 
claims from proceeding. 
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With this in mind, an identity system was developed that made use of a mixture 
of various biographical and biometrical information. As each claimant came 
forward, unique physical characteristics as well as behaviour were noted and 
verified against written records. Where there were no outstanding features, the 
system resorted to the use of anthropometric measurements (bodily 
measurements). Food allowance was only provided once the identity had been 
fully verified, thus putting an end to the false claims. 
2.2.1.2 Poor$Laws,$beggars$and$badges$
Poverty in England had become a major problem towards the end of the 16th 
century (Carroll, 1996). The growth of the population and inflation were major 
contributors to the situation. With the poorest being hardest hit, many 
individuals turned to begging for survival. Early responses to aiding the poor 
typically came from monastery support and sermons that tapped into the 
religious beliefs to provide aid. The authorities eventually took over the 
responsibility for supporting the poor. 
At this time, the authorities became concerned about the existence of sturdy 
beggars living among those who were genuinely poor (Carroll, 1996); these were 
fraudsters who preyed on charities by faking mutilation and disabilities. The 
authorities devised a system that licensed real beggars, and in doing so provided 
tokens that symbolised their right to beg and request for alms. 
However, many individuals refused to obtain a license. According to Hindle 
(2004), beggars were required to wear the badges at all times, inducing feelings 
of shame. Furthermore, children within the households were also forced to wear 
the badge, and could be removed from their families. Thus, individuals chose to 
resort to crime, making the situation worse than it originally had been. 
2.2.2 The&Development&of&Nation&States&and&Identification&Practices&
Other than service provision, the rise of nation states also had an impact on the 
identification practices of government. The enforcement of boundaries around a 
country and the attribution of individuals as belonging to a particular country 
only effectively came into being after World War II (Torpey, 2001). However, the 
late inception of nation states should not be mistaken as having only a small 
impact on the development of N-IDMS. The concept of rallying individuals to a 
particular cause, i.e. the country, creates a powerful mechanism that gives 
governments authority over individuals.  
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Prior to government involvement, identifying documents were provided by 
private entities such as churches, market organisations, and localities; these 
entities vouched for their members by providing documentation to ensure safe 
passage between geographically different places. In the Middle Ages, feudalism, 
serfdom, and slavery greatly supported this type of identity system (Torpey, 
2000). During these times of social ordering and segregation, the lower classes 
of society were ruled and controlled by their masters; landlords governed over 
the serfs who worked the land, while slaves were under the control of 
slaveholders. 
 However, as nation states developed, governments came to play a constantly 
increasing role in shaping the future of the country and all its inhabitants. The 
ambiguous nature of these nation states, at once “sheltering and dominating”, 
require the capability to establish the identities of the people residing within 
them (Torpey, 2000); the dual natured policies sought to capture identity for the 
sake of securing resources (human or otherwise), as well as to establish control 
over individuals, for their own safety and that of the country (Torpey, 2000). 
In attempting to embrace the population, governments began to take steps to 
retrieve control of the identification system. Early attempts made use of the 
available private infrastructure to keep tabs on the population. For example, 
France made use of parish registers to establish and recognise the civil identity 
of an individual (Noiriel & Laforcade, 1996). In Imperial Russia, metrical books 
(registers that held records of births, deaths and marriages) maintained by 
religious institutions remained the de facto identity mechanism until 1917 
(Steinwedel, 2001). However, these situations typically led to the undesirable 
exclusion of certain religious groups.  
Therefore, nation states created greater civic inclusion by reducing their 
dependence on third party identities. Nationality, and in some cases ethnicity, 
became the measure by which civil status was established. This created a more 
homogenous population in the eyes of the state despite the diversity of the 
public. The transformation produced “the levelling of the governed”, and the 
establishment of direct relationships between government and individual, both 
of which are signs of a modern state (Steinwedel, 2001; Weber, Roth, & Wittich, 
1978). Thus, the concept of nationality took centre stage, and citizens came to 
rely on the government to issue official identities, without which they would be 
lost within the society (Lips et al., 2005). 
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The field of surveillance studies has also touched on the role of nation states in 
the development of surveillance practices. In this field of research, surveillance 
is theorised to have arisen from military origins (Lyon, 2002). Citizenship rights 
are thought to be extended after wars, which concomitantly entail military 
surveillance measures. The military struggles led to the development of internal 
controls as nation states sought to embrace the local population, while 
protecting them from external harms. 
2.2.2.1 Nazi$Germany,$Vichy$France$and$national$identity$
Totalitarian regimes seek to establish strict control and order over society; 
exerting influence over every aspect of public life requires the regulation of 
individuals within the country. Typically built on the premise of nationalism and 
national rebirth, this emphasises the need on the part of the government to 
identify those who meet certain criteria that fits with the state’s vision.  
The government seeks to embrace the people it represents, while rejecting others 
who have no right to be there. Therefore, a totalitarian regime needs to develop 
rules and practices that ostracize problematic outsiders. Identification by 
nationality can form stronger bonds within society, while emphasising 
differences between target groups, thus drawing the public into the same 
thought pattern as that of the state. Those outside the group are made to be seen 
as a burden, and to possess a lower status.  
Another important step is to establish a set of controls over the outsiders. In 
order to expose them to an increased level of surveillance, the government needs 
to establish a strong net of identifying procedures that discriminates against 
outsiders, controlling their movements, and in some cases criminalizing them or 
their practices. It is through state-issued national identity documentations that 
socialist and communist countries can gain control over their people (Werth, 
2004). 
Under the rule of the totalitarian Nazi party, Germany introduced an N-IDMS 
that provided the government with control over the movement of the native 
population, while exposing individuals to an unprecedented level of surveillance 
(Fussell, 2004). The government maintained various registers that gave law 
enforcement and intelligence officer’s access to a wealth of information with 
which to carry out their task (Kempner, 1946). This level of surveillance allowed 
the state to quickly extinguish any signs of resistance while ensuring that 
everyone was working towards the government’s vision. 
  41 
The system was dependent on nationality and ethnicity, and served to 
“deindividualize, dehumanize and demonize” those whom the state considered 
to be un-worthy (Fussell, 2004). To this end, the government of Nazi Germany 
in 1938 began to mark the identity cards of Jews with a J-Stamp, enabling quick 
and easy identification; this eventually led to more visual forms of identification 
such as branding. This identity system separated the Jews from the rest of the 
population, allowing them to be constantly watched. It was also used as an aid in 
the genocide of the Jews and other minority groups residing in the German 
empire.  
This comprehensive identity system was installed in the various countries 
Germany occupied, such as Poland, Norway and France, among others. Again 
here the J-Stamp was applied to the Jewish population, aiding in the genocide 
that took place (Fussell, 2004). In Norway alone, 750000 Jews were identified 
and sent to the death camps. Following the defeat of France by Germany, the 
Vichy regime established the French identity system and card in 1940. The carte 
d'identité de Français, as it was known, was also used in the identification of 
Jews. In this case, up to 76000 people were deported to death camps. 
2.2.2.2 Great$Britain,$identity$cards$and$World$War$I$and$II$
Britain’s first experience with an N-IDMS was in World War I, when a National 
Register was quickly passed through parliament for the purpose of recording all 
persons between the age of 15 and 65 (Agar, 2001). While there was great debate 
as to the possible intention on the part of the government to use the system for 
conscription (Agar, 2001; Elliot, 2006), the implementation was eventually 
agreed upon, if only to establish the number of men who would be capable to 
take arms in times of need. Once the required statistics were generated, interest 
in the system waned and it was eventually abandoned. 
However, civil servants saw the potential value that such a system could offer 
during peaceful times, and set out guidelines that would ensure the continued 
relevance of an N-IDMS in times of calm. The government’s strategy was to 
provide the identity system a “parasitic value” (Public Record Office 1923 in 
Agar, 2001) in such a way that it penetrated and attached itself to the activities 
of normal civilian life. The government found an opportunity to create such a 
system during World War II. 
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The administration believed that tying the system to food rationing would 
ensure the survival of an identity system (Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1995). The requirement to produce identity cards to receive necessary supplies 
would motivate the public to keep hold of the card. This parasitic component 
helped to secure the relevance of the identity system well after the end of World 
War II. However, since food rationing could not serve to maintain public 
cooperation forever, the government attempted to attach the national register to 
the provision of health services (Agar, 2001; Flaherty, 1979).  
Eventually, much opposition arose to the identity card as the public and media 
began to rally against the government. The Wilcock case proved to be the 
beginning of the end for the identity cards, in which John Wilcock refused to 
produce his identity card when randomly stopped by officers (Agar, 2005). The 
media and public viewed the system as prussianizing, and requests of 
identification by police unacceptable. The case was brought to court where the 
judged sided with Wilcock. The N-IDMS was decommissioned shortly after.  
2.2.3 Migration&
Nations are imagined communities, in which memberships are territorial in 
nature (B. Anderson, 1991). As modern states began to take shape, governments 
began to assume greater control over the movements of people in their territory; 
this was necessary in assuring social and civil stability within the country.  
The main tool in designating a trans-national legible citizen (Scott, 1998) is the 
passport. A passport allows an individual to establish his/her identity and 
nationality, thus providing the right to move and receive assistance from the 
government. More importantly, passports provide the government with a means 
to prevent or stimulate the departure of its citizens, to identify and control alien 
movement, as well as enabling surveillance of the population (Lucassen, 2001).  
Internal passports (see 2.2.3.1), precursors to the current passport system, were 
typically issued in times of serfdom and slavery; they were distributed to control 
the movement of the lower classes within the country (Garcelon, 2001). These 
documents were eventually abolished as people were given their freedom, and as 
capitalism replaced feudalism, government thus recognised the value of mobile 
individuals (Torpey, 2001).  
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However, passport documentation soon reappeared in the early stages of the 
nineteenth century, during which the revolutionary climate posed a threat to 
many countries stability. Passport controls were introduced to identify and 
prevent the entry of dangerous aliens (Lucassen, 2001). Thus, new regulations 
were enforced on foreigners; they were required to possess a passport from their 
country of origin, as well as a visa issued by the country of entry.  
Eventually, the political climate shifted towards a more liberal attitude with 
respect to the movement of people. Again, as with internal passports, influence 
came from economic liberalism; suspicions towards foreigners were replaced by 
the recognition of potential value (Torpey, 2001). It was during this period that 
Europe saw the abolition of passport and visa obligations as the region entered a 
period of identity lassiez faire (Lucassen, 2001; Noiriel & Laforcade, 1996).  
However, this open-door policy on movement came to an end during World War 
I. Identity requirements that had been loosened before were now reinforced, and 
were stronger than ever. For example, passports were not only required to enter 
Germany, but also required by those wishing to leave the empire (Torpey, 2001). 
Therefore, with a revised purpose, the new identification documents were not 
only enforced on immigrants but also the entire local population. Unlike 
previous passport controls, these policies continued to remain in effect after the 
war, as states were faced with other burdens, such as welfare provision, during 
peacetime. 
After World War I, states assumed greater responsibility in the economic 
domain (Lucassen, 2001). The development of welfare states is one of the 
reasons why the rigid document controls on identity and movement remained 
(Lucassen, 1998). Armed with an interest in the socioeconomic welfare of the 
people, countries were concerned about the influx of poor immigrants. To 
protect the local work force, passport controls were used to regulate the entrance 
of aliens into the national labour markets. Additionally, identity records were 
important in distinguishing between nationals who had a right to aid from the 
government, and immigrants who were likely to be sent back home. Thus, the 
threats faced from migration spurred the need for tighter controls, and hence 
shaped passport documents to the form that we have become familiar with 
today. 
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Surveillance theories relating to the military struggles of a nation state are 
evident here. The development of the passport controls to prevent dangerous 
individuals from entering countries elucidated here can be related to efforts in 
obtaining information about enemies (Lyon, 2002). Theories surrounding the 
political economy stream of surveillance practices are also visible, where 
surveillance is carried out to enforce the interest of one class of people over 
another. While typically applied to surveillance in the private sectors, it is still 
relevant here. The capitalistic grounds of the political economy, and the sorting 
of consumers (i.e. the differentiation between nationals and non-nationals) are 
present in the development of welfare states. 
2.2.3.1 Russian$internal$passport$system$
Serfdom in Russia was only abolished in 1861. Up to this time, peasants were 
subject to a multitude of laws that reinforced the feudalistic social order 
(Matthews, 1993). The government required mechanisms that would enable it to 
control and extract wealth from the country’s largely serf population. The 1649 
code of laws enacted local registers that tied peasants to a given estate. Under 
this law, anyone who was caught leaving the assigned land would be sent back 
(Eltis, 2002).  
However, faced with the continuing prospect of serfs reneging on their 
obligations (paying tax, serving in the army, etc.), Peter the Great introduced 
internal passports (Matthews, 1993). Anyone who was travelling needed to be in 
possession of travel documents to be presented at police posts for inspection; 
serfs required written permission from the landowner, stating the intended 
destination and the duration of travel. Coupled with the high price in acquiring 
these passports, the identity system effectively removed serfs’ right to 
movement. 
The actual success of this system is difficult to assess, and records show that a 
large number of manhunts were launched to find individuals who evaded the 
system due to the extreme demands of the law (Matthews, 1993). The abolition 
of serfdom in 1861 did provide some individuals with freedom, but did not see 
the removal of internal passport controls. A relaxation of rules only occurred 
towards the end of the 19th century, as governments attempted to stimulate 
economic growth by mobilizing work forces (Eltis, 2002). 
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2.2.3.2 Dutch$passport$system$1813$J$1860$
The French revolution under Napoleon came to an end in 1813. However, the 
instability that was still present in France after its defeat was considered to be a 
threat, and it became necessary to cordon this off with strong states. The Dutch 
Kingdom was formed through this need, and the implementation of the Dutch 
passport system was designed to monitor, control and prevent the influx of 
revolutionists and their ideas (Lucassen, 2001). 
Under this system, any aliens entering the country were required to be in 
possession of a passport. The government’s practices in selectively enforcing the 
system illustrated that this was a tool designed to target a particular population; 
French citizens experienced the full force of the passport measures and controls, 
while British nationals were treated much more leniently. The British 
government at the time did not issue passports to its citizens, yet the Dutch 
admitted British citizens into the country (Lucassen, 2001). 
The revolutionary climate slowly dissipated in the mid-nineteenth century. This 
also coincided with the economic liberalization in the European region. With the 
French no longer being considered a threat to society, the emphasis was now on 
the potential value of immigrants (Torpey, 2001). Therefore, as it was no longer 
in the government’s interest to stop movement of people, the passport 
requirements were abolished in the 1860s. However, records show that many 
people continued to enrol and make use of the passport system despite its 
abolition, as the passports allowed them to access protection and services within 
foreign countries (Lucassen, 2001). 
2.2.3.3 French$nomad$law$
In the early 20th century, the French began to show an increasingly negative 
attitude towards the nomadic population within the country. Public disapproval 
hit lows when people began to stereotype gypsies, associating them with socially 
unacceptable behaviour. The French government sought to control the situation 
by introducing methods that confined the movement of the nomads. It was 
hoped in this way to eliminate the gypsies through social integration 
(Kaluszynski, 2001). 
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The French Nomad Law of 1912 was developed for this purpose. The 
discriminatory nature of the law is revealed in the different categories of nomads 
that were posited. Despite the fact that travelling showmen shared the same 
mobility as gypsies, the showmen faced reduced obligations and penalties. For 
example, travelling showmen were only required to have an occupational 
identity card when travelling. Gypsies, on the other hand, were to obtain 
anthropometric identity passes that recorded physical characteristics (to capture 
their criminal otherness) of all members in the travelling group (Kaluszynski, 
2001). 
Gypsies were required to present these anthropometric passes to local law 
officials on arrival or departure from a community. Failure to abide by the law 
was met with severe fines and punishment. This was particularly problematic as 
local officials were given the authority to allow or disallow anyone to camp 
within their commune. The pass represented a powerful instrument of control to 
the government.  
Fuelled by public distrust towards gypsies, the law remained in effect for over 20 
years. In this time, the identity system was used successfully in persuading part 
of the gypsy population to give up their nomadic lifestyle. However, others who 
continued their lifestyle began to move more frequently due to the new 
restrictions (Kaluszynski, 2001).  
2.2.4 Crime&and&Law&Enforcement&
Crime has always been a major catalyst in the development of identification 
techniques. Throughout medieval Europe, criminal identification mainly 
involved the use of physical descriptions to aid in the capture of criminals (see 
2.2.4.1); tactics for subsequent identification of known criminals include the use 
of branding, which, while cheap and effective, posed problems for social 
integration (Cole, 2001). Specifically, the visibility and irreversibility of the 
method prevented criminals from being integrated into society. For example, 
branding was abandoned in England because “it had not had its desired effect 
by deterring offenders from the further committing of crimes and offences, but 
on the contrary, such offenders, being rendered thereby unfit to be entrusted in 
any service or employment to get their livelihood in any honest or lawful way” 
(Pike 1873, in Braithwaite, 1989).  
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While the abolition of branding was a success for human rights, it created 
problematic situations for law enforcement. With no effective means to re-
identify criminals, authorities were faced with problems of recidivism 
(Kaluszynski, 2001). Where first offenders were to be rehabilitated and 
reintegrated into society, re-offenders were to be severely punished, and perhaps 
even segregated from the rest of society. The removal of branding gave first 
offenders better chances of social reintegration, but created problems in 
identifying recidivists who should have been given harsher punishments. 
Some studies have attempted to use physical indicators to identify an individual 
as a criminal; it was assumed that criminals had a biological disposition to 
commit unlawful acts, and that this criminal nature would manifest itself 
physically (Cole, 2001; Gibson, 2002; Lombroso & Horton, 1911). In a way, this 
was a way of identifying group membership rather than specific identity. Suffice 
to say that this line of identification did not produce any valid results. Cole 
(2001) cites the example of all people with pointy-heads facing the wrath of the 
law as a possible consequence of this type of thinking. As such, the authorities 
were in desperate need of methods that would allow them to identify individual 
recidivists. 
It was with respect to this belief that bertillonage and dactyloscopy were 
developed and applied. While anthropometry achieved some initial success in 
law enforcement, its reliability was questioned as it necessarily involved 
subjective human judgements in the capture of identity (see 2.2.4.2). Eventually, 
Dactyloscopy trumped the anthropometric solution as it produced results in a 
more consistent and accurate fashion (see 2.2.4.3). Additionally, a shift in the 
focus of identification took place. Police responsibilities grew, from only having 
to identify recidivists to include the identification of criminals who were present 
at the scene of the crime. Dactyloscopy was crucial in allowing law enforcement 
officials to carry out this task. 
2.2.4.1 Physical$description$of$individuals$
As individuals in the Middle Ages started moving around between various 
communes, the identification of particular persons became problematic; at the 
time, people were reliant on personal experiences with an individual to construct 
the relevant identity (Clanchy, 1979). Therefore, it was necessary to fill this gap 
in the identification of dangerous individuals, who would otherwise remain 
unknown, as he/she would move around between different communities.  
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In the early medieval period, portraits and descriptions were used to fill this 
identification gap (Groebner, 2001). Typical of these early times were the 
distribution of criminal wanted lists to various communes in the hopes of 
revealing the true identity of the individual to the rest of society and also aiding 
law enforcement. The system was a mixed success as criminals devised 
techniques to counter the identification procedures. Early implementations 
made use of attire as the main descriptors, as clothes were expensive and 
difficult to come by. However, this meant that such individuals could evade 
identification by obtaining new clothes or donning disguises (Groebner, 1999).  
2.2.4.2 France,$recidivism$and$Bertillonage$
Held in the grip of crime and recidivism, the authorities of 19th century France 
required a means of recognising repeat criminals so as to apply harsher 
punishments (Gibson, 2002). At the time, the police used photographs to 
identify criminals who had been previously arrested. As these photographs were 
stored and sorted by name, criminals easily circumvented detection by providing 
a false name. Recognising this, Alphonse Bertillon set out to create a criminal 
identification system based on a scientific verification of identity (Kaluszynski, 
2001). 
 The resulting system, bertillonage, made use of a tripartite system; capturing 
the identity of a criminal resulted in a Bertillon card that contained 11 
anthropometric measurements (i.e. scientific measurements of the human 
body), physical descriptions, and photographs (Cole, 2001). The main advantage 
of the Bertillon system came from the anthropometric measurements that were 
used in the filling system. Sorting through records now involved the precise 
matching of an individual’s bodily measurements, which he/she could not lie 
about (Kaluszynski, 2001). The system revolutionised the field of criminal 
identification field, and was eventually implemented in several other countries. 
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However, Bertillonage was eventually abandoned, as it was incredibly 
complicated to take anthropometric measurements, requiring expensive 
precision equipment, and extensive training (Kaluszynski, 2001). Yet 
measurements and descriptions still contained subjective elements, such as 
descriptions of the eyes or in the estimating measurements. Furthermore, 
criminals could force errors in measurements through movement, such as the 
bending of the back or the arching of the foot (Joseph, 2001). The system was 
not applicable to women (due to physiological changes such as pregnancy), and 
children (who have yet to mature, and hence were still growing).  
Bertillonage also face much opposition in Argentina, as the recording of 
measurements was seen as an attack on an individual’s honour, which is 
described as “the highest level of the human personality” (Ruggiero, 2001). 
Resistance against the system was so strong that the identity records were 
regularly destroyed, even the records of criminals who had completed their 
sentence. This completely undermined the aim of the system to identify 
recidivists. 
2.2.4.3 Forensics,$criminal$investigation$and$Dactyloscopy$
The Bertillonage system of identification was short lived; the advantage of the 
filing system, and therefore the effectiveness of the identification process, soon 
appeared in other identification technologies. Dactyloscopy, a fingerprinting 
method, stored and retrieved identity records in a more logical and economical 
manner (Ruggiero, 2001). Dactyloscopy also reduced the subjectivity involved in 
the capture of the identity; the use of ink and paper to create rolled fingerprints, 
which “presented a literal physical trace of the body”, and provided the system 
with a perceived mechanical objectivity (Cole, 2001; Daston & Galison, 1992; 
Finn, 2005).  
However, the true advantage of dactyloscopy lay in its forensic ability, extending 
its potential uses beyond those of Bertillonage; dactyloscopy not only allowed for 
positive identification of recidivists, but also provided authorities with forensic 
evidence that tied individuals to crime scenes.  
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The first recorded case of the forensic use of fingerprints came from Argentina in 
1892 (Lee & Gaensslen, 1991). The local dactyloscopy advocate, Vucetich, was 
able to link a bloody fingerprint of Francisa Rojas to the crime scene of her 
murdered children. She eventually pleaded guilty under the weight of the 
evidence (Ruggiero, 2001). In 1898, the East India Company used dactyloscopy 
in a murder case investigation; the judge here deemed the evidence as enough to 
charge the party for trespassing and burglary, but claimed that the presence of 
the fingerprint was not proof of (Cole, 2001).  
While fingerprint identification is still practiced widely today, recent studies 
have shown that fingerprint identification is not as infallible as most people 
believe it to be. A high error rate is prominent among practitioners comparing 
fingerprints, especially those retrieved from crime scenes. These errors have 
been found to result in the imprisonment of innocent individuals (Cole, 2004). 
Investigating the murder of Marion Ross in 1997, the Scottish law authorities 
found fingerprint evidence that linked one Mr Asbury to the crime; this was 
eventually used in court where he was found guilty. More importantly, 
investigations also found fingerprints in the home that belonged to one Shirley 
McKie, who at the time was an officer on the case (BBC, 2000a). McKie 
maintained that she did not enter the victim’s house, and so could not have left 
the fingerprint; if this were true, it would call into question the evidence against 
Asbury. Following this McKie was suspended, fired, and charged with perjury. 
Although McKie was acquitted two years later, it took her to 9 years in court 
actually get compensation in 2006, where the authorities still maintained that 
no error was made. A formal public inquiry was completed in 2011 which 
dismissed conspiracy issues that were raised throughout the ordeal as 
“misidentifications due to weaknesses in the methodology” (Campbell, 2011) ; 4 
fingerprint experts working for the Scottish authorities all made positive 
identifications of McKie’s fingerprints, while external experts claimed that it 
wasn’t. 
In the case of the 2004 Madrid bombings, FBI detained Brandon Mayfield on 
the account that his fingerprints matched those found at the scene; “a 100% 
verified” match (Isikoff & Pape, 2004; Murr, 2004). As a result, Mayfield spent 
17 days in detention until Spanish law enforcement forced the FBI to admit its 
mistake, as the Spanish investigators matched the fingerprints to the true 
perpetrator.  
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2.3 Modern*Parallels*to*Historical*Contexts*
Identity systems are continuously evolving; parallels can be drawn between the 
historical influences on identity and the current forces that shape today's 
systems. The developments in administrative procedures, the creation of virtual 
borders, as well as the emphasis on crime prevention and human rights can be 
traced back to the historical roots reviewed above. The following provides an 
overview of current themes. 
2.3.1 eCGovernment&and&Virtual&Borders&
Identity has always been important in the provision of benefits and services (see 
2.2.1). However, citizens of today are more mobile than ever before and have 
become dependent on the modern forms of communication to gain access to 
information and services. One of the goals of e-Government is the provision of 
services through the Internet. This new emphasis on online services requires 
new mechanisms for the identification of individuals; in order to operate in this 
digital medium, individuals need the ability to adequately represent themselves 
in the digital world.  
A digital identity is required; one that will empower individuals, allowing them 
to assert their identity in a virtual environment, thus enabling them to access 
and claim services to which they have a right. 
Taylor, Lips, & Organ (2006) have gone a step further, highlighting the 
similarity between the digital paradigm of e-Government and the historical use 
of identity documents in controlling access to countries’ borders. Where the 
paper controls in the analogue world allowed individuals to enter and leave the 
country, a digital identity allows a government to restrict access within a digital 
setting. The equivalent of border checks would be the log in mechanisms 
required to access websites and online services. In this way, digital mechanisms 
control access to virtual territories, extending the government borders beyond 
the physical realm of a country’s boundaries. 
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From a surveillance theory perspective, the shift in government administration 
and identification practices stems from the disembodiment of everyday 
interactions (Lyon, 2002). The earlier shift from oral to written records was the 
first act that contributed to the disappearing of bodies that allowed interactions 
to transcend space and time (see 2.1.1). The electronic medium allows 
individuals to further leap past these boundaries. Organisations therefore 
capture digital identities to extend their range and surveillance in order to 
establish and confirm their relationship to individuals who are not present. 
2.3.1.1 The$Belgian$eID$
The roll out of the Belgian eID scheme to nine million individuals began in 2004 
(London School of Economics, 2005) . Replacing the previous paper-based 
system in place since 1919, the main focus of the new shift was to provide 
citizens with a secure channel through which to perform online transactions 
(Cock, Wouters, & Preneel, 2004) . The government also believes that the new 
platform, with added security, is essential in providing a more open, transparent 
and responsive administration (Cock et al., 2004). In order to fulfil these goals, 
the eID system made use of digital certificates in their identity cards, making 
Belgium the first country in Europe to do so (Cock, Wolf, & Preneel, 2006). 
Comparing the eID implementation to the previous paper-based mechanism 
reveals that the information being collected remains unchanged, while the data 
stored on the chip reflects the data that lies on the face of the card, with the 
added digital signatures to support the new online environments. All the data 
being collected is stored in a central registry, as has been the case since 1919. 
Additionally, individuals are given the choice to opt out of the digital signing 
scheme.  
Statistics on the actual usage of the eID for online services are scarce. A recent 
study has revealed that 44% of the working population has made use of eID from 
home (Grommen, 2009; Indigov, 2009; De Morgan, 2009). The study also 
states that there is limited adoption of the card in the workplace, while the 
digital signature capabilities are very rarely used at all (Mariën & Audenhove, 
2010). Lack of e-readers at work is argued to be a main factor, with only an 
estimated 18.8% of all workers having access to the devices. Complexity of the 
software required and the lack of awareness on the uses of the eID, such as the 
validity of the digital signatures, were also highlighted as possible reasons for the 
poor rate of adoption. 
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2.3.1.2 Austrian$Citizen$Card$
Austria is one of the forerunners of e-government in Europe. To facilitate its 
vision for the provision of online services, the government needed a system that 
would support citizen identification and interaction of services in a digital 
environment. The concept of the Austrian Citizen Card was defined to fill this 
role (Leitold & Posch, 2004). 
The Citizen Card, contrary to its name, is not a single physical card. It is in fact a 
set of ideas, standards, and requirements that have been developed to support 
digital identification and authentication (Arora, 2008); it outlines mechanisms 
for secure identification numbers and digital signatures. To protect privacy, 
separate identity numbers are generated for each sector that an individual 
interacts with; there are 26 sectors in total (tax, health, education, etc.), each of 
which uses a different identifier per individual. 
By focusing on the high level details instead of specific technology 
implementations, the government has created a highly flexible and inter-
operable platform. Individuals can obtain Citizen Cards from a number of 
providers, and choose to load them onto various devices that include official 
government eCards, Bank ATM cards, and even mobile phones (Arora, 2008). 
The Austrian model is often highly regarded, and is seen as a benchmark for 
other countries intending to implement digital identification procedures.  
However, recent studies have shown a low rate of adoption; by early 2009, only 
74,000 individuals had activated their digital identities and signatures (Martens, 
2010). This represents 0.9% of the overall Austrian population, a very slight 
increase of about 0.2% from the year ending 2005 (Meints & Hansen, 2006). A-
Trust, an Austrian certification service provider, attributes the lack of adoption 
to the complexity, cost and lack of benefit from an individual’s point of view 
(Sokolov, 2006a, 2006b). 
2.3.2 Digital&Nations&
The development of nation states was a crucial turning point in the development 
of modern identity infrastructure. Based on law of the soil or law of the blood 
(Lips et al., 2005) that designates people according to the land of their birth or 
heritage, nationality forms an important part of a person’s identity today. 
Without such a government-sanctioned identity, life for a citizen can be quite 
difficult. Access to benefits, privileges and protection is severely limited; in this 
way, governments establish authority over their people. 
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According to Lips et al. (2005), the universal access of services by citizens may 
be at risk from the technological developments happening in the realm of 
identity. The creation and use of digital identity may lead to a new law of 
information that presides over the status of citizenship. Technological 
developments, coupled with the wide availability of citizen information, give 
governments the ability to sort citizens, enabling segmentation in the provision 
of service (Lyon, 2007), effectively altering the relationship between citizen and 
the state (Lips et al., 2005). 
In the past, attempts to establish authority over the entire population required 
that governments broke free from the private institutions that controlled identity 
(Steinwedel, 2001). This created a homogenous population in the eyes of the 
government. The population of today is now at risk of being segregated again; 
now this will be based on the information that can be linked to each individual, 
rather than attributes such as religious affiliation. 
This fragmentation of society further echoes the bureaucratic theories of 
surveillance, where organisations seek to carry out rational calculable actions 
(Lyon, 2002). Identity and information provide governments with this 
rationalising ability, splitting the population into different groups on the basis of 
their digital persona, and hence attempting to predict the needs of individuals 
on the basis of group membership. 
2.3.2.1 UK$identity$card$scheme$
The British government has recently scrapped its attempt to re-introduce an N-
IDMS (BBC, 2008a). As with the insecurity of World War I and II justifying the 
need for such cards in the past, the latest push for an N-IDMS was driven by 
security issues such as terrorism, organised crime, illegal immigration, and 
benefit fraud. 
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In reviewing the scheme, Agar (2005) claims that the plan for the new N-IDMS 
had little parasitic value that would ensure the usefulness of the system during 
periods of calm. However, the possibility for the system to penetrate the various 
avenues of everyday life is realised when analysing the number of issues that the 
system is supposed to tackle. Function creep was one of the major arguments 
that privacy advocates raised in opposition to the implementation (London 
School of Economics, 2005). This danger is very real, and begins when the 
identity is requested by a large number of organisations. The N-IDMS would 
become a vital part of the country’s infrastructure, seeping into the daily 
activities of everyday life. It is this function creep that, if unchecked, will provide 
the system its parasitic value, thus ensuring that life without it could come to a 
halt. 
The plan to introduce a new N-IDMS has faced mass opposition from privacy 
advocates, as well as resistance from the general public. With a recent change in 
government, the current coalition party has scrapped plans for the system (BBC, 
2010a). 
2.3.2.2 German$eID$and$the$legacy$of$a$totalitarian$past$
While the totalitarian Nazi regime was eventually defeated, its downfall did not 
bring with it the complete abolition of the identity system. German laws forbid 
the government from creating a central system to store biometric information 
(London School of Economics, 2005). Information is stored at local registration 
offices, and then destroyed once an identity card is produced. The system does 
not assign unique identity numbers to its citizens, nor can the serial numbers of 
identity cards be used as an identifier (Kubicek & Noack, 2010b). This prevents 
the potential function creep of the information, reducing chances of it being 
abused. 
Another step that has been taken to prevent potential abuse of the system is the 
removal of group affiliation. The current German N-IDMS does not collect or 
store any information dealing with race or religion. This precaution can also be 
seen in other countries, especially in Europe. Fussell (2004) has noted that other 
countries are taking steps to abolish group classification in their national 
identity systems, including Greece, Georgia, Indonesia and Russia, among 
others. 
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Current efforts in the country are focused on the introduction of digital identity 
cards that make use of RFID chips and that can facilitate online transactions. 
The system will make use of pseudonyms that will be uniquely generated per 
card, per service (Banse, 2008; Bender, 2008; Birch, 2009). This is similar to 
the Austrian approach in the use of sector specific identity numbers, providing a 
layer of security by preventing the tracking of individuals across different public 
and private spheres. A point of controversy in the planning of the system was the 
mandatory provision of fingerprints; after much debate, the final decision was to 
make fingerprinting an optional opt-in scheme as an aid for travel (Noack & 
Kubicek, 2010). 
2.3.2.3 Greek$ID$cards$
While Greece does not have a digital N-IDMS, its recent reduction of its 
information collection practices for its paper-based system is worth noting. The 
situation faced by the Greek government is unique when compared to 
experiences encountered in other countries, as the public backlash it 
experienced occurred for atypical reasons.  
All citizens of Greece who are 14 years of age or older are required to report to 
the police station to register for a paper-based National Identity card (London 
School of Economics, 2005). Citizens are required to carry the cards at all times, 
and since the police have the power to demand the card for inspection, failure to 
do so could lead to detention until proof of identity has been established 
(Fontana, 2003). All data collected is stored in a centralised database under the 
control and protection of the police. 
Traditionally, the process of enrolment in Greece requires the collection of a 
large amount of personal information, including an individual’s fingerprints, 
spouse’s name and religion. All this information is printed on the card face, 
including the unique identity number. In 1993 the government passed a ruling 
that citizens are no longer required to declare their religious beliefs. However, 
this move to reduce data collection and protect privacy was met with resistance; 
thousands of people came together to rally against the new ruling (BBC, 2000b). 
With 97% of the population being members of the Orthodox Church, the 
religious declaration is argued to be a symbol of pride and a dedication to their 
faith (LoBaido, 2000).  
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Despite resistance, the government proceeded to abolish religious affiliation 
from the system; this was done to prevent discrimination against the minority 
who are not of the same faith. Along with religion, the government has stopped 
collecting fingerprints, as well as information on spouses, profession and 
residential address (London School of Economics, 2005).  
2.3.3 Globalization&and&Travel&
The role of identity in migration today has been largely shaped by the events of 
World War I (Lucassen, 1998). However, recent economic developments have 
seen a relaxation of the tight controls on identity controls and movement of 
people. In Europe, for example, the Schengen agreement has abolished the need 
for border checks in the European region (see 2.3.3.1). This has allowed people 
from the participating countries to move freely across borders. Other efforts in a 
similar vein include Trusted Traveller programs that allow individuals to pass 
through immigration points easily (see 2.3.3.2). To a certain degree, this mirrors 
the freedom of movement between countries that was witnessed during the pre-
World War I era. 
In contrast to this freedom of movement, countries are also taking measures to 
prevent the entry of unwanted individuals, and controls are even stronger than 
they were in the past (see 2.2.3). Again, here governments impose limitations 
with the intention of protecting the local population. The UAE bans foreigners 
from re-entry if they break the law while in the country (see 2.3.3.2), while other 
countries expose travellers to high levels of security to prevent or track the entry 
and exit of potentially dangerous criminals and terrorists (see 2.3.3.4). 
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2.3.3.1 Schengen$agreement$
The European Union has been steadily working on increasing collaboration 
between countries within the region. Driven by political, economic and social 
concerns, agreements have been made to facilitate free movement between 
participating parties. Under the Schengen agreement, border checks between the 
countries would be eliminated, aiding in the development of large markets in a 
union of rich states (T. Bauer & Zimmermann, 1997). To date, 25 European 
nation states comply with the agreement, allowing individuals to travel between 
each country using only an identity card (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) (European 
Commission Home Affairs, 2010). 
Citizens from Schengen countries are not required to carry passports within the 
Schengen zone. However, if needs be, the agreements allow for identity cards 
from each respective country to be used as a proof of identity. Entries of foreign 
nationals into the EU zone pass through border checks, and still face passport 
controls. Once through border control, freedom of movement within the 
Schengen zone is typically granted. Identification information about individuals 
and property relating to external border security and law enforcement is stored 
in the Schengen Information System that is shared between countries (Lettice, 
2005). 
2.3.3.2 UK$–$IRIS$immigration$system$
At the original time of this writing in early 2010, the United Kingdom Border 
Agency had iris recognition systems at certain border checkpoints. However, an 
update as of January 2012, the Border Agency website states that “all enrolment 
rooms in [the] 'IRIS scheme definition document' has been superseded - all 
enrolment rooms are currently closed” (UK Border Agency, 2012). While the 
system is still working for those already enrolled, it may signal that the iris 
system may be decommissioned in favour for facial recognition, which is briefly 
discussed in this section. 
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The aim of the IRIS system was to provide timesaving and convenience to 
individuals who are exempt from immigration controls, visa holders, as well as 
frequent flyers to the UK. It is a voluntary scheme, and is offered free of charge 
to those who are eligible. The system is designed such that travellers present 
their iris at the gate, which is then checked against all iris pattern stored in a 
database in a one-to-many matching operation. 
Individuals making use of the system have reported bad experiences when using 
the iris system. Reports indicate false rejection rates at the barriers of up to 
3.57% (Biometric Technology Today, 2007). 
The UK Border agency has also been testing the use of facial recognition systems 
since 2008, and has now installed the system in 10 different airports across the 
country. The system is open to all citizens of European Economic Area countries, 
who hold biometric passports; the system works by automatically comparing 
individuals face to that stored on the chip of the passport. Usage statistics and 
satisfaction rates are currently unavailable; however an incident in February 
2011 caused the border agency to suspend use of the machines for 3 days. A 
couple had been able to clear and walk through the automated the gates, despite 
having mistakenly swapped passports with one another; the issue was only 
spotted because an immigration officer was supervising the gates at the 
particular time (BBC, 2011b). 
2.3.3.3 UAE$J$iris$recognition$
One of the recent challenges that the United Arab Emirates government faced 
was the re-entrance of expelled individuals into the country. Before the current 
system, border control relied on the use of biographical information for security; 
identification documents were crosschecked against a database of blacklisted 
individuals. However, deported individuals returned to the UAE with new 
passports containing altered information, thus allowing them to avoid detection 
(Rosenzwig, Kochems, & Schwartz, 2004). 
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The UAE government chose to make use of iris recognition as a means of 
overcoming the drawback of the previous system (Al-Raisi & Al-Khouri, 2008). 
Deployed in 2003, the system was designed such that there was a central 
database holding the iris patterns of all expelled individuals; 751 individuals as 
of 2006 (Al-Raisi & Al-Khouri, 2008). Entry borders were equipped with iris 
scanners that would cross check the individuals to find a match in the database. 
It is claimed that the system has yet to produce any false positives; processing 
2.7 billion comparisons per day, the system has prevented the re-entry of 9,500 
persons (Kabatoff & Daugman, 2008). 
2.3.3.4 US$VISIT$program$
In response to the 9/11 terror attacks, the United States government sought to 
secure the integrity of their immigration system, by apprehending or tracking 
dangerous individuals as they entered the country. The system was officially 
deployed in 2004 at over 150 different sites (EPIC, 2007). The system has been 
plagued with problems since its inception. 
One of the biggest concerns was the system’s dependence on fingerprints, and 
the amount of function creep to which the fingerprints are susceptible. 
Originally intended for the verification of visas, the system did not make use of 
any biometric information, and kept inter-agency interaction to minimal. After 
the terror attacks, biometrics were introduced, and the programme eventually 
expanded to cover all individuals travelling to the US (Privacy International, 
2004). Additionally, the information collected by the US VISIT program is now 
cross checked against various other systems (criminal databases, etc.) for which 
it was never intended. 
During its operation in 2005, 150 complaints of errors were filed, including 
aircrew members who had already successfully passed background checks 
(EPIC, 2007). As of 2006, the media has reported that the US-Visit scheme has 
only caught one terror related suspect since its inception (Morgan, 2006). 
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Furthermore, governments and members of the general public consider the 
system to be discriminatory. The Brazilian government has retaliated by setting 
up systems that would require the fingerprinting of all US visitors to Brazil 
(BBC, 2003). Local US businesses have also expressed worry about the effects of 
current extensions or problems of the US VISIT program (San Antonio Express, 
2008). A recent report claims that the US saw an 11% drop in visitors since 2000 
(Collis, 2008); the security procedures in place are believed to be one of the 
contributing factors: individuals do not feel welcomed as they are treated like 
suspects on arrival.  
2.3.4 Proactive&Criminal&Investigation&
Identification for the purposes of law enforcement has typically been driven by 
the need for greater accuracy for individual identification. However, new 
techniques like that of DNA typing “is that plus much more” (Cole, 2001), 
adding capabilities to identify group affiliation and hereditary conditions. The 
possibility of linking individuals to group affiliation allows authorities to 
generate more complete portraits of the individuals in question. 
Recently, the British government has been considering the possible use of DNA 
as a tool for identifying nationality (Lettice, 2007). However, this is impossible, 
given that nationality is not a biological trait but an artificial grouping of 
individuals into a community (B. Anderson, 1991); it can be assigned and 
revoked to individuals from a variety of backgrounds, making DNA matching to 
nationality unfeasible. 
Other developments of government and identity assert more proactive 
approaches in trying to keep track of identity and potential criminals. For 
example, the British government has been discussing the option of introducing a 
database of children who exhibit behaviour that might possibly signal criminal 
behaviour later on in life (Every Child Matters, 2007). National children 
databases would allow authority figures that come into contact with children to 
report on their behaviour and conduct. This then allows for the tracking of 
unwanted behaviour that might eventually lead to serious crime. Unfortunately, 
systems like these remove the subjective judgements that are important when 
dealing with vulnerable children and their need for support (see 2.3.4.2). 
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A strong trend in the development of criminal identity systems is made apparent 
through a review of past and present systems. Initial concern was the 
identification of re-offenders. Using forensics, efforts then moved towards 
accurately identifying criminals the first time through. Now work is being done 
in predicting who will become criminals. The question of identity thus evolves 
from the point of establishing it with some other incident in the past 
(recidivists), to securing the identity of individual to current events (forensics), 
and now to guessing the identity of individuals in the future (prediction).  
Surveillance techniques driven by the bureaucratic drive for rationalisation and 
prediction materialise here. Additionally, the technology strand of surveillance 
theory is also relevant (Lyon, 2002). This branch of theory takes the stance that 
surveillance is a technology-driven need looking for the best mode of operation. 
In this view, surveillance technology is a self-augmenting and all-embracing 
quest for perfect knowledge. The technology results in a form of determinism 
where technology shapes and constructs society, thus allowing it to perform its 
function. 
2.3.4.1 UK$DNA$database$
“DNA is genetic material that determines, in part, individual characteristics 
that are faithfully transmitted from parent to offspring” (Bieber, 2004). The 
human genome only varies by about 2 per cent; these variations typically appear 
in the non-coding regions of DNA sequences, i.e. the sections of genetic material 
that have no function (Cole, 2001). DNA typing makes use of these variations by 
analysing DNA for variant lengths and sequences (alleles) at specific sites (loci). 
These variations can then be compared across samples for identification 
purposes, and in comparison to fingerprints, DNA provides superior forensic 
applications (Sankar, 2001).  
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Established in 1994, the UK currently has the largest DNA database in the world, 
holding samples retrieved from crime scenes and convicted criminals 
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2006). However since 2004, it 
has been legal to obtain and store DNA samples from all suspects, even those 
who have been acquitted of all charges (Wallace, 2006). The situation has 
resulted in much controversy. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled 
that the retention of the DNA of un-convicted individuals is unlawful (BBC, 
2008c; The European Court of Human Rights, 2008). The current government 
is proposing to delete hundreds of thousands of profiles from the DNA database, 
making it illegal for police to retain DNA from un-convicted individuals (BBC, 
2011a). 
 The DNA database has also raised other issues of privacy surrounding the 
function creep of DNA usage. The Chief Constable in charge of the database 
regularly receives requests for matching to be performed for paternity cases; 
even though these are refused, the risk of paternity suits has been cited as a 
reason why police officers do not want their DNA to be stored on the databases 
for elimination purposes (Bennetto, 2000).  
The authorities have also experimented with new techniques for identification, 
such as familial searching to assist their investigations (Bhattacharya, 2004). 
For example, familial searching was crucial in solving the 1988 murder of 
Lynette White in Cardiff (BBC, 2006). The search of the database for a rare gene 
profile, lead the police to a 14-year-old boy, who was in fact a nephew of the 
murderer, Jeffery Gafoor; Gafoor received a life sentence in 2003. Another 
example came in 2004, police managed track down and convict Craig Harman 
for manslaughter in Surrey; not being on the database himself, police managed 
to track him down through a relative that was (Bhattacharya, 2004).  
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Furthermore, just as with dactyloscopy, the infallibility of DNA typing is also in 
question. Individuals have been sent to prison on the grounds that their DNA 
matches samples extracted from crime scenes (BBC, 1999; Thompson, Taroni, & 
Aitken, 2003). In 2007, Mr Easton was accused of a burglary after his DNA 
produced a match to a crime scene sample in Bolton, Manchester (BBC, 2007). 
Mr Easton had given a DNA sample 3 years earlier for being involved in a family 
dispute; the police then found the matched when while they were going through 
unsolved cases. However, Mr Easton is suffering from Parkinson, and clearly 
could not have committed the crime. However, a second DNA test to clear his 
name led to another positive match. This ordeal lasted four months before law 
enforcement officials were satisfied that Mr Easton is innocent.  
DNA evidence was also pivotal in the case of Madeline McCann, who at the age 
of 3 in 2007, disappeared in Algarve while on holiday from the UK (BBC, 
2008b). The local Portuguese police claimed to have found DNA evidence 
matching Madeline in the car that her parents hired 24 days after her 
disappearance (Rayner, Gammell, & Britten, 2008; The Independent, 2007). 
Following this, the McCann’s became prime suspects in the ‘accidental killing’ of 
Madeline, and were vilified by both the media and the general public in the UK. 
However, forensic experts in the UK who conducted their own tests found the 
DNA evidence to be of little value, and greatly exaggerated. By the time the 
Portuguese police closed investigations, the McCanns were no longer suspects; 
Madeline remains missing to this day. 
2.3.4.2 Contact$Point$
The death of six-year-old Victoria Climbie due to child abuse was a source of 
great controversy in 2000 (Laming, 2003). The Every Child Matters (ECM) 
programme was launched in response to the perceived inadequacies of child 
protection services; ECM is a programme that called for the sharing of children’s 
personal information, across various services, aiming to ensure the well-being of 
children. 
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Contactpoint, a database holding information on all children in the UK, is thus a 
key element in the ECM programme (Every Child Matters, 2007); it holds 
information on a child’s name, address, and gender, as well as a listing of all the 
carers and services with which the child comes into contact. However, critics 
claimed that it would not work as it wasn’t the lack of information surrounding 
child abuse cases, but the way the carers interpreted the information. This view 
was supported by the death of 17-month-old Baby P; carers across various 
services, who came into contact with Baby P, were aware of each other and had 
all the information, but still failed to interpret the trail of abuse that eventually 
led to the child’s death (Henry, 2008). It is argued that Contactpoint only 
increases bureaucratic burdens on carers, serving only to hamper subjective 
process of assessing abuse cases (Munro, 2008). 
Other concerns of the Contactpoint database stem from its potential use as a tool 
for pre-emptive criminal identification. Debates to introduce a similar system 
has taken place even before the Victoria Climbe case, except its aim was to 
identify children at risk of offending; “It actually represents a broadening of 
child protection services from protection to that of welfare and from there 
primary and secondary crime prevention” (Anderson et al., 2006). This is in 
line with the idea expressed in the “tough on the causes of crime” slogan that the 
UK Home secretary subscribed to in 1993. This potential use of Contactpoint 
raised much opposition, who cited issues of e-discrimination (Anderson et al., 
2006), and self-fulfilling prophecies (Murray, 2008). Arguments centred on the 
fact that irresponsible behaviour is not a good indicator of future criminality. 
Contactpoint could potentially result in the digital branding of children; just as 
physically branded criminals faced stigmatisation, behaviour towards children 
that have been digitally branded may be altered, thus pushing them in the 
direction of unlawfulness. Contactpoint was shut down on the 6th of August 
2010. 2.4 An*Analysis*of*Problems*
The past and current global situation is filled with diverse examples and 
experiences of N-IDMSs. While differing contexts and conditions means that no 
two systems will exactly mirror each other (London School of Economics, 2005), 
one can still identify common insights that requires further investigation. 
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2.4.1 Consequences&of&IDMS&Implementation&and&Use&
One of the lessons that can be learned from the review is that the 
implementation and use of N-IDMSs has a very real impact on individuals’ lives 
and opportunities, as well as influencing their treatment by society. 
For example, the N-IDMS deployed in Nazi Germany had a chilling effect on the 
Jewish population. Intended to make individuals more visible, the N-IDMS 
constantly exposed individuals’ to the rest of society, thus paralysing the 
individuals while turning the rest of the population against them. A similar effect 
is seen with the French anthropometric passes for gypsies, where the N-IDMS 
was designed so as to capture and display their otherness; coupled with strict 
rules, many individuals were forced to change their way of life, abandoning their 
culture altogether.  
The US VISIT programme provides an example where the choice of low quality 
data sources has resulted in a negative outcome for individuals. Producing a lot 
of false matches, many innocent individuals were thus wrongly identified as 
dangerous criminals or terrorists, resulting in a restriction of their movement. 
Conversely, schemes such as the Schengen agreement, helped to provide more 
opportunities to individuals, by reducing information checks at borders.  
2.4.2 Acceptance&of&IDMS&
Another insight gained from the review is the importance in considering 
individuals’ acceptance of new N-IDMS. Without support from the very 
individuals who are to enrol, it is unlikely that the system will fulfil its purpose. 
The Poor Laws provides a prime example where individuals’ perceptions were 
not taken into account. Forced to constantly display badges that marked them as 
being poor, individuals felt shame when enrolled into the system. In addition, 
individuals were aware that their children could be taken away, if they enrolled. 
As a result individuals refused to enrol, resulting in the failure of the system, and 
thus created bigger problems where individuals turned to crime instead. 
In the Russian Internal Passport system, individuals were clearly not content on 
serving a particular ‘master’, in a particular area. Thus the IDMS tying them to a 
particular location resulted in a mixed success, as a large number of manhunts 
were launched to track individuals who were not happy with the system. 
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Furthermore, culture may also play a part in influencing individuals’ acceptance 
of identity systems. In 2003, a Canadian based committee, tasked with 
investigating the various approaches to N-IDMS, noted that cultural differences 
between countries affected the citizen-government relationship, and hence had 
an effect on the acceptance of systems (Fontana, 2003). For example, the British 
population have always been critical towards the introduction of identity cards, 
especially when compared to other countries in Europe who have had a long 
history of N-IDMSs.  
The use of the Bertillon system in France and Argentina further highlights the 
differing reactions caused by differing cultures and perceptions. In France and 
most other countries where Bertillonage was adopted, there was no public 
opposition to the collection and use of anthropometric measurements. 
Argentineans, on the other hand, resisted these measures, viewing them as an 
insult to their honour. As a result, judges regularly ordered the destruction of the 
anthropometric records, rendering the system ineffective. 
2.4.3 Purpose&of&the&IDMS&
Lastly, it must be recognised that the organisation plays a central role in the 
implementation of the system. It is the organisation, its purpose, and 
requirements that will drive the implementation and use of the system. 
Nevertheless, most organisations today tend to see identity as an all-in-one 
solution to a myriad of problems. Yet, it is not clear how organisations devise 
their identity requirements and policies. This has resulted in the implementation 
of ineffective and potentially dangerous IDMSs.  
For example, the law authorities and the general public have come to lean very 
heavily on forensic matches to crime scenes as proof of guilt, even in the 
presence of contradictory evidence. Additionally, the current intention to predict 
the identity of future criminals further emphasises the reliance placed upon 
identification systems. More evidence of this identity dependence comes from 
some of the arguments to support the implementation of N-IDMSs. Common 
justifications include the reduction of crime, illegal immigration, benefit fraud, 
identity theft and terrorism. Yet, there appears to be little discussion on how 
identity will integrate into current systems or procedures ensuring the 
realisation of the benefits claimed. 
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Another example comes from the US Visit programme. The system is not only 
ineffective, but has negatively impacted innocent individuals. This is largely 
down to the failure in not considering the organisations identity requirements in 
its context of implementation, thus resulting in the poor choice of fingerprints. 
Compare this to the successful use of iris recognition in the UAE border control 
scheme.  
Therefore, it is critical that organisations consider their identity requirements 
when implementing IDMS. Who is the system supposed to identify? What are 
the accuracy requirements? Who will have make use of it? These are all basic 
questions that help to ensure the IDMS will fulfil its purpose.  2.5 Chapter*Summary*
A review of past developments sheds light on the effect that the transformation 
and evolution of administrative practices has on the identity requirements 
placed upon society. The migration from oral memory to written records 
emphasised the need for written forms of identification, just as the current shift 
towards the digital medium brings with it the necessity of digital identity that 
will allow users to interact in the virtual world. 
History reveals the importance placed on the efficiency and accuracy of 
identification techniques. The primitive use of symbols, insignias and passes 
were readily doctored, and eventually gave way to verbal portraits to secure 
identity. Anthropometry eventually gave way to the more accurate method of 
dactyloscopy, establishing objective forms of identity based on the stable aspects 
of a person’s body. Modern biometric solutions such as DNA seek to further 
reduce the uncertainty of identity. Currently, identification techniques seek to 
predict future identity of individuals; what better way to efficiently identify an 
individual than to predict who a person shall become? 
The emergence of nation states after World War II also represented a powerful 
force in steering the path of identity systems, allowing governments to embrace 
their people. The governments’ social responsibilities, coupled with issues of 
migration and crime, was a large catalyst in the implementation of identity 
schemes. Current developments resonate with government efforts to embrace 
their people. For example, electronic identification systems allow geographically 
distant citizens to access services and information regardless of their location. 
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Fear has also played a major role in the history of identity. Examples can be 
obtained from the discriminatory systems developed because of the perceived 
otherness of certain groups, such as the gypsies in France. The insecurity 
produced during periods of war also gave rise to the need for identity systems; 
the establishment of National ID Systems in the Britain during World War I and 
II illustrates this point perfectly. Additionally, the rule of totalitarian regimes 
also resulted in strict controls of identity. Nationality, group segregation, and a 
need to control resources drive such regimes towards identity systems so as to 
better control the population. 
Throughout the review, it was evident that the human component was critical in 
determining the success or failure of an IDMS. From the feelings of shame in the 
Poor Laws, to an insult of honour in the Bertillon system; from the prussianizing 
perceptions of the of the British identity cards to the confusion around digital 
signatures; from the privacy concerns of DNA identification to the self-fulfilling 
prophecies of predictive criminal identification, it is this human component that 
IDMS must account for.  
In reviewing the N-IDMSs, research into identity systems need to account for 
the real impact that a system has on individuals that are enrolled. Furthermore, 
research also needs to develop an understanding of individual acceptance 
towards N-IDMS, of which culture may also have an influence. 
Last but not least, the review has also highlighted the importance of 
organisations purpose and requirements in defining the overall structure and 
implementation of an IDMS. It is therefore crucial that research seeks to 
understand what organisations need, and how a balance can be struck between 
the organisation and the individual. 
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Chapter&3:&Literature&Review&
This chapter reviews the published literature within the identity field, identifying 
gaps that this thesis will address. 
Beginning with the concept of identity itself, the review in Section 3.1 uncovers that 
current research is limited to functional perspectives, where individuals are treated 
as functional objects. This approach ignores the concept of identity as strategic 
information to inform organisational processes (for example the UK government’s 
intention to use the N-IDMS to combat terrorism by using an audit trail to 
investigate suspected terrorists; Section 7.2.2.2, or the intention to use the 
Contactpoint child database to identify future criminals; Section 2.3.4.2). As a 
result, most ‘human-centred’ identity solutions tend to focus on usability issues and 
the reduction of barriers to getting individuals to share information, instead on the 
broader impact of identity.  
The consequence of the functional view of identity becomes evident in Section 3.2, 
where the review of the privacy literature reveals that research has focused on 
information privacy. The emphasis is on a confidentiality paradigm, which does not 
explore the consequences of identity information collection, storage, and use (for 
example the paralysing effects of the Nazi’s N-IDMS [Section 2.2.2.1] or the lack of 
perceived benefits in the Austrian Citizen Card [Section 2.3.1.2]; these effects of 
system design on the lived experience are studied and detailed in Section 5.2). 
Recently researchers have called for a broader approach, focusing on the protection 
of identity, instead of the protection of information as a static concept (Section 
3.2.4.3). 
Moving on to the concept of trust, the review in Section 3.3 finds that past research 
does not consider the impact of identity on individuals’ trusting behaviour; 
specifically, it does not account for how system design can influence perceived risk, 
and thus affect individuals’ intentions to trust and adopt IDMSs. 
Finally, this chapter also reviews the concept of culture, and how it can affect 
individuals’ trusting intentions (Section 3.4). Understanding the impact of culture 
can be useful because it helps to explain the differences between the privacy and 
trust reactions of populations from different countries (for example, individualistic 
cultures are highly critical and vocal of systems that restrict their freedoms; this is 
explored in the study outline in Section 6.5.2). 
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3.1 Identity*
Being part of everyday language, many feel than the term identity is widely 
understood, and see no need to define it. This is one of the problems that 
researchers and implementers face; a proper definition of identity is required in 
order to fully study the phenomenon of interest, as well as to increase 
understanding among the research community. This chapter will define identity as it 
is used in this thesis; in order to do so, several different definitions that have been 
put forward are reviewed and their respective shortcomings described (Section 
3.1.1).  
This chapter will also explore the concept of an IDMS, and the various 
configurations that these systems can take (Section 3.1.2). The chapter then looks at 
the current approaches that focus on creating a user-centric approach to IDMS 
(Section 3.1.3). A review of the literature shows that research in the area focuses on 
identity as a means for access control, only seeing it as a mechanism to allow 
individuals to access restricted resources. Current efforts do not explore identity in 
terms of strategic information that is being used by an organisation, how it relates to 
the individuals that are seen as static objects that are disconnected from the real 
world.  
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3.1.1 Defining&Identity&
“The worst thing one can do with words, wrote George Orwell’...’is to 
surrender to them’…’let the meaning choose the word, and not the 
other way about.’ Identity, we argue, tends to mean too much (when 
understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak 
sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity).” (Brubaker & 
Cooper, 2000) 
Pfitzmann & Hansen (2010) define identity as an individual’s bounded concept 
that represents a perception of life, social interaction and continuity. This 
explains the lack of clarity regarding identity, as this bounded concept varies 
across individuals. Furthermore, identity today can refer to a number of nouns 
and concepts; it can be interpreted as a set of personality traits, or just as 
commonly to refer to a hashed password (Camp, 2004a). With the growing 
importance of identity and IDMS, there is a growing need to accurately define 
identity, typically in terms of information collected and stored about an 
individual. 
3.1.1.1 Identity$and$its$building$blocks$
A proper definition of identity first requires an understanding of its basic 
building blocks. There are two core constructs that make up an identity in the 
computing field, and are defined by (Camp, 2004b), as follows: 
1. Attribute. A characteristic associated with an entity. Examples include 
long-lived characteristics such as height and date of birth, as well as 
temporary attributes such as address and employer. 
2. Identifier. An identifier identifies an identity within a specific context.  
An entity can have many identifiers; for example, a car has a license plate 
but also a permanent serial number. “Each identifier is meaningful only 
in a specific context, or namespace, and can reasonably be thought of as 
having a <thing identified, identifier> pair” (Camp, 2004b). 
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An understanding of these two components allows for the definition of identity; 
continuing from above, (Camp, 2004a) defines identity as a "set of permanent 
or long-lived temporal attributes associated with an entity". This definition 
diverges from other definitions in the field, as it fails to account for the 
uniqueness of identity within a system. Cameron (2005) also does not capture 
this aspect when defining identity as "a set of claims made by one digital subject 
about it-self or another digital subject". Furthermore, this definition confuses 
the concept of identity with the entirely separate process of identification; i.e. 
the definition alludes to the process of presenting an identity to another entity, 
rather than defining what exactly the claims might be. 
An alternative definition of identity comes from White (2008), who states that 
identity is "a set of characteristics, or identifiers, of an entity that uniquely 
identifies that entity within a specific context or system." Similarly, in 
developing an ontology of identity-related terms, Pfitzmann & Hansen (2010) 
define identity as "any subset of attributes of an individual person which 
sufficiently identifies this individual person within any set of persons." While 
these definitions capture the essence of uniqueness, the definitions are aligned 
more with the concept of an identifier, which is but one part of an identity; it 
fails to fully recognise the importance of the attributes and information attached 
to an identity.  
3.1.1.2 Attributes,$partial$identity$and$context$
Identity does not exist in a vacuum; it is established on the basis of interactions 
with others, and its content is defined by the role that an individual assumes in 
each interaction. Each role consists of a set of attributes relevant to the 
particular context, and this subset of relevant attributes, in relation to the 
particular role, is termed a partial identity (A. Pfitzmann & Hansen, 2010). An 
IDMS should therefore aim to instantiate individuals within the system, by 
capturing the attributes that make up the partial identity, allowing individuals’ 
to carry out the tasks in relation to their role. 
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Figure 3 Partial Identity (Pfitzmann, Hansen, Liesebach, Pfitzmann, & Steinbrecher, 2006) 
  
However, in order to fully research identity and its impacts, we must consider 
richer forms of identity that go beyond the standard definitions. The data 
shadow refers to the collection and storage of various types of information about 
an individual, stretching beyond the traditional definition of identity as 
attributes (Garfinkel, 2001). It is the data trail that an individual leaves behind 
with every transaction (every cash withdrawal, every credit card payment, etc.); 
highly dynamic new information is constantly produced, and is attached to an 
individual’s identity within the system. Brought together, this information forms 
a digital dossier (Garfinkel, 2001) of a subject that can then be used by the 
organisation; individuals’ interaction with organisations will probably be 
mediated by the data shadow, and not solely on the basis of the individual’s 
inherent attributes. 
It is therefore important that a definition of identity express the uniqueness of 
an identity, while at the same time capturing the depth and reach of the identity. 
For the purposes of this research, identity is defined as the set of information 
and attributes about an individual that is collected and stored within a particular 
context; linked to an identifier(s) that sufficiently identifies the individual within 
as set of individuals.  
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3.1.2 Identity&Management&Systems&(IDMS)&
The literature simply defines an IDMS as a system that enables the 
administration and use of identities, and their attributes. Within a government 
context, White (2008) states that identity management is the administration of 
identity, "so as to provide secure and controlled access to the resources that an 
entity is entitled to use". Pfitzmann & Hansen (2010) describe identity 
management as “the administration of identity attributes including the 
development and choice of the partial identity… to be (re-)used in a specific 
context or role”.  
These definitions, as with the typical definitions of identity, are insufficient as 
they confine identity management to the realms of access controls, disregarding 
other potential uses, such as the use of identity to power recommendation 
systems. These definitions of identity management have probably contributed to 
the traditional focus on Type 1 IDMS as described by Bauer, Meints, & Hansen 
(2005): 
1. Type 1 IDMS used for account management, implementing 
authentication, authorisation, and accounting. 
2. Type 2 IDMS used for profiling of user data by an organisation, e.g. 
detailed log files or data warehouses that support analysis of customer 
behaviour.  
3. Type 3 IDMS used for user-controlled context-dependent role and 
pseudonym management. 
While the initial development of IDMSs may have largely served to act as an 
access control mechanism, reflecting Type 1 IDMS, hybrid configurations are 
now becoming more common, i.e. systems that fit into two or three types of 
IDMS configurations, such as social networking and recommender systems 
(Mentis & Zwingelbery, 2009). It is therefore imperative that research accounts 
for the current trends in the field.  
As such, an IDMS can be defined as a mechanism that allows for the 
administration of information and attributes of an identity; and its use by 
individuals to gain access to resources, as well as its strategic use by 
organisations to inform business processes and decision-making. 
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3.1.2.1 The$identity$lifecycle$and$models$of$IDMS$
Identities instantiated within an IDMS typically go through a set of phases. 
According to Hansen, Pfitzmann, & Steinbrecher (2008), these phases are 
establishment, evolution, and termination of identity. Similarly, Windley (2005) 
states that an identity starts out by being provisioned, after which it is 
propagated though the system, where it gets used, maintained, and finally de-
provisioned. In general, the IDMS literature typically expands upon the lifecycle 
relation to traditional Type 1 IDMS. The phases of identity described below are 
an amalgamation of commonly established processes encountered in the 
literature: 
1. Enrolment. The creation of new identities within the IDMS. It involves 
the identification of relevant individuals, the capturing of their attributes, 
and the instantiation of their identity. Authentication credentials are 
generated and provided to each individual allowing them to use it.  
2. Provisioning. The back-end management of identity, where identities 
within the system are given permission to access certain resources; i.e. 
access policies. 
3. Identification. The process whereby an individual presents his/her 
identifier and credentials to the system; the individual presents a claim 
that he/she owns the identity linked to the provided identifier. 
4. Authentication. In this phase the IDMS takes the identifier and 
credential provided in the previous phase, and checks that it is valid. 
Failure to produce a valid identifier-credential pair will prevent an 
individual from accessing the system. 
5. Authorisation. If authentication was successful, the system then 
retrieves the access permissions that were attached to the identity during 
provisioning. The individual is then provided access to the resources to 
which he/she is allowed to access. 
6. Maintenance, deletion, and auditing. Typically there is also a 
mechanism by which identities can be edited, where identity is updated 
to reflect new information, and audited for security purposes. Identities 
can also be deleted from the system, where the identity, and all related 
information is purged from the system. However, in modern systems, 
identities may not be deleted or suspended. 
  77 
An inspection of the stages in the identity lifecycle quickly reveals the emphasis 
placed upon the use of identity as an authentication mechanism; i.e. the lifecycle 
describes a Type 1 IDMS implementation. There is no recognition of the back-
end use of identity information, by an organization, to inform its practices or 
functions. This aspect of identity usage, a core function of Type 2 systems, has 
been side-lined in the literature (although investigated to a point from a social 
science aspect under the umbrella of surveillance studies; see Lyon (2002) for an 
example). 
Thus, following the focus of high-level identity descriptions on Type 1 
configurations, current identity literature has focused on Type 1 related issues of 
functionality and usability. Similarly, IDMS architectures have been developed 
around  the Type 1 viewpoint, where identity is only seen as a means of accessing 
resources, while failing to account for identity as the strategic resource that is 
being accessed by the organisation in the back-end (White, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 4 Identity Management architecture (White, 2008) 
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3.1.3 UserCcentred&Identity&
Following the typical description of the identity lifecycle, common research into 
user-centric identity systems also falls within the realm of type 1 IDMS 
configurations, where identity is actively used by an individual to access 
privileged resources. In the era of networks and distributed services, research 
into user-centric identity manifests itself in the form of federated schemes, 
which aim to make it easier for individuals to use their identity. 
Traditionally, services exist within silos; each organisation (i.e. service provider) 
implemented a standalone IDMS to work with their own systems. With the 
increased level of services being provided online, individuals are required to 
memorise a large number of passwords, making such systems unmanageable 
and causing identity overload and password fatigue (Jøsang, Zomai, & Suriadi, 
2007).  
 
Figure 5 Silo model of IDMS (Jøsang, Zomai, et al., 2007) 
Aiming to reduce these barriers to adoption, federated identity schemes have 
been proposed as a solution to create user-centric identity management. 
Federated identity is a “set of agreements, standards, and technologies that 
enable a group of service providers to recognise user identifiers and 
entitlements from other service providers within a federated domain” (Jøsang 
& Pope, 2005). This allows individuals to enrol with a single organisation (i.e. 
identity provider), and use the resulting identity credentials to login to other 
service providers that are separate from the identity provider. OpenID is an 
example of a federated identity scheme, and is being used and supported by 
Google, Yahoo, and Facebook among others. 
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Figure 6 Federated model of IDMS (Jøsang, Zomai, et al., 2007) 
Similar efforts in the area of user-centric identity are the development of an 
identity metasystem (e.g. Info-Cards, Higgins, etc.). In recognising that the 
identity on the internet is a “patchwork of identity one-offs”, Cameron (2005) 
suggests the creation of an identity layer that abstracts away from the internal 
complexities of identity systems, allowing various standards and technologies to 
work from similar user-interfaces. In line with this, he developed a set of seven 
laws that would guide the development of an identity system with the objective 
of creating a system that is widely accepted: 
1. User control and consent 
2. Minimal disclosure for a constrained use 
3. Justifiable parties 
4. Directed identity 
5. Pluralism of operators and technologies 
6. Human integration 
7. Consistent experience across contexts 
3.1.4 Limitations&of&Current&Identity&Research&
Current approaches to identity do not recognise it as strategic information that 
alters individuals’ interaction with organisations and the larger identity 
ecosystem.  
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This is largely driven by the traditional role of identity within Type 1 IDMS 
configurations, where identity is used as a security mechanism used to access 
resources. As a result, user-centric research (Section 3.1.3) on identity is 
generally focused on ease of use, to encourage individuals to enrol in the system, 
without examining the strategic usage of identity and its effect on the individual 
(see for example federated identity that attempts to eliminate barriers to sign up 
and information sharing).  
Human-centred IDMS research should not only consider ease of use, but also 
take into account the relationship between identity and the individual, break 
away from the Type 1 view of IDMSs, and focus on the broader implications and 
uses of identity. Identity is not just a static component, its use has impacts on 
the individuals and the world around them; the influence of this concept on the 
approach taken in this thesis is further clarified in the review of the privacy 
literature in the next section (Section 3.2). 
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3.2 Privacy*
“A free and democratic society requires respect for the autonomy of 
individuals, and limits on the power of both state and private 
organisations to intrude on that autonomy... Privacy is a key value 
which underpins human dignity and other key values such as freedom 
of association and freedom of speech” (Australian Privacy Charter) 
Traditional approaches to privacy do not acknowledge the wider implications of 
identity on everyday lives. As this review will reveal, privacy research sees 
identity information as a static component, resulting in approaches that focus on 
confidentiality rather than protection of identity and the individual. 
Privacy can be defined in relation to the physical, psychological, interactional 
and informational realms (Section 3.2.1). The nature of computers and their use 
in the collection of personal information has placed an importance on the 
informational dimension of privacy in computing literature. Studies seeking to 
capture individual’s informational privacy concern focus on the collection of 
information, the errors that may occur during collection, its unauthorised use, 
as well as improper access to subject information. However, other research has 
shown that individuals tend to view privacy concerns in terms of the potential 
outcomes (Section 3.2.2). 
With the focus on information privacy, approaches addressing privacy concerns 
have led to the development of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (Section 3.2.4) 
that focus on data minimisation and anonymity, which do not fully address the 
impact of identity on the individual (Section 3.2.4.1); i.e. the lived experience. 
Furthermore, emphasis on information privacy has also influenced the 
development of laws and regulations to focus on the collection and storage of 
information, as opposed to the focus on identity itself (Section 3.2.4.2). Recent 
debates have called for a rethink of the legal infrastructure, seeking to establish 
the right to identity (Section 3.2.4.2). 
Further research into privacy and IDMS should therefore focus on the 
consequences of identity, and how it can affect the individual. Research should 
look at the lived experience of identity (Section 3.2.5).  
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3.2.1 What&is&Privacy?&
Anyone involved within a society has to balance the notion of privacy. Some have 
defined privacy as having “the right to be left alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890), 
while others question the simplicity of this definition. In part, the difficulty in 
agreeing on a single definition of privacy stems from its multi-dimensional 
nature. For example, Burgoon (1982) introduces privacy dimensions relating to 
the physical, social, interactional, and informational. This is somewhat 
reflected by Davie's (1999) concept of data, communications, bodily and 
territorial privacy; while DeCew (1997) identified concerns with regards to 
informational, accessibility and expressive privacy. 
Whatever the case, the number of privacy debates is increasing. Not long ago, 
one would be able to stand in an open field to guarantee a private conversation; 
however, this is no longer possible with the array of devices available. 
Technology has an inherent ability to erode the walls of privacy that we build 
around ourselves. The mechanisms of today allow for easier collection and 
storage of data; the decline in storage costs permits for larger collections of data 
that can then be stored for longer periods of time, while ubiquitous computing 
introduces the ability for the recording of timely and accurate location data 
(Anderson & Dourish, 2005; Bellotti & Sellen, 1993; Price, Adam, & Nuseibeh, 
2005; Smith, LaMarca, Consolvo, & Dourish, 2004). Meanwhile, network 
infrastructures allow information to be traded easily among organisations, 
enabling new deductions to be made, and hence creating more privacy invading 
situations (Palen & Dourish, 2003).  
Recently, developers have begun to take privacy design seriously; many 
researchers and developers believed that individuals and society would adapt 
their privacy expectations and behaviours to fit in with new technology. Adams 
& Sasse (2001) paralleled this early view of privacy with similar notions in early 
human computer interaction (HCI) debates; it was initially argued that users 
would learn and familiarize themselves with highly unintuitive interfaces. This 
of course has been proven false, and HCI is now considered an integral 
component in the design of successful applications.  
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Similarly, researchers and system designers are now taking the issue of privacy 
seriously, working to eliminate or reduce the risk of privacy invasions when 
developing new systems (Iachello & Hong, 2007). Due to the technical nature of 
Computer Science, and its focus on the collection and storage of personal 
information, privacy research in the field is largely focused on the issue of 
information privacy.  
3.2.2 Individual&Privacy&Concerns&and&Behaviour&
The concept of privacy is invariably tied to the individual; it is his/her privacy 
that is being invaded. However, most research in the area has focused on 
protecting data without a proper understanding on what exactly individuals 
deem as being private (Adams & Sasse, 2001; Paine, Reips, Stieger, Joinson, & 
Buchanan, 2007; Palen & Dourish, 2003). Without a proper understanding of 
individuals’ privacy views, how can systems be designed to enforce them? 
Unfortunately, therein lies the problem; privacy boundaries are dynamic, and 
vary between individuals, such that it becomes an ambiguous concept that 
escapes proper definition (Anderson & Dourish, 2005; Bellotti & Sellen, 1993; 
Smith, 1993).  
Investigating privacy concerns towards the collection of personal information by 
organisations, (Smith et al., 1996) developed a set of categories that capture an 
individual’s informational privacy concerns. Developed on rich theoretical 
material, it has a large base of empirical results that verify the validity of the 
measure. The categories as defined by (Smith et al., 1996) are: 
1. Collection. The concern over the excessive collection and storage of 
personal information. 
2. Unauthorised use. The concern over the use of personal information 
for other purposes. 
3. Improper access. The concern over the unauthorised access and use of 
personal information. 
4. Errors. Concerns over the occurrence of errors, deliberate or accidental, 
in the personal information. 
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However, recent studies into privacy illustrate that individuals more readily 
associate privacy concerns with the potential negative outcomes of a breach. 
Paine et al. (2007) found that the privacy concerns of Internet users seem to 
focus on crime, and not privacy problems; individuals raised issues regarding 
viruses, spam, spyware and hackers among other things. Therefore, individuals 
may see the privacy issue as a wider concept than do those in academia, with its 
narrow focus on information privacy. 
3.2.3 Identity&and&Informational&Privacy&
In line with the research in the general computing field, common approaches to 
the privacy problems, presented by IDMSs, are tackled from the information 
privacy dimension. In the computing field, this has led to the development of 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) that focus on the confidentiality of 
personal information. Similarly influenced by informational privacy, laws and 
regulations that aim to address privacy concerns raised by IDMSs focus on the 
concepts data protection and data minimisation. 
3.2.4 Identity&and&Privacy&Enhancing&Technologies&
While the increasing use of technology has been the catalyst for the current 
privacy debates, a lot of work is being done to use technology to enable privacy. 
In line with the understanding of information privacy, these PETs seek to ensure 
privacy by minimising the collection and processing of personal information. As 
a result, the dominant paradigm in the development of PETs has been that of 
“privacy as confidentiality” (Gürses, 2010). 
The cornerstone of this confidentiality perspective in the IDMS field is the 
concept of anonymity. At a simple level, anonymity can be defined as the un-
identifiably of a subject among a set of subjects. Pfitzmann & Hansen (2008) 
further describe anonymity in terms of unlinkability; unlinkability refers to the 
inability of an attacker to sufficiently establish a relationship between two items 
of interests (e.g. an individual and an action); individual anonymity with respect 
to a particular attribute can therefore be expressed as the "unlinkability of an 
individual to the particular attribute". Popular mechanisms by which PETs 
achieve this unlinkability are the use of pseudonyms to hide an individual’s true 
identity, and encryption techniques that transform data into unreadable form 
(Senicar, Jerman-Blazic, & Klobucar, 2003).  
  85 
3.2.4.1 Beyond$confidentiality$
Reviewing PETs in their early stages, Burkert (1997) identified as one of its 
limitations, the “capability to identify persons behind anonymous information”. 
By pooling together and matching information from various anonymised 
sources, an individual can be re-identified with sufficient accuracy so as to take 
discriminatory measures (Burkert, 1997). Gürses (2010) further expands on this 
idea, stating that “anonymously collected data does not protect against 
surveillance systems, and the reflexes of their controllers to manage and sort 
populations”.  
PETs can create a false sense of autonomy and control, since information 
collectors are still able to manipulate behaviour using anonymised information. 
While Gürses (2010) sees PETs as being useful, she suggests newer approaches 
that focus on the control of information, how it is used, as well as creating more 
engagement between the individual and the flow of his/her information. 
Hildebrandt (2008) suggests something similar in the form of Transparency 
Enhancing Tools (TET) that “renders accessible and assessable the profiles that 
may affect their lives”. 
3.2.4.2 Privacy$laws$and$data$protection$
Development of laws and regulations designed to limit the privacy-invading 
aspects of IDMSs date back to the 1960s, with respect to proposed plans for 
centralised database systems. The response was the codification of the first set of 
data protection laws (Mayer-Schönberger, 1997). Today the European Union 
enforces a set of Data Protection Directives, while the United States has opted 
for a sectored approach, i.e. relegating privacy policy enforcement to 
professional bodies.  
In a 1998 report regarding the collection and storage of personal data, the 
United States Federal Trade Commission published a set of recommendations 
that aim to provide individuals with adequate privacy protections. Codified 
under the Fair Information Practice Principles, the recommendations consist of 
five core principles (Federal Trade Commission, 1998): 
1. Notice. Individuals should be given notice of an entity's information 
practices before any personal information is collected from them. 
2. Choice. Individuals should be provided options as to how any personal 
information collected from them may be used. 
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3. Access. Individuals should be able to access data about him/her-self 
and to contest that data's accuracy and completeness. 
4. Integrity. Collectors must take steps to ensure data is accurate and 
secure. 
5. Enforcement. A mechanism to enforce these principles; self-
regulation, private remedies, and regulatory schemes need to be put in 
place. 
Similarly, the European Union has published the Data Protection Directive that 
aims to protect privacy by focusing on the processing of personal data. The 
directive ensures that personal information of European citizens will have 
similar protections across the union. Each country is required to bring their 
national legislation in line with the directive; the United Kingdom Data 
Protection Act is an example of the implementation, and consists of eight key 
principles (House of Lords, 1998): 
1. Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawful.  
2. Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and 
lawful purposes. 
3. Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation 
to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed. 
4. Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. 
5. Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept 
for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes. 
6. Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data 
subjects under this Act. 
7. Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken 
against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and 
against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. 
8. Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside 
the European Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures 
an adequate level of protection for the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects in relation to the processing of personal data. 
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3.2.4.3 From$protecting$privacy$to$protecting$identity$
Recent debates around these identity and privacy laws are calling for a rethink of 
the legal infrastructure (Hildebrandt, 2008); a shift for the right of privacy, 
toward the recognition of a “right to identity” (De Hert, 2007). It is argued that 
“identity related issues cannot be dealt with from a privacy-perspective” 
(Gutwirth, 2009); providing an example, De Hert (2007) elaborates further; 
“when homosexuals seek anonymous contacts with others fearing 
stigmatisation and professional harm, the issue is certainly identity-related, 
but what kind of issue is it from a legal point of view? A privacy issue? A liberty 
issue? Or a freedom of movement issue?” 
Lusoli, Maghiros, & Bacigalupo (2009) also call for a new regulatory framework, 
arguing for the “need to move beyond discussions about privacy, and move into 
a full fledge discussion of identity”. They propose an autonomy regulatory 
framework, which may be viewed as an “enactment of decisional privacy, 
whereby citizens can take decisions for themselves and act on those decisions 
free from external interference”. 
In a similar vein, Hildebrandt (2008) describes the threats of identity profiling 
on individuals’ abilities to construct their identity, as well as the shortcomings of 
current regulations to address the problem; “informational privacy is all too 
often reduced to a private interest in the hiding of personal data”, thus ignoring 
the consequences of the knowledge asymmetry between the individual and the 
profiler. Profiling can create an autonomy trap that seduces an individual to act 
in a manner that he/she would not have done otherwise, as well as allowing for 
easier market segmentation, and therefore easier discriminations. Lips et al. 
(2006) describe the effects of social sorting within a government context, where 
individuals are treated differently on the basis of their identity and trust profiles, 
thus fundamentally changing the relationship between citizen and state; an 
unequal and discriminatory form of layered citizenship is created. In light of 
these dangers, Hildebrandt (2008) calls for a rethink of the legal framework to 
understand how profiles may impact individuals’ lives in practical ways.  
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3.2.5 Limitations&of&IDMS&Privacy&Research&&
Privacy in the general computer science, and hence IDMS field, has largely been 
tackled from the informational privacy dimension. This has resulted in 
approaches to mitigating privacy concerns through a confidentiality paradigm, 
seeking to minimise data collection and prevent information from being linked 
directly to an individual. 
The narrow focus on informational privacy may be linked to the focus on Type 1 
IDMS, as introduced in the previous chapter. However, IDMS are no longer just 
used as an access mechanism, but are now widely used in Type 2 IDMS 
architectures, where individual profiles are used to aid organisational decisions. 
It is not just the collection and storage of identity that is of concern, but the 
actual usage of identity that has an impact on an individual’s life. 
The current debates on the suitability of current technological and legal 
procedures to solve issues of identity are largely driven by the focus on the 
outcomes dictated by identity collection, storage, and usage. Autonomy, and the 
ability to freely develop one’s own identity and to avoid being discriminated 
against, all call into question the suitability and moral uses of identity 
information. Similarly, research has shown that individuals tend to think of 
privacy in terms of the implications rather than the information being collected.  
In discussing the collection of personal information, Mayer-Scho ̈nberger (2009) 
writes about the dangers of not forgetting stored information; he conjures up an 
image where individuals are “shackled by their constantly present past”. Not 
being able to act and interact with others only in the present, individuals are 
denied the ability to develop further.  
“Digital memories make possible a comprehensive reconstruction of 
our words and deeds, even if they are long past, they create not just a 
spatial but a temporal version of Bentham’s Panopticon, constraining 
our willingness to say what we mean, and engage in our society” 
(Mayer-Scho ̈nberger, 2009). 
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Therefore, privacy research should reflect the current calls of privacy experts to 
focus on the consequences of identity collection, storage, and use (Section 
3.2.4.3). This is in line with individuals’ perception of privacy that focuses on 
outcomes such as being victims of crime (Section 3.2.2). Research should thus 
look beyond the traditional information domain, and seek to explore the impacts 
of identity. How does an IDMS influence the life of an individual? In reference to 
the act of profiling, Hindlebrandt (2008) states that the main concern lies in the 
“the process of constructing profiles and their application to people”. Thus 
research needs to focus on the design of design of identity and IDMSs, and its 
affect the outcomes for individuals. Research should focus on exploring the lived 
experience of identity (Rahaman & Sasse, 2011), which captures the main 
concern identity on individuals’ everyday lives. 
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3.3 Trust*
 “Scholars tend to mention [trust] in passing, to allude to it as a 
fundamental ingredient or lubricant, an unavoidable dimension of social 
interaction, only to move on to deal with less intractable matters” 
Gambetta (1988). 
Trust is a central component to privacy because it mediates for any privacy concerns 
that arise; for example, providing sensitive personal information to an organisation, 
requires individuals trust in the organisation to keep his/her information private, 
while also not misusing or abusing the personal information. An analysis of the trust 
literature reveals that little work has been done in relation to IDMS, and even then 
current research does not account for how the design and perceived risk affect 
individuals’ trusting intentions.  
Based on the literature, this chapter explores the concept of trust, elaborating it in 
terms of risk and uncertainty. Differences between the development of initial trust 
before interaction, and the transition to on-going trust in continuous interactions 
are also discussed (section 3.3.1).  
Several models of trust have been developed to predict individuals trusting 
behaviour in the face uncertainty. Early models focused on economic perspectives, 
where trusting actions are dependent on the benefits gained. Current approaches 
that predict trusting behaviour in e-commerce and e-government systems take a 
multidisciplinary approach, guided by an overall behavioural framework (section 
3.3.2) 
A trust model that predicts adoption of N-IDMS was developed and proposed in the 
literature (section 3.3.4). However, as with many of the current trust models, the 
proposed model does not fully capture how the system itself can affect adoption 
(section 3.3.5).  
The chapter concludes that it would be highly beneficial for studies to investigate 
how a system’s design, and thus its perceived implications, can affect trusting 
intention and adoption. In so doing, a better understanding of the overall situation 
is gained and practical tools or methods may be developed that allow researchers 
and practitioners to design more trustworthy systems. 
  91 
3.3.1 Trust&and&Risk&
Trust is pervasive in our daily interactions. It forms an important part of social 
interactions; without it, we would be incapable of dealing with the world in its 
endless degrees of risk and complexities (Cofta, 2007; Riegelsberger et al., 
2005), as well as promoting co-operative behaviour, and allowing a person to 
depend on the actions of unknown others (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
In spite of, or perhaps because of its pervasive nature, trust eludes a single 
definition; for example, Mcknight, Cummings, & Chervany (1998) found 17 
different definitions of trust when reviewing the literature. 
Trust is typically required in situations when there is something at stake, and 
hence the potential for negative outcomes (Riegelsberger et al., 2005). 
Therefore, trust is said to be needed when there is an element of risk involved; 
an individual (trustor) needs to take trusting action in the hopes that the other 
party (trustee) will act as intended. However, risk in itself is a rather vague 
concept with various definitions and interpretations. 
Risk is sometimes associated with uncertainty, and although both terms tend to 
be used interchangeably, there are slight differences between the two concepts 
(Riegelsberger et al., 2005); risk typically implies that the probability of a 
negative result is known, while uncertainty implies that the probability of the 
outcome is unknown. According to Giddens (1991), trust is no longer required 
when the trustor’s actions, motivations and abilities are known; a trustee is able 
accurately to come to a conclusion of the risk involved, and hence take a risky 
action instead of a trusting one. As such, it would seem that trust is better 
related to the concept of uncertainty than to that of risk. However, situations of 
risk can be viewed as those of uncertainty by reducing its complexity, eschewing 
any probability calculations involved (Luhmann, 1979). 
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3.3.1.1 Initial$Trust$and$the$Expectation$of$continuity$
The development of trust can be broken down into two distinct phases (Carter & 
Bélanger, 2005; Warkentin, Gefen, Pavlou, & Rose, 2002). Firstly, there is the 
concept of initial trust, where a trustor has yet to interact with the trustee; in 
this phase, a trustor’s trusting intentions are largely based on personal 
dispositions and social norms. A separate distinct phase of trust development is 
that of on-going trust. In these situations, trusting intentions are driven by the 
experience gained through repeated interactions; on-going trust breeds 
familiarity between trustor and trustee, reducing the trustor’s perception of risk 
involved. Familiarity provides trustors with a framework for future interactions 
based on previous experience, thus increasing the levels of trust (Riegelsberger 
et al., 2005). 
3.3.2 Effects&of&Trust&and&Risk&on&Adoption&
Trust research has gained a lot of momentum in the e-commerce and 
information science domain; it is also gaining traction in the field of e-
government. Typically posited as a factor that influences the adoption of new 
services and technologies, initial trust is seen as a mechanism that shapes a 
trustor’s behaviour when interacting with the new service or technology. 
In research, trust is typically explored alongside the concept of risk. “Scholars 
have provided different views regarding the relationship between trust and 
risk, i.e. whether trust is an antecedent of risk, the same as risk, or a by-
product of risk” (Kim, Ferrin, & Rao, 2008); in any case, trust is required in 
situations of risk, making it difficult to uncouple the two concepts. 
Several different trust, risk, and adoption models have been developed. From 
psychology, we have the Theory of Reasoned Action, which focuses on behaviour 
of individuals. The social sciences look at trust from a societal point of view. 
Game Theory places importance on social control in the development of trust, 
while economical approaches appear to model trust in terms of perceived risk, as 
well as the potential benefits and losses. Research soon took on a multi-
disciplinary approach, accommodating for relevant elements extracted from the 
various models in the creation of a more complete and more accurate 
mechanism to assess trust, risk, and its impact on adoption (McKnight & 
Chervany, 2001). 
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3.3.2.1 Theory$of$Reasoned$Action$and$Behaviour$
Many current trust models are rooted on the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), 
and its later counterpart the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). In these 
models trust is expressed as an intention or willingness to carry out a trusting 
behaviour. 
 
Figure 7 Theory of Planned Behaviour Model 
According to the TRA, as described by Fishbein & Ajzen (1975), intention to 
perform a specific behaviour is dependent on an individual’s volitional 
characteristics that capture the rational and calculative decisions that an 
individual makes. There are two constructs that make up the volitional 
component: 
1. Attitude. A person’s favourable or “unfavourableness towards an 
action” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). It is an evaluative bipolar dimension 
that an individual makes about an object or decision (for example 
like/dislike, favourable/unfavourable, etc.). 
2. Subjective Norm. An individual’s preconceptions on whether the 
people closest to him/her think that the action should be carried out. 
Later, TPB introduced a non-volitional aspect that can influence behavioural 
intentions (Ajzen, 1985, 1991): 
3. Perceived Behavioural Control. An individual’s perceptions of the 
opportunities and constraints on performing the action. Greater 
perceived behavioural control positively influences intention. 
Additionally, perceived behavioural control not only determines 
intention but also directly influences behaviour. This allows it to 
accommodate for situations when there are elements that are out of a 
user’s control (e.g. lack of resources or to perform the action). 
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The three determinants of behaviour are in turn based on a set of beliefs. Beliefs 
are the “subjective probability of a relation between the object of belief and 
some other object, value, concept or attribute” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). They 
are the judgements an individual makes about the world around him/her:  
1. Behavioural beliefs. The consequences an individual attaches to 
carrying out the behaviour; it influences attitudes.  
2. Normative beliefs. An individual’s view of whether other people 
approve or disapprove of the behaviour. Subjective norm is formed on an 
individual’s normative beliefs. 
3. Control beliefs. The perceived presence or absence of resources. These 
beliefs are based on previous experience or second-hand information. 
Control beliefs influence an individual’s perceived behavioural control. 
3.3.3 Technology&Acceptance&Model&
In his doctoral thesis, Davis (1985) outlined the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM), which was an adaptation to the TRA, designed specifically to explain the 
adoption of information systems. According to the TAM, attitude was influenced 
by two particular belief level constructs about computer systems (Davis, Bagozzi, 
& Warshaw, 1989): 
1. Perceived usefulness. An individual’s subjective view that using the 
system will increase performance. 
2. Perceived ease of use. An individual’s perception of how hard/easy it 
is to use the system. 
 
Figure 8 Technology Acceptance Model, with trust and risk factors 
(Pavlou, 2003) 
Behavioural Intention
Perceived Ease of 
Use
Perceived 
Usefulness
Perceived Risk
Trust
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Although not explored in this thesis, these two constructs are believed to be affected by 
various external variables, such as the visual design of the system, as well as the 
provision of system training and education. In expanding the use of the TAM into 
consumer acceptance of e-commerce websites, (Pavlou, 2003) integrated two more 
factors of interest to the research here: 
1. Perceived risk. Individuals’ perception of possible loss in carrying out 
an action. 
2. Trust. Individuals’ belief that the other party will act responsibly.  
The study found that the inclusion of the trust and risk constructs greatly 
improved the explanatory power of the model; perceived risk was a factor that 
directly influenced behavioural intention; trust also influenced behavioural 
intention, but also had an impact on perceived risk, perceived usefulness, and 
ease of use. 
3.3.3.1 McKnight’s$model$of$trust$
Exploring adoption and behaviour within an e-commerce setting, McKnight et 
al. (2002) present a multidisciplinary model of trust. Similar to TAM, the TRA 
was used as a broad overall framework; the aim of the trust model was to 
develop a complete understanding of how individuals develop initial trust 
towards e-commerce websites. 
Based on prior research, McKnight’s trust model took a parsimonious version of 
the TRA, dropping the attitudinal constructs, positing that belief level constructs 
directly influence an individual’s trusting intention to engage with a web-vendor. 
These trusting beliefs are framed as the trustor’s perceptions of three web-
vendor attributes (McKnight et al., 2002a): 
1. Competence. The ability of the trustee to fulfil trustor’s needs. 
2. Benevolence. The trustee’s general motivation to fulfil promise. 
3. Integrity. Individuals’ perceptions of the trustee’s honesty. 
The model further states that trusting beliefs are influenced by: 
4. Disposition to trust. The trustor’s personal tendency to trust/depend 
on others. 
5. Institution-based trust. Trustor’s belief that structural conditions are 
to ensure success (e.g. laws and technology infrastructure). 
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Figure 9 McKinght's Model of Trust 
Similar to Pavlou (2003), McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar (2002b) further 
explored the effect of risk perceptions on behavioural intentions. Modelled as 
perceived web risk, this captures “the extent to which a user believes it is unsafe 
to use the web or that negative consequences are possible” (McKnight et al., 
2002b). Together, the trust and risk were found to be significant predictors of 
behavioural intentions towards carrying out a trusting action.  
3.3.3.2 Internet$Users’$Information$Privacy$Concerns:$a$causal$model$
Tying privacy concerns to the behavioural intention in e-commerce transactions, 
Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal (2004), explored the effects of information collection 
and use on individuals’ behavioural intentions. Drawing on social contract 
theory, as well as the information privacy dimensions (Smith et al., 1996), the 
study conceptualised a measure for Internet Users’ Information Privacy 
Concerns (IUIPC) as a second order variable that was found to have an influence 
on the individual’s trusting belief and risk beliefs. The IUIPC influences 
individuals’ perception of the following factors: 
1. Collection. The degree to which an individual is concerned about the 
amount of personal information collected to the perceived benefits. 
2. Control. The individual’s view of the amount of say that the individual 
has over his/her personal information. 
3. Awareness. The degree to which an individual is concerned about 
his/her knowledge of an organisation’s information privacy practices. 
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Figure 10 IUPIC model that links information type to behavioural intention 
More interestingly for this thesis, Malhotra et al. (2004) also explored the effect 
that the type of information requested had on behavioural intentions. The study 
found that information type had a significant impact on individual perception 
and intentions; “more sensitive information significantly decreased trusting 
beliefs, increased risk beliefs, and decreased intention” (Malhotra et al., 2004). 
3.3.4 Linking&Trust&to&NCIDMS&
The various e-Commerce based trust, risk, and adoption models have been 
applied to explore the adoption rates of new e-government services (for 
examples see Belanger & Carter, 2008; Lemuria Carter & Bélanger, 2005).  
However, there has been little to no published studies that apply trust to N-
IDMSs, such that Halperin & Backhouse (2008) states that “trust, is a vital issue 
for this topic [identity] that requires theorizing and operationalizing to be 
studied within the context of identity”. 
 $
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3.3.4.1 Trust,$Risk,$and$eID$
Studying individuals’ perceptions of eID from citizens in the UK and Germany, 
(Halperin & Backhouse, 2012) have proposed a trust-risk model that is theorised 
to influence individuals' behavioural intentions to adopt a system. 
Using open ended survey questions, which were analysed using Grounded 
Theory, Halperin and Backhouse put forward that intentions is influenced by 
individuals’ risk perceptions: 
1. Information risks. Risks associated with the handling and processing 
of personal information, as well as the technology used in such activities. 
2. Economical risk. Individuals’ cost-benefit assessment of the system.` 
This not only deals with individuals’ personal economic gain/loss, but is 
also an individuals’ assessment of public funds.  
3. Socio-Political risk. Individuals’ concern about the growth of 
government power, at the loss of citizen rights. 
These risk perceptions would in turn be influenced by individuals trusting 
beliefs in the organisation: 
4. Competence. Perception that the organisation will be able to keep the 
eID system secure. 
5. Integrity. Perception that the organisation will use the identity 
information in a manner not agreed by individuals. 
6. Benevolence. Perception of organisations underlying motives for 
introducing the system. Is the eID system designed to empower 
individuals, or to increase organisations’ surveillance power?  
 
 
Figure 11 Halperin & Backhouse (2012) proposed trust model in eID 
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Furthermore, individuals trusting beliefs are formed on individual’s background 
views. Background views refer to the role of past events or experiences involving 
the organisation, whereby negative events serve to lower individuals trusting 
beliefs in the organisation. Three types of background views were identified: 
7. IT failures. Organisations past failed implementations of technology 
systems. 
8. Function creep. Previous events where governments have authorised 
the use of personal information for other states purposes. 
9. Political history. The past relationship between individual’s rights and 
the organisation. For example, Halperin and Backhouse state that a 
history of totalitarianism is linked with doubts over governments’ 
goodwill.  
3.3.4.2 Li’s$model$of$Trust$
Li (2004) developed and tested a comprehensive model of trust that predicts 
citizen’s trust in N-IDMS. The new model is rooted in TRA and TPB. As such, 
Li's (2004) model predicts trusting behaviour through behavioural intention. 
  
Figure 12 Li's Model of Trust in N-IDMS 
Borrowing constructs from other models, such as McKnight’s model of trust 
(Section 3.3.3.1), the aim of the research was to uncover the context specific 
variables that influence the trusting belief constructs; these constructs were not 
covered in the original TRA and TPB models. Li (2004) developed four context 
specific variables, termed bases, which are shown to influence beliefs: 
1. Personality base. Individuals’ general tendency to trust. The sub-
constructs of the personality base are faith in competence, faith in 
benevolence, faith in integrity and trusting stance. 
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2. Cognitive base. Cues and impressions on the basis of which individuals 
form their trust; an individual’s assessment of the object or system in 
question is dependent on its reputation, stereotypes, and people’s 
illusion of control. 
3. Calculative base. Individuals’ perception of cost vs. benefit of carrying 
out the trusting behaviour. 
4. Institutional base. The availability of structures that enhance trust. 
Situational normality and structural assurance will be used to represent 
this trusting base. 
Through empirical research, Li (2004) established that the cognitive base 
determined behavioural and normative beliefs, the calculative base affected the 
normative beliefs, and the institutional base influenced an individual’s perceived 
behavioural control. The personality base was found to influence the 
institutional base variable. 
Li (2004) also found that mandatory systems increase trusting intentions. 
However, this should not be relied upon as a method to ensure adoption. It 
would be more beneficial for an organisation to increase positive attitudes, 
subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control which would make 
individuals want to use the system, thus ensuring that initial adoption turns into 
on-going use. For example, referring to further research of TAM within the 
workplace, Venkatesh & Davis (2000) found that mandatory systems increased 
individuals’ subjective norms, and thus, intentions to use a system during the 
early stages of implementation (one to two months after implementation); 
however, the study also revealed that over time (three months after 
implementation) intention to use the system is not affected by these subjective 
norms and mandates of use. 
3.3.5 Limitations&of&Current&IDMS&Trust&Research&
IDMSs create privacy concerns, affecting risk beliefs that require individuals to 
trust the implementing organisation; these risks arise from the unpredictability 
of negative outcomes. Trust mediates the risks, and thus both concepts are 
highly intertwined, so much so, that efforts to reduce privacy concerns can be 
seen as methods to induce trusting behaviour. In these cases, trust and risk 
should not be studied in isolation of one another. 
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While Li's (2004) trust model for N-IDMS is useful, it does not consider the 
risks that require it. Although the trust model does have a calculative base that 
may capture some of the risk involved, an examination of the questions used to 
explore this construct do not include any specific system variables; i.e. the model 
does not account for how the system design may affect individuals’ perception of 
risk or trust.  
Looking at the research conducted by Malhotra et al. (2004), we can see that the 
type of information has an impact on the overall trust beliefs, risk beliefs and 
behavioural intentions. Research to further bolster the strength of such models 
needs to further build on these elements, exploring how individual perceptions 
regarding the collection, storage and use of identity information affects the 
overall behavioural intentions. Therefore, it would be useful for IDMS trust 
research to explore how the system design itself can affect individuals’ trust and 
risk perceptions, and hence their intention to accept these systems.  
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3.4 Culture*
“Culture consists of the unwritten rules of the social game. It is the 
collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of 
one group or category of people from others” (Hofstede, 2005).  
This thesis also seeks to explore the effect of culture on individuals’ behaviour 
around identity. The values individuals hold will influence their privacy risk 
perceptions and tolerance levels, thus affecting their behavioural intentions. The 
review reveals that, while some preliminary work has shown differences in the 
perception of IDMS between individuals from different countries, it has not been 
analysed within any formal cultural framework (Section 3.4.2.1). 
Culture carries many meanings; in the context of this research, culture is defined 
as patterns across groups; this includes the explicit observable forms of culture, 
as well as the implicit thought patterns that are common to a group of people 
(Section 3.4.1). These explicit forms include the behaviours, rituals, and artefacts 
that can be recorded, while the implicit consists of a set of values that are 
internal to groups. Implicit culture refers to broad tendencies and preferences of 
groups to the world around them. An analysis of the two levels of culture reveals 
that the internal implicit patterns shape the outer explicit forms of culture-like 
behaviour.  
The implicit, being the internal collective state of mind, dictates acceptable 
behaviour expected of individuals (Section 3.4.1.2). This has implications for the 
spread of culture within groups; faced with a situation, people in the same group 
expect other individuals to take a certain course of action as determined by the 
implicit values that they hold; this correct expected action taken then serves to 
reaffirms those implicit values. 
Extending the concept of culture to groups of people across countries gives rise 
to the concept of a national culture (Section 3.4.2). Therefore, despite the 
heterogeneity that is present within countries, a national culture is believed to 
exist in which the people of a country share similar values. The impact that this 
has on national identity schemes may help to determine the success or failure of 
such systems. As such, this thesis will seek to make use of national culture to 
determine the influences that national culture has on the development of 
individual perceptions of N-IDMS.  
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3.4.1 What&is&Culture?&
Culture is an all-pervasive force that shapes and exerts an influence on 
individuals’ actions and behaviours. As Hickson & Pugh (1995) put it, culture 
“shapes everything”. The current era of globalization has highlighted the 
importance of culture and its effects; in a time when organisations are spread 
out across several continents, culture can be used as a tool to understand and 
possibly predict the possible ramifications. For example the rejection of N-IDMS 
by the general public in the UK (Section 2.2.2.2 and 2.3.2.1) may be partially 
attributed to national culture; in fact, the research here uncovers that the 
populations’ individualistic values raise much concern regarding the potential 
erosion of freedoms caused by N-IDMS (see Section 6.5.2). However, despite the 
growing use of cultural studies, there is still much debate in the fields of 
anthropology, psychology and sociology as to what culture really is, and what 
impact it has on behaviour (McSweeney, 2002). 
A source of confusion and controversy around the word is its varied use in 
everyday language (Dahl, 2004). On one hand, the phrase ‘work culture’ might 
refer to the work ethic within an organisation. However, when used to describe a 
person as ‘cultured’ the term takes on a new form, i.e. describing a highly 
educated individual. However, the one thread that is common to all 
interpretations is that culture isn’t a physical manifestation. It is an abstract 
phenomenon, one that is so embedded in everyday life that it becomes hard to 
capture. Hall (1984) described it as an invisible mechanism that steers and 
controls our lives. As such, the far-reaching effects of culture have resulted in the 
term being adopted for use in several different fields to represent seemingly 
unrelated concepts.  
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At a basic level, culture can be defined as a shared system of values and patterns 
across groups of people. Compiling the various definitions of culture present at 
the time, Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1963) state that “culture consists of patterns, 
explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by 
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including 
their embodiment in artefacts; the essential core of culture consists of 
traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their 
attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as 
products of action, on the other, as conditional elements of future action.” 
Explicit in this definition refers to the observable forms of culture-like actions 
and behaviour. Implicit refers to thoughts and ideas about the world. Hofstede, 
2005) refers to this implicit concept as mental programming. 
3.4.1.1 The$shape$of$culture$
 
Figure 13 The onion-layer model of culture 
 
The separation of culture into a two-tiered structure (the implicit and the 
explicit) is an important one, as it is the implicit shared values that influence the 
explicit actions. Hofstede (2001) elaborates on this structure through a layered 
model; here culture is shaped like an onion, with various layers, at the core of 
which lie shared group values. The explicit is further broken down into various 
layers, with each layer dependent on the layers below it. This model illustrates 
how the values at the core have an influence over the observable facets of 
culture.  
values'
rituals'
heroes'
symbols'
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Spencer-Oatey (2008) introduces some modifications to this model. While the 
core values remain unchanged, it is encircled not by rituals but by beliefs, 
attitudes and conventions. This is then followed by the concepts of systems and 
institutions and finally artefacts, rituals, and behaviour. The introduction of the 
second layer of attitudes and beliefs corresponds to another layer of the implicit 
culture that allows for the variation that might occur within a group. Individuals 
are unlikely to have exact attitudes, but are more likely to show family 
resemblances, which can be contributed to the unique personalities of each 
individual. 
An individual’s mental programming can be broken down into three different 
levels (Hofstede, 2001): 
1.  The universal. The most basic and applies to all human beings 
regardless of group membership (e.g. survival instinct, etc.). 
2.  The collective. The collective programming, which refers to the 
cultural influences. 
3. The individual. The truly unique part of a person’s mental state. This 
allows for individual personalities and can account for the heterogeneity 
in a group. 
 
Figure 14 The levels of human programming. The universal, the collective, and the 
individual 
individual'
collec3ve'
universal'
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3.4.1.2 The$spread$of$culture$
The implicit values shared among a group of individuals influence behaviour, 
which materialises as common explicit actions. Not only are these culturally 
driven actions common within the group, but they also become expected social 
behaviour. Triandis (1972) introduced the concept of a subjective culture, in 
which the mental programming is used as a means of deciphering the social 
environment. When interacting with other people, an individual perceives and 
assesses the situation through the values that he/she has internalized. As such, 
any action taken is influenced by his/her perception, and hence values. 
Observers of the situation holding the same cultural values would likely 
anticipate the individual’s behaviour. Not only is a certain course of action 
anticipated, but it is also expected; culture acts as an invisible control 
mechanism (Hall, 1984). Once carried out, the action only serves to reaffirm the 
values. Therefore, in a way culture feeds on itself: it influences action, and is 
further reinforced by it. 
This is in line with Hofstede (2005) view, in which the “transfer of collective 
software [i.e. the shared cultural values] is a social phenomenon”. Unlike the 
universal level of programming, which is believed to be largely hereditary, the 
collective level is learned (Hofstede, 2005); it is obtained from a very young age 
when individuals are exposed to the environment around them. Through 
observation of the habits and rituals of others around them, individuals absorb 
the messages and rules by which the particular society plays. This creates a 
“system of permanent and transferable tendencies… which can be collectively 
orchestrated without an actual conductor” (Bourdieu 1980 as quoted in 
Hofstede, 2001). 
3.4.2 National&Culture&
Given the definition of culture as shared values within a group, how does one 
identify a culturally similar group? Wallerstein (1990) identifies cultural groups 
as those with some form of self-awareness, and some kind of organisation. 
Groups are said to have a culture if a “statically significant relationship between 
group ‘membership’ and certain behaviour, or values” exists (Wallerstein, 
1990). As such, nations can be seen to possess a shared culture; individuals in 
the population are aware of being members of the group, and differences can be 
observed in the way different nationalities may act and behave. 
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However, we must also recognise that national culture is not the only culture 
within a nation. Individuals are members of many different groups. They 
possess multiple identities and assume various roles, each accompanied by their 
own set of cultural attributes; for example, there might be norms associated with 
a person’s religion or work environment. Therefore, there is debate over the 
measurement of a national culture, given that differences may be encountered 
within such a large population (McSweeney, 2002). How can we identify and 
single out the preferences associated with national culture from the other 
subcultures that are present (or any culture national or otherwise)? There is 
compelling evidence that differences between populations in terms of 
preferences and values do exist, and that these differences can be measured 
(Hofstede, 2005; Schwartz, 1999; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1994).  
One possible method of identifying culture would be through the observation of 
the outer layers, the explicit forms of culture. Through the observations of 
actions, behaviour and artefacts, one can slowly peel away the layers until 
arriving at the core. The other route to identifying the cultural values is by 
questioning the values themselves. This is the method that Hofstede, Schwartz 
and Fons Trompenaars subscribe to. Hofstede's work is easily the most 
prominent; though critics claim that his cultural measures are out-dated, 
unreliable, and contain too few dimensions too accurately capture national 
culture. However, these concerns are addressed by the large body of replications 
that support the Hofstede’s original findings (Hofstede, 2005; Sondergaard, 
1994). Furthermore, new dimensions have recently been added (Geert Hofstede, 
Minkov, & Vinken, 2008), keeping Hofstede’s measures remain current, while 
capturing as much cultural diversity as possible. Thus, in this thesis, Hofstede’s 
measures are favoured in exploring any cross-cultural differences. 
Hofstede (2005) defines cultural values as “broad tendencies to prefer certain 
states over others”. He discovered nuances in cultural difference while 
conducting research for IBM looking into organisational culture. His initial 
study revealed four sets of values that capture differences in national culture; the 
four sets of values as defined by (Geert Hofstede et al., 2008) are: 
1. Power Distance. The extent to which the less powerful members of a 
society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. A high 
value for this index represents a large amount of inequality that is both 
exerted from leaders and accepted by the followers. 
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2. Uncertainty Avoidance is the measure of society’s tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity. A high measure of this index is usually 
accompanied by strict laws and rules that minimise unstructured 
situations. Uncertainty accepting cultures on the other hand tend to be 
accepting of others’ views and have as few rules as possible. 
3. Individualism is the opposite of collectivism. Individualism stands for 
a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: a person is 
expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family 
only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people are integrated 
from birth onwards into strong, cohesive in-groups, which continue to 
protect them throughout their life in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty. 
4. Masculinity is the opposite of femininity. Masculinity stands for a 
society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct: men are 
supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; 
women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the 
quality of life. Femininity stands for a society in which social gender 
roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, 
and concerned with the quality of life 
Later research investigating culture based on Hofstede’s model identified 
another value (G Hofstede & Bond, 1988). This was followed by the discovery of 
two other values that were incorporated in to the framework (Van Vugt, Ronnie 
G.M.A. 2006 in Hofstede 2008). This brings the total number of cultural values 
to seven. The new values added  are: 
5. Long-Term Orientation is the opposite of short-term orientation. 
Long-term orientation stands for a society that fosters virtues oriented 
towards future rewards, in particular adaptation, perseverance and 
thrift. Short-term orientation stands for a society that fosters virtues 
related to the past and present, in particular respect for tradition, 
preservation of “face”, and fulfilling social obligations (Hofstede & 
Bond, 1998). 
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6. Indulgence stands for a society which allows relatively free 
gratification of some desires and feelings, especially those that have to 
do with leisure, merrymaking with friends, spending, consumption and 
sex. Its opposite pole, restraint, stands for a society that controls such 
gratification, and where people feel less able to enjoy their lives (Van 
Vugt, 2006 in Hofstede 2008). 
7. Monumentalism stands for a society that rewards people who are, 
metaphorically speaking, like monuments: proud and unchangeable. Its 
opposite pole, self-effacement, stands for a society that rewards 
humility and flexibility. The monumentalism index will probably be 
negatively correlated with the long-term orientation index, but it 
includes aspects not covered by the latter (Van Vugt 2006 in Hofstede 
2008). 
3.4.2.1 Impact$of$National$Culture$on$IDMS$
A review of the literature reveals that culture is a rich source of information 
about groups of people and their preferences. The values that groups possess 
form the core of any culture that then influence the beliefs, attitudes, 
behaviours, and actions. Therefore, culture can be a valuable and powerful tool 
that can be used to predict people’s reactions. From management to various 
fields of human-computer interaction, the implications are so widespread that 
many researchers from diverse fields have attempted to utilise culture to explain 
behaviour. 
As such, it is useful to consider culture in determining the acceptability of N-
IDMSs. If the designs of such systems go against the core values of the national 
culture, then it is likely for the system to be rejected. While there has been some 
work done in the area of culture, trust and privacy, there have not been any 
studies that specifically explore the cultural effects on IDMSs; research should 
attempt to fill this gap, and explore the effects of national culture within the 
context of IDMS. 
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3.4.2.2 Privacy$and$the$influence$of$culture$
The sharing of information can be seen as a social action, and therefore may be 
affected by the norms and culture present within that society. The nature of 
information and hence its sensitivity is determined by the structure of societies 
in place. For example, a closely-knit community might not regard a piece of 
information as sensitive; on the other hand, a fragmented setting might highly 
value the privacy of the same information. In the same way, a highly 
bureaucratic society might see the government as a non-threatening receiver of 
information, while an oppressed society might view it negatively. 
There has been some research that attempt to link informational privacy and 
culture. Milberg, Burke, Smith, & Kallman (1995) first attempt failed to establish 
any link whatsoever between informational privacy concern and culture, but did 
uncover the influence of national culture on the level of government involvement 
in privacy issues. Using Hofstede (2001) Cultural Values Measures, the second 
study conducted by Milberg, Smith, & Burke (2000) revealed a positive 
correlation between power distance, individualism and masculinity and privacy 
concerns. Uncertainty avoidance had a negative impact on privacy concerns. 
However, a separate study by Bellman, Johnson, Kobrin, & Lohse (2004) failed 
to corroborate these findings, and instead discovered that power distance, 
individualism and masculinity had a negative influence on privacy concerns.  
The discrepancy in the results of the two studies may be accounted for by the 
different statistical methods; when applying the same statistical methods as 
Milberg et al. (2000), Bellman et al. (2004) found a similarity, in that 
uncertainty avoidance was negatively correlated with privacy concerns. Another 
source of discrepancy may be attributed to the differing levels of analysis; 
Milberg et al. (2000) looked at correlations between cultural values and overall 
informational privacy concerns, while Bellman et al. (2004) analysed 
correlations with each individual information privacy construct (i.e. collection, 
improper access, errors, and unauthorised use). Lastly, the two studies look at 
privacy concerns in two different contexts; Milberg et al. (2000) framed the 
privacy concerns relating to organisations, while Bellman et al. (2004) focused 
on privacy concerns in websites. Therefore, the results of these studies do not 
appear to be comparable until an agreed study protocol is used across the 
different studies. 
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3.4.2.3 Linking$trust$to$culture$
The literature linking culture to trust is less developed than that available on 
privacy. There is a lack of studies that investigate the effects of national culture 
on the development of trust. In a call to explore the area, Doney, Cannon, & 
Mullen (1998) have theorised the effect of culture on trust, but have not explored 
it further. Some evidence for the effect of culture on trust comes from Backhouse 
& Halperin (2007) survey of European citizens’ trust of identity systems.  
Their results indicate that citizens’ in Central and Eastern Europe had largely 
positive attitudes towards N-IDMSs and authorities, when compared to the 
negative responses obtained from the UK, Ireland, Germany, Austria, Finland, 
and Scandinavian countries. The findings were not explored in the context of 
any cultural measures such as those of Hofstede (2005), but indicate that there 
might be a possible effect of national culture on the development of trust.  
  112 
3.5 Organisations*and*NGIDMS*
Organisations implement an IDMS to fulfil a particular purpose. The design of a 
system will reflect the goals that the organisation is trying to achieve, thus 
making the organisation a critical part of this research (Section 3.5.1.1).  
Looking specifically at N-IDMS, the organisation in question is the government 
agency that is tasked with the planning, implementation, and management of 
the system. There is little published research that covers how organisational 
identity requirements and purpose shapes the design of an identity system. 
Within the computer science literature, Identity Management Architectures 
(IDMA) have been proposed that are either focused on specific technological 
details, or detail a high-level overview of IDMS workflows and processes; in 
either case IDMAs do not capture or describe how organisational identity 
requirements and purpose actually influences the implementation details 
(Section 3.5.2.1).  
There is also available research that focuses on the public policy debates about 
N-IDMS; of interest to this thesis, current investigations have uncovered a 
short-circuiting of these identity policy debates, by reducing discussions to 
technological aspects, without suitable assessment of fit-for-purpose (Section 
3.5.2.2 and 3.5.2.3). These debates focus on the theoretical evidence presented 
by the government agency, which do not fully explore the complexities and 
effectiveness of identity technology in its implementation context. 
Further research should attempt to address this problem by investigating how 
the purpose and requirements of an organisation shape the planning and design 
of implementation of an IDMS (Section 3.5.3). 
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3.5.1 Investigating&Organisations&
Identity pervades all levels of social interactions, and is either managed by 
individuals or organisations; on a personal level, identity is managed by each 
individual, who draws upon his/her mental constructions and memories to 
construct identities for each person he/she encounters; however, on a larger 
scale, officially recognised forms of identities are managed by organisations that 
ensure the validity of registered identities.  
The conditions under which these managed identities can be used are defined by 
the organisation; more accurately, organisations implement and design identity 
systems to fulfil a particular purpose. Therefore, the implementing 
organisation’s requirements and expectations behind identity become an 
important component in the research of IDMS. As this research largely deals 
with N-IDMS, the organisation in question is the government or the specific 
government agency tasked with the planning, implementation, and running of 
an N-IDMS. 
3.5.1.1 Purpose$of$the$IDMS$
The purpose for which a system is implemented will influence its design, so that 
it can best achieve the goals set out for it. Having clearly established goals for an 
IDMS will aid in identifying the individuals that will be enrolled, what personal 
information will be collected, as well as identifying who will be able to access the 
identity, and what they can use it for. “Decisions made at this level will also 
have ramifications for the technological underpinnings of the system, including 
what levels and kinds of system security will be required” (Kent & Millett, 
2002). 
Specifically considering N-IDMS, purpose is partly defined by the context of the 
situation in which it is introduced; objectives of the system are driven by the 
unique requirements of each country. While the overall aims across different 
countries may be the same (e.g. reduce terrorism or tackle immigration), the 
manner in which it is deployed might not be. Each system needs to be tailored to 
each country by accounting for population size, current immigration procedures, 
laws and a variety of other constructs. A statement that clearly defines the 
purpose of an N-IDMS system will allow the formulation of a strategy, and an 
assessment of that strategy, to be made in relation to its unique implementation 
conditions. 
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It should be noted that an N-IDMS can have more than one purpose. We have 
already identified early on (Section 1.2 and 1.3) that proponents of N-IDMS see 
identity as a silver bullet, being able to increase government efficiency, while 
also reducing organized crime, battling terrorism, and tackling benefit fraud; all 
of which have been arguments put forward by the UK in its recently scrapped 
pursuit of an N-IDMS (Section 2.3.2.1 and Section 7.2.2). Therefore, 
organizations must be clear about the entire purpose(s) of the identity system, 
and everything that it will be used for. 
3.5.2 ShortCcomings&of&current&approaches&
Recognising that IDMS should be designed to fit the purpose of the system, 
current approaches do not account for it. Traditional identity literature that 
address (Section 3.5.2.1 and Section 3.5.2.3) organisations' concerns over the 
implementation of an IDMS tend to focus on the basic identity lifecycle and 
identity architectures as identified in Section 3.1.2.1. Similar to the pattern 
identified within the identity, privacy, and trust literature, organisations still 
view identity simply as an authentication mechanism. As such, the literature 
does not account for the strategic value of identity to the organisation, and its 
influence on the success or failure of an IDMS implementation; “most of this 
research [on N-IDMS] deals with individual identity management, or with 
identity management within organisations. There is not much discussion for 
similar features with regard to official identities of citizens on the national 
level” (Kubicek, 2010). 
3.5.2.1 Identity$Management$Architecture$(IDMA)$
An IDMA is a “set of processes, workflow, framework, standards, and policies 
that defines and describes a system of Identity Management” (White, 2008); it 
is a blueprint that describes all the components of an IDMS, thus providing 
organisations with a structure and roadmap for the design and implementation 
of an identity system. 
In his doctoral thesis, White (2008) developed an IDMA that was technology 
agnostic, while integrating higher order strategic aims; this is a significant 
departure from traditional architectures that focused on technical security 
aspects of an IDMS (Windley, 2005). Analysing several federated identity 
systems implemented by the Australian government, the proposed architecture 
consisted of several different frameworks as illustrated in Figure 4 (see Section 
3.1.2.1).  
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While White's (2008) architecture is a step forward from the security technology 
perspective, it is not without its shortcomings. First of all, despite “integrating 
the organisations strategic aims”, the high level view of the IDMA means that it 
is absent of any specific details regarding the actual considerations that affect 
implementation; what are the actual factors that the organisation must consider 
to ensure a system that is fit-for-purpose?  
Secondly, while it is suggested that the IDMA can be used to design citizen side 
N-IDMS, it is highly limited to a Type 1 IDMS configuration (Section 3.1.2.1). 
The architecture was developed within the context of identity as an 
authenticator to access a resource. However, as described earlier (Section 3.1.4), 
identity is no longer just used as a mechanism to access the resource, but has 
itself becomes the resource that is being accessed and used by the organisation. 
Therefore, coupled with the high level view of the architecture, White (2008) 
briefly describes that the construction of identity (i.e. the choice of identity 
information, its collection, storage, etc.) as a function of the Human Resource 
department.  
Finally, a result of the high level Type 1 view of the IDMA, the privacy 
management framework takes a very functional view, looking at integrating 
typical “enterprise privacy policies” (White, 2008). As uncovered in the privacy 
literature review, typical privacy polices takes a functional confidentiality 
approach, and that future privacy work needs to stretch towards the greater 
implications on the lived experience (Section 3.2.5).  
3.5.2.2 Framework$for$the$Path$of$New$NJIDMS$
While White (2008) focused on distilling common attributes of IDMS into an 
architecture, Kubicek (2010) took a different approach, focusing on the 
differences between N-IDMSs in Europe, hoping to “understand the differences 
between national eIDMS in other European countries, and assess the scope and 
magnitude of changes in the citizen-government relation”.  
 As a background, several European governments are in various stages of the 
planning, implementation, and distribution of citizen electronic identities (eID) 
to support their e-government and e-commerce agendas. Different countries 
have each chosen different approaches, implementing measures that they 
believe best fit their needs and situations. It is within this context of exploring 
inter-operability of the different eIDs schemes that a framework is developed to 
explain the differences noted across different N-IDMS (Kubicek, 2010). 
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Figure 15 Kubicke's (2010) path analysis for eIDMS 
Using a mixture of path analysis, institutional actor theory and policy field 
analysis, the study focused on eight different countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). The research found that 
the current organisational, technological, and regulatory arrangements have a 
very strong tendency to be brought forward into the new system. “Path changes 
and path creation have to be explained, while path continuation is the default 
assumption” (Kubicek & Noack, 2010b). For example, Sweden has typically 
relied on other organisations for identities, and chose to outsource the 
administration of its new N-IDMS to banking consortiums. In contrast, 
governments, like Germany, that have typically kept control of identity tend seek 
to implement government-controlled and managed identities. Cultural attitudes 
and norms also have an effect, where privacy sensitive countries with stronger 
regulations tend to have higher security requirements, and privacy legislations 
when implementing the new systems. 
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The research has also found that identity discussions, despite being a multi-field 
policy effort, fail to cater for other policy actors that they would like to interact 
with. As a result, there is low uptake of the identity by other public and private 
agencies, as the lack of co-ordination has resulted in low level of perceived 
benefit (Kubicek & Noack, 2010b). With regards to citizen-government 
relationships, the research has found that eIDs are not appropriate or effective 
solutions to addressing an individual’s security and safety concerns. Kubicek & 
Noack (2010b) argue that these problems occur because “policy makers 
following the advice of technical experts reduced the societal problem to a 
technical problem”. Technological concerns and trust were typically reduced to 
discussions and precautions around technical security, instead of the identity 
system itself in relation to the purpose.  
Finally, the researchers found no compelling evidence that links eIDs to changes 
in the citizen-government relationship. The privacy fears brought about by the 
digitalisation of identity and its impacts on the citizen were non-existent, as to 
“citizens it is still considered and used as means for interpersonal 
authentication” (Kubicek & Noack, 2010a).  
However, while the study uncovers many dependencies, like White's (2008) 
IDMA, the study is limited towards Type 1 IDMS (Section 3.1.2.1). Little 
discussion is given towards the suitability of identity information and 
technologies being implemented. As a result it doesn’t accurately explain for the 
low take up of government eIDs experienced in most of the countries 
investigated. Furthermore, this explains the lack of privacy concerns raised by 
citizens, who are not consulted about the strategic use of identity by the 
organisation; Kubicek & Noack (2010b) themselves admit that “privacy 
concerns addressing the exchange of person-related data between different 
government back offices are without any doubt justified, but they are not 
influenced by the eIDMS for online authentication in the front offices. Rather 
front office and back office processes are quite independent with regard to 
privacy intrusion and provisions”. Research needs to focus on the broader views 
of IDMS; to focus on identity on the strategic aims of the organisations, its use of 
identity to fulfil those aims, and thus the lived experience and perceptions of 
individuals with respect to the new approach. 
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3.5.2.3 Developing$New$Identity$Policies$
In investigating the role of policies in the development and success of new 
systems, Kubicek & Noack (2010b) point out the multidisciplinary nature of 
identity policy, highlighting the lack of interaction between the implementing 
organisation and other important actors, as well as the reductive approach of 
diminishing issues to pure technological discussion. Whitley & Hosein (2010) go 
on to explore these issues with the aim of developing effective identity policies 
that address various concerns. 
Taking a broader view, Whitley & Hosein (2010) state that comprehensive 
identity policies “involve creating or adopting schemes for the collection and 
processing of individual-specific data that will be shared across services, both 
within and beyond government, often for a variety of purposes”. As with 
Kubicek & Noack (2010b), the authors highlight the delicate nature of identity 
policies that cut across various public and private policy drivers. This is further 
complicated by the technological aspects of an identity system; identity 
technology is commonly seen as a solution, but itself introduces new questions 
into the policy debates that are ignored, and thus can undermine the 
effectiveness of the identity solution. 
Examining the recently abolished UK identity card system, Whitley & Hosein, 
(2010) conclude that governments attempt to manipulate and control the 
conversation by short-circuiting identity policy debates through the use of: 
1. International obligations. These are used as an excuse to implement 
new technologies without deliberation. It creates a risk where policies are 
never adequately deliberated at any level, each level presuming that the 
other levels will or have done it.  
2. Technology and facts. There is a separation of scientific fact from 
social action. It ignores perplexities of claims, not accepting of alternative 
knowledge claims, especially with policies that need to use science, in 
which there is no consensus within the scientific community.  
3. Language ambiguity. The use of vague language to escape proper 
scrutiny.  
Whitley & Hosein (2010) suggest that effective identity policies should be led by 
clear goals that facilitate responsive, reliable, and relevant development of 
technology, and limit abuse. The N-IDMS should also be proportionate and 
transparent, serving the individual and private sectors alike.  
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These recommendations are also reflected by Kent & Millett (2002), who state 
that identity policies need to address several questions, which will drive the 
identity technology considerations and final N-IDMS implementation: 
1. Purpose of the system? 
2. Scope of the population? 
3. Scope of the data? 
4. Who would be the users? 
5. What type of uses would be allowed? 
6. Is participation voluntary or mandatory? 
7. What legal structures would protect the system’s integrity? 
3.5.3 Further&Research&
The currently available literature on organisations and N-IDMS has focused on 
high-level policy considerations, pointing out that a clear purpose will be 
determinant to implementing a successful system; a clear goal will influence the 
technological choices, and structure of the final identity system. 
While Kubicek (2010) has developed a framework detailing the influences of 
external forces on the organisations plans on the N-IDMS, research could 
further benefit from a closer investigation into the decision making process that 
influences the specific identity technologies. Expanding on the knowledge base 
presented here, and its focus on purpose, research should investigate how 
particular organisational requirements may have an impact on the identity 
technologies, the information required to construct identity, and the structure of 
the final system.  
Developing an in-depth framework that focuses on the identity system and the 
technologies or information required would provide a more accessible tool for 
system designers and researchers, helping to alleviate some of the problems 
caused by the technology and ambiguity in short-circuiting identity policy 
debates. 3.6 Chapter*Summary*
This chapter reviewed literature from the related fields of identity, trust, privacy, 
and culture; as well as an examination of organisations approach towards 
implementing N-IDMS. In so doing the thesis identifies gaps within the field 
that this research investigates. 
  120 
Beginning with the concept of identity itself, the review has found that current 
definitions are limited by the traditional focus on Type 1 IDMS; identity is 
largely seen as a static object that is used as a security mechanism to gain access 
to resources. Driven by this purely functional concept of identity, current 
human-centric identity approaches typically focus on ease of use, merely 
treating individual’s functional pieces within the system; for example, federated 
identity attempts to reduce barriers to sign up and information sharing. 
Reflecting, or perhaps as a result of the shallow view of identity, the current 
privacy literature focuses on similarly narrow view of information privacy. 
Developments within in the field have traditionally focused on the issues of 
confidentially and data minimisation. Meanwhile, N-IDMS trust research is 
largely absent of individuals’ perception of risk presented by an identity system. 
Therefore, further research undertaken needs to consider a broader view of 
identity that reflects the real world. Identity systems have grown to become 
hybrid systems that not only control access to resources, but are used in a 
strategic manner to inform organisational decisions and interactions with an 
individual (Type 2 IDMS); this could range from simply providing individuals 
with personalised services, to tracking suspected terrorists. 
This is the stance with which the thesis approaches the problem. In so doing, the 
research aims to fill the gaps taken by the traditional IDMS research. In terms of 
privacy, this means investigating the consequences of identity beyond that of the 
informational privacy; i.e. the research moves from the concepts of 
confidentiality and data minimisation towards the actual impacts of identity on 
individuals’ lived experience. Similarly the research will take a broader view of 
the trust research, focusing on how the design of the system affects individuals’ 
perceived risks, and hence its impact on the intention to adopt IDMSs.  
This thesis also seeks to further augment the exploration of perceived risk and 
behavioural intention through an investigation of culture, which is an all-
pervasive influence that shapes a populations behaviour and expectations. Thus, 
in the context of N-IDMS, national culture may explain for differences in the 
reaction of populations across different countries. While there has been some 
work done in the area of culture, trust and privacy, they have not been 
specifically explored within the context of identity systems; this research 
attempts to fill this gap, and explore how culture can affect the implementation 
and acceptance of IDMSs.  
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Finally, the thesis also recognises the organisation as an important stakeholder 
that shapes the implementation of an IDMS. Of prime importance is ensuring 
that the system design reflects the organisations purpose for implementing an 
IDMS. However, again current research has shown that identity is commonly 
seen as a security mechanism (i.e. Type 1 IDMS), thus ignoring the overall lived 
experience. Further exacerbating the situation, organisations typically short-
circuit N-IDMS policy debates, refusing to entertain discussion or alternative 
views to ensure the proposed identity system is actually fit-for-purpose. 
Research should not be deterred by this fact, and therefore this thesis 
investigates the organisational requirements that shape IDMS, and thus guide 
the implementation to ensure a suitable system is implemented.  
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Chapter&4:&Methodology&
This thesis explores the relationship between individuals, organisations, and N-
IDMS (Section 5.1). The research is exploratory, seeking to create a better 
understanding through empirical studies, utilising various methods to collect 
and analyse qualitative and quantitative data (Section 5.2.3).  
The research was conducted in three separate studies; a system, an individual 
study, and an organisation centred studies (Section 4.3). Using historiography to 
collect second-hand accounts around past and present N-IDMS, the system 
study aimed to identify themes that capture the practical design aspects of N-
IDMSs, and how these can impact everyday life (Section 4.3.4).  
The individual and organisational studies, guided by an overall case study 
approach, investigated the implementation of N-IDMSs in Brunei, India, and the 
United Kingdom (Section 4.3.1). The individual study made use of focus groups 
to identify individual perceptions of N-IDMSs (Section 4.3.2.1), while the 
organisation study investigated the intentions in implementing N-IDMS using 
material collected from official documents and interviews (Section 4.3.3). Both 
areas of investigation made use of grounded theory to develop narratives and 
theory directly from the data.  
The individual study also investigated the effect of culture on individual 
perceptions. This was done using Hofstede’s cultural values (Section 4.3.2.3). 
Finally, the thesis made use of triangulation to bring all the data together into a 
single coherent model, and also acted as a tool for validation and verification 
(Section 4.4). 
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4.1 Research*Question*and*Direction*
This thesis explores a human-centred approach to IDMS, focusing specifically on 
N-IDMS. A review of the identity literature has revealed that identity is typically 
seen as a functional access mechanism to security systems (Section 3.2 and 3.3). 
Meanwhile, a review of current research on organisations and IDMS reveals the 
importance of broader policy considerations, ensuring the IDMS and technology 
chosen is fit for purpose (Section 3.5.3).  
Considering the gaps identified in the literature review (Section 3.1.4, 3.2.5, 
3.3.5, 3.5.3), this thesis seeks to augment the field by answering the following 
question: 
What are the human factors that influence identity, and how does it 
affect the development, implementation, and use of Identity 
Management Systems? 4.2 Research*Methods*in*Human*Computer*Interaction**
To answer the above question, the research needed to identify and employ the 
appropriate methods of investigation. A review of the Human Computer 
Interaction (HCI) field uncovered a growing body of research methods that pulls 
in expertise from many disciplines. 
Early HCI research were typically experimental studies that examined 
individuals’ interaction with technology. These lab studies were focused on 
collecting objective performance measurements (e.g. task completion, time 
taken, etc.), as well as some subjective feedback on user satisfaction. This 
approach has now evolved to include advanced performance measures such as 
eye tracking, as well as objective measures of user-cost through the 
measurement of physiological indicators like stress.  
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However, these types of experimental lab studies are not suited to the 
investigation of complex ill-defined socio-technical phenomena (Anne Adams, 
Lunt, & Cairns, 2008). HCI research is highly contextual, driven by issues of 
user group, task, and context of interaction. Thus lab studies cannot be carried 
out in situations where these issues are not fully understood; i.e. the phenomena 
under investigation is not been fully defined. As Sasse (1997) states, “HCI 
phenomena which have not been sufficiently well described and understood 
should not be expressed as formalisms and investigated by methods of scientific 
experimentation; instead, exploratory research is required to obtain precise 
descriptions as a basis for further research”.  
As the issue of human-centred identity is one that is not fully understood, this 
thesis does not seek to test some preconceived theory in structured lab 
experiments, but instead aims develop theory to better define and understand 
the phenomenon under investigation. This calls for an exploratory investigation 
that departs from using the traditional HCI quantitative approach, and draws 
more upon the qualitative domain of social-based investigations. 
In order to fully appreciate the differences the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, it would be beneficial to briefly review the two main research 
stances, positivism and constructivism, and how these can influence the choice 
of methods that researchers subscribe to. 
4.2.1 Positivism&and&Quantitative&Methods&
Positivism is a philosophy of science that is driven by the belief that there is a 
single reality (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Positivists aim to achieve a purely 
objective and value free line of inquiry, focusing purely on the observable and 
measurable facts. The naïve realism and objectivist assumption of the positivist 
stance also implies that knowledge is easily generalizable across different 
contexts (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). As such, positivists work under the 
assumption that one can determine “how things really are” and “how things 
really work” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). It is explanatory in nature, seeking to 
establish links of causality.  
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Driven by their ontological and epistemological views, positivists make use of 
experimental and scientific approaches. Armed with hypotheses, research makes 
use of quantitative methods, i.e. numerical based methods (King, Keohane, & 
Verba, 1994; Punch, 1998). The use of numbers provides the objectivity that 
underlies positivism in that researchers are presented with a set of unchanging 
numerical figures that has a uniform value to each and every researcher. 
However, not all data in the real world naturally assumes a numerical form; 
researchers enumerate this data by either employing techniques that involve 
counting or scales. 
In trying to explore casual connections, the design of quantitative research must 
identify the variables that will be measured, of which there are three types; the 
independent variable, the dependent variable and the control variable. The 
independent variable is the variable that is theorised to cause fluctuations in the 
dependent variable. Control variables can also have an effect on the dependent 
variable; however, unlike the independent variable, researchers aim to partially 
or completely eliminate the influence of control variables. 
The common tools for quantitative research are the use of questionnaires and 
surveys. Theory is generated a priori, implying that this form of research is 
suited for theory verification rather than theory generation. Clear themes, well-
formed research questions, and complete research frameworks are essential for 
this purpose. Statistical methods are used to analyse the data gathered to prove 
the hypothesis that was been put forward. 
4.2.2 Constructivism&and&Qualitative&Methods&
Constructivism, and its derivatives, assumes a stance that is diametrically 
opposite to that of positivism. The ontological and epistemological beliefs of 
constructivists were developed in response to the positivist point of view 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Constructivists believe that there are many 
different versions of realities; there is no one truth, as truth is constructed on the 
basis of ones experiences, which varies between individuals; research sought to 
identify the subjective experiences. The relativist assumptions and the subjective 
values of all participants naturally implied that generalizations from the 
particular were impossible; constructivists seek to understand the uniqueness of 
each context. It is exploratory in nature, as opposed to the explanatory positivist 
approach.  
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Constructivists reject quantitative methods, and make use of qualitative 
methods that develop understanding not through numbers but through words, 
behaviour, and their meanings (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). They focus on the use 
of non-statistical methods as a means of analysing data collected through a 
variety of techniques; these can include interviews, observations, documentation 
notes, and personal experience (Punch, 1998). Qualitative methods can be 
applied for many different purposes; they can be used to infer causal links, or to 
describe certain situations, as well as to develop or to verify theory. Whatever 
the case, the methods aim to develop a holistic view of the situation being 
studied, typically involving prolonged contact (Punch, 1998). 
Unlike quantitative research, qualitative methods are diverse in terms of the 
techniques used to collect and analyse data. Additionally, studies of this nature 
tend to be relatively unstructured; research questions are vague, and the design 
of the inquiry process is developed as research is being conducted. Therefore, 
research tends to be an unfolding process that is loosely guided by general 
questions.  
4.2.3 Pragmatism&and&Mixed&Methods&
While the various paradigms along with their respective quantitative and 
qualitative methods appear to be incompatible, many researchers today have 
advocated the complimentary use of both research methods, stating that the 
differences have been overdrawn by purists (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). 
Pragmatists are aligned with the positivists, in the sense that they accept the 
existence of a single reality independent of our influence (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
1998). However, similar to the constructivists, pragmatists argue that one can 
never truly discover this truth, and that any explanation of the reality is 
interpreted. Pragmatist research is driven by a normative concept of truth, 
seeking to find the explanation or theory that works best, and realising that 
“claims cannot be totally abstracted from contingent beliefs, interests and 
projects” (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998).  
Pragmatists are not aligned with one particular method. Instead, research 
strategy driven by the research question, i.e. the method for data collection and 
analysis is determined by the type of data that best answers the research 
question. Pragmatists make use of both quantitative and qualitative strategies; 
this mixed-method approach, can be broken down into three main categories 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998): 
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1. Equivalent status designs. Research places equal importance on both 
quantitative and qualitative methods. 
2. Dominant/less dominant designs. Research is conducted using a 
dominant paradigm, supported by a small study using an alternative 
methodology. 
3. Multilevel use designs. Various types of data are collected using 
different methodologies. All the data is collected together and analysed. 4.3 Research*Approach*
Ideally, the research conducted here would have investigated the human factors 
by building on existing knowledge that is already available in the field. However, 
current research into ‘human-centred’ IDMS is largely theoretical solutions that 
fail to fully capture the complexity of human behaviour (Section 3.1.4, 3.2.5, 
3.3.5). A holistic approach is required to identify and assimilate the human 
factors that can affect the implementation of an IDMS.  
Coupled with the fact that the concept of identity is highly dependent on the 
context of use, an exploratory approach is required to validate and extend the 
present body of research on the subject matter. Therefore, this research takes a 
pragmatic approach to the problem; it uses mixed-methods, dominated by 
qualitative studies, and where possible, is supported by quantitative methods.  
The research conducted here was approached from three different perspectives 
and studies: 
1. System study. Recognises the IDMS system itself as a key element 
within the ecosystem. The line of inquiry seeks to identify how a system 
implementation influences the social impacts that arise. 
2. Individual study. This perspective seeks to discover how citizens think 
about and assess an IDMS. It seeks to explore the concerns that citizens 
have when confronted with an identity system. 
3. Organisation study. Looks at organisations identity requirements, 
and how that influences the design and implementation of the identity 
system. 
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Each study utilised different techniques and methods that were best suited to 
the differing lines of enquiry. In order to fully explore the cultural influences of 
individual behaviour, as well as to maximise differences and similarities between 
organisations, the individual and organisational studies were further broken 
down into three separate case studies.  
The following sections provide a general overview of the main methods used to 
explore each perspective. They also provide a general overview of the inquiry 
strategy used, leaving the specific application details to the later chapters that 
cover each of the three studies. 
4.3.1 Case&Study&Research&
Case study research is defined as "an approach capable of examining a simple 
or complex phenomenon, with unit of analysis varying from single individuals 
to large corporations and businesses; it entails using a variety of lines of action 
in its data-gathering segments, and can meaningfully make use of and 
contribute to the application of theory" (Berg, 2001). It is a systematic 
investigation of a phenomenon through one or more illustrative cases. 
In the past, the usefulness of case studies has been questioned, whereby 
conventional wisdom believes that the findings uncovered cannot be generalised 
beyond the specific case(s) studied. However, Flyvbjerg (2006) who is an 
influential figure in the use of case studies has addressed the 5 common 
misunderstandings that underpins the erroneous conventional views: 
1. Theoretical knowledge is more valuable than concrete 
practical knowledge. Working within the sociological domain, 
Flyvberg argues that one cannot find universal predictive theories when 
dealing with human affairs. Instead case studies and its closeness to real 
life aids in the development of nuanced view of reality.  
2. Generalisations cannot be made on the basis of a single case. 
This point is countered by the use a critical case, where by theory 
generated under extreme conditions implies that it would hold under 
normal conditions. Alternatively a single case study can be useful for 
falsification, i.e. black swans. 
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3. Case study is not suitable for hypothesis testing or theory 
building. This misconception is built on the previous misconception, 
and therefore acceptance that generalisations can be made implies that 
case studies are useful for hypothesis and theory building. In fact, the 
deep study of multiple extreme cases that have maximum variance can 
aid in the generation of richer hypotheses and theories. 
4. The case study contains bias towards verification. Experience in 
the case study approach has revealed that researchers are typically forced 
to reconsider their preconceptions, thus falsifying their original stance, 
and eliminating bias.  
5. Difficult to summarise and develop general propositions. In 
this case, Flyvberg agrees that it is difficult to summarise case studies. 
However he goes on to state that good studies should be read as a 
narrative in its entirety, a case story is the result itself, and the 
contextual richness can prove to be better for policy intervention.  
Therefore, as opposed to the old conventional wisdom, case studies can in fact 
be used for theory generation, providing a deep, thick, and generalizable 
understanding of the phenomena of interest.  
The research here made use three main case studies, where the cases were 
chosen so as to reflect similar goals, i.e. the implementation of an N-IDMS that 
involved the enrolment of all citizens, and the provision of a unique national id 
number per citizen. However, each case was also unique in terms of the stage of 
implementation, levels of public acceptance, as well as integration within the 
country; this variance between the cases helps in the generation of rich theory as 
a large range of actors and experiences are captured and analysed (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). The cases that were chosen for investigation are: 
1. United Kingdom. The UK government has recently decommissioned 
its planned N-IDMS, and has now invalidated the identity cards that 
were produced; at the time the research here began, the system was just 
being implemented. Its initial introduction was met with much 
resistance. The UK government had high expectations of the system, 
stating that it would help in the battle against crime, immigration and 
terrorism. 
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2. Brunei Darussalam. The government introduced a digital smart card 
in 2000, which served as a replacement of the previous paper-based 
identification scheme. Although the digital N-IDMS has been around for 
eleven years, extended use of the card has been limited. Its main function 
is to identify citizens when required; recent new functionality allows the 
smart card to be used as an access card to certain benefit information, as 
well as being used as a frequent traveller card. 
3. India has faced little if any public opposition to its plans for an 
N-IDMS. It is currently in the process of implementing the system, and 
enrolling citizens. When completed, it will be the largest N-IDMS system 
in the world. It also differs from the other systems in that it aims to 
provide a unique identity number for every person, but not necessarily 
provide them with an identity card. 
These three cases formed the structure by which the individual and 
organisational studies were conducted; each study will be framed and conducted 
within the context of the countries discussed above.  
4.3.2 Investigating&Individual&Perceptions&
The main theme of the thesis is to discover how the human elements interact 
with an IDMS. As such, the individuals enrolled in IDMS form a key aspect of 
the investigation. Initial plans for this study involved the exploration of 
individuals’ experiences through the various stages of the identity lifecycle, from 
enrolment to the actual usage and maintenance of the identity (for the identity 
lifecycle see Section 3.1.2.1). However, the cases under study made it impractical 
to capture an appropriate sample of individuals who had undergone the process. 
Negotiations with the UK Identity and Passport service to follow up on enrolled 
individuals broke down, and the eventual decommissioning of the N-IDMS 
meant that it would be impossible. Similarly, the lead agency in India was 
unresponsive to any requests made.  
Therefore, this study focused on individuals’ perception of N-IDMS, aiming to 
discover the concerns that individuals have with regards to the collection, 
storage, and use of identity. Seeking to develop a holistic understanding of how 
individuals perceive an N-IDMS, the methodology used was chosen so as to 
capture rich descriptions of individuals’ thoughts and reasoning when 
encountering identity systems. 
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4.3.2.1 Data$collection$–$Focus$Groups$
Focus groups are an interview technique whereby a group of individuals are 
gathered to discuss a topic of interest. Compared to traditional interview 
techniques, focus groups provide a researcher with data that is more naturalistic 
(Silverman, 2004); dynamics of group interaction allows for spontaneous 
interactions and ideas to develop among participants, creating data that is 
socially constructed through synergistic effects where individuals respond to 
each others ideas. As (Krueger & Casey, 2000) state, the focus group method 
works because “it taps into human tendencies. Attitudes and perceptions … are 
developed in part by interaction with other people”. 
Focus groups are particularly suited to extracting “perceptions, feelings, and 
thinking of people about issues, products, services, or opportunities” (Krueger & 
Casey, 2000), making them ideal in an attempt to uncover perceptions of N-
IDMS. In order to build an understanding of the holistic experience that 
individuals have when encountering an IDMS, we need to provide individuals 
with an opportunity to openly discuss their thoughts.  
One must also note the elusive nature of the concepts in question. Individuals 
rarely think about privacy and trust unless prompted by some kind of negative 
event or experience; i.e. unless presented with a situation that they can relate or 
empathise to, individuals only consider these aspects in passing. Therefore, it 
would be highly beneficial if subjects could bounce ideas of one another to flesh 
out ideas on how IDMS can affect themselves and society in general, thus 
providing interviewers with access to “both actual and existentially meaningful 
experiences” (Berg, 2001). This makes focus groups an ideal mode of inquiry for 
this aspect of the research. 
Critiques against the use of focus group in the generation of theory, typically 
claim that it produces unreliable results. This stems from positivist quantitative 
realms that focus on test-retest reliability, which is argued to be impossible with 
focus groups, due to constant differences in the group construction. However, 
this is rebutted by Lunt & Livingstone (1996) who argue that the unit of analysis 
in focus groups is the thematic content of discussion, and “not the properties of 
individuals composing the groups. Therefore, variation is not an error in the 
measurement of a property of an individual in the group, but rather the 
expression of variation in the discursive treatment of a topic for discussion”.  
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The manner in which a focus group is conducted is steered by the features of the 
group(s) under study. These main “characteristics relate to the ingredients of a 
focus group: (1) people who (2) possess certain characteristics and (3) provide 
qualitative data (4) in a focused discussion (5) to help understand the topic of 
interest” (Krueger & Casey, 2000). These characteristics have implications for 
the study as listed below: 
1. People. The number of people that are involved in each focus group. 
The literature in the area does not reach a particular consensus in this 
area. Recommendations spread from about 3 to 12 people (Kitzinger & 
Barbour, 1999). However, larger focus groups pose the danger of 
fragmentation, as individuals do not get the opportunity to speak. Small 
groups on the other hand suffer from fewer experiences and hence ideas 
(Krueger & Casey, 2000). 
2. Similar Characteristics. Homogeneity of participants within focus 
groups is natural, as the participants are likely to consist of the people in 
whom you are interested. The level of similarity can vary from the 
vaguely general (e.g. a customer of a store) to highly detailed and specific 
(e.g. customers of certain age and gender who come from a specific area).  
3. Focused Discussion. “The topics of discussion in a focus group are 
carefully predetermined and sequenced, based on an analysis of the 
situation” (Krueger & Casey, 2000). This means that the researcher 
should identify the areas of interest in the area of research. The 
questioning route, according to (Krueger & Casey, 2000), typically starts 
from general open ended questions, to stimulate early discussion and 
thought. Questions towards the end become more focused and specific. 
The research here will make use of small highly structured focus groups. A small 
group size is deemed sufficient because of the complex nature of identity, 
privacy, and trust. A smaller focus group will allow participants to discuss and 
expand on their thoughts as needed. Furthermore, these groups are structured 
to elicit these elusive concepts, through the provision of scenarios that describe 
N-IDMS implementations (this is further elaborated later in the thesis in Section 
6.2).  
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Although the focus groups were structured through the use of scenarios, 
measures were taken so as to prevent facilitator bias from influencing 
participants’ answers. This was generally done by starting discussions with a 
broad open-ended question, which solicited participants' general thoughts on 
each particular scenario (David Morgan, 1996). The facilitator then guided each 
discussion based on the unique feedback received the particular focus group; i.e. 
the discussion moved from general to specific issues, revolving around issues 
that participants themselves have raised from the very beginning. This ensures 
that the moderator does not "predetermine responses, and that they allow the 
opportunity for issues to arise which had not been anticipated." (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 1996).  
Given that we are looking at national scale IDMS implemented by governments, 
the population that we are interested in consists of the citizens of a particular 
country. It would be improbable to expect focus group participants to produce a 
representative sample of the population in a country. Practical limitations 
around time and funding make it impossible to conduct multiple large-scale 
focus groups that cover the diversity in the demographics of the population (i.e. 
age, education, work, income, etc.).  
As such, the study used pragmatic sampling procedures; limiting participants to 
university students, which also helps to improve comparability of responses 
between groups. The demographics of the participants were selected to reflect 
the demographics of the user population in the case studies (Section 4.3.1); i.e. 
each focus group was made up of participants that were homogenous in terms of 
nationality (i.e. Bruneian focus groups, Indian focus groups, or British focus 
groups). 
The disadvantage of only using university students in focus groups is that it is 
not a representative sample of the population. However, attempting to gather a 
representative sample of the population in 3 different countries was beyond the 
reach of this research project. 
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The British and Indian focus groups were conducted at the University College of 
London in the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, the Bruneian focus groups were 
conducted at the University of Brunei Darussalam in the country of Brunei; this 
was due to the fact that there were an insufficient number of Bruneian students 
studying within the United Kingdom; however, even while conducting it in 
Brunei, response rates to participation were very low. Ideally, the Indian focus 
groups would have been conducted at a local university in India, much like the 
Bruneian focus groups were in Brunei. However, attempts to contact local 
Indian universities for co-operation in arranging rooms for discussions and aid 
in the recruitment of participants were not entertained. Thus as a matter of 
practicality, it was necessary for the research to rely on Indian students at the 
University College of London.  
A total of 43 participants took part in the focus groups. These were a mixture of 
postgraduate and undergraduate students studying a variety of subjects that are 
detailed in Table 5. 
Table 5 Area of study for Focus Group participants 
Subject Number of Participants 
Economics 3 
Politics/Law 6 
Engineering/Computing 10 
Philosophy 1 
Medicine 10 
Science 8 
Education 5 
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4.3.2.2 Data$analysis$–$Grounded$Theory$
Grounded theory is an approach to develop theory that is grounded in data 
(Punch, 1998); grounded theory does not seek to test some preconceived theory, 
but instead seeks to start from an empty slate, and ends with a theory that 
emerges through a systematic collection and analysis of data (Corbin & Strauss, 
1990). This approach to research requires a constant cycle of data collection and 
analysis until a point of theoretical saturation has been reached; i.e. no new 
theory is being generated. 
Developing theory from data collected requires the breakdown of data to define 
what it is about, followed by its conceptualisation and reconstruction into theory 
(Charmaz, 2006). The process of grounded theory analysis consists of three 
different stages (Corbin & Strauss, 1990):  
1. Open coding breaks data down into discrete events, situations, 
perceptions, etc. Instances and categories relating to the phenomena of 
interest are identified and grouped into concepts. 
2. Axial coding develops relationships between categories, and the 
conditions that relate each category together. Reassembling the data that 
was broken-down in open coding. 
3. Selective coding identifies the core category, i.e. the central 
phenomenon around which other categories revolve. A narrative is 
developed around this core category, forming the development of a 
storyline, which can further be developed into theory. 
Grounded theory is suited to an exploration of events from individuals’ 
perspectives. The aim of the individual study was to understand how individuals 
perceive systems, making grounded theory a suitable mode of analysis. 
4.3.2.3 Exploring$culture$J$Hofstede$cultural$value$survey$$
The development of nationwide services impacts the population of countries as a 
whole, highlighting the role of national cultures in dictating the acceptance of an 
IDMS. By varying participants of each focus group on the basis on their 
nationalities, the data obtained can then be analysed and compared to that from 
the others, exploring the differences in the way that different national cultures 
react to similar systems.  
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The research conducted here will make use of Hofstede's (2001) cultural values 
survey as it is has the largest body of reproductions, and is continuously updated 
(Section 3.4.2). It is also the most popular model for measuring culture, and has 
been used in a variety of fields including that of privacy research. 
Due to the small number of countries being looked at, a limitation is imposed on 
the application of cultural measures. “Quantitative use demands data for a 
large number of countries, preferable ten or more; qualitative use is possible 
for any comparison of two or more cases” (Hofstede, 2001). Furthermore, the 
qualitative application of the cultural values is better suited to the type of 
material and analysis produced from the focus group study.  
4.3.3 Investigating&Organisation&Requirements&
Organisations represent another component in IDMS research. The IDMS lies 
between the individuals and the organisations, thus requiring a balance among 
the needs of one group and the wants of the other. A successful implementation 
will need to take into account the impact that the organisation and its 
requirements will have on the system. The focus of the study is on the strategic 
vision of the organisation in relation to the N-IDMS. 
4.3.3.1 Data$collection$–$interviews$and$documentation$
“Interviews may be defined simply as a conversation with a purpose” (Berg, 
2001). The purpose, typically, refers to the collection of information about an 
item or phenomena of interest. It involves an interviewer questioning an 
identified interviewee about a particular subject on a one-to-one basis. There are 
several different methods that the questioning route can take. 
Berg (2001) lists the three main types of interviews: 
1. Standardized interviews have a formal structure, where interviewers 
strictly follow a set of pre-written questions. 
2. Unstandardized interviews have no pre-defined questions, and 
interviewers adapt to each session. 
3. Semi-structured interviews have some general questions to guide 
interviewers, while providing the freedom to adapt to each session, 
allowing for the examination of unexpected interesting points that may 
be raised in the session. 
Semi-structured interviews themselves can be broken down into several 
different sub-types (Flick, 2002):  
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1. Focused Interview. This form of interviewing is designed to assess the 
impact of a stimulus on an individual. All interviewee’s are presented 
with the same stimulus, enabling the researcher to analyse the differing 
subjective opinions. 
2. Semi-Standard Interviews. Extensions of the semi-structured 
interviews, executed in two sessions. In the first session, the interviewee 
is asked to several different open-ended questions, which are then 
analysed. In the second session, the interviewee is asked to assess the 
analysis, and correct as needed. 
3. Problem-Centred Interview. This interview style is focused on 
uncovering interviewee’s view of a specific item of interest. This is done 
by asking specific questions, making use of interpretive statements, and 
confronting interviewee’s with inconsistencies in their answers. 
4. Expert Interview. Expert interviews differ from other interviews in 
that the interest lies with the role of the interviewee as a specialist in a 
field rather than the interviewee as an individual. This restricts the range 
of relevant information provided about the interviewee. These forms of 
interviews are useful when attempting to uncover professional 
considerations rather than personal accounts of events. 
5. Ethnographic Interviews. These interviews resemble that of ‘friendly 
conversation’ rather than formal interviews, and typically occur 
spontaneously. Ethnographic interviews are used as support material for 
the observations that are typical of ethnographic studies. 
The purpose of involving the organisation in this research is to account for the 
arguments that are put forward in support of an IDMS implementation. This 
research is not interested in the technical details, but rather in the reasoning 
behind the organisation’s decisions. This thesis seeks to uncover the 
rationalisations and requirements that result in the design and implementation 
of an IDMS. To this end the research will make use of expert interviews. 
The target population for the expert interviews are those individuals within the 
organisation that devise and influence the overall IDMS strategy in each of the 
case studies. Therefore, the experts need not be technical experts in the field, but 
those who are the leaders or key policy makers within the organisation. It is 
these individuals who will provide the research with insight into the 
government’s intentions and concerns for the system and the impacts that it has 
on the eventual system design. 
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Furthermore, the organisation study also made use of official government 
documentation detailing the strategy and implementation of N-IDMS. This was 
especially true in situations in which government agencies were unwilling to 
come forward for interviews. Again, as with the choice of the expert interviews, 
the documentation collected and analysed were geared towards identifying the 
strategic motivations, and considerations that affected the implementation, 
design, and use of the IDMS in each of the three case studies. 
4.3.3.2 Data$analysis$–$Grounded$Theory$
The data obtained from the organisational study, was analysed using the 
grounded theory method (Section 5.3.2.2). The study is interested in identifying 
the process and planning considerations that go into the establishment and 
implementation of an N-IDMS; thus, grounded theory is a suitable medium with 
which to explore organisational concerns. 
4.3.4 Exploring&IDMS&Design&
Finally, apart from the individual and organisation, there is the IDMS itself. It is 
the core element, making it a critical part of this research. The investigation will 
revolve around the design of an N-IDMS and its impact on individuals’ lives; 
design here is not used in the typical sense to refer to highly technical constructs, 
but rather to refer to the aspects of information flow and information type.  
4.3.4.1 Data$collection$–$Historiography$
Historiography is an examination of elements in relation to some past event 
(Berg, 2001), the aim of which is to produce theoretical explanations for the 
subject of interest. This is differentiated from standard historical accounts in the 
sense that historiography is more descriptive and rich. It is not so much a 
nostalgic retelling of historical events as an expression of the nuances and 
meanings behind past events that have led to and influenced the present day 
situation. “One cannot fully evaluate or appreciate advances made in 
knowledge, policy, science, or technology without some understanding of the 
circumstances within which these developments occurred” (Berg, 2001). 
Historical research can draw on a large source of materials from which 
researchers can distil and analyse past events. Materials of interests can range 
from government reports, newspaper editorials, folk songs, photos, artefacts, 
interviews, etc. These sources can be classified into two main categories (Berg, 
2001): 
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1. Primary sources can be thought of as original accounts of events. A 
primary source is one that is produced as a direct outcome of the event in 
question; typically accounts created by those who have personally 
witnessed the events. 
2. Secondary sources are second-hand accounts of the event in question. 
The producers of the material in question were not present at the time 
and place of the event of interest. 
Typical applications of historiography attempt to establish a large body of 
primary source material for analysis. In fact, many consider the gathering of 
such material the core task of historical research. Berg (2001) does iterate and 
recognise the potential and importance of secondary sources in bringing 
together large bodies of material, and revealing details that are not otherwise 
apparent. The danger of using second-hand accounts is that some sources are 
actually written by authors who have little to no knowledge of the primary 
material (James Harvey Robinson, 1904). As a consequence, some secondary 
sources may in fact be four or six times removed from the original source; and 
typically the more a report is passed from mouth-to-mouth the less accurate or 
reliable it becomes. 
History presents the system study with a vast resource of material and 
experience around the implementation of N-IDMS. In attempting to discover the 
impacts of practical IDMS design, it is important to acknowledge the context in 
which identity systems were required, and how this influenced the outcomes. 
Historiography provides an invaluable tool in approaching the material in 
question.  
In contrast to the individual and organisation studies, the system study was not 
limited to the three cases identified previously (Brunei, India and UK; see 
Section 4.3.1). The system study draws on a richer base; it explores the historical 
development of identity that spans several different countries and timeframes. 
Furthermore, the investigation of well-known identity systems, of which the 
outcomes have been documented and reviewed by other experts, allows the 
study to focus on the exploration of the practical design aspects, and its impacts 
on everyday life. 
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4.3.5 Data&Analysis&C&Thematic&Coding&
Thematic analysis is a method of investigating texts to deduce patterns that lie 
within the data (Marks & Yardley, 2004). In this form of analysis, a researcher 
goes through data gathered in one particular context, searching for and coding 
themes of interest, then comparing the themes to other similar contexts. Themes 
can either be developed deductively drawing from theoretical ideas that already 
exist, or inductive in nature, being developed from the data itself (Marks & 
Yardley, 2004). 
Thematic coding requires a priori identification of various items under study 
(Flick, 2002); sampling of material is chosen to increase the comparability to 
other contexts. Additionally, the unit of analysis should be defined beforehand. 
Coding of the material is guided by the research question. Codes are developed 
for each case, compared and cross checked with one another and then refined by 
splitting, splicing, and linking the codes (Marks & Yardley, 2004).  
Thematic analysis was used to investigate the practical design of IDMS, and its 
effects. Several different implementations of N-IDMS were chosen across 
various timeframes and purposes, allowing for comparisons that stretched 
various boundaries, strengthening the themes that were developed. Given the 
depth of each system, the unit of analysis chosen was that of the case level. The 
material on each N-IDMS was brought together to form a complete narrative of 
the situation, which was then analysed, picking out system attributes that 
influenced outcomes and interactions. 4.4 Triangulation*
Finally, this thesis makes use of triangulation as a form of verification, and a 
method to bring the three different studies together. Triangulation is a method 
that researchers make use of to gain a robust and through understanding of the 
research problem. The term has been borrowed from the land surveying field, in 
which it is defined as a "method of location of a point from two others of known 
distance apart" (Flick, 2007). From a methodological research standpoint, 
triangulation involves the use of multiple perspectives to study the issue of 
interest. As one of the earliest proponents of triangulation in qualitative 
research, Flick (2007) states that the advantage of triangulation is that it helps 
to reduce personal bias that arises from single method or single investigator 
research. Triangulation acts as a form of validity checking, as theory generated 
comes from a variety of sources. 
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There are four different techniques to perform triangulation (Flick, 2007): 
1. Data Triangulation is the collection and analysis of different sources 
of data. This can be achieved by studying instances of the same 
phenomenon in different settings, for example different points of time, 
different people or different locations.  
2. Investigator Triangulation is the use of multiple researchers to 
minimise investigator bias of a single person. It involves a systematic 
comparison of various observations and the different influences of each 
researcher. 
3. Theory Triangulation Denzin & Lincoln (1998) describe this as 
"approaching the data with multiple perspectives and hypotheses in 
mind". When different theories exist, a researcher can then view the 
problem from different standpoints, finding the one that fits best. 
4. Method Triangulation involves the use of multiple methods that are 
carefully chosen to maximise the validity of efforts. The research 
methods employed should play off each other’s strengths and 
weaknesses. 
While the use of triangulation does not pose a problem to those who approach 
research from a pragmatic paradigm, certain critics, especially interpretivists, 
have voiced their reservations; interpretivists argue that any discoveries made 
using one particular method or data source do not capture the same 
phenomenon as those made with another. However, in spite of this, critics still 
find value in triangulation, such that when combined, different traditions will 
produce a fuller picture of the phenomenon. It provides the research with range 
and depth that would otherwise not be captured (Flick, 2007). 
The research conducted here will make use of two forms of triangulation; data 
and method triangulation. The use of multiple data sources, and methods to 
investigate them, can be observed from the three different approaches to N-
IDMS, i.e. the system perspective, the individual perspective and the 
organisational perspective. This approach will provide the research with the 
depth that is required to fully understand the phenomenon in question. 
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The use of triangulation is also useful in bringing together the outcomes from 
each of the study into a single coherent framework. Construction requires the 
identification of overlaps and relationships between each strand of research, 
enabling the construction of one complete narrative that describes the entire 
situation. This process also lends validity to the overall findings, as each study 
supports and validates the results of the other.  4.5 Chapter*Summary*
The aim of this research is to take a human-centred approach to IDMS. It seeks 
to explore the relationship that human factors have with such systems. With this 
in mind, the methodology used should reflect the goals that have been set out. 
Considering the complex socio-technical interactions of such systems, the 
research requires the use of various data sources and methods to suit the 
different contexts under investigation.  
The investigation is broken down into three main areas of exploration. Firstly, a 
system study is carried out. Using historiography as a main tool for data 
collection, it is supported by the use of thematic analysis to uncover how the 
design of an IDMS affects the lives of individuals. 
The other two areas of investigation tackle the issue from an individual and 
organisational perspective. These studies will be guided by a case study 
methodology based on three different countries; Brunei, India, and UK. The 
individual study will make use of focus groups to explore how individuals assess 
IDMS. The influence of culture on individuals will be approached using 
Hofstede’s cultural values to identify differences between countries.  
Meanwhile, the organisation study will be investigated through material 
collected from official documentations and interviews. Both areas of 
investigation will make use of grounded theory to develop explanations directly 
from the data. 
Finally, the research will make use of triangulation to bring all the data together 
into a single coherent framework that provides a holistic view of human-centred 
IDMS. This also acts as a form of validation, as theory generated from various 
sources is checked against, and reinforces, that from others. 
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Chapter&5:&System&Study&–&Lived&Experience&of&Identity&
This chapter presents a framework that outlines how the design of an IDMS can 
affect the lived experience. For an alternate reading, please refer to 
Appendix IX.  
The literature review has revealed that privacy research is largely tackled within 
an informational privacy perspective, meaning that emphasis is placed on 
confidentiality, treating individuals and their identities as static functional 
objects (Section 3.2). Recent debates call for a focus on the larger issues that 
surround identity, focusing on the consequences of collecting, storing, and using 
personal information.  
Focusing on the outcomes of identity, the framework here identifies a set of 
design properties that impact individuals’ everyday lives. These properties were 
identified through an analysis of public response to 15 past and present national 
identity systems (Section 5.1.1). They capture the practical design aspects of an 
identity system, from structural properties that affect the flow of information – 
Control Points, Subject Engagement, Identity Exposure, Population Coverage – 
to the metrical properties that considers how information is used and perceived 
– Expert Interpretation, Population Comprehension, Information Accuracy, 
Information Stability, Subject Coupling, Information Polymorphism (Section 
5.2.1 and 5.2.3).  
Any identity system can be described in terms of these fundamental properties. 
Practitioners and researchers would make use of this framework by analysing an 
identity system in terms of the various properties, and the impacts of these 
properties on the lived experience (Section 5.3).  
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5.1 System*Research*
As outlined in Chapter 4 this thesis seeks to address the research question by 
tackling the problem from three different perspectives; i.e. the system, 
individual, and organisation. This chapter presents the system study that 
investigates the effects of an IDMS individuals lives.  
The type of information and the way in which it is used can have an impact on 
the outcomes for an individual (Section 3.2). However, traditional approaches to 
identity abstract the IDMS away from the specific consequences that it has on 
individuals’ lives, and the various coping strategies that might be adopted. 
Experts talk about data minimisation or ease of use, but what does it mean to an 
individual? How does it affect an individual’s relationship with the organisation 
and society? The current frameworks have been useful for the development of 
better systems, but in applying these principles we lose sight of the entire 
context of implementation; i.e. the identity ecosystem that recognises the 
relationships that exist between the individual, system, and society.  
The concept of the lived experience increases the scope of human-centred design 
beyond traditional usability concepts, which are “directed more toward 
functional accounts of computers and human activities (McCarthy & Wright, 
2004). Designing for the lived experience requires an understanding of “the 
relationship between people and technology in terms of felt life and the felt or 
emotional quality of action and interaction” (McCarthy & Wright, 2004). 
Inglesent and Sasse (2001) go on to elaborate that "the lived experience 
emphasizes the ways in which difficulties at the interface can lead to serious 
disruptions away from the interface in the lives of users". As such in this thesis, 
the lived experience of identity is defined as the effect of the collection, storage, 
and use of identity information on all areas on individuals' everyday lives, 
freedoms, and interactions. The benefit of such a definition over traditional 
views of information privacy and trust (Section 3.2.3), is that it broadens the 
scope of identity research towards the overall implications of identity. In so 
doing, identity research is focused on the meaning of identity for the individual. 
Practitioners and researchers require a way of analysing the lived experience 
that results from participating in an identity ecosystem. They require a 
framework that will allow them to assess how the designs of an identity system 
might influence an individual’s everyday lives, and thus their roles in society. 
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5.1.1 Methodology 
In order to distil the impacts of an IDMS design on the lived experience, the 
study analysed a total of 14 different past and present N-IDMSs, for which the 
outcomes are already known. The scope of that review was limited to N-IDMSs 
implemented in the Western world, largely focusing on a timeframe extending 
from the medieval periods to the present day; according to Torpey (2000), these 
countries have been leading the development and adoption of modern identity 
systems.  
Historiography (Section 5.3.4.1) was used in the information collection phase, 
with the aim of developing a brief narrative that describes the overall 
development of each N-IDMS, and the reactions of individuals to the system; 
these narratives can be found in the form of a literature review in Chapter 2 and 
is summarised in Table 6.  
The development of this narrative relied on secondary sources; the reliance on 
material that provided second-hand accounts was necessary as the review 
spanned various timeframes and countries, resulting in the inaccessibility of 
certain material, as well as language barriers posed by original material. The 
accounts that were used were chosen for their depth, accuracy and recognition in 
their field. To account for the dangers of using secondary accounts (Section 
4.3.4.1), where possible, the research relied on secondary sources that includes 
or references directly from original documentation. Furthermore, secondary 
accounts used were chosen based on the depth of analysis, as well as recognition 
in the field. 
The data collected was analysed using thematic coding to identify similarities 
across each N-IDMS narrative (Section 4.3.5); the focus of the analysis was on 
identifying the practical design aspects of an IDMS that had an impact on the 
outcomes of each implementation under review. Each N-IDMS was treated as a 
separate case, where features of each system that led to the various outcomes 
were coded. The analysis took place in three main phases: 
1. Reviewing accounts of each implementation, determining the 
degree of adoption, and the various reactions towards the 
system; did individuals sign up to a voluntary system? Did they 
attempt to evade non-voluntary systems? Did they change their 
habits as a result of being part of the system?  
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2. Discover the arguments that lead individuals to react in the 
manner identified; how did they feel about the system? 
3. Code the basic features, i.e. the design properties of the system 
that brought about the identified reactions of individuals. 
Table 6 List of N-IDMSs analysed, along with the country of origin and overall 
purpose. 
System Country Purpose 
Poor Laws and Badges United Kingdom To provide members of organisations proof of association 
Criminal ‘Wanted’ Lists Medieval Europe To provide for accurate identification of individuals especially 
criminals 
Internal Passports Russia To track movement of locals in the country  
Passports Netherlands To prevent or monitor the entry of dangerous foreign radicals 
into the country 
French Nomad Law France Identification and monitoring of unwanted members of the 
population 
National ID Cards United Kingdom 
Germany 
To provide unique identities to individuals allowing easy 
identification of the entire population 
Bertillonage France To identify recidivists enabling enforcement of severe 
punishment  
Dactyloscopy Argentina To identify recidivists enabling enforcement of severe 
punishment 
US Visit Programme United States To identify criminals and terrorists entering or leaving the 
country 
UAE Iris Scan United Arab 
Emirates 
To accurately identify known individuals against captured Iris 
scans (e.g. criminals) 
Criminal DNA Database United Kingdom To accurately identify individuals against DNA samples 
Contact Point United Kingdom To identify children in need of protection services before serious 
harm is caused 
PKI and Digital Signatures Austria To provide individuals access to services in a virtual environment 
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5.2 Analysis*
The results of the coding process revealed that the practical design properties of 
an N-IDMS that influences outcomes can be grouped into two main categories, 
each of which are made up of several different properties (Table 7): 
1. Structural properties that capture the flow and relationship of an 
individual’s information within the identity ecosystem created. 
2.  Metrical properties that capture the qualities that are affected by the 
type and amount of information that is being collected and used in the 
identity system. 
Table 7 A description of the system design properties that account for the lived 
experience of identity. 
Structural Properties Metrical Properties 
1. Number of Control Points express the 
situations in which an individual’s identity is 
required in order to proceed with a particular 
function 
1. Population Comprehension is the 
general level of understanding that the general 
population has regarding the techniques and 
technologies used for identification 
2. Subject Engagement captures whether an 
individual is an active or passive participant in 
the use of the identity. 
2. Expert Interpretation captures the 
amount of human activity required to collect 
and use identity information 
3. Identity Exposure refers to the degree of 
control that individuals have over the 
presentation of their identity to other 
individuals or relying parties that have no right 
to that identity. 
3. Information Accuracy is the property that 
defines the reliability of the information that is 
collected, stored and used in the identity 
system. 
4. Population Coverage describes the 
number of individuals that are registered in 
and interact with the system, in relation to the 
size of the total population 
4. Information Stability refers to the rate 
with which the information stored in an identity 
system changes over time 
 5. Subject Coupling expresses the degree of 
representativeness between the captured 
identity and the relevant partial identity 
 6. Information Variability expresses the 
ease with which the identity information may be 
used for a different purpose 
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Analysis was done until theoretical saturation was reached, within the set of 
cases that made up the study. This would imply that there might be other design 
properties that may be revealed by analysing other identity systems. For 
example, an expert evaluating the findings of this study has put forward the 
property "system fuzziness" in reference to federated identity systems (Section 
9.2.3.1). However, with that said, the properties that have been uncovered in this 
research have been derived from a varied set of implementations, and will later 
in this chapter, be shown to be applicable in other contexts such as Social 
Networking (Section 5.3.2), and Personalized Advertising (Section 5.3.3). As 
such, the properties here are the key design properties that are applicable to any 
form of IDMS. 
In order to aid clarity and understanding, the following sections will introduce 
the design properties, and their impact on the lived experience, within the 
context of the various N-IDMS implementations; this is done through a 
systematic review of the technologies that enable the presentation and use of 
identity (Section 5.2.1), as well as the type of information that makes up the 
identity (Section 5.2.3). 
5.2.1 Analysis&of&Structural&Mechanisms&and&Their&Properties&
The structure of an IDMS captures the flow of information within the identity 
ecosystem; it is concerned with the mechanisms that enable the use and 
consumption of an individual’s identity. It defines how individuals and societies 
interact with, and are shaped by the IDMS.  
Drawing from the review of the past and present N-IDMS implementations, a 
breakdown of various structural mechanisms is provided, detailing its operation, 
and its impact on the lived experience; in this process the practical design 
properties of the structural components are highlighted. 
5.2.1.1 Reproducible$tokens$
Reproducible tokens are identity documents that emphasise the use of symbols 
and emblems as a means of recognition. Making use of common insignias and 
symbols, these tokens were suited for use in identifying group membership, 
where rights to perform certain acts were endorsed by organisations onto their 
members (Groebner, 2001). 
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With the Poor Laws, tokens were distributed to beggars in the forms of badges 
that allowed them to request for alms (Section 2.2.1.2). However, few beggars 
actually came forward and instead resorted to a life of crime. Unfortunately, 
since the badges were related to that of a perceived lower class, they eventually 
came to be seen as a mark indignity (Hindle, 2004). As badges were to be worn 
at all times (high Number of Control Points), and were visible to everyone (high 
Identity Exposure), beggars refused to cooperate (high Subject Engagement). In 
addition, the highly targeted nature of the system (low Population Coverage) 
meant that individuals lost control over their dignity in within society. 
Turning attention to the Nazi branding of the Jews shows the effect more 
sinister applications of tokens have on the lived experience (Section 2.2.2.1). 
Seeking to make outcasts of the Jews, the government made effective use of 
tokens to target individuals’ social construction; the identification system 
became a powerful weapon in the government's arsenal (Fussell, 2004).  
"Identification had a paralyzing effect on its victims. The system induced the 
Jews [low Population Coverage] to be even more docile, more responsive to 
command than before. The wearer of the star was exposed [high Identity 
Exposure]; he thought that all eyes were fixed upon him. It was as though the 
whole population had become a police force, watching him and guarding his 
actions [high Number of Control Points]. No Jew, under those conditions 
could resist, escape or hide without first riding himself of the conspicuous 
tag, the revelling middle name, the tell-tale ration card, passport and 
identification papers [high Subject Engagement]" (Hindle, 2004).  
With the development of stigma around group membership, the Jewish 
population lost a sense of control over their lives, creating a negative lived 
experience. Additionally, the badges here were paralyzing for an individual, as 
society merely lumped them into groups.  
5.2.2 Personal&Documents&
In contrast to reproducible tokens, personal documents are identifying 
mechanisms that focus on distinguishing unique individuals from a group rather 
than to assign them to one. After being issued unique documents, it is up to 
individuals to present and make use of the mechanism as needed. As such, the 
system is best operated for situations when an administration wishes to control 
access to certain privileges based on varying individual attributes.  
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The Russian Internal Passports are form of personal documentation that 
was introduced to restrict movement of the local population within the country 
(Section 2.2.3.1). However, the extreme demands of the system fuelled evasion 
attempts. Based on (Matthews, 1993) analysis of the passport system showed 
that the lack of compliance may be due to the large number of bureaucratic loops 
that an individual had to go through (high Subject Engagement), as well as the 
large number of checkpoints where the identity documents were to be presented 
(high Number of Control Points); individuals lost their believed right to free 
movement, and thus rejected the system with its large number of controls. 
The introduction of the Dutch Passports in the early 19th century was also 
designed to control movement (Section 2.2.3.2). However, compared to the 
Russian Internal Passports, the focus was on movement into the country at its 
borders (low Number of Control Points), making it a much less restrictive 
system, and less of a burden to adhere to. Documents remained in circulation 
even after the passport requirements for travel were removed; this was largely 
driven by the benefits of security against harassment by law officials in foreign 
lands (Lucassen, 2001). 
The French 1912 Nomad Law’s provide greater insights into the effect of the 
structural properties on the lived experience (Section 2.2.3.3). The introduction 
of the law and passes was met with mixed success. The gypsy population (low 
Population Coverage) were required to present the passes (high Subject 
Engagement) upon entry and exit of every commune (high Number of Control 
Points). The result was a highly discriminatory system, placing difficult burdens 
on a specific set of the population; as a result, some of the gypsy population gave 
up their way of life to free themselves of the hardship (Kaluszynski, 2001).  
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Finally, the demise of the British World War I identity cards also 
highlights the impact of the number of checkpoints (Section 2.2.2.2). The 
implementation of the system was based on an act that enabled the creation of a 
National Register during the period of war, and was thus abandoned shortly 
after the war ended. Additionally, there is also evidence of public intolerance to 
the prussianizing aspect of the system, with its endless reporting and 
interference (high number of Control Points and high Subject Engagement) was 
the downfall of the system. "Public anxiety over the state interference which 
maintenance of the register implied" meant that many individuals failed to 
update their information such as change in address, leading to an inaccurate 
identity system.  
Similarly, the British World War II identity cards were abolished after an 
individual refused to produce his identity document (high Subject Engagement) 
when randomly stopped by police officers (high Control Points); the judge 
presiding over the case claimed that “to demand registration cards of all and 
sundry… is wholly unreasonable” (Agar, 2005).  
5.2.2.1 Database/Register$
In the basic meaning of the term, databases are a centralised collection of 
records that are gathered for a specific purpose. Databases are a key component 
of criminal identification systems that enables law enforcement to record, 
identify, and track criminals.  
The privacy concerns in the UK DNA Database can be partly attributed to the 
high degree of centralisation in the system design (Section 2.3.4.1). Whenever a 
crime is committed, law enforcement agencies may match samples obtained 
from crime scenes against the whole DNA database (high Number of Control 
Points), without individuals’ knowledge (low Subject Engagement). The 
constant access of individuals’ information, coupled with their passivity in the 
interaction creates feelings of uneasiness, thus fuelling privacy concerns. 
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Furthermore, traditional criminal IDMS, such as Bertillonage and 
Dactyloscopy, have historically been targeted towards convicted criminals. 
Meanwhile, the UK DNA database increases this scope to cover all suspects, 
including those whom are not convicted of any crime. However, overall it is still 
a discriminatory system, covering only seven per cent of the total UK population 
(low Population Coverage); as a result, innocent suspects are treated differently 
from the rest of the population, this further creates feelings of uneasiness among 
the population, as innocent individuals may be treated like criminals. 
5.2.3 Analysis&of&Identity&Metrics&and&Their&Properties&
While the system structure defines how identity is applied, the identity metric 
deals with the kind of information that represents identity; it is concerned with 
the type of information that is captured, presented and used in various identity 
requiring situations. 
5.2.3.1 Biographical$information$
The use of biographical information is a common way to construct an 
individual’s identity. It can revolve around something as simple as a name, to a 
whole collection of life experiences. The relevant identity information in any 
context is defined by the role that an individual adopts in that context.  
During Medieval times individuals, wanted lists of criminals typically only 
described criminals by the attire as opposed to any physical attributes. At the 
time clothes were expensive, and could be rarely changed. However, clothes 
eventually became cheaper and more accessible, and thus became an unreliable 
form of identification. The dynamic nature of the information (low Information 
Stability) used to represent identity meant that criminals could easily evade 
identification by simply changing their attire.  
The lived experience of the French Nomad Law was not only affected by the 
structural properties outlined earlier (Section 6.2.2), but may have been further 
influenced by the chosen identity metrics. The scheme was effective because the 
identity was constructed so as to closely represent the targeted individuals’ 
nomadic lifestyle (high Subject Coupling), which happened to be highly dynamic 
in nature (low Information Stability). Thus, when individuals chose to abandon 
the gypsy lifestyle, they were freed from the burden of having to maintain a 
constantly changing identity.  
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The purpose of the Contactpoint Database was to quickly identify children at 
risk of abuse by sharing information across different government services. 
However, critics claimed that it would not work, as it wasn’t the lack of 
information that prevented detection of child abuse, but the way in which carers 
interpret the information; identifying child abuse is a highly subjective process 
(high Expert Analysis). Concerns about e-discrimination and self-fulfilling 
prophecies were also raised when law enforcement wanted to use the 
Contactpoint database to identify future criminals. Arguments centred on the 
fact that irresponsible behaviour is not a good indicator of future criminality 
(low Subject Coupling). Furthermore, children are constantly growing and 
developing new behaviours, implying that the information may be quickly 
changing (low Information Stability), and therefore may lead authorities to 
make decisions based on out-dated information.  
5.2.3.2 Biometric$data$
Biometric identification is the use of physiological characteristics to recognise 
individuals. It is based on the principle that certain biological attributes are 
unique, and are hence suited for identification of individuals. This section covers 
the biometric technologies that were implemented in the IDMSs that formed 
part of the review. 5.2.3.2.1 Anthropometry*
Despite being a step forward from conventional criminal IDMS at the time, the 
use of anthropometry in the Bertillonage system possessed certain limitations 
(Kaluszynski, 2001). For example, it was not applicable for use in the 
identification of women, due to pathological disturbances (e.g. pregnancy), or 
children, who were still growing (Cole, 2001; Fosdick, 1915). This produced 
constantly changing measurements (low Information Stability), which allowed 
such individuals to evade identification as recidivists. Furthermore, despite the 
extensive training provided, measurements still required a certain amount of 
interpretation and subjectivity (high Expert Analysis). Coupled with the ability 
of the individual to force erroneous measurements through subtle movements 
(low Information Accuracy) meant that the performance of the Bertillon system 
was negatively affected.  
  154 
Finally, perceived human rights violations attached to the Bertillon system also 
hampered its success in Argentina. The public viewed the anthropometry 
procedures as being intrusive and “damaging to the soul” (Ruggiero, 2001). This 
misconception of the identity metric (low Population Comprehension) led to the 
destruction of anthropometric records of criminals who have completed their 
sentence thus preserving their honour and dignity (Ruggiero, 2001), making the 
system useless for identifying recidivists.  5.2.3.2.2 Dactyloscopy*
Dactyloscopy had two main advantages over the Bertillon system for 
identifying criminals. Firstly, the use of rolled fingerprints provided a form of 
mechanical objectivity in the capturing of identity, thus creating more accurate 
records (high Information Accuracy). Secondly, fingerprints could be used in 
forensic investigations. 
However, caution should be taken in charging criminals based only on 
fingerprint evidence. For example, an early application of dactyloscopy to a 
murder investigation in 1898, saw a judge deem that the fingerprint evidence 
was only sufficient to prove trespassing and not murder (low Subject Coupling) 
(Cole, 2001). From this, we can deduce that the level of representativeness in the 
forensic use of fingerprints was already called into question from its early 
applications; finding a fingerprint at a crime scene does not equate to proof of 
guilt. 
Yet, in its practice today, fingerprint identification in criminal cases carry a lot of 
authority, of which is rarely questioned (Cole, 2001). An exemplar is the McKie 
case, in which Shirley McKie was arrested, charged, and prosecuted based only 
on fingerprint evidence allegedly found at the crime scene (low Subject 
Coupling). In an ordeal that last 9 years to resolve and gain compensation, 
authorities did not concede any error in the positive identification by their 
fingerprint experts, even in the face of other expert testimonies who claimed 
otherwise (high Expert Analysis). Although a public inquiry ruled out any 
collusions, identity systems that do not tackle this issue are a danger to public 
justice and freedoms, where individuals may be charged on little evidence that is 
put forward by unregulated ‘trusted’ experts.  
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Meanwhile, also making use of fingerprints, the increased scope of the US Visit 
scheme from visa authentication towards security and terrorism presented some 
problems. In matching fingerprints against criminal databases, individuals who 
produced a ‘positive identification’ were automatically treated as dangerous 
without further consideration, including aircrew members who had already 
successfully passed through previous background checks (low Subject 
Coupling). The situation was exacerbated by the inaccurate fingerprints 
available on databases, and the general low performance of a one-to-many 
fingerprint search (low Information Accuracy); to date, the system has only 
caught one terror related suspect. 
The improper use of fingerprints for counter-terrorism is further elaborated by 
the Brian Mayfield case. Mayfield was placed on police custody for two weeks 
based on FBI claims that fingerprints found on Madrid bombing site were an 
“absolutely incontrovertible match” (low Subject Coupling) (Isikoff & Pape, 
2004; Murr, 2004), based on erroneous applications of the fingerprint 
identification methodology by their experts (high Expert Analysis).  5.2.3.2.3 DNA*
As with fingerprints, DNA data lends itself to forensic investigations. However, 
as with fingerprints, forensic DNA investigations present similar problems of 
infallibility of expert identifications. In the UK DNA Database scheme, the 
Easton case illustrates a situation where Mr Easton was a prime suspect in a 
burglary case based on DNA evidence; this despite his Parkinson’s condition that 
indicated he could not have committed the crime (low Subject Coupling). 
The Madeleine McCann case highlights issues about public understanding of 
identity systems. When traces of DNA were found in the car hired by her 
parents, many people falsely perceived this as a sign of guilt, likely due to the 
lack of comprehension around the process and probabilities – “one in trillions” 
(Graham, 2007) – of DNA typing (low Population Comprehension). Not only 
were the McCanns forced to deal with the trauma of losing their daughter and 
questioning by the police, but they were also forced to deal with the negative 
reaction of the public in light of their perception of the DNA evidence; early 
public support for the McCanns quickly turned to accusation and attacks against 
them.  
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The deterministic nature of DNA identification is further exacerbated by the 
subjective matching decisions that are made (high Expert Analysis), against 
contaminated or degraded crime scene samples (low Information Accuracy). 
The 1993 Timothy Durham case in the United States serves to illustrate this 
problem; despite having a strong alibi, Durham was found guilty of raping an 11-
year-old girl, largely on the basis of DNA evidence (Thompson et al., 2003). 
Durham was set free in 1996, after it was shown that there was an error that 
“arose from misinterpretation”, due to the failed separation of the 
contamination between the male and female DNA during extraction of the 
semen stain (Thompson et al., 2003). 
Apart from the misunderstandings of DNA identification process, the nature of 
the data itself has raised privacy concerns. DNA can not only be used for 
individual identification, but also for a number of other purposes such as 
identifying racial heritage and familial linkages, or the likelihood of developing 
certain illnesses (high Information Variability). The use of the UK DNA 
database in familial searching, constant requests for paternity tests, and its 
recent call for use as a medical database are prime examples of how DNA can be 
easily used for other purposes. The possible function creep and unpredictability 
around the use of the identity is seen as a threat to privacy that can negatively 
affect individuals. 5.2.3.2.4 Iris*
Iris recognition is seen as one of the most stable and accurate forms of biometric 
identification, however lacks forensic applications (although the increasing use 
and improvement of CCTV technology and iris recognition algorithms may make 
it a reality in the future). As a result, identity systems using iris recognition tend 
to produce good results. 
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The UAE Iris system, implemented at the country’s borders to prevent banned 
individuals from coming into the country, has been a big success. Everyone 
passing through these borders is exposed to the system. Iris captures are 
matched against a database of high quality iris images (high Information 
Accuracy) of banned individuals, ensuring that a match is likely to correlate well 
with a known individual (high Subject Coupling); as opposed to inaccurate crime 
scene samples used in fingerprint systems seen previously (Section 6.2.3.2.2). To 
date, it is claimed that the system has not produced a false match despite 
processing 2.7 billion comparisons per day, while preventing the re-entry of 
9,500 banned individuals (Kabatoff & Daugman, 2008).  
5.2.3.3 Digital$Signatures$
A digital signature is a cryptographic based technique to simulate the function of 
a real world signature in a digital environment (not to be confused with digital 
signature recognition which is a biometric that has seen limited 
implementation). Despite the promise of digital signatures, uptake among the 
public tends to be rather low due to its complexity.  
The review of the Austrian Citizen Card and Belgian eID scheme show 
incredibly limited adoption of digital signatures, which has been attributed to a 
lack of opportunities to actually make use of the digital signatures (low Number 
of Control Points) and the lack of understanding on how it works (low 
Population Comprehension). Similarly, in a study of merchants trading through 
Amazon (Garfinkel, Margrave, Schiller, Nordlander, & Miller, 2005) found that 
only 54% of those who received digital signatures know how they worked. 
Furthermore, 59% per cent of merchants thought it was important to use 
encrypted and signed mail, yet 59% also admitted to not knowing whether their 
email client supported it.  5.3 Towards*the*Lived*Experience*
In introducing the properties above, this thesis has illustrated its use in 
understanding the lived experience. In certain configurations, such as an 
identity system with a high number of Control Points, the system might be 
perceived as being too cumbersome and oppressive, and thus might be met with 
resistance. A system that needs to be up-to-date, but makes use of a metric that 
has a low Information Stability, may be seen as a burden upon individuals, who 
continuously have to report changes in their personal information. 
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However, reactions against identity systems are rarely caused by any single 
property; it is the combination of these various properties, and their 
interactions, which determine the lived experience. One can then construct the 
possible narratives and potential outcomes based on the various contextual 
elements and social norms. Consider a system with low Population Coverage, 
high Subject Engagement, and a high Number of Control Points. The resulting 
system is highly targeted towards certain criteria, while the majority of the 
population acting in that particular context would not be troubled. Additionally, 
as individuals play an active role at a large number of Control Points, some 
might decide that the burden of the system is unbearable. As such, in cases 
where it is possible to do so (e.g. identification systems based on religion), a 
number of individuals might avoid the identity system altogether by abandoning 
their current identity, and constructing a new one, as was the case with the 
French Nomad Laws; being enrolled in such an IDMS is a form of punishment or 
a means of controlling behaviour and forcing change. 
For the DNA database, most of the properties introduced here are relevant to 
interpreting the public reactions towards the system (Table 7). The initial set of 
privacy concerns stem from the constant access of the identity (high Number of 
Control Points) of which the individual is unaware (low Subject Engagement). 
This is further amplified by the possibility that the identity information can be 
easily reused for other purposes in completely different contexts (high 
Information Variability), again potentially without the individual being aware of 
this. 
Issues of fairness and freedom also come into play when considering the highly 
targeted nature of the DNA database (low Population Coverage), especially in 
light for the lack of control that an individual has over the presentation of the 
identity to the rest of society (high Identity Exposure). Furthermore, the lack of 
control is substantially worsened by the incomplete yet deterministic nature of 
such identification (low Subject Coupling) that is based on subjective 
assessment (high Expert Analysis) of potentially inaccurate information due to 
contamination and degradation (low Information Accuracy).  
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Based on this narrative for the DNA database, it is not surprising that the system 
is surrounded by privacy concerns and controversy. These concerns are given 
strength, perhaps counter-intuitively, by the broadening of the Population 
Coverage, as it includes not only convicted criminals but suspects as well. This 
can perhaps be explained by the fact that it is still a highly targeted system, just 
broader in scope. Additionally, from the point of view of innocent suspects, they 
do not believe themselves to belong on the database at all, meaning the partial 
identity created goes against the relationship between the individual and the 
state, thus further driving down the level of Subject Coupling. 
The combination of all these properties creates a very negative lived experience 
that influences society’s interactions with the individual. The risk of false 
accusations, based on minimal evidence, that people do not understand, put 
forward by ‘infallible’ experts, based on potentially erroneous data, creates 
problematic situations that individuals are not able to overcome or fight against. 
Such a scenario would fundamentally change the relationship of the individual 
to society. The public will vilify these individuals, while interactions with 
organisations will be mediated by these suspicions thus creating self-fulfilling 
prophecies.  
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Table 8 A summary of the system analysed in this study, their design properties, and impacts on the lived experience 
System' Structural'Properties' Metrical'Properties'
Control'
Points'
Subject'
Engagement'
Identity'
Exposure'
Population'
Coverage'
Subject'
Coupling'
Population'
Comprehension'
Expert'
Interpretation'
Data'
Accuracy'
Data'Stability' Information'
Variability'
Poor'Law'Badges' High% High% High% Low% Low% High% Low% Medium% Low% High%
Few'people'came'forward'to'request'for'an'identity.'
Beggars%were%required%to%prove%that%they%could%not%get%work.%They%were%required%to%wear%badges%at%all%times%in%order%to%prove%that%they%have%the%right%to%request%for%alms.%A%small%
number%of% individuals%had% to% constantly%wear%badges%on% their%arms,%which%were% clearly% visible% to%everyone%else.%This% shamed% individuals,%making% them%unwilling% to% come% forward.%
Furthermore,%the%information%was%also%to%determine%parenting%ability,%a%purpose%that%differs%from%the%original.%
Criminal'Wanted'
Lists'
Low% High% High% Low% High% High% Low% Low% Low% Low%
High'rates'of'evasion.'
The%system% is%based%on%a%simple%set%of%physical%descriptions% that%had%a% focus%on% the%attire%of% individuals.%This%data%was%not%very%accurate%and% involved%a%high%degree%of% subjective%
decisions%as%to%a%match.%Furthermore%the%individual%can%easily%change%his%physical%appearance%by%donning%disguises%or%new%attire.%
Russian'Internal'
Passports'
High% High% Low% High% Low% High% Low% Low% High% Low%
Large'number'of'evasion'attempts'and'manhunts'were'frequently'launched.'
The% identities% created% tied% individuals% to% a% piece% of% land%where% they%were% required% to%work.% This% identity%was% rejected% by% individuals%who% did% not% agree%with% the% relationship% and%
attempted%to%flee%from%the%state.%
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System' Structural'Properties' Metrical'Properties'
Control'
Points'
Subject'
Engagement'
Identity'
Exposure'
Population'
Coverage'
Subject'
Coupling'
Population'
Comprehension'
Expert'
Interpretation'
Data'
Accuracy'
Data'Stability' Information'
Variability'
French'1912'Law' High% High% Medium% Low% Low% High% Low% Medium% Low% High%
Part'of'the'targeted'population'(Romani)'abandoned'their'way'of'life'and'assumed'new'identities.'
The%system%was%a%burden%on%individuals,%constantly%showing%their%identities%whenever%they%moved.%Being%a%highly%targeted%system,%an%individual%can%avoid%the%system%by%“changing”%
his/her%identity.%
French'
Bertillonage'
Low% High% Low% Low% High% Medium% High% Low% Low% Low%
Reliability'and'effectiveness'of'recidivists'was'called'into'question.'
The% identification%process%was%highly%subjective%using% inaccurate% information,% resulting% in% inconsistent% identifications.%As% individuals%were% involved% in% the% identification%process,% they%
could%alter%their%dimensions%by%not%fully%coFoperating,%e.g.%not%standing%straight,%etc.%Furthermore,%it%was%ineffective%at%identifying%young%individuals%as%they%were%still%growing.%
In%Argentina,%system%was%rejected%on%grounds%that%the%measurements%insulted%their%honour.%It%can%be%argued%that%they%either%did%not%understand%the%process%or%they%felt%that%it%was%a%
misrepresentation%of%their%identity.%
%
' '
'
'
'
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System' Structural'Properties' Metrical'Properties'
Control'
Points'
Subject'
Engagement'
Identity'
Exposure'
Population'
Coverage'
Subject'
Coupling'
Population'
Comprehension'
Expert'
Interpretation'
Data'
Accuracy'
Data'Stability' Information'
Variability'
Argentina'
Dactyloscopy'
Low% Low% Medium% Low% Medium% Low% High% Medium% High% Low%
Dactyloscopy'has'become'a'de'facto'standard'in'criminal'investigations.'
Fingerprints% collected% did% not% change% over% time% and% was% more% accurate% than% body% measurements% or% descriptions.% It% gave% the% identification% of% criminals% a% form% of% “mechanical%
objectivity”%in%that%the%fingerprints%were%captured%using%objective%approach.%
Issues'of'false'accusations'have'recently'been'called'into'question.'
Dactyloscopy%still% requires%subjective%decisions% to%decide% if% there% is%a%match.%Crime%scene% fingerprints%are%not%accurate%representations%of% fingerprints,% further% raising%the%error% rate.%
People%are%not%aware%of%the%entire%fingerprint%identification%process%and%therefore%individuals%lose%the%ability%to%resist%such%accusations.%
WW'I'and'II'UK'
Identity'Cards'
High% High% Low% High% Low% High% Low% Medium% Low% High%
Individual'information'was'out'of'date.'
The% information%collected% included%attributes%such%as%address%which%were%open%to%change.%The%high%variability% in% the% information%collected%and%stored,% required%the%coFoperation%of%
individuals%to%update%their%records%as%needed.%The%public%however%proved%unwilling%to%assist%them%in%these%procedures,%especially%since%the%cards%did%not%provide%any%benefits%after%war%
time%(after%its%use%in%food%rationing).%It%is%perceived%as%the%needless%prussianizing%of%institutions.%
Resistance'to'carrying'and'showing'ID'Cards.'
The%needs%for% identity%cards%represent%a%clash% in%the%culture%for%the%public.%The% identity%created%by%such%a%system%goes%against%the%relationship%that%exists%between%the%state%and%its%
people.%Therefore,%the%identity%instantiation%did%not%match%well%to%the%individuals’%perception%of%the%situation.%This%led%to%resistance%towards%hosing%ID%cards,%as%in%the%case%of%Wilcock,%
which%was%brought%to%court%and%gained%a%lot%of%public%support%and%negative%media%publicity%against%the%ID%cards.%
%
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System' Structural'Properties' Metrical'Properties'
Control'
Points'
Subject'
Engagement'
Identity'
Exposure'
Population'
Coverage'
Subject'
Coupling'
Population'
Comprehension'
Expert'
Interpretation'
Data'
Accuracy'
Data'Stability' Information'
Variability'
WW'II'Nazi'
Jewish'Identity'
System'
High% High% High% Low% Low% High% Low% High% High% High%
Paralysis'of'the'Jewish'Population.'
The%identity%system%created%was%highly%targeted%to%the%Jewish%population.%It%started%off%as%an%identity%document%with%clearly%stated%markings,%indicating%the%individual%was%a%Jew.%This%
eventually%led%to%the%use%of%symbols%that%had%to%worn%and%be%visible%at%all%times.%This%made%the%Jewish%directly%visible%to%the%other%members%of%the%population%limiting%their%freedom%and%
movements%
Aid'in'the'mass'killings.'
The%biographical%information%used%in%the%system,%lends%itself%to%other%purposes.%In%this%particular%case,%it%made%it%easy%to%gather%and%round%up%the%Jewish%population%aiding%in%the%act%of%
genocide.%
UK'DNA'
Database'
High% Low% High% Low% Low% Low% High% Medium% High% High%
Large'amount'of'privacy'concerns'have'been'raised.''
The%DNA%is%information%constantly%being%accessed%without%individuals%being%aware%of%it.%Furthermore%it%is%a%highly%targeted%system%that%also%includes%nonFconvicted%individuals.%These%
individuals%do%not%believe%they%should%be%on%the%database,%creating%a%situation%of%conflict%in%the%creation%of%the%identity.%This%becomes%a%major%concern%since%individuals%cannot%control%
the%presentation%of%identity%to%the%rest%of%society.%
%
%
%
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System' Structural'Properties' Metrical'Properties'
Control'
Points'
Subject'
Engagement'
Identity'
Exposure'
Population'
Coverage'
Subject'
Coupling'
Population'
Comprehension'
Expert'
Interpretation'
Data'
Accuracy'
Data'Stability' Information'
Variability'
Contact'Point' High% Low% Medium% High% Low% High% High% Low% Low% High%
Effectiveness'of'system'has'been'called'into'question.'
Recent%cases,%such%as%the%death%of%“Baby%P.”,%have%raised%doubts%on%the%usefulness%of%the%system.%The%individual’s%information%being%entered%into%the%system%is%not%objective%and%reduces%
the% accuracy% of% the% data% collected.% Furthermore,% interpretation% of% results% is% highly% subjective.% As% the% “Baby% P.”% case% shows,% carers%were% all% aware% of% each% other,% but% still% failed% to%
recognise%the%trail%of%abuse.%%
Issues'of'freedom'and'selfUfulfilling'prophecies'have'been'raised.'
Services%that%make%use%of%the%information%may%preFemptively%judge%an%individual%and%change%their%modes%of%interaction.%The%individual%is%potentially%being%assessed%on%an%incomplete%
picture%of%his/her%identity%based%on%interactions%from%another%context.%Furthermore,%being%targeted%at%children,%such%information%is%not%stable%and%will%continuously%change,%reducing%
the%representativeness%of%the%individual’s%identity.%
Austrian'Citizen'
Card'
Low% High% Low% High% High% Low% Low% High% High% Low%
Low'rates'of'adoption'in'the'digital'signature'functionality'of'the'Citizen'Card.'
The%system%does%not%present%an%individual%with%many%opportunities%to%make%use%of%the%identity,%creating%a%lack%of%perceived%benefits.%Furthermore,%individuals%do%not%understand%the%
system%making%it%difficult%to%use.%
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5.3.1 Applying,the,Properties,to,Other,Contexts,
To further illustrate the applicability of the properties to different contexts, 
which in turn acts as a form of verification, the properties will be used to 
investigate the lived experience of IDMS implemented in non-government 
contexts. In the following, we apply the properties to a social networking system, 
and a personalised advertising platform. 
5.3.2 Social,Networking,
Online Social Network Sites (SNS) have experienced significant growth over the 
past few years. It has become an increasingly popular medium for individuals to 
connect with each other and share a large amount of personal information. From 
our point of view, an SNS can be viewed as an identity management system. This 
makes such sites a prime candidate by which we can apply the codes that the 
research has uncovered. Specifically, we will be looking at the Facebook 
platform. 
With over 200 million registered individuals, Facebook is arguably the most 
popular social platform today. It has also been the centre of some controversies. 
Just recently Facebook has been accused of breaching Canada's Privacy Laws 
(BBC, 2009). More relevant to our considerations is a change that Facebook 
made to its website that brought out negative reactions among its community. 
In 2005, Facebook introduced new features that affected the way in which 
information was distributed to an individual’s network on the site. Prior to these 
changes, information that was inserted or updated on an individual’s profile was 
only visible when another party visited his/her profile page. Facebook then 
added the Newsfeed feature, which essentially aggregated all these information 
changes and broadcast them to an individual’s friends. This changed a process 
from a 'pull' to a 'push' operation. Individuals reacted against this and 
established resistance groups to voice their opinions. Facebook’s CEO eventually 
responded, stating that no privacy options were taken away, and that the 
information was visible only to the same people who would have had access 
before. "Nothing you do is being broadcast; rather it is being shared with 
people who care about what you do" (Hoadley, Xu, Lee, & Rosson, 2009). 
Nevertheless, Facebook took down the Newsfeed, and re-released it with various 
privacy controls. 
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In their study of the situation, Hoadley et al. (2009) attributed the resistance to 
individuals’ perception of “information access” and “illusion of control”. 
Individuals viewed the Newsfeed as increasing the ease with which others could 
access their information, and the absence of controls reduced the level of control 
that individuals perceived themselves to have. While this point of view is 
certainly justified, the properties that have been uncovered here might be able to 
shed more light on the situation and better relate the changes in the system to 
the reactions. 
The most relevant properties for this scenario are the Control Points and Subject 
Engagement. Pre-Newsfeed, information was only accessible when another 
party visited the individual’s page. One can technically view this as a single 
Control Point. Post-Newsfeed, the Number of Control Points increased 
dramatically; every party that the information was pushed to represents a 
Control Point, where the individual’s information is consumed.  
In addition, the Newsfeed can be interpreted as a reduction in the level of 
subject involvement. In the ‘pull’ model, visiting an individual’s page was a 
requirement. The page is a representation of the individual on the platform, 
whom has spent time to create a profile that represents him/her to others. 
Therefore, accessing the individual’s profile page can be seen as a Control Point 
that has high Subject Engagement. The Newsfeed represents a loss of 
involvement, as the information is taken from the individual’s controlled profile 
and broadcast to the other Control Points that individuals are not aware of or 
over which they have no control. 
5.3.3 Targeted,Advertising,
Targeted advertising has proved to be an extremely lucrative way to increase 
revenues. This form of advertising involves the tracking of an individual’s 
identity across various services. It could be something as simple as contextual 
targeting (using keywords based on the content of the current page), or based on 
individuals’ browsing history across one or more sites. These browsing histories 
and identification details are typically handled in a decentralized manner, 
making use of cookies stored on the user’s computer. These tracking methods 
have raised issues among privacy advocates. 
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A recent study found that a significant number of the US population object to the 
tracking of behaviour. Turow, King, Hoofnagle, Bleakley, & Hennessy (2005) 
found that 86% of young adults reject targeted advertising that tracks behaviour 
across different websites. Advertisers, however, say that individuals – especially 
the younger generation – do not mind having their habits tracked. Recent 
developments in targeted advertising have taken the tracking to new levels. 
Phorm is a company that developed a targeted advertising platform that is tied 
directly to an individual’s Internet Service Provider (ISP). Every subscriber to 
the ISP's network is enrolled into the Phorm system. Every website that an 
individual visits is passed through the system, and is checked against a list of 
advertising categories. If a match is found, the category is marked in a cookie 
and stored on the user’s computer. This cookie is then used to provide targeted 
advertisement on any websites through the use of a widget. The European Union 
has recently launched legal proceedings in response to the controversial use of 
Phorm (Wray, 2009). The arguments are usually tackled from a high level law 
based view of privacy rights. Phorm's representatives argue that people do not 
understand the technology and how it works, claiming that it actually provides 
anonymity.  
Applying the structural properties from the proposed framework, the items of 
interest are Subject Involvement, Identity Disclosure, and the Number of 
Control Points. With every website passing through the system, Phorm presents 
individuals with a high Number of Control Points resulting in a very restrictive 
environment for the individual. This situation is exacerbated by low subject 
involvement at the Control Points. The individual’s information is taken in a 
covert manner, without the individual being involved in the process. Phorm also 
provides individuals with a high Identity Exposure. The tracked information is 
stored on a cookie on the user’s computer. In a multi-user environment, the 
same computer will be used by various individuals amongst whom Phorm will 
not be able to differentiate. When serving customised ads, the system is 
constantly at risk of revealing an individual’s preference by presenting 
customised content to the "wrong" individual. 
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From a metrical standpoint, the properties of interest are in this case are Subject 
Coupling and Information Stability. Phorm is a platform used by a user’s ISP to 
deliver targeted advertisements. The relationship between the user and the ISP 
is that of a consumer paying fees to gain access to the network. This relationship 
calls for the sharing of certain general and financial information. This is the 
relevant partial identity of the individual in the subscriber role. By making use of 
Phorm, ISP's expand beyond this boundary by tracking an individual’s habits in 
depth. This results in low Subject Coupling in the ISP-subscriber relationship. 
Additionally, an individual’s browsing habits are constantly growing and 
producing a very dynamic data set that results in low Information Stability. 
Therefore, in order to keep an accurate representation of the individual, large 
volumes of up-to-date records are required. This raises concerns of privacy due 
to the tracking nature of such a system. 5.4 Summary*and*Discussion*
This chapter provides an analysis of a selection of IDMS (based on the systems 
reviewed in Chapter 2 that resulted in the development of a set of design 
properties that impacts individuals’ lived experience. Using thematic analysis, 
and coupled with the known outcomes for each system, this study outlined a set 
of structural and metrical properties that can be used to predict the lived 
experience offered by an IDMS. 
The structural properties define the flow of information across the entire 
identity system, and are captured by the following properties: 
1. Control Points refer to the volume of points at which a subject’s 
information is accessed or used. A low number of control points imply 
that the identity is required infrequently throughout the entire life of the 
identity instantiation. 
2. Subject Involvement is concerned with the level of participation that 
the individual has across the various control points. For example, a 
system that constantly makes use of information at back-end control 
points, without the subject’s knowledge, would signify low subject 
involvement. 
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3. Population Coverage deals with the percentage of the general 
population that is actually enrolled into the system. It can be seen as a 
ratio between the numbers of individuals who are enrolled, against those 
who are exempt from the system. A highly targeted system would result 
in low population coverage. 
4. Identity Exposure defines the level of control that an individual has in 
the presentation of the identity to other entities that have no right to it. 
Low identity exposure is one in which the individual has little control of 
the exposure of the identity to other portions of the population. 
The metrical properties of an identity system are concerned with the type of 
information that is captured as well as how the identity information interpreted 
and used. The following properties are identified as having an influence on the 
outcomes of an IDMS: 
1. Expert Analysis refers to the amount of manual involvement of experts 
that is required to make an identification or authentication. Put in simple 
terms, it can be seen as the level of subjectivity in the usage or 
construction of identity. A high level of subjectivity involving specialised 
skills implies high expert analysis. 
2. Population Comprehension captures how well the general 
population understands the identification process and technologies being 
used. Low population comprehension occurs when the general 
population does not understand how the identity is constructed and 
used. 
3. Information Accuracy defines the reliability of the system 
consistently to produce correct matches in the practical usage scenarios. 
A system that doesn’t produce any false positives or false negatives is said 
to have high data accuracy.  
4. Information Stability is concerned with the frequency with which the 
subject information being collected changes over time. A system in which 
the information changes frequently and thus requires constant updating 
is labelled as having low data stability.  
5. Subject Coupling is focused on how well the identity instantiation in 
the system matches the relevant partial identity in the context of use. A 
system that collects too much or too little information accurately to 
represent the individual has low subject coupling.  
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6. Information Variability refers to the possibility of the type of 
information being used for reasons beyond those that it has been 
collected for. Information such as DNA would have high information 
variability as various things can be deduced from it, such as medical 
information, relative identification, etc. 
All these properties allow researchers or practitioners to examine how an 
identity ecosystem can influence outcomes and behaviours of the subjects that 
have been enrolled into the system. While these properties can be seen in 
isolation, the real explanatory power of these properties lies in viewing them as a 
cohesive whole, each influencing and interacting with the others. For example, 
one can see how a high number of control points, coupled with low levels of 
subject involvement and low levels of subject coupling, could steer the public to 
fear an identity system, as has been the case with the DNA database.  
5.4.1 Future,Work,
First off, while the analysis of the work was done until theoretical saturation was 
reached, a continuous application of these properties to other implementations 
can serve to further refine the uncovered properties. As an example, it may be 
beneficial to break down the Control Point property into Read-Only Control 
Points, where an individual’s information is only consumed, as opposed to a 
Write-Only Control Point where the individual’s identity entry is updated with 
new information. Another possible break down is a distinction between 
mandatory and voluntary Control Points.  
Alternatively, new properties can be developed to cover design issues that may 
not have been brought out in the present analysis. An example of a new 
property, and one that is currently under consideration, is that of Information 
Salience. This property focuses on the impact of certain metrics in other 
contexts. Religion for example is a very influential attribute and therefore has a 
high degree of salience. However, this Information Salience property might 
cause confusion and overlap with that of Subject Coupling. It is important to 
consider the relationship of the new property to the current properties, ensuring 
that there is no overlap or contradiction. Furthermore, new properties should be 
valid across different implementations of identity systems. 
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Another area for further development is the creation of a complete mapping 
between the individual properties and the potential outcomes that it can bring 
about. As an example, the analysis here has not identified how high levels of 
population comprehension might affect the lived experience, and therefore its 
impacts on the acceptance or rejection of an identity system. One could theorise, 
and seek proof of a situation where individuals might reject an identity system 
on the grounds that the population has a complete understanding of that system, 
thus enabling them to make more informed decisions on what may or may not 
be acceptable. A complete mapping of the properties to potential outcomes 
would increase the usability, and hence effectiveness, of the model in describing 
the lived experience. 
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Chapter,6:,Individual,Perceptions,of,NIIDMS,,
This chapter outlines a framework that describes individuals’ concerns that 
affect their perceptions and acceptance of IDMS. While the previous study 
investigated the lived experience of IDMSs (Chapter 5), it does not provide any 
insight into how individuals develop their initial intentions to trust and accept 
new IDMSs. The study in this chapter explores individuals’ perceptions and 
thought processes when encountering an IDMS for the first time. 
The study presented in this chapter analyses how individuals’ initial decision to 
accept an IDMS is influenced by their perceptions of potential outcomes as a 
result of the system design. The results of the study show that individuals’ 
willingness to adopt a system is influenced by: 
1. Situation Perception. The individual’s perception of how important 
the situation being addressed is (Section 6.3.1).  
2. System Judgement. The individual’s assessment of how useful the 
system will be in tackling the issue (Section 6.3.2).  
3. Concerns. An individual’s concern over the safety of his/her 
information in the system (Section 6.3.3). 
This study consists of three main phases. Firstly, an initial investigation using 
focus groups to identify concerns, and develop a proposed framework (Section 
6.3). Second, a survey based on the proposed framework, was constructed, 
distributed, and analysed to further refine the framework (Section 6.4.1). 
Finally, this study also conducted a qualitative exploration of cultural influences 
on the constructs in the proposed framework (Section 6.5).  
  173 
6.1 Individual,Study,
A review of the trust literature reveals that current approaches to predicting 
trust in a system do not account for individuals risk perceptions (Section 3.3). 
Current approaches focus on the individuals’ general disposition to trust, as well 
as individuals’ context insensitive constructs such as attitude and beliefs. These 
approaches do not consider the influence that individuals' perception of the 
system design has on their intentions to trust identity systems; for example, the 
research has found that individuals' willingness to accept and IDMS is influence 
by their System Judgement on the usefulness of the identity system, which in 
turn is dependent on the quality of the information (Section 6.3.2). 
The development of a framework that helps to understand individuals’ 
perception of IDMS provides practitioners and researchers with a tool to build 
more trustworthy systems, which directly address individuals’ concerns, thus 
increasing acceptability.  6.2 Methodology,
The individual study used focus group discussions of hypothetical N-IDMS 
implementations, with the aim being to uncover concerns that individuals have 
when encountering such systems (Section 4.3.2.1).  
Initial pilot studies that made use of one-to-one interviews that proved to be 
ineffective because individuals seemed to rarely think about identity, privacy, or 
trust, unless prompted by some kind of negative experience that they can relate 
to. The subject was not conducive to one-on-one discussions, and thus the 
interviews quickly devolved into ‘interrogations’ that produce little interesting 
data. Based on these initial experiences, it was determined that the study would 
use Focus Groups to help stimulate rich discussion and shared experiences 
about individuals’ concerns of IDMS (Section 4.3.2.1). 
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Focus group discussions were further encouraged through the use of scenario-
based design as described by Carroll (2000). A set of six different scenarios were 
developed, each addressing a different policy area that required a hypothetical 
implementation of an IDMS by a government agency (see Appendix II for 
detailed scenarios or Table 9 for a summary). The use of a hypothetical 
implementation was necessary to ensure that all focus group participants, who 
have been limited to university students (Section 4.3.2.1), were 'exposed' to the 
same system, and thus enabling all participants to discuss the same topic. 
Furthermore this also enabled this research to carry out a cross-cultural 
comparison of the responses of the different nationalities (Section 6.5); i.e. how 
does national culture influence individuals' responses to the same system. The 
scenarios provided details of: 
1. A problem that the agency was trying to solve 
2. A proposed identity system to help address the problem 
3. A use case scenario that described how the system would work.  
Each hypothetical IDMS differed in terms of the type of information collected, 
stored, and how it is used. The purpose of this exercise was to determine 
individuals’ concerns in relation to personal information and identity, which 
could then be extrapolated to various conditions. 
Of the scenarios provided to participants, Scenario 6 is the only one that deals 
with the implementation of an N-IDMS in the traditional meaning of the term, 
i.e. the use of unique id numbers and identity cards for the whole population. 
However, the rest of the scenarios still maintain the core issues of N-IDMS, 
which is the collection, storage, and use of personal identity information by the 
government.  
Further, some of the hypothetical systems in the scenarios may be seen as 
ambitious in its implementation. However, these scenarios actually encouraged 
the most discussion, with participants actively discussing the short-comings and 
improvements to the system. In a way, these scenarios can be viewed as being 
similar to the concept of extreme cases in case study research, which seeks "to 
obtain information about unusual cases", which would produce hypothesis that 
would "hold under normal conditions" (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
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Table 9 Summary of hypothetical scenarios used in the focus groups to aid 
discussions 
 Situation Solution 
Scenario 1 Child Abuse 
Any suspicions of child abuse would be noted into a centralised 
identity system by carers that came into contact with a child 
(e.g. doctors and teachers) 
Scenario 2 Personal debt 
More government control of lending practices. Centralised 
government system to collect of personal spending and saving 
information from stores and across all bank accounts. 
Information used to calculate risk profile each time a loan is 
requested  
Scenario 3 
Obesity 
 
Use of CCTV and facial recognition to record food purchases at 
stores and activity levels at gyms. Information routed to central 
agency, to determine risk of obesity. Advice provided to those 
who may be at risk. 
Scenario 4 Benefit fraud 
Employers enter details of all individuals who are interviewed 
for a job (commitment, appearance, suitability, etc.) into a 
central database. Information matched to individuals using 
fingerprints, and used by government agency to assess if 
individuals are trying to improve their situation. 
Scenario 5 Crime 
Collection of DNA from all suspects of a crime, including those 
who are proven innocent. All recorded DNA is used by 
authorities to match to crime scene evidence 
Scenario 6 
Terrorism 
Illegal 
immigration 
Introduction of identity cards and a national database for the 
whole population. Cards required to prove identity in various 
situations from picking up parcel, to accessing government 
services. Interactions with cards recorded into a centralised 
database. Law enforcement can access database to investigate 
security issues. 
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A total of 15 focus groups were conducted, with the modal group size being 3 
participants;2 groups had a total of 4 participants, 9 groups had 3 participants, 
and 4 groups had 2 participants. Of the 4 groups that had only 2 participants, 1 
group was British, 1 was Indian, and 2 were Bruneian. This was largely due to 
several participants not showing up the focus group sessions, even when 4 
participants were scheduled. Research in this case was required to proceed, and 
did not seem to hamper the study, as the analysis revealed that discussions were 
just as rich, and that participants debated with one another, while raising similar 
concerns to the larger groups. Therefore, the research saw this data as being 
useful for inclusion into the study. While the size of the focus groups were small, 
this produced discussions that were more productive and rich than those of 
larger groups of four and above; this is probably due to the complex subject 
material that required participants to talk in depth about their concerns.  
Focus group participants consisted of university students who were of British, 
Bruneian, or Indian nationality, thus keeping the study in line with the 
constraints of the organisation study (5.3.1). Each focus group only consisted of 
participants from the same nationality; of the 15 focus groups, 5 groups 
consisted of British participants, 5 groups of Bruneian participants, and 5 groups 
of Indian participants. 
The discussions from each focus group, lasting between 60 and 90 minutes, 
were transcribed, which in total amounted to 115,848 words. The transcripts 
were analysed using grounded theory (Section 4.3.2.2) to uncover similar 
thought patterns. During the initial open coding phase, codes such as “using 
information for fun” and “don’t mess with the wrong person” were extracted 
directly from the transcripts. These type of in vivo codes quickly added up, by 
the fourth group the analysis produced 286 codes. Analysis quickly moved onto 
the next phase, i.e. axial coding, where similar concepts were brought together. 
In this case, “using information for fun” and “don’t mess with the wrong 
person”, were combined under the construct of insiders (Section 6.3.3), which 
was then grouped with other similar codes under the construct of security 
concerns (Section 6.3.3). At the same time the analysis carried out selective 
coding, specifying the relationships, between the constructs, around the 
phenomenon of interest, i.e. the acceptance or rejection of the proposed IDMS. 
Analysis was done until theoretical saturation was reached, with respect to the 
data set analysed, and no new codes were being discovered. 
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6.3 Analysis:*Uncovering*Concerns*from*Focus*Group*Discussions*
The grounded theory analysis of the focus group discussions reveal that 
individuals, from all cultures, may develop their intention to adopt/use IDMSs 
based on three different aspects of a systems implementation: 
1. Situation Perception 
2. System Judgement 
3. Security Concerns 
6.3.1 Situation,Perception,
An identity system is typically introduced as a support mechanism to address a 
particular problem; situation perception describes how critical an individual 
believes is found. This is especially true in the case of an N-IDMS, where 
individuals typically believe that governments should justify their intentions to 
the public. An individual assesses a problem situation and determines how 
important it is; the more importance placed on a problem, the more likely 
he/she will be to choose to adopt the system that will help solve it. These 
individual assessments are based on three main criteria: 
1. Severity 
2. Extent 
3. Exposure 
6.3.1.1 Severity,
Severity describes the perceived seriousness of consequences that people might 
suffer when affected by the problem. Focus group participants rated issues as 
more serious when there were larger social principles at stake, such as those of 
equality, fairness, justice, and national security; for example, child abuse, 
terrorism, and crime are seen as serious issues, when compared to individual 
problems of health care and personal debt. Therefore, severity isn’t just about 
the implications on the individual him/herself, but is concerned with a moral 
emotive sense of social good and justice.  
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Further, severity is not judged for the specific problem itself, but in the context 
of other problems. At a national level, governments have to manage several 
different problem issues, each competing for limited resources. Individuals’ 
perception of severity is judged in comparison to these other problems. For 
example, in Scenario 4, one of the participants stated that benefit fraud “isn’t a 
big problem”, suggesting that resources be diverted to other issues: “put more 
budget on the obesity thing or the child abuse. This will not be a priority” 
(Focus Group 8 (Bruneian), Scenario 4). In contrast to the emotive drivers of 
severity, individuals also apply a more logical cost-benefit argument in deciding 
which problems are worth tackling at a particular point in time. 
6.3.1.2 Extent,
Situation perception is also driven by the assumed extent of the problem across 
the entire population. As the number of people that are affected by the problem 
increases, the importance of solving the problem is seen to increase. Indian 
participants thought that personal debt (Scenario 2) was not a problem for many 
people, and thus saw no need for the proposed identity system. On the other 
hand, participants in Brunei held a different view, and were more accepting of 
the proposed solution in the scenario.  
“Participant 1: We need this one. Seriously.  
Participant 2: Yeah, definitely. 
Participant 1 and 2: Bruneian’s are all in debt” (Focus Group 8 (Bruneian), 
Scenario 2). 
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6.3.1.3 Exposure,
Finally, exposure captures the amount of contact or awareness that an individual 
has to the problem; this can either happen directly from personal experience, or 
vicariously through the experiences of people they can empathise with. For 
example, when discussing Scenario 2, one of the participants recounted a bad 
experience with his credit rating, in which someone else’s purchasing 
information was attached to his identity. As a result, he was much more 
accepting of the proposed identity system involving personal debt, stating “if it 
was a government run system, I think it would be an improvement over what 
exists at the moment” (Focus Group 3 (British), Scenario 2). Similarly, 
participants who had experience working with children such as Bruneian 
students doing an education curriculum, as well as two British participants who 
have experience with Family Law, were more aware of related issues, and were 
typically more inclined to agree that a solution needed to be found when tackling 
issues of child abuse. 
Indirect experience of the problem can come from media reports. Problems that 
are highlighted in the news expose individuals, making perception of the 
problem more salient, and thus more important to solve. In response to the child 
protection scenario, the British focus groups regularly referred to television or 
newspaper reports, and how the current procedures are shown not to work. 
When discussing personal debt, the Bruneian groups frequently touched on 
recent media coverage that outlined a speech from the Sultan criticising the 
Brunei Islamic Religious Council (BIRC) regarding the distribution of Zakat 
(alms) to people in need (Focus Group 7 (Bruneian); Scenario 4); at the time, 
BIRC was still in possession of BND$230 million of undistributed funds (Brunei 
Times, 2009). 
6.3.2 System,Judgement,
In addition to situation perception, an individual’s initial acceptance of an 
identity system may be influenced by his/her overall judgement of the 
effectiveness of the IDMS in helping to tackle the stated problem. System 
judgement is a deduction that an individual makes based on his/her 
understanding of how the system works. An individual’s deduction about a 
system appears to be developed based on four different areas of consideration: 
1. Information Relevance 
2. Information Accuracy 
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3. Information Reliance 
4. Outcomes 
6.3.2.1 Information,relevance,
One of the core components to system judgement is individual’s perception of 
the relevance regarding the information collected, to the goals of the agency. 
Participants would make negative judgements of the IDMS if they thought that 
the information being collected was irrelevant to the problem situation or 
organisation. The focus groups show that information relevance is influenced 
by: 
1. Granularity 
2. Sensitivity 
Granularity refers to the level of detail being collected and stored in the IDMS; 
i.e. it refers to the amount/depth of information that is collected. Collecting too 
detailed personal information is seen as overstepping boundaries. When 
discussing Scenario 2, participants who favoured the system stated that 
collecting details on every single purchase would be intolerable. They suggested 
that information collection be minimised, and limited to general categories of 
data (e.g. luxury items); in doing, so the granularity of the information collected 
is reduced to acceptable levels. “… if on the point 4, it was just a simple cash 
flow, non-itemised, I think it would be good, cause it would help banks develop 
better risk profiles for people. So, good in that regard. Anymore, and I sort of 
get a bit uncomfortable.” (Focus Group 1 (British), Scenario 2). 
Sensitivity captures how private nature the information is to the individual. The 
more sensitive the information, the more individuals will judge it to be 
irrelevant. When discussing Scenario 1, participants raised concerns about 
deductions that teachers may be able to make about a child’s medical condition 
from the doctors notes in the system. The inverse issue was never raised, 
indicating that the notes that teachers make are seen to be less sensitive, and 
therefore more acceptable.  
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Sensitivity and granularity are not mutually exclusive; a better understanding 
of relevance can be obtained when considering how the two interact with one 
another. The more specific the information becomes, the closer it is to the 
individual’s private boundaries, and therefore the more sensitive it becomes. 
Similarly, the greater the perceived sensitivity of the information collected, the 
more critical individuals tend to be about the granularity of the information. 
6.3.2.2 Information,Accuracy,
System judgement is also influenced by the overall accuracy of the personal 
information collected, stored and used. Individuals’ perception of inaccurate 
information, developed through their assessment of the overall data collection 
protocol, negatively affects the final judgement of the usefulness of the system. 
Through the focus groups, three main factors are believed to influence 
perceptions of information accuracy: 
1. Subjectivity 
2. Completeness 
3. Visibility 
Firstly, there is the concern about subjectivity in the information collection 
phase. Situations in which information is not ‘objectively’ captured, but is 
generated by third parties, are seen to reduce accuracy. There is the perception 
that these parties may exaggerate or influence the information according to their 
personal preferences, thus producing inconsistencies between different external 
parties. These concerns show themselves in Scenario 4, where employers’ notes 
about an individual’s appearance are deemed to be a subjective construct that is 
influenced by the employer’s personal preference; “It is especially bad in the 
case thing, how the employer is interviewing and makes notes, especially on 
appearance. That is one person’s opinion” (Focus Group 1 (British), Scenario 
4). Thus, inconsistencies are created where no two employers would produce 
similar comments on the exact same appearance of an individual. Similarly in 
Scenario 1, several groups believed that the notes made by carers regarding 
suspicions of abuse would only create a database of inaccurate rumours. In these 
cases, participants proposed reducing subjectivity by introducing a quantifiable 
measures or proper guidelines, thus providing a perceived element of objectivity 
to the information. 
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Completeness is another concern; all focus groups raised the issue that the 
system would not be able to collect all the required information specified, and 
thus would produce an inaccurate representation of the individual in that 
particular context. For example, in Scenario 3, participants pointed out that the 
system would not be able to track all the physical activities of an individual; the 
individual might do exercise outside the monitored gym environment, thus 
producing an inaccurate representation of the individual’s activity levels. Similar 
concerns were raised in Scenario 2, where it would be impossible to track every 
single purchase from every single store, thus reducing completeness. 
It seems here that there is some tension between the individuals’ perception of 
granularity and completeness. On the one hand, individuals are not comfortable 
in the organisation collecting too much detail, but on the other hand are also 
concerned about the organisation not capturing enough information to develop 
an accurate representation. Some distinction can be made between the two 
concerns in that completeness deals with the specific points of data collection, 
while granularity deals with the specific information collected at each of these 
points. Nevertheless these tensions still exist, and system designers should be 
aware of these potential conflicts that need to be resolved.  
Lastly, visibility refers to the accessibility of the targeted personal information 
by parties other than the individual to whom it pertains; the more visible the 
information, the easier it is for an external party to notice and record that 
information; the less visible the information is, the more individuals believe that 
there will be inaccuracies, as there are gaps in the knowledge. This concern is 
especially prevalent where information needs to be noted without the subject’s 
co-operation or awareness (subjectivity; see paragraph above). In Scenario 1, 
the issue of child abuse is something that is not directly visible. As a result, not 
only are the notes about children considered subjective, but participants also 
believed that the lack of visibility would lead to further inaccurate notes that 
sensationalise the information. “Child abuse is hidden. It is hard to know when 
it’s just completely innocent. It is a big step for teachers to say: Oh look, there is 
a bump there, so there must be abuse” (Focus Group 1 (British), Scenario 1).  
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6.3.2.3 Information,reliance,
A third factor that may influence system judgement is the degree to which 
organisations come to rely on the information collected and stored. Information 
reliance highlights the individual’s perception of how relevant parties will utilise 
their personal information to inform their decision making process when 
interacting with the individual. The perception of reliance is mediated by: 
1. Dependence 
2. Challenge 
Focus groups were concerned about organisations sole dependence on 
information stored on the IDMS. When organisations become too reliant on the 
stored information, they stop seeking out other sources of information that 
individuals believe would lead to more appropriate outcomes. For example, a 
common conclusion in Scenario 2 was that the loan decisions would not produce 
good results, because the system does not collect the varying reasons for each 
loan application (business ventures, etc.). In Scenario 4, the welfare agency 
would only make decisions based on the information provided by employers. It 
was suggested that the agency not rely on this single source, but should seek out 
more information, such as mental health status, to ensure that proper action is 
taken. 
Here, there is another source of tension; one between the dependence and 
relevance. While individuals are deeply concerned about the organisation over 
stepping its boundaries, they also believe that the organisation should also 
collect varying types of information so as to come to informed judgements. So 
again, designers need to be aware of these subtle conflicts within individuals’ 
perception of the system.  
Lastly, focus group participants were concerned about the ability of an 
individual to challenge the information that leads to decisions made about 
him/her. This issue was most prominent in Scenario 5. Participants saw the use 
of DNA to be deterministic, in that they perceive it to be too difficult to challenge 
one’s identification as a criminal. The most common solution proposed was to 
create mechanisms to ensure that the DNA information collected would not be 
used as evidence of a crime, but instead as indicators to pursue further 
investigation, thus reducing information reliance, while increasing an 
individual’s ability to counter the claims.  
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6.3.2.4 Outcomes,
Along with information relevance, accuracy and reliance, an individual’s 
system judgement may be mediated by the perceived outcomes of the system 
implementation. Outcome is generally expressed as the overall effects that the 
system has on society; this can materialise as issues of: 
1. Freedom 
2. Fairness 
Issues of freedom are commonly tied to issues of tracking that are seen to erode 
personal liberties; individuals feel like they are constantly being watched, and 
will thus be reluctant to act freely. For example, the use of CCTV in stores and 
gyms in Scenario 4 is seen as a highly judgemental system, which places a 
psychological burden on the individual to change his/her behaviour, so as to fit 
the expected norm. These perceived attacks on freedom negatively influenced 
individuals’ perception of the system. In Scenario 4, one participant claimed 
“she would rather leave the country than be exposed to the system”. 
Furthermore, many participants claimed that weight management was a 
personal choice, and should not be imposed upon people, unless they specifically 
requested for that level of control in the first place. Similar views were expressed 
in some discussions about Scenario 2, where financial management is 
considered a personal right that should be free from government control.  
Fairness covers issues of potential discrimination, and the creation of a tiered 
society. In Scenario 4, most participants were against the idea of using the 
information collected to reduce free medical support for obese individuals who 
fail to lose weight. The argument put forward was fairness; obese people were 
singled out, while people suffering from other self-inflicted health problems, 
such as smoking, are not. One group claimed that in order to ensure fairness the 
system would also have to adjust medical benefits for those who choose to do 
extreme sports, and are therefore more prone to injury. 
6.3.3 Security,Concerns,
In addition to the situation perception and system judgement, willingness to 
adopt an identity system is mediated by individuals’ concerns about the security 
of their personal information in the system. The concerns identified related to 
issues of: 
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1. Unauthorised Access. Participants raised concerns about the systems 
security and hackers gaining access to the system. For example, one 
participant stated, "the biggest fear I have is that, unless you have a 
closed network, you are going to open that system up to the web. That 
becomes a huge target. Not only hackers, but even other countries to 
attack" (Focus Group 3, British, Scenario 6). In another focus group a 
participant was concerned about "the possibility of someone going into 
your system, hacking and changing information... we are not there yet" 
(Focus Group 7, Bruneian, Scenario 6). 
2. Insiders. Participants were concerned about corruption, and thus abuse 
of their personal information by people who have legitimate access to the 
system. The concerns were centred on the use of the identity against the 
individual, for insiders’ personal gain. As explained by a participant, "I 
do not mind if my DNA is collected, but it has to be used only for crime, 
not just for fun. It would likely happen. Maybe the officer hates me or 
something, trick the system, into making others think I did something 
bad." (Focus Group 6, Bruneian, Scenario 5). Similarly participants in 
India echoed these concerns who frequently stated and agreed that 
"there is a lot of corruption in India", and that "you cannot really trust 
the government employees, they just like to make a quick buck if they 
could.  If they could use that footage in some way, which would help 
them, they would.  They wouldn't think about it twice" (Focus Group 12, 
Indian, Scenario 4). 
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3. Future Unpredictability. Focus groups raised concerns that the 
information collected can be used for other unknown purposes, by future 
governments that might come into power. This issue dealt with function 
creep and governments’ ability to resist from using information that they 
have for entirely different purposes. "Well, I think if it was possible to 
contain a DNA database for the specific use of crime then it might be 
worth while doing. But I think now, it probably wouldn't be limited to 
that. It's probably the way that the DNA would be used for other 
purposes. That makes it a risk. For the right crime, it's probably a good 
idea. I don't know that much, but I fear that it wouldn’t be limited to just 
that." (Focus Group 1, British, Scenario 5). In another group, discussion 
on the use of fingerprints for the purposes of benefit fraud, a participant 
expressed the belief that the system "can be used for other things. It is 
more likely to be a wider criminal database. The pressure to use it to do 
that… government will submit to pressure of function creep" (Focus 
Group 3, British, Scenario 4).  6.4 Proposed*Framework*for*the*Citizen*Perception*of*Identity*
Using the results of the focus group analysis, a model for the development of 
initial citizen perception and acceptance of an IDMS can now be created (Figure 
16). From the analysis, the three major antecedents to the initial acceptance 
appear to be: 
1. Situation Perception. Situations and problems perceived to be 
important will create a more accepting attitude towards a new IDMS.  
2. System Judgement. Positive perception of the effectiveness of an 
IDMS will also generate more positive attitudes.  
3. Security Concerns. High levels of concern around the security of 
personal information would have a negative impact on the acceptance 
rate.  
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Figure 16 Proposed Citizen Perception framework based on analysis of focus groups 
 
Severity and Extent are hypothesised to be antecedents to Situation Perception. 
The perceived importance of addressing a particular problem is positively 
influenced by the seriousness of the problem being tackled, as well as the extent 
of the population affected by the problem. Individuals’ perception of Severity 
and Extent are further influenced by their exposure to the problem; having had 
some kind of experience or awareness of the problem may inflate individuals’ 
attitudes regarding the seriousness of the problem, and the number of people 
affected by it. 
System Judgement is based on individuals’ perception of information being 
collected and how it may be used; it is influenced by accuracy, relevance, 
reliance, and outcomes. Systems that are perceived to hold inaccurate and 
irrelevant information are seen as an ineffective tool or resource for an 
organisation. Furthermore, a perceived strong reliance by the organisation on 
the information in the system is seen to lead to inflexible and mechanical 
responses from the organisation, thus generating a negative response to the 
IDMS.  
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The overall outcomes also influence the individuals’ views of the system; a large 
number of negative outcomes may be perceived to create a more problematic 
situation. Outcomes, dealing with issues of fairness and freedom, are influenced 
by the type and amount of information collected; therefore, like system 
judgement, outcomes are influenced by accuracy, relevance, and reliance. 
6.4.1 Survey,Study:,Improving,the,framework,
Based on the analysis and hypothesised theoretical framework from the focus 
groups, the study used quantitative methods to confirm the relationships 
between constructs to examine and improve the fit of the model.  
The survey was designed so as to focus on the higher level constructs identified 
within the model (see Appendix III for survey questions); e.g. questions items 
were only developed to focus on the issue of information relevance itself, and 
not on its sub-constructs (i.e. granularity or sensitivity). This limitation was 
introduced so as to keep the length of the survey down to a manageable size; the 
inclusion of questions relating to each of the nine sub-constructs identified 
would have drastically increased the length of the survey, negatively affecting 
completion rates. Several question items were developed to operationalize each 
of the constructs under investigation; these questions were constructed and 
refined through discussions and informal evaluations with colleagues and 
acquaintances, as well as a very small pilot study within the department. Every 
item was measured on a 4-point scale (Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, and 
Strongly Agree), so as to ensure a positive or negative response to each 
question. 
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The study made initial attempts to pre-test the survey by distributing a 
recruitment email to all Computer Science students within the University 
College London (UCL); participants were entered into a luck draw to win £50. 
However, this received very low response rates, with only a total of only 13 
participants. Therefore, due to time limitations, the research had to resort to 
individual walkthrough of the survey with 6 different participants, consisting of 
other research colleagues who have designed surveys, as well 4 acquaintances 
that have no background in research. The result of the walkthrough test showed 
that all participants understood the questions, with only very minor changes to 
the wording of the questions. The other concern raised through the walkthrough 
with research colleagues was with respect to the length of the questionnaire. 
However, the responses received from the Computer Science students showed 
that all participants who participated completed the survey, indicating that the 
survey was able to hold participants attention till completion of the survey. 
After pretesting, the survey was distributed online to a random sample of 
students from the University College London. This was achieved by sending an 
email out to a UCL wide mailing list that targeted all undergraduate students. 
Each survey participant was entered into a lucky draw for a prize of £50. Based 
on the 13,772 undergraduate students enrolled in UCL at the time the survey was 
distributed (UCL Registry & Academic evices, 2012), this represents a 4.85% 
response rate. Participants were first required to read Scenario 1, outlining the 
implementation of an IDMS that aimed to tackle the issue of child abuse.   
Analysis of the data occurred in a two-step procedure; Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA) was first used to test the measurement model, ensuring that all 
question items loaded onto the appropriate construct. This was then followed by 
the use of Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to test the structural model, 
which deals with the relationships between the constructs. It is typical operating 
procedure that the same dataset not be used for both EFA and SEM. To 
accommodate for this, the responses obtained from the survey were randomly 
split into two data sets (using SPSS software package), containing 320 and 366 
responses respectively.  
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6.4.1.1 Exploratory,Factor,Analysis,
EFA is a procedure that is typically used to understand the underlying structure 
of a set of variables (Field, 2009). It calculates the correlation between each 
variable; groups of variables that correlate highly among each other indicate that 
those variables are measuring aspects of the same underlying factor. EFA was 
used here to ensure that the question items developed loaded onto the relevant 
constructs while diverging from the other constructs.  
Using SPSS 19 software for windows, EFA was applied onto one half of the 
randomised dataset. Principal Components was used as the extraction 
technique; initial EFA applications used an eigenvalue threshold of one to 
extract underlying factors. Varimax rotation was used to maximise the loading of 
questions onto a single construct, to help improve interpretation of the data.  
The results of the initial EFA extracted a total of eight factors, which is less than 
the 11 constructs predicted in the proposed framework. Based on the rotated 
component matrix (see Appendix IV), the analysis found that: 
1. Severity and Situation Perception question items loaded onto 
a single factor 
2. Relevance and Accuracy question items loaded onto a single 
factor 
3. A few Reliance question items loaded onto the combined 
accuracy/relevance factor.  
4. Remaining Reliance items and a majority of the Judgement 
items loaded onto the same factor.  
In light of these unexpected factor loadings, a confirmatory approach was 
adopted in which the expected number of factors was specified; i.e. 11 factors to 
reflect the 11 expected constructs. All 11 factors extracted were observed to 
Eigenvalue of 0.865 or more (Table 10), which is still above the widely accepted 
Eigenvalue of 0.7 (Field, 2009).  
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Table 10 Factor Analysis of all question items with 11 factors specified 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalue Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 9.583 26.619 26.619 4.894 13.596 13.596 
2 3.188 8.855 35.474 3.698 10.271 23.867 
3 2.247 6.241 41.715 2.604 7.233 31.100 
4 1.940 5.388 47.103 2.401 6.670 37.770 
5 1.596 4.432 51.535 2.103 5.842 43.612 
6 1.394 3.873 55.409 1.836 5.100 48.712 
7 1.137 3.158 58.567 1.801 5.003 53.715 
8 1.004 2.789 61.356 1.576 4.377 58.092 
9 .969 2.692 64.048 1.467 4.076 62.167 
10 .930 2.583 66.631 1.262 3.505 65.672 
11 .865 2.402 69.032 1.210 3.360 69.032 
12 .769 2.136 71.168    
 
However, the results of the confirmatory factor analysis were unsatisfactory, in 
that certain question items still loaded unexpectedly onto different constructs 
(see Appendix IV); in particular one extent and judgement question item loaded 
onto a single factor, while one accuracy question item loaded onto the 
acceptance factor. To address this issue, the study took an exploratory approach 
to examine the strength of variable loadings onto unexpected factors. The 
corresponding question item was reviewed, and compared to the other question 
items with which they correlated; similarities in the questions would explain the 
unexpected loadings, and in these situations two initially separate constructs 
may in fact be collapsed into a single construct. On the other hand, unexpected 
loadings in which the question is not related to the other correlated questions, 
and thus have no theoretical reasoning, would imply that the variable should be 
eliminated. 
Using this iterative process, items that only loaded strongly onto a single factor 
on its own, without any theoretical basis, were removed from the data (see 
Appendix IV). A total of 10 question items were removed; including all the items 
relating to the outcome construct.  
  192 
Also to be noted is that the severity and situation perception question items still 
loaded onto a single factor, as did the remaining accuracy and relevance items. 
Furthermore, system judgement and use items now also loaded onto the same 
factor. 
To further explore these loadings, separate EFAs were conducted on the 
development of situation perception, and the development of system 
judgement. These are two different processes that are based on different aspects 
(situation vs. system), and therefore it would be beneficial to explore the factor 
loadings of the corresponding question items in isolation of each other. An EFA 
analysis was applied onto the question items that correspond to situation 
perception and its antecedents (experience, severity, and extent). Similarly, EFA 
analysis was also run on the variables corresponding to system judgement and 
its antecedents (accuracy, reliance, outcomes, and judgements).  
EFA on the situation constructs, based on Eigenvalues of one, produced similar 
results to previous test, where situation perception and severity question items 
still loaded onto a single construct. However, taking a more confirmatory 
approach, and using PCA to extract four factors (min. Eigenvalue = 0.743), 
severity and situation perception question items did in fact load onto two 
separate factors, implying the existence of the two separate constructs. The 
initial loading of the two constructs onto a single factor might be explained by 
the fact that severity is an antecedent on situation perception, and therefore are 
strongly correlated to each other. 
On the other hand, a confirmatory approach on the system judgement process 
did not present any new insight. Thus, accuracy and relevance constructs were 
collapsed into a single construct called information quality. The theoretical 
underpinning of this decision was that both original constructs dealt with the 
process of information collection and storage.  
On a similar note, the remaining use and judgement variables still loaded onto 
the same factor. Going back to the survey reveals that the use question items 
dealt with the impacts of using the identity information to inform organisational 
decisions; this is theoretically similar to the remaining judgement items that 
deal with the effectiveness and usefulness of the overall system. Therefore, 
informed by the factor loading, and the theoretical similarity of the question 
items, the remaining use items were collapsed under the judgement construct. 
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Table 11 Factor loadings of all question items. Factor Analysis (PCA). Minimum 
Eigenvalue of 1. Varimax rotation. 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
acc3 .771             
acc2 .720             
acc4 .720             
acc1 .690             
sev2   .751           
per1   .751           
sev3   .686           
sev1   .677           
per2 .419 .658           
per3 .514 .651           
con1     .807         
con4     .758         
con3     -.700         
con2     .676         
jud1       .756       
jud2       .673       
use3       .641       
use1 .437     .500       
acu3         .788     
acu1         .755     
rel2         .643     
rel3         .442     
ext1           .813   
ext2           .788   
exp1             .774 
exp2             .769 
exp3   .447         .567 
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Table 10 shows the factor loadings under rotation, after the removal of 
unsatisfactory variables; factors were extracted on the basis of a minimum 
eigenvalue of 1, and weak loadings of less than 0.4 were suppressed for easier 
reading. The clustering of variables around factors fit the following constructs: 
• Factor 1 represents acceptance 
• Factor 3 represents concerns 
• Factor 4 represents judgement (use variables subsumed under 
judgement) 
• Factor 5 represents information quality (accuracy and 
relevance collapsed together) 
• Factor 6 represents extent 
• Factor 7 represents experience 
Factor 2 in Table 11 shows the combined loading of severity and perception 
items onto a single factor. Table 12 shows the factor loadings of items that are 
related to the development of situation perception only. From the table, 
situation perception and severity can be seen to load onto two different factors, 
factor 1 and factor 2 respectively.  
Table 12 Factor loadings of situation perception, severity, extent, and experience 
question items. Principal Components Analysis. 4 factors specified. Varimax 
Rotation 
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
per2 .848       
per3 .845       
per1 .790       
sev3   .784     
sev1   .760     
sev2 .470 .677     
exp1     .847   
exp2     .733   
exp3   .405 .602   
ext1       .871 
ext2       .749 
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The factor loading matrices also enable us to establish the validity of the survey 
instrument and measures. Validity is a necessary prerequisite for successful 
development of a model, ensuring that the instrument measures what it was 
designed to. This mainly consists of convergent validity that refers to the extent 
to which the variables posited reflect a given construct converge, and 
discriminant validity that refers to the extent to which variables that make up a 
construct differ from those that are not believed to make up the construct. 
Analysis of the factor loadings shows that most measures load highly onto their 
respective factors, having factor scores of greater than 0.5, with the majority 
being in the range 0.65 to 0.8. The exception to this is rel3 that has a factor score 
of 0.442, which is still close to 0.5. These results provide evidence for convergent 
validity. 
Analysing the tables for cross-loadings of question items to different factors 
shows that the variables do not load strongly with any other factors; where 
cross-loadings do exist, it does not exceed the loading of the variable onto its 
original factor. Furthermore, the factor score co-variance matrix shows that each 
factor is independent of one another (Table 13). Together these figures establish 
the discriminant validity of the measures.  
Table 13 Factor Score Covariance Matrix after iterative EFA. Extraction Method. 
Maximum Likelihood 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 .952 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
2 .000 .850 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
3 .000 .000 .751 .000 .000 .000 .000 
4 .000 .000 .000 .744 .000 .000 .000 
5 .000 .000 .000 .000 .704 .000 .000 
6 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .629 .000 
7 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .598 
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Validity is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of a measure. Reliability 
must also be considered, ensuring that the measures can be interpreted 
consistently across different conditions. Reliability can be tested by calculating 
the value of Cronbach’s alpha for each measure. Values of 0.7 or 0.8 for 
Cronbach’s alpha are considered a good measure of reliability, while scores 
below 0.7 may also be accepted when dealing with psychological constructs. 
Analysing Cronbach’s alpha for the factors shows that all constructs have high 
levels of reliability, with alpha being greater than 0.7. However, experience has a 
value of 0.6, and extent a value of 0.647, both of which is still within acceptable 
levels. 
Table 14 Cronbach Alpha values for factors identified through the survey 
Construct) Cronbach’s)Alpha)
Perception) 0.863)
Experience) 0.6)
Severity) 0.763)
Extent) 0.647)
Information)Quality) 0.728)
Judgement) 0.807)
Concerns) 0.773)
Acceptance) 0.878)
6.4.1.2 Structural,Equation,Modelling,
Once EFA was completed on the measurement model, and constructs confirmed 
for reliability and validity, SEM was used to assess the fit of the structural model, 
analysing the correlations of the constructs against each other. AMOS 19 was 
used for the SEM process, where the proposed model was specified 
(accommodating for the merging of factors described in Section 6.4.1.1); 
constructs were set up as latent variables, while each item corresponding to that 
construct was set up as an observed indicator of that variable (Table 17) 
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Chi$square+ Normed+Chi$Square+ GFI+ AGFI+ NFI+ CFI+ RMSEA+
820)
)p)=)0.000)
2.598) 0.858) 0.831) 0.821) 0.881) 0.66)
 
Figure 17 Proposed individual perception model constructed in AMOS to test fit 
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The model was analysed in AMOS using maximum likelihood as the estimation 
procedure. The suitability of the model is evaluated by assessing the various 
measures of fit produced. Table 15 shows the most commonly cited fit measures, 
and their critical values for interpretation. The more fit measures that fall within 
acceptable ranges, the more confident one can be of the model fit. 
Table 15 Commonly used fit statistics in SEM (Abramson, Rahman, & Buckley, 2005) 
 
The analysis of the proposed model produced fit measures that fell outside the 
acceptable range, with only the normed chi-square and RMSEA statistics 
providing an indication of good fit. Following this, the study adopted an 
exploratory approach to produce a better fitting model. Fit measures assess how 
well the parameter estimates produced by the model, account for the co-
variances observed in the data set. While the initial model that was developed 
through the focus group analysis produced two fit statistics within acceptable 
ranges, the model re-specification brought other fit-measures within acceptable 
ranges, thus providing the research with greater confidence that the re-specified 
model accounts for all the observed co-variances; i.e. the re-specified model is a 
more accurate reflection of reality.  
This model re-specification involves the adding or removal of variables, and can 
be aided by the use of residual matrices and modification indices produced by 
AMOS (Abramson, Rahman, & Buckley, 2005). This was an iterative process, 
involving the removal or addition of single variables or correlations (that have 
theoretical basis) to analyse its effect on the overall fit of the model; the adjusted 
model produced is illustrated, along with its fit measures, in Figure 18. 
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The Model Fit indices for the adjusted model show that this is a better model 
than that originally proposed, with the normed chi-square, GFI, CFI, and 
RMSEA all indicating a good fit. Based on the modification indices produced by 
AMOS, new theoretically justifiable relationships were added to the model. 
Information quality is placed as an antecedent to concerns, as this constructs 
deals with the security of information within the system. Concerns in turn act as 
a direct antecedent to system judgement; having high concerns over the security 
of the personal information would have a negative impact on the judgement of 
the overall system. Situation perception also acts as an antecedent to system 
judgement; the more urgent a situation is perceived to be, the more the 
judgement of the system will be a positive one. Lastly, exposure was removed as 
an antecedent to extent. 
Finally, attempting to produce a better fitting model, simple multiple 
regressions was used to explore the relationships in isolation. The findings from 
this showed that while experience had a statistically significant relationship with 
severity, the strength of the relationship was very weak (0.067). Removing the 
experience construct from the overall model in AMOS, increased NFI to 0.9 
indicating a good model, while also increasing the AGFI to 0.893 (Figure 19); 
this indicates that the final model produced is a better fit when compared to the 
second adjusted model (Figure 18) 
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Chi$square+ Normed+Chi$Square+ GFI+ AGFI+ NFI+ CFI+ RMSEA+
268)
)p)=)0.000)
1.763) 0.907) 0.887) 0.890) 0.949) 0.046)
 
Figure 18 Improved individual perception model based on SEM process 
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Chi$square+ Normed+Chi$Square+ GFI+ AGFI+ NFI+ CFI+ RMSEA+
222)
)p)=)0.000)
1.789) 0.914) 0.893) 0.902) 0.954) 0.046)
 
Figure 19 Final individual perception model after experience construct is removed 
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6.5 Analysis:*Cultural*Factors*Affecting*Acceptance*
Apart from the general constructs that lead to the acceptance or rejection of an 
identity system, the study also investigated the influence of national culture on 
acceptance. Focus groups were designed such that participants in each group 
were culturally homogeneous, sharing the same nationality, thus allowing for a 
comparison of responses across these three cultures (i.e. Bruneian focus groups, 
British focus groups, Indian focus groups).  
Hofstede’s national culture values (Section 3.4.2 and Section 4.3.2.3) were used 
to establish the cultural differences between each of the three countries. While 
the cultural measures of British and Indian focus groups were readily available 
(Geert Hofstede et al., 2008), measures from Brunei were not. Therefore, the 
cultural value measurement survey was distributed to undergraduate computer 
science university students in Brunei (University of Brunei Darussalam). 
However, these Bruneian measures are not directly comparable to the published 
British and Indian results, as they are based on unmatched samples; 
“comparisons of countries should be based on matched samples of respondents: 
people who are similar on all criteria other than nationality that could 
systematically affect the answers” (Hofstede et al., 2008).  
A possible way around this limitation is to anchor the new results to the 
available measures by distributing the survey to one other country of which the 
values are already known. “Anchoring means that the scores from the extension 
research should be shifted by the difference of the old and new scores for the 
common country” (Geert Hofstede et al., 2008). As such, the study distributed 
the Value Survey Module (VSM) questionnaire to undergraduate computer 
science students in Britain; specifically students from the University College 
London; the VSM is a publicly available questionnaire, provided by Hofstede, to 
measure National Culture (Hofstede et al., 2008).   
A total of 21 Bruneian and 22 British students replied to the survey, which is 
within Hofstede’s minimum recommendations (Hofstede et al., 2008). The 
anchored cultural measures are listed in Table 16. 
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Table 16 Cultural value measures for countries under investigation 
+ PDI+ IND+ MAS+ UA+ LTO+ IVR+ MON+
Brunei+ 84) 41) 56) 88) 79) 39) (57))
UK+ 35) 89) 66) 35) 51) 69) (25))
India+ 77) 41) 56) 40) 51) 26) (N))
 
A limitation of the cultural inquiry is the small number of countries under 
investigation; according to Hofstede (2001), quantitative use of the cultural 
measures “demands data for a large number of countries, preferably 10 or 
more; qualitative use is possible for any comparisons of two or more cases”. 
Therefore, the cultural investigation here seeks to qualitatively explain the 
variances in responses between participants of each country, based on the 
discrepancies in the cultural scores, and their implied effects as described by 
Hofstede (2001). 
The investigation has uncovered several affects that national culture has on the 
acceptance of IDMS: 
1. PDI correlated positively with concerns for information abuse 
2. IDV correlates positively with concerns of freedom 
3. IDV correlates positively with concerns of function creep 
4. UA correlates positively with concerns over security 
5. UA correlates positively with acceptance (low protest 
potential) 
6. LTO correlates negatively with information quality 
(information is more sensitive) 
7. LTO correlates positively with acceptance (focused on the 
growth of the country) 
6.5.1 Power,Distance,on,Concerns,of,Information,Abuse,
“Power Distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organisations within a society expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally” (Geert Hofstede et al., 2008). In High PDI societies, the 
powerful tend to exert their power and maintain their positions, while the 
weaker individuals accept the power gap. As a result, high PDI societies tend to 
have citizens that distrust authorities, and also tend to have higher occurrences 
of corruption (Hofstede, 2001).  
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Brunei and India both rate highly on the PDI scales (84 and 77 respectively), 
when compared to a Britain (35); this discrepancy in the scores appears to 
reflect the concerns of individuals when assessing an N-IDMS. Bruneian and 
Indian focus groups were highly concerned about corruption and the abuse (see 
Section 6.3.3, as well as the direct quotations provided below, that emphasise 
the concerns of participants) of information by insiders.  
Indian participants felt uneasy about having all that information in the hands of 
the government, specifically mentioning corruption, and how information could 
be used against them by those in power.  
“Interviewer: But you also raised issue about do you trust the authorities and 
do you trust …? 
Participant 1: Yeah. 
Interviewer: Could you expand on that some more. 
Participant 1: Yeah. Well, okay, like bringing in all these other factors like the 
politicians having their own problems and their own past crimes, whether 
their information will actually be correct or not. It’s possible that my DNA is 
mixed with yours, or like switched with yours just because of carelessness or 
just because of problems with the structure itself. Maybe that would be a 
problem, maybe purposeful changes made to the data. That could be a 
problem, so it’s just, I don’t know if it’s safe in the hands of someone like the 
police. Maybe like people have mentioned, maybe high profile cases sure, but 
not necessarily everyone. 
Interviewer: Does everybody agree with that? 
Participant 2: Yeah, at the moment the DNA should be kept in the hands of 
the police. I don’t think that it should be a case if this is implemented in India 
because the police can’t be trusted” (Focus Group 13 (Indian), Scenario 5). 
Bruneian participants also had concerns of abuse by insiders (Section 6.3.3), but 
were less focused on the higher political corruption issues; instead, concerns 
centred on insiders who might use stored personal information for personal 
attacks against the individual, and “exploit this data, for their own use” (Focus 
Group 9 (Bruneian), Scenario 6).  
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“Participant 2: For example, anyone apart from the carers, have access to 
that information. They can use that information to perhaps sabotage the 
parents. I think that would be a problem” (Focus Group 7 (Bruneian), 
Scenario 1). 
“Interviewer: Do you trust the government to protect your information? 
Participant 2: That is quite blurry. 
Participant 1: In Brunei… 
Participant 2: It depends. If you don't mess with the wrong person” (Focus 
Group 8 (Bruneian), Scenario 3).  
On the other hand, British participants did not explicitly raise issues of 
corruption issues. It was only mentioned implicitly when suggesting that proper 
access and security protocols would provide the necessary security for the 
identity information. 
6.5.2 Individualism,,Freedom,and,the,Future,Unpredictability,
“Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are 
loose: a person is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her 
immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from 
birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which continue 
to protect them throughout their lifetime in exchange for unquestioning 
loyalty” (Geert Hofstede et al., 2008). A consequence of this is that the principle 
of equality among individuals becomes an important point for individualist 
societies. Hofstede (2001) notes that IDV is positively correlated to a country’s 
human rights ratings. High IDV societies also tend to strongly believe that 
everyone has a right to privacy. 
Britain scored highly on the IDV scale (89). Compared to the more collectivist 
societies of India and Brunei (IDV score of 41 for both countries), British 
participants more frequently raised issues around future unpredictability 
(Section 6.3.3) of the personal information, constantly mentioning issues of 
tracking, being pressured from acting freely; this confirms the importance of 
privacy and human rights within highly individual societies. 
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“Participant 1: If it was to suffer from the same problems as the last one, the 
with the, uh, sort of, not believing people can make the right decision of their 
own accord. It’s really not, like, respecting their ability to make decisions. It 
seems to be a bit like… and also people have a right, people have a, it’s their 
choice if they want to be, if they want to be overweight and not do exercise. 
Fine. If they want that. That’s fine. 
Participant 2: I think there’s nothing wrong in promoting a healthy lifestyle. 
I think that is good, I think we have to do it in the, like when we study we 
have to do health promotion and, but there are different ways of doing it and 
I think this isn’t really a good way. I don’t think that people would find this 
encouraging. I don’t think that people would take it… like, I want to be 
healthy but I would never, I don’t think I could ever, I don’t know, what’s it 
called?... Do this. No, I, I wouldn’t apply to this, I’d be very reluctant. So I 
think that it’s obviously targeting a good thing but no I’d find it really hard. 
It’s too much monitoring. I don’t want to be monitored 24 hours, no” (Focus 
Group 2 (British), Scenario 3). 
In a similar vein, British focus groups were highly concerned about function 
creep; information being collected and stored would be used for other purposes. 
Again, this taps into human rights issues where the information is used in new 
ways that potentially invades privacy and freedoms, creating unequal 
relationships between citizen and state. 
“Participant 1: I was just going to say that this goes a bit further than the 
idea of a credit rating. This is actually, checking out what you are buying. 
Which as long as you don’t go into debt and don’t pay off your debts, you buy 
what you want, don’t you? 
Participant 2: I do ponder as well. It says, it will track information, 
purchasing habits, but if you are buying cash, I don’t see how it can track. If 
you are paying cash over a debit card, then I am not entirely sure, will that 
shopper who makes a lot of cash transactions, and then, hey if I am making a 
lot of cash transactions, is it because they are doing illegal stuff? It’s this 
danger of creep. You can have one thing and then have someone who is 
taking out a lot cash and say, ‘Why is this person buying in cash? Are they a 
drug dealer? What is going on?’ The problem is, it starts off with innocent 
and positive effects, but could quite easily slip into creep” (Focus Group 3 
(British), Scenario 2). 
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In contrast, participants from India and Brunei rarely brought up freedom 
principles, and function creep took a back seat in the discussions, only ever 
mentioned implicitly. These results are in line with Hofstede’s observation that 
collectivist societies tend to have lower human rights ratings, and accept states 
where “private lives are invaded by public interests” (Hofstede, 2001). In 
certain cases, especially the Bruneian context, there was some recognition of the 
privacy invasions, but was seen as less important when compared to the greater 
good.  
“Participant 1: Child abuse is something you don't talk about in public. You 
have to dig deep down to know. The child won't say anything. It is up to the 
carers, the teachers, and doctors, to notice. 
Participant 2: Maybe it should not be accessible for the employees, just for 
the doctors, the police officers, things like that. 
Participant 1: Yes. Input information, but not access what others commented 
about that child. I wish we can have this here. 
Participant 2: I am thinking about those kids” (Focus Group 8 (Bruneian), 
Scenario 1).  
6.5.3 Uncertainty,Avoidance,on,Security,and,Acceptance,
“Uncertainty Avoidance is defined as the extent to which the members of 
institutions and organisations within a society feel threatened by uncertain, 
unknown, ambiguous, or unstructured situations” (Geert Hofstede et al., 2008). 
Hofstede (2001) found that uncertainty avoidance was negatively correlated 
with confidence in the civil service, and willingness to protest. 
From the focus group discussions, Bruneians tended to voice concerns over the 
security of the system; government was seen as being unable to sufficiently 
defend against attackers breaking into the system, i.e. hackers (Section 6.3.3). 
This was less evident in the British and Indian groups, and is explained by 
Brunei’s comparatively high score on the UAI measure (88 to Britain’s 35 and 
India’s 40).  
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Additionally, the Bruneian focus groups were less likely to express strong 
resistance or outright rejection of the scenarios. Rejection of a system was 
commonly expressed as the system being “annoying” (Focus Group 6 
(Bruneian), Scenario 3), or that “it would not be a nice thing to do” (Focus 
Group 7 (Bruneian), Scenario 3). This is in contrast to Indian participants who 
expressed stronger arguments about why an identity system should not be 
implemented; British participants were the most vocal in their rejections, 
sometimes stating that they would protest, or would “just go to a country where 
they don’t have it (the identity system)” (Focus Group 5 (British), Scenario 3). 
6.5.4 LongITerm,Orientation,on,Sensitivity,and,Acceptance,
“Long-Term Orientation stands for a society which fosters virtues oriented 
towards future rewards, in particular adaptation, perseverance and thrift. 
Short Term orientation stands for a society which fosters virtues related to the 
past and present, in particular respect for tradition, preservation of ‘face’, and 
fulfilling social obligations” (Geert Hofstede et al., 2008). As LTO is a relatively 
new dimension to the cultural survey, there are not many connotations attached 
to it; however, according to Hofstede (2001) “high LTO families tend to keep to 
themselves”. 
Brunei scores highly on LTO (79), while India and Britain have comparatively 
low scores (both scoring 51). This difference manifests itself in the Bruneians’ 
approach to determining information sensitivity (Section 6.3.2.1) and its impact 
on privacy; Bruneians didn’t see privacy as being only about the individual, but 
as also extending to the individual’s social circle; breaching an individual's 
privacy is seen to have an impact on the family unit as well. This concern is 
further emphasised by common arguments relating to the small size of the 
country, where in “Brunei, everyone knows everyone” (Focus Group 10 
(Bruneian), Scenario 1). India and British participants did not share the same 
concerns, and privacy was judged on an individual level, rather than the social 
level. 
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However, LTO might also have an impact on the overall acceptance of an 
identity system. Although Hofstede has not investigated the impacts of LTO 
beyond family and business, the focus group indicate that LTO could have a 
positive impact on the willingness to ensure for the long-term security of the 
country. It was common for Bruneians to express acceptance of an IDMS they 
might not entirely agree with, citing the importance of growth and development 
of the country. These arguments were absent from the Indian and British focus 
groups.  
“Interviewer: Do you think the public would be accepting of such a system? 
Participant 2: I myself, if I was a parent, I would want that. It means that 
the country is advancing; they should be open to such things” (Focus Group 7 
(Bruneian), Scenario 1.) 
“Participant 1: Even though I don't agree with… stores might give false 
information, etc., but I 90% agree that this will reduce the number of people 
being in debt in Brunei” (Focus Group 8 (Bruneian), Scenario 2). 6.6 Summary*and*Discussion*
A focus group study was conducted to explore individuals’ perception and 
acceptance of IDMS. Grounded theory analysis revealed that individuals’ 
willingness to accept an IDMS is depends on 3 main constructs. Based on the 
above findings, a proposed model for acceptance of an IDMS was developed that 
had each main construct serve as an antecedent to acceptance, which in turn was 
dependent on its sub-constructs: 
1. Situation Perception describes the urgency with which a problem 
needs to be addressed. 
a. Severity touches on the seriousness of being affected by the 
problem. 
b. Extent captures the frequency of the problem among the 
population. 
c. Exposure accounts for the experiences and awareness that an 
individual has to the problem. 
2. System Judgement describes the individual’s perception of how useful 
the system will be in helping to address the problem.  
a. Information Accuracy captures the individuals’ perceived 
accuracy, completion, and subjectivity of the information being 
collected and stored. 
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b. Information Relevance captures the individuals’ thoughts on 
the relevance, sensitivity, and granularity of the information 
being collected and stored. 
c. Information Reliance captures the perceived dependency and 
flexibility of the organisation in using the information to make 
decisions. 
d. Outcomes capture the general societal outcomes in terms of 
freedom and fairness. 
3. Security Concerns describes the individuals’ fears over the security, 
safety, and abuse of the identity within the IDMS.  
Using the proposed model and constructs, a survey was developed to 
quantitatively explore the hypothesised relationships between the major 
constructs. The survey was distributed to all undergraduate students at the 
University College London, and received a total of 668 completed responses. 
Based on the 13, 772 undergraduate students enrolled in UCL at the time of the 
survey , this represents a 4.85% distributed (UCL Registry & Academic evices, 
2012).  
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) showed that information accuracy and 
information relevance loaded highly onto the same factor; these were then 
collapsed into a single factor called information quality dealing with the overall 
concerns about the information being collected and stored. EFA further showed 
that most of the outcome items loaded highly onto judgement. Referring back to 
the survey, the respective questions items all touch on concepts similar to the 
judgement construct. This may indicate a need to develop new questions for the 
outcomes construct so as to avoid any overlap. To proceed with the quantitative 
investigation, the outcomes construct was removed from the model, while 
merging the relevant items into the judgement construct. 
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Overall the factor loadings showed that items loaded strongly onto a single 
factor, with little cross loadings onto other factors. An exception is the severity 
and situation perception construct; however, this is unsurprising as severity is 
predicted to be an antecedent to situation perception, and is thus expected to 
correlate to some extent. Isolating and running EFA on situation perception and 
its antecedents showed that severity and situation perception do load onto 
separate constructs; thus, divergent and convergent validity is achieved across 
all factors. Cronbach’s alpha was used to show the reliability of all constructs, all 
of which had a value of above 0.6, the majority of which were in the range of 0.7 
and 0.8. 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was then used to explore the model and 
relationships between each construct. Initial analysis based on the proposed 
model produced unsatisfactory fit statistics. Through an iterative process, based 
on the SEM results, as well as sound theoretical reasoning, new relationships 
were added or removed from the model. A well-fitting model was produced 
where: 
1. Experience was eliminated from the model 
2. Information Quality was an antecedent to Concerns 
3. Concerns was an antecedent to System Judgement 
4. Situation Perception is an antecedent to System Judgement 
In addition to the general acceptance model, the study was also designed to 
investigate the effects of national culture on the overall perception, and 
willingness to accept an IDMS. Focus Groups were designed so that all 
participants in each focus group came from one particular country; five British 
focus groups, four Bruneian focus groups, and five Indian focus groups. Due to 
the small number of countries investigated, the effects of national culture could 
only be described qualitatively. This was done using Hofstede’s cultural value 
measures and the implied effects that he has captured and described (Hofstede, 
2001). 
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Figure 20 Final individual perception framework, including culture 
Using the results from the grounded theory analysis, discrepancies between 
responses from the different countries were noted, and linked to the cultural 
score values. The study has found that power distance, individualism, and 
uncertainty avoidance serve as antecedents to security concerns; with each 
measure respectively heightening issues around abuse, unpredictability, and 
ability of government to secure information. On the other hand, long-term 
orientation serves as an antecedent to information quality, where long-term 
orientated societies tend to have a more social view of privacy, and therefore see 
information as being more sensitive.  
Finally, long-term orientation and uncertainty avoidance both have a positive 
relationship on the acceptance construct; long-term orientated societies place 
the development of countries above personal concerns, while high uncertainty 
avoidance countries reduce their willingness to protest, thus increasing the 
likelihood of acceptance. 
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Overall these findings indicate that individuals’ perception of IDMS is largely 
focused on the outcomes of the system. How will the situation be improved? Are 
the right problems being tackled? Will the system be useful and effective in 
solving the problem? Will insiders and hackers abuse the identity information? 
These findings are in line with other privacy research that has found that 
individuals are focused on consequences, as opposed to traditional 
informational privacy dimensions. (Paine et al., 2007) showed that Internet 
users’ privacy concerns were focused on issues viruses, and hackers. Similarly, 
Weirich (2001, 2005) found that individuals concerns over following security 
measures were influenced by their perceptions of hackers gaining access to the 
system. Adams's (2001) work in multimedia communications found that privacy 
invasions happen when due to the transmission of sensitive information, as well 
as its unexpected usage. Further, the proposed framework does have some 
similarity to that of Smith’s traditional informational privacy measures (Smith et 
al., 1996). For example, the originally proposed constructs of granularity and 
Smith’s collection construct, as well as the proposed information accuracy 
construct and Smith’s error construct. However, the framework developed here 
extends beyond Smiths’ standalone constructs, as it is used as an antecedent to 
determine individuals’ system judgement. 
6.6.1 Future,Work,
The individual acceptance framework broke away from the traditional trust 
research in order to identify how the IDMS itself influences intentions to adopt. 
Having done so, it may be beneficial to extend the findings incorporate trusting 
elements to increase the explanatory of the framework.  
Using Pavlou (2003) and Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal (2004) as a foundation, we 
begin to see how risk can be integrated into the trusting model as described by Li 
(2004). Pavlou (2003) showed that perceived risk influences trusting intention, 
while trust is an antecedent to both trust and risk (Figure 21). Malhotra et al. 
(2004) also demonstrated that risk beliefs affect trusting intention, and further 
illustrated that the risk beliefs are influenced by privacy concerns regarding the 
information collection and control, as well as the sensitivity of the information 
collected (Figure 22). 
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Figure 21 Pavlou (2003) Trust-Risk model 
 
  
Figure 22 Malhotra et al. (2004) IUPIC model 
 
Meanwhile, the findings of individual acceptance framework appear to align 
themselves with the concept of risk; for example, concerns over the security of 
the information, or the severity of the problem if left unattended, resonate with 
the concept of risk. Therefore, future work might hypothesise and place the 
constructs of the individual acceptance framework as an antecedent to the 
individual’s perceived risk of an identity system, which is determined by an 
his/her system assessment, problem evaluation and security concerns. Thus, 
based on the above two models, it may be possible to combine the individual 
acceptance framework with Li's (2004) comprehensive N-IDMS trust model, as 
shown in Figure 22. 
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Figure 23 Proposed trust-risk framework for IDMS 
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Chapter,7:,Organisation,Perspective,on,the,NIIDMS,,
This chapter describes a framework that captures organisations’ identity 
requirements, and guides the design and implementation of an IDMS. 
The literature review in Section 3.5 revealed that most research into 
organisations and IDMSs have focused on identity as an authentication 
mechanism to access secured resources. However, as it is used today, identity 
has moved beyond security, and has itself become a resource.  
The research presented here explores identity as the strategic resource being 
accessed; it explores the influences of organisational identity requirements on 
the design and implementation of an IDMS. This study investigated the 
implementation of N-IDMS in 3 different countries; Brunei (Section 7.2.1), UK 
(Section 7.2.2), and India (Section 7.2.3). Using interviews, and publicly 
available government documents, data collection was focused on organisations 
arguments for the system, as well as the corresponding strategy and design of 
the N-IDMS to fulfil those goals. 
Using Grounded Theory, the analysis found that organisational identity 
requirements are driven by the overall purpose of the system (Section 7.4), 
which in turn affects two major processes that organisations are concerned with; 
identity construction (Section 7.3.1), which is focused on maintaining the 
integrity of identities within the system, and identity use (Section 7.3.2), which 
is focused on the access and use of identity. 
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7.1 Organisation*Study*
While the previous two studies focused on the system and the individual 
respectively, the third and final research study focused on the organisation 
implementing an IDMS. In recognising the organisation, discovering the 
organisation’s identity requirements, and how these affect the planning and 
implementation of an IDMS.  
By investigating identity as a strategic resource, this study constructed a 
framework that captures the organisational requirements and its implications on 
the design of an IDMS. The formalisation of these requirements into a 
framework can help designers build identity systems that are fit for purpose, 
while also helping to inform policy debates, by highlighting the areas of concern, 
as well as reducing ambiguity in the discussions. 7.2 Methodology*
The study presented in this chapter used a case study approach (Section 4.3.1) 
across three different N-IDMS implementations, each in a different country; 
Brunei, United Kingdom, and India (Table 17). The investigation drew from 
various qualitative sources that were available in each context, ranging from 
interviews to publicly available government documents.  
7.2.1 Case,Study,1:,Brunei,Darussalam,
Documentation on the current Bruneian N-IDMS case was not readily available. 
There are only a handful of articles that cover the history of the system; these 
were used to describe the development of the system since its inception. 
Therefore, to support the main analysis of this case study, interviews were 
conducted with several different government agencies that have been involved in 
the implementation and use of the system. Interviews were conducted with: 
1. Brunei National Registration Agency (BruNIR). The lead agency 
and owner of the Bruneian N-IDMS. This key interview session involved 
the director of the BruNIR along with two other high-level government 
officers that were involved in the development, and on-going use of the 
system.  
2. Information Technology Protective Security Services (ITPSS). 
A company that handles various security aspects of the identity system, 
and other e-Government projects. 
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3. Tabung Amanah Pekerja (TAP). TAP, which is in charge of the 
national retirement fund, is one of the few organisations that have 
adopted the multi-use functionality built into the N-IDMS smart cards.  
4. Land Transport Department (LTD). Initially seen as prime 
candidates to ride on top of the BruNIR N-IDMS. However, current plans 
to upgrade the LTD system include plans to introduce their own stand-
alone identity and smart card system.  
7.2.1.1 System,development,
Brunei Darussalam, located on the island of Borneo in South East Asia, and has 
had an N-IDMS for the past 63 years. The first paper-based identity cards, which 
contained a photograph and personal details, were introduced in 1949 under the 
authority of the Police Force (Yunos, 2009). This responsibility was later 
subsumed by the BruNIR in 1965, which introduced new forms of paper ID 
cards that made it easy to distinguish between citizens, permanent residents, 
and temporary residents (Brunei Immigration & National Registration 
Department, 2005). The system was later upgraded again in 1975 to include the 
collection, storage, and display of rolled fingerprints. 
In 2000, the BruNIR chose to modernise its identity infrastructure. Upon 
enrolment, which is compulsory for any citizen over the age of 18, personal 
details and digital copies of each individual’s biometrics (facial and fingerprint) 
are recorded, and stored on a centralised database (Yunos, 2009). A unique 
identifying number is generated for each individual, who is then provided with 
an identity card. Intending to create an environment to support the development 
of eGovernment, the BruNIR chose to use smartcards that contained a chip 
holding a digitised version of the individual’s personal information, as displayed 
on the card, as well as a digital template of the individual’s fingerprints. 
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Table 17 Summary of the N-IDMS analysed in the study. 
! Brunei! India! Britain!
Date!Implemented!! 2000#–#today## 2010#–#today## 2008#–#2010#(abandoned)#
Purpose! Multi5function#smart#card# Support#poor#in#accessing#
services#
Prevent#terrorism,#crime,#
benefit#fraud,#travel#card#
Mandatory! All#residents#(18#and#above)# Volunraty#for#all#Indian#
residents#
Mandatory#for#high#risk#
personnel;#airport#staff,#etc.#
#
Voluntary#in#early#stages,#
with#eventual#plans#for#it#to#
be#mandatory#for#everyone.#
Unique!ID!Number! Yes# Yes# Yes#
Identity!Card! Yes# Yes# Yes#
Smart!Chip! Yes# No# Yes#
Centralised!Database! Yes# Yes# Yes#
Specifically,#the#system#will#
make#use#of#three#separate#
databases#
5 one#for#biometrics#
5 one#for#biographical#
information#
5 one#for#PKI#data.##
Authentication!
(Against!Card)!
Yes# No# Yes#
Authentication!
(Against!Database)!
No# Yes# Yes#
Audit#log#of#transactions#
Information!Read! Third#Parties#can#access#
biographical#information#on#
card#and#chip.#
Third#parties#can#confirm#the#
accuracy#of#information#
(yes/no#response#only).#
Third#parties#can#access#
biographical#information#on#
card#and#chip.#
Security#organisations#can#
get#access#to#all#information#
on#the#database#(through#
information#commissioner).#
Information!Write! Third#parties#can#to#write#to#
the#smart#card#
None# Information#can#be#pushed#
from#third#parties#to#the#
database.#
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7.2.1.2 Adoption,
Although the distribution of the smartcard to the total eligible population was 
completed by 2001, the uptake of the digital authentication and multifunction 
use of the smartcard has stagnated. TAP is the only local third party organisation 
that makes use of the smartcard; it is used as an authenticator that allows an 
individual to check the balance in their retirement accounts at specific kiosks 
(Brudirect, 2002). 
Additionally, the BruNIR has recently entered agreements with neighbouring 
Malaysia, enabling both countries to use their respective smartcards as 
passports at land borders; respective immigration agencies in each country are 
able to authenticate, read, and write information against the chip (Razak, 2007; 
Said Ya’akub, 2007).  
However, in spite of these developments, many public and private organisations 
continue to use the identity smart card only as a physical proof of identity, while 
also stating that there were no limitations placed upon the use of the unique 
identity numbers provided to each individual (Interview with BruNIR).  
7.2.2 Case,Study,2:,United,Kingdom,
Due to the long running controversies that led to the eventual demise of the UK 
N-IDMS, the present study was unable to secure interviews with relevant 
stakeholders from the Identity and Passport Service (IPS). While some early 
indications for interviews proved promising, they never materialised; the study 
also attempted to hook onto the PVNets project, which conducted privacy 
investigations on the IPS passport system, but this avenue also did not lead to 
any interviews with the organisation. 
However, unlike the Bruneian context, official documentation on the system was 
more readily available. Although the documentation did not contain specific 
technical details, it was rich in the strategic arguments on the need for an N-
IDMS, and its potential uses. Other material was also available in the form of 
research publications and media relations, both of which were used to support 
analysis where needed; specifically when building the historical background of 
identity development in the country studied (Section 7.2.1.1 and 7.2.2.1), as well 
as to refer to key influential critiques of the N-IDMSs under investigation 
(primarily the [London School of Economics, 2005] report on the UK N-IDMS 
that is referred throughout this section). 
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7.2.2.1 System,development,
In the past, the United Kingdom had implemented and managed two identity 
systems, during World War I and World War II respectively (Agar, 2001); both 
systems were scrapped soon after each war. The World War I system was used to 
aid in the process of conscription, enabling the government and military to 
count the number of able-bodied individuals who could take up arms (Elliot, 
2006). The system fell into disuse once it had fulfilled its purpose. 
The identity system established in WWII was set up as an access mechanism for 
the distribution of rations to the public. The system survived through the end of 
the war, as rations were still being distributed. Recognising the value of an N-
IDMS for efficiency, and that the need for rations would soon expire, the 
government attempted to attach other parasitic value to the N-IMDS by 
integrating the use of identity cards into the health and insurance schemes 
(Colvin & Spencer, 1995). However, the system faced much resistance from the 
public, who rejected the prussianizing aspects of an N-IDMS, failing to update 
their records as needed (Agar, 2005). This all culminated in the case of John 
Wilcock who was arrested when he refused to present his identity card to the 
police. Mr Wilcock’s case was taken to court, where the judge sided with 
Wilcock, which eventually led to the decommissioning of the WWII identity 
system. 
Recently, the British government has attempted to introduce an identity card. As 
with previous systems this was done under their premise of National Security, 
claiming threats from terrorism. Other justifications that the government put 
forward for the need of an N-IDMS included organised crime, illegal 
immigration and benefit fraud (London School of Economics, 2005). The 
current approaches of proving identity, where individuals regularly make use of 
various third party documents (e.g. banks or utilities), were argued by the 
government to be insufficient to tackle these issues. A stronger identity system 
controlled by the government was claimed to assist governments in addressing 
the stated problems.  
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Furthermore, international developments around travel documents were also 
used as an argument to support the introduction of an N-IDMS. For example, 
the United States was in the process of adopting and mandating the need for 
biometric identifiers in travel documents (U.S. Senate, 2002). Additionally, the 
Schengen agreement between 25 European nations (Austria, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) allowed 
individuals to travel between each country using only an identity card (European 
Commission Home Affairs, 2010). Therefore, in addition to its national security 
goals, the N-IDMS was also positioned as an ideal platform by which it can abide 
by the new standards being adopted in travel documentation (London School of 
Economics, 2005). 
The government introduced the Identity Cards Act in March 2006 (“Identity 
Cards Act,” 2006) that provided the legal framework for the establishment of the 
IPS to implement and manage an N-IDMS. The act called for the introduction of 
an identity card supported by a database, the National Identity Register (NIR). 
Anyone over the age of 16 was required to enrol with the IPS, by attending an 
interview session, providing 50 different categories of biographical information, 
as well as providing biometric information (Identity Cards Act, 2006). In 
November 2008, IPS began rolling out compulsory identity to foreign nationals 
entering the country. Voluntary enrolment was eventually opened to residents of 
Greater Manchester in November 2009, which was followed by enrolment of air 
industry staff at London and Manchester airports (Identity and Passport Service, 
2009, 2010). 
7.2.2.2 Functionality,
Identity systems by their nature both enable and disable individuals from 
carrying out some form of action. However, following the pattern of reasoning 
adopted by the UK government, their intention for introducing the N-IDMS 
seemed to be on the exclusionary power of identity; the focus on prevention can 
be seen to materialise in the early enrolment strategies that target high risk 
populations, such as airport workers and foreigners (Identity and Passport 
Service, 2008). 
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The UK N-IDMS was designed to support both online and offline authentication 
of identity (Identity and Passport Service, 2006). Offline authentication using 
the identity card was designed to work in two ways; firstly, there was the simple 
visual check of the individual against the facial photograph printed on the 
identity card; secondly, using a card reader, the relying party could check the 
fingerprint of the individual against the biometric template stored on the chip. 
Online authentication was also available, where the fingerprint and card details 
would be routed to the IPS and checked for authenticity ensuring that the card 
was real and the fingerprints matched. 
In addition to the authentication capabilities, the UK N-IDMS also supported 
information sharing. This can be initiated by the individual through the use of 
the identity card, enabling a third party to read the data stored in the card. The 
system also supports the push of information to third parties when an individual 
updates his/her information in the database (Identity and Passport Service, 
2006). Alternatively, the IPS also specified back-end approaches to sharing 
information. Supported by its anti-terror goals, the N-IDMS has mechanisms 
that enable security organisations to access personal information stored on the 
database; the individual is never notified of this access, and would remain 
unaware that his/her information had been accessed (Blunkett, 2003; Identity 
Cards Act, 2006).  
7.2.2.3 Adoption,
Although implementation began in 2009, roll out of the N-IDMS was never 
completed due to a change of government; the new Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat coalition was opposed to the introduction of an N-IDMS (BBC, 
2010a). Additionally, public perception had shifted; while initial polls in 2003 
showed that the public was in favour of ID cards (61% for, 38% against, 1% 
neutral), a follow up poll in 2006 showed a decline in public support (46% for, 
51% against). Privacy campaigns, such as NO2ID, regularly voiced their 
opposition to the system. Media coverage became highly critical of the planned 
N-IDMS, as were researchers working in diverse fields from security, to privacy, 
and public policy (for example, see London School of Economics, 2005). Within 
this landscape, the new government announced the abolition of the N-IDMS, 
and introduced a new bill that would cancel all existing identity cards, and the 
destruction of data held on the N-IDMS database (Home Office, 2010). 
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7.2.3 Case,Study,3:,India,
The Indian N-IDMS forms the third and final case study. As with the case in the 
UK study, the research into the Indian N-IDMS was not able to secure interviews 
with the relevant stakeholders. Contact was made through the Science and 
Innovation department of the British Deputy High Commission in Bangalore; 
the request for interviews was forwarded to the UIDAI, who showed interest, but 
failed to follow up; in response to the request, the contact in the Science and 
Innovation department stated that “the Identity Card project representatives 
are keen to work with international researchers but they don't have a proper 
mechanism or protocol for it right now”. However, as with the UK study, the 
Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) has made available 
documentation outlining its strategy, and the integration of its services with 
various public and private services; these materials formed the basis of the 
investigation into the Indian N-IDMS. 
7.2.3.1 System,development,
India does not have much experience with N-IDMS, and a large section of the 
poor population do not possess any form of recognised identity; while no exact 
figures on those without identity documents are available, (Unique 
Identification Authority of India, 2010a) states that the N-IDMS intends to 
register up to 1.079 billion individuals that make use of social welfare services in 
the rural areas. This has largely led to the development of fragmented identity 
schemes across different areas, where the proof of identity varies between 
regions or between service providers. Consequently, the poorest and most needy 
part of the population have been unable to access various welfare services, such 
as the Public Distribution System (PDS), the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), public health, and financial institutions among 
others. The shifting requirements of identity and the general lack of 
documentary proof have made it too difficult and expensive for the poor 
population to claim or prove their identity (Unique Identification Authority of 
India, 2010a). 
The lack of an identity infrastructure means that organisations are unable to 
track the proper distribution of goods and services to those who are entitled to 
them. Furthermore, the current identity approach is also believed to facilitate 
corruption, as organisations are unable to effectively identify who may be 
siphoning resources that they do not have a right to. (Unique Identification 
Authority of India, 2010b, 2010c). 
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Thus, the Indian government has been keen to introduce an N-IDMS. Attempts 
in 1993 and 2003, saw the distribution of identity cards by Election 
Commission, without any national database or identifiers. In 2009, the 
government began restructuring its efforts to introduce a nationwide scheme 
that did not focus on identity cards, but instead the distribution of unique 
identifiers to every resident, and the implementation of a Centralised Identities 
Data Repository (CIDR) (Hemant, Srikanth, & Sanjay, 2010). The Unique 
Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was established; its responsibility 
being the implementation, enrolment, and verification of unique identity to the 
population of India (Unique Identification Authority of India, 2010a). 
7.2.3.2 Functionality,
UIDAI has claimed to take a very inclusive and pro-poor approach, seeking to 
ensure that those who are currently locked out of services would be able to prove 
their identities when required (Unique Identification Authority of India, 2010a). 
The strategy adopted was that of an online authentication model, where third 
parties can compare the demographic and biometric information of an 
individual against the record held in the central database. The UIDAI has issued 
assurances that third parties will not be able to access or get hold of any personal 
information held on the CIDR; instead, the UIDAI will only authenticate the 
accuracy of personal information with a yes/no response (Unique Identification 
Authority of India, 2010b).  
Furthermore, the government has encouraged the use of individuals’ unique 
identifiers as an index within third party systems (Unique Identification 
Authority of India, 2010b). In several of its use case scenarios, storing and 
referencing the identifiers has been advocated as a key technique in allowing 
relevant organisations to monitor the effectiveness of their services, as well as to 
reduce corruption by tracking employees (Unique Identification Authority of 
India, 2010c). 
  226 
7.3 Analysis:*Organisational*Concerns*of*Identity*
Using grounded theory analysis (Section 5.3.3.2), each of the cases were 
systematically compared. Viewing identity as a strategic resource, each IDMS 
was broken down into various underlying processes that aim to maintain or 
exploit this strategic value. An example of the coding process is governments 
concern over what identity information to use for verification, with thus affected 
the identity attributes collected and stored. The underlying factors that 
influenced these differences were traced, compared, and coded (in this case 
authenticity and uniqueness in Section 7.3.1 were the high level constructs 
identified).  
Overall, the analysis revealed that the organisational requirements that affect 
the implementation and design of an N-IDMS can be divided into two main 
processes; identity construction and identity use. 
7.3.1 Identity,Construction,
When an identity system is first implemented, a new and unique context is 
created, within which several different identities need to be instantiated. It is 
within this newly created context that an implementing organisation needs to 
ensure the integrity of all identities within the IDMS. This represents a 
significant hurdle for the organisation, especially during initial enrolment, as it 
involves the verification of unknown individuals. When faced with this problem, 
organisations typically fall back on two main criteria, both of which will have an 
impact on the overall information that is collected and stored; authenticity and 
uniqueness. 
7.3.1.1 Authenticity,
Authenticity refers to the truthfulness of an identity created within the IDMS. It 
seeks to answer the question, is the individual really who he says he is? 
Organisations typically ensure authenticity of an individual’s identity by 
verifying his/her biographical information (e.g. name, age, address) against 
various different sources. Consequently, organisations can increase their 
confidence in the authenticity of an identity by placing restrictions on the source 
of the information, which then affects the list of biographical information that is 
collected and stored. Organisations can vary the source of information by 
choosing between two different schemes of identity verification: 
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1. Introducer-Based Scheme, which is built on the concept of personal 
referrals. It works by having a recognised individual (i.e. a person whom 
the organisation knows, and believes is trustworthy) vouch for the 
authenticity of another individual who is attempting to enrol into the 
system. 
2. Document-Based Scheme that builds on the use of documentary 
evidence to prove that the enrolling individual is who he says he is. This 
scheme in effect relies on the third party organisations confirming the 
authenticity of individuals. 
While the organisation can vary the identity information, which is stored and 
used to verify authenticity, from either the introducer or document-based 
schemes, it is limited by the context of its implementation; the main contextual 
factors that influence the applicability of these schemes are: 
1. Universality 
2. Intimacy 
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Universality describes the percentage of the target population already possess 
widely accepted forms of identity documents. These are identities that 
individuals have typically established with third party organisations, with which 
they have a trusting relationship (e.g. banks, utilities, and municipalities that 
have interacted with the individual over a period of time). The degree of 
universality in the targeted population will affect the organisation’s ability to 
rely on a document-based scheme to ensure authenticity. Specifically, having 
little to no universality would remove such an option from the implementing 
organisation, as a large number of individuals would not be able to provide the 
required documents, and therefore would not be enrolled into the new identity 
system. 
The Indian case study provides an example of the implications of low 
universality. In fact, it is one of main issues that the Indian N-IDMS aims to 
tackle, as low universality has direct implications for the individual; in general, 
low universality means that individuals tend to be locked out of both public and 
private services, as they do not possess any form of recognised identity. This is 
particularly true for the current poor population in India, where the weak 
identity infrastructure places unacceptable burdens on the poor population in 
India. 
"...every time an individual tries to access a benefit or service, they must 
undergo a full cycle of identity verification. Different service providers also 
often have different requirements in the documents they demand, the forms 
that require filling out, and the information they collect on the individual. 
Such duplication of effort and identity silos increases overall costs of 
identification, and cause extreme inconvenience to the individual. This 
approach is especially unfair to India's poor and underprivileged residents, 
who usually lack identity documentation, and find it difficult to meet the 
costs of multiple verification processes." (Unique Identification Authority of 
India, 2010a) 
Therefore, India cannot solely rely on a document-based scheme, as this would 
lock out a large section of the targeted population from inclusion in the IDMS. 
To accommodate for this, the government has shifted the focus towards an 
introducer-based scheme, "where introducers authorized by the Registrar, 
authenticate the identity and address of the resident” (Unique Identification 
Authority of India, 2010b).  
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The UK case study provides a contrast to the Indian context. In the UK, the focus 
of the identity system lies in the prevention of illegal activities. In all the 
reviewed documents, the UK government has never mentioned issues about 
individuals not getting access to services due to lack of identity (it does state that 
the UK N-IDMS will make it easier to prove identity, but not that individuals are 
locked out because of a lack of identity). This implies that the UK context already 
has achieved high levels of universality, in that the target population is already 
in possession of accepted forms of identity. 
The UK government took a document-based approach, requiring individuals 
who were to enrol in the system, to provide several different documents as proof 
of authenticity (Blunkett, 2003); i.e. documents that have some form of unique 
identifier such as passport numbers, driving license numbers, national insurance 
numbers and "any number of any designated document which is held by him" 
(Identity Cards Act, 2006). This information is provided to create an 
information-net around the claimed identity, which the government can then 
use to ensure authenticity by verifying the individual’s personal information 
with the relevant third party organisations. 
The second factor that influences the choice of a document or introducer-based 
scheme is the intimacy that an implementing organisation has with its target 
population. Intimacy captures how much of the targeted population is already 
known to the organisation. Having high levels of intimacy implies that the 
organisation can be more confident in making use of an introducer-based 
scheme, as it can easily support a transitive trust scheme that extends from 
known to unknown individuals.  
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The effects of intimacy can be seen in the Bruneian context with its combined 
approach to ensuring authenticity, incorporating elements of both a document-
based and introducer-based scheme. This is possible because the government 
has been running an identity system since 1949 (Yunos, 2009). Over that period, 
the government has been enrolling and storing the identity and personal 
information of all individuals born and staying within the country, and as a 
result, has established a great deal of intimacy with the general public. 
Therefore, while individuals are required to provide their birth certificates as 
documentary proof during enrolment, the government also records the identity 
numbers of the individual's parents. This in effect creates a hybrid document-
introducer-based scheme where the authenticity of the individual is proven with 
a minimal amount of documentary evidence, which is further supported by 
linkages to introducers that are already enrolled within the system. The 
advantage for the organisation in using an introducer-based approach over the 
documents-based scheme is that is easier to rely on internal systems that they 
trust, instead of a fragmented approach where different individuals may present 
different sets of documents to prove authenticity (e.g. some individuals may not 
possess a passport, while others may not possess a driving license).  
However, in India, the government’s choice of an introducer-based scheme was 
forced by low universality. However, India also faces the problem of low 
intimacy to support introducers as it is used in the Brunei case. Having never 
registered identities of past populations, the Indian government cannot 
currently rely on parents as introducers to the system. As a result, the 
government has devised a scheme to artificially boost intimacy, by limiting the 
pool of introducers to a set of trusted recognised introducers. These trusted 
introducers are required to be registered with, and be recognised by, the 
registrars that handle enrolment. By making use of such a scheme, the 
government is more confident of the authenticity of the introducer, and thus the 
individual being introduced. 
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While a distinction is made between introducer-based and document-based 
schemes, both schemes are not mutually exclusive, in that they both make use of 
transitive trust to ensure authenticity of the claimed identity. The document-
based scheme is basically an institutionalised version of the introducer-based 
scheme. At the centre of the document-based scheme is the implementing 
organisation’s reliance on the documents that have been produced by third party 
institutions, and can therefore be seen as taking the role of an introducer, as 
opposed to known individuals in the introducer-based scheme. In the end, the 
authenticity of the claimed identity is verified by a third party and the level of 
trust and confidence the organisation has in that third party. 
7.3.1.2 Uniqueness,
In addition to authenticity, the type of information that the organisation will 
collect and store is also shaped by the uniqueness of an identity. Uniqueness 
refers to the property of an identity not being enrolled more than once into the 
identity database. Organisations’ desire for uniqueness is driven by concerns of 
identity fraud, where individuals might attempt to enrol into the system more 
than once. A common strategy to preserve uniqueness is through the collection, 
storage, and use of biometric data.  
Today, organisations can choose between various biometrics strategies, with 
facial, fingerprint, and iris recognition being current solutions of choice. 
Organisations’ choice of biometrics is affected by three main criteria: 
1. Obligations (International standards, Current practices) 
2. Performance (Accuracy, Human readability) 
3. Population (Size, compatibility, Geographic diversity) 
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Figure 25 Organisations' uniqueness requirements 
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Similarly, although the government of India was not greatly focused on ensuring 
compatibility with other countries, adhering to an accepted standard would help 
create a consistent and portable identity within its large borders. As such, the 
report from the Indian Biometric Committee recommended the implementation 
of biometrics based on international standards (ISO 19794), stating that the 
"standards are widely accepted, and best embody previous experiences of the 
US and Europe with biometrics" (Unique Identification Authority of India, 
2009). Organisations tend to view compliance to general standards as a form 
of best practice, irrespective of whether the technology actually supports the 
overall purpose of the N-IDMS.  
Organisations also face obligations around current practices that either it, or 
related third party organisations may have already implemented. The existence 
of current practices around the use of certain biometrics implies the availability 
of experience, expertise, and infrastructure around that particular biometric. 
Having such familiarity with a particular biometric can help to ease the 
implementation of a new identity system that makes use of the same biometric. 
In the UK context, this can be seen in the relationship between the Identity and 
Passport Service (IPS) and the Immigration and National Directorate (IND) 
(Identity and Passport Service, 2006). Prior to the IPS plans to introduce an N-
IDMS, the IND had already been processing, recording, and storing facial and 
fingerprint biometrics of foreigners for the purpose of UK visa applications. 
Thus, when the IPS finalised its plans for the N-IDMS, it chose to ride on the 
IND’s systems, directly storing fingerprints and facial biometrics on IND 
databases. In the Bruneian context, the biometrics deployed in the new identity 
system carried forward practices from the old, making use of fingerprints and 
facial photographs that they were familiar with. 
Aside from obligations, organisations are also influenced by the performance of 
the various biometrics; these can be expressed in terms of: 
1. Discriminability 
2. Human readability  
  234 
When implementing a biometric system to ensure uniqueness, an organisation 
will have a confidence threshold that no individual will enrol more than once. 
This is captured by the discriminability of the biometric, which is the 
performance of the biometric in a one-to-many identification matching process; 
i.e. comparing an individual’s biometric against all other biometrics in the 
database, thus ensuring that he/she is not already enrolled in the identity 
system. Discriminability of a biometric should also consider the ease of which it 
can be circumvented. For example, Facial Biometrics is "considered a poor 
biometric for use in de-duplication" as an individual can easily avoid 
identification through "the use of a disguise, which will cause False Negatives in 
a screening application" (Unique Identification Authority of India, 2009). 
Performance should also take into account the human readability of the 
biometric. While the use of biometrics to ensure uniqueness is typically an 
automated process, a manual form of checking identity is typically required 
when a false rejection is encountered. Since the system is unable to accurately 
distinguish between two or more biometrics, human intervention is required to 
confirm or deny the false rejection. Therefore, having a biometric that enables 
quick manual forms of checking becomes a necessity. Most biometrics do not 
lend themselves easily to manual inspection. As a result, despite its low levels of 
accuracy, facial biometrics become invaluable to organisations for the purposes 
of human visual inspection (Unique Identification Authority of India, 2009). 
"We use AFIS, Automated Fingerprint Identification System. All the 
fingerprints captured will be processed with the fingerprint matching, and 
this is very useful when the citizen does registration of the card. This is to 
ensure that one citizen holds one card and number only. Those who register 
will go through the AFIS matching, and if it is OK, then we will do the 
registration. Otherwise there will be human intervention; a matching 
process, the system will list the possible candidates that match, but normally 
we go for a 100% match. There is a possibility of 70, 80, 90 and 100% match 
by fingerprints. The system also makes use of facial image, from the entries 
identified by AFIS. So it’s easy for us to do the matching, we can even assign 
the matching tasks to the clerk, by looking at the facial image and the 
percentage. It is very straight forward and user friendly.” (Interview with 
BruNIR) 
The organisation’s performance considerations are in turn mediated by the 
population, which can affect the performance of a biometric in two ways: 
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1. Size 
2. Compatibility 
3. Geographic Diversity 
First of all, organisations need to consider the size of the targeted population. 
Large population sizes can negatively affect the overall accuracy of the 
biometric. This is particularly indicative in the choice of the ten finger biometrics 
as proposed in the UK and Indian scheme. The Indian Biometric committee 
(Unique Identification Authority of India, 2009) established that "False 
Acceptance Rate is linearly proportional to gallery size"; using a two 
fingerprint scheme with a population size of 1.2 billion, the FAR was estimated 
to be 14%, which is well above the 1% mark that they required. Therefore, the 
recommendation was to proceed with a ten-fingerprint scheme which was 
estimated to provide a 0% FAR, maintaining the uniqueness of individuals in the 
database. 
The second population characteristic is that of compatibility, which captures the 
suitability of the biometric for use on the targeted population. Compatibility can 
be expressed in two different ways, the most obvious of which is the availability 
of tests demonstrating that performance is not affected by characteristics of the 
target population (e.g. skin tone, etc.); the lack of such studies was highlighted 
by the Indian Biometric committee (Unique Identification Authority of India, 
2009). Additionally, compatibility can also be affected by real world factors. 
Again, the Indian Biometric Committee pointed to the use of Lawsonia Inermis 
(Henna) by women on the Indian sub-continent, stating that it can prevent the 
accurate collection of fingerprints as "sensors may not properly capture 
fingerprint features." Another example is the large percentage of population in 
India who are "employed in manual labour", and thus provide "poor biometric 
samples", as their fingerprints have been worn away by the nature of their work. 
On the other hand, iris biometric is believed to be more compatible with the 
general population (Unique Identification Authority of India, 2009). Similarly in 
Brunei, the BruNIR has encountered problems with the compatibility of 
fingerprints: 
“… only one, the taking of the fingerprint. Because they can get worn out, 
and those are very difficult to capture. We identified that since the beginning 
of the project, and we came up with a solution to make use of moisturizer. It 
helps, but that is the major problem.” (Interview with BruNIR)  
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Lastly, geographic diversity deals with the spread of the population across 
space. Large geographic diversity can introduce inconsistencies into the 
procedures, and the conditions under which the data will be collected. When a 
population is spread across large spaces, the implementing organisation is 
unlikely to be able to collect all the information on its own; it will probably adopt 
an accredited enrolment strategy, where authorised third parties collect 
information on their behalf. UK and India are prime examples of such a 
situation, where third parties are drawn into the fold, allowing private 
organisations to enrol and capture individual biometrics, which are then sent to 
the government’s central database. This can result in "several non-technical 
factors that can impact accuracy more significantly than technical accuracy 
improvement efforts", such as the lack of adherence to operational quality, and 
the differing environmental conditions that affect performance (e.g. face 
recognition is very sensitive to light changes) (Unique Identification Authority of 
India, 2009). 
7.3.2 Identity,Use,
In addition to the information creation process, the implementing organisation 
is also concerned about establishing and defining the mechanism in which 
enrolled identities will be used. In this way, viewing identities as sensitive 
strategic information that is necessary to carry out various organisational tasks 
will help to inform the design of the system. By identifying and defining the 
purpose of the identity, the implementing organisation is answering the 
questions that relate to “who, what, why and when”, that in turn will help to 
define the connectivity and overall information access policies. There are four 
main dependent constructs that organisations focus on when defining the 
information access policies and mechanisms: 
1. Relying Parties (Organisation, Individual) 
2. Objectives (Enablement, Proof) 
3. Conditions (Risk level, Timeliness) 
4. Accessibility (Information set, Locality, Direction) 
7.3.2.1 Relying,parties,
At the most basic level, organisations must specify the various relying parties 
that need to use or access identities on the system; there are two main types of 
relying parties (RP): 
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1. Organisational 
2. Individual 
First of all, there are the organisational entities that need access to the identity, 
which can further be differentiated into intra-organisational versus inter-
organisational dependence on identity. Intra-organisational access of identity 
is typically a requirement since the implementing organisation needs to create 
and manage identities in the first place. However, the access of identities within 
the organisation can extend to support any other functions that the 
implementing organisation needs to carry out. For example, BruNIR in Brunei is 
not only responsible for the distribution of the identity cards in the country, but 
also for the monitoring of identities across the borders. Recent developments 
have meant that the Brunei identity card can now be used as a passport at land 
boarders with Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak). Therefore, BruNIR requires other 
forms of internal access to support these activities.  
This is not the case in the Indian context, where the UIDAI was set up solely to 
handle the registration of identities, leading to fewer intra-organisational 
requirements. As such, India’s main focus lies on the inter-organisational 
access of identity. In its plans to introduce the identity system the UIDAI clearly 
established and discussed plans with several different third party organisations 
that include PDS, NREGS, as well as the general education and health provision 
systems. Meanwhile, the IPS in the UK has defined both intra-organisational 
use of its systems (Identity cards as passports) as well as its inter-organisational 
aims by identifying various agencies that include the Department of Work and 
Pensions (DWP), the CRB, and law enforcement agencies, among others. The 
Bruneian context on the other hand has comparatively ill-defined inter-
organisational obligations, only stating its intention to create a multipurpose 
smart card that can be used by any third party organisation as necessary.  
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In addition to the organisational reliance on identity, the implementing 
organisation also needs to recognise the individual as an RP that may be able 
access their own identity and personal information. This is especially the case in 
the UK scenario, where the IPS has specified that individuals were to able to 
access all their information on the system, which is envisioned to eventually be 
an online service (Identity and Passport Service, 2006, 2008, 2009); India and 
Brunei have not specified any mechanisms by which individuals can directly 
access or view their identity records, but still have procedures in place that allow 
an individual to submit information to the implementing organisation after 
registration. 
 
 
Figure 26 Organisations requirements for identity use 
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The use of identity to mediate the provision of services will always create a 
division between those who have access and those who do not; however, there 
will always be a dominant mode of use and the other will be a side effect. This 
dominant intention to use identity to either enable or disable individuals is 
captured by the enablement construct. In India, the main intention of the RP is 
dominated by the enablement of poor people, so as to provide them with access 
to the services to which they are entitled. Additionally, the Indian banks are 
focused on introducing new forms of mobile banking, thus enabling individuals 
to access new services that are to be developed. In comparison, the objectives 
described in the UK context are those of disablement (benefit fraud, crime, 
illegal immigration, and terrorism). The Bruneian context has described a 
largely enabling use of identity, with its intention to support the introduction of 
new on-line services introduced by third parties.  
Proof describes the objective of the RP in using the IDMS as a simple single-use 
proof of identity, or as a key that enables the tracking of individuals’ across 
several different interactions or contexts. The Indian case provides an 
illustration of a tracking scenario where all RPs are advised to use the UIDAI as 
a foreign key to their own systems. It even suggests that the identity be used 
internally by RPs, so as to keep track of employees. The Bruneian case makes no 
such recommendations nor enforces any rules to such use, resulting in a mixed 
approach, where some RPs make use of the identifier as an index to their 
records, while others merely use the identity as a proof or authentication 
mechanism. 
7.3.2.3 Conditions,
The organisation will also need to identify the conditions under which the access 
to the identity will take place. These conditions capture the operating conditions 
under which a RP will need to access the IDMS; this can be expressed as: 
1. Risk Level 
2. Timeliness 
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Risk level is a measure of the security sensitive nature of the information access. 
Information access that is done under conditions that can affect national 
security would be classified high risk, and would have different privileges, when 
compared to a low risk situation that has little implication for the agency, 
country, or organisation. The importance of risk level in the development of the 
identity system and the information access policies is most evident in the UK 
scenario. In its phased roll out of the N-IDMS, the IPS had clearly identified 
those working in high security environments (airport and airline workers) as 
targets for early adoption (Identity and Passport Service, 2009). Additionally, 
while the IPS defined that all access by third parties would be recorded, any 
access done in relation for the purposes of counter terrorism would take place 
without consent, and not be recorded (Identity and Passport Service, 2006, 
2008, 2009). 
The risk level in India and Brunei are not as apparent, but the Bruneian 
Immigration Department has made an official channel by which law 
enforcement can send in a written request, with sufficient supporting reasoning, 
to get hold of certain information. Meanwhile, the UIDAI has not specified any 
direct access to the information by third parties. However, in its plans for the N-
IDMS it was pointed out that the unique identifier per individual would be 
incredibly useful for third parties to keep track of employees that might pose a 
risk from corruption. 
In addition to risk level, the timeliness of the information access is another 
factor to consider. Considering that one of the many cited benefits of an identity 
system is the efficiency gains, it is not surprising that the time pressures of the 
information access are an important consideration when considering the 
accessibility to the identity system. An example of this is the use of the UK N-
IDMS for the purposes of Criminal Background Checks (CRB) when applying for 
certain working positions (e.g. work that involves interaction with minors). The 
problem raised by the current CRB procedure is that it takes a long time for 
them to confirm individuals’ identity, thus leading to a backlog of applications. 
Therefore, it is imperative that the agency handling these background checks get 
responses in a more timely manner, and are therefore seen as a prime candidate 
for gaining some form of access to the identity system; “the time for issuing 
Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) disclosures could be reduced from 4 weeks to 3 
days” (Home Office, 2005). 
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The Indian government has also highlighted the time sensitive nature of third 
parties, stressing the importance of addressing the application of current ration 
cards due to “prolonged delays in processing the application” and the 
advantages in using the unique ID number in the distribution of rice grain 
(Unique Identification Authority of India, 2010d). The Brunei N-IDMS has no 
specific examples regarding the timeliness of information, but general efficiency 
was a main factor in the introduction of the smart card system, as it would allow 
the transfer of information in digital format reducing the overhead for filling in 
forms (Interview with BruNIR). 
7.3.2.4 Accessibility,
Once the organisation has identified the RPs and their respective objectives, it 
can then go on to define the accessibility of the system to these parties. This 
access to the system can be described in terms of: 
1. Information set 
2. Locality 
3. Direction 
Information set describes the type and amount of identity information that the 
organisation will need or have access to. In the UK case, with its emphasis on 
national security and terrorist prevention, the IPS has clearly defined that the 
authorities would be able to gain access to all the personal information on the 
database of potential suspects. In India no RP will have access to the personal 
information, but the UIDAI will only confirm or deny the accuracy of personal 
information held in their database. The immigration services in Brunei has 
stated that third party organisations will not have any access to the database, 
and can only access the information that is visible on the card and stored on the 
smart chip. 
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Locality refers to the spatial mode of access to the identity system. On the one 
end, locality of access can be confined to the physical location where the identity 
is presented to an individual. The other extreme lies with the remote access of 
identity through a networked database. The Bruneian N-IDMS does not provide 
third parties with any remote access to their database; all the information and 
authentication functions that the relying party can access are stored on the card 
itself. This is in contrast to the Indian N-IDMS that emphasises remote 
authentication procedures, where the UIDAI would communicate with third 
parties across a network. The UK N-IDMS has specified a range of access options 
that include local options such as visual authentication and local chip 
authentication, but also specifies methods that allow fingerprint authentication 
across a network, to match records in its database. 
The direction of the information access is another dimension that the 
implementing organisation needs to consider when providing third parties 
privileges to the identity system. Direction captures the push or pull nature of 
the identity access, which in turn defines the readability (including 
authentication procedures) or write-ability rights of the third party. On the one 
hand, the Indian N-IDMS does not provide relying parties with any privileges to 
write information to the database. The transactions are primarily a pull of 
information, where the third party requests authentication of identity. On the 
other hand, the UK N-IDMS also records information about the third party 
access when performing authentication procedures. A new entry is created on 
the database recording the time and location of the authentication; this 
represents a combined push and pull operation, where information is sent and 
stored on the identity database. Meanwhile, the Bruneian N-IDMS does not 
provide any remote access, but certain third parties (law enforcement) can still 
make queries through written means, which is a remote pull of information. 
However, third parties can also store information onto the chip when required. 
This represents a local push of information onto the card, and therefore affects 
the overall information access policies that need to be provided. 
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7.4 Ensuring*“FitNforNpurpose”*
Finally, while the previous sections have outlined the organisation’s concerns 
over the construction and use of identity, it is the purpose of the system that 
drives these requirements. Who are the relying parties that require access, and 
what identity information does the system need to hold? These questions are 
answered through a definition of the purpose, which then informs the 
organisation’s identity construction and use requirements, striving to ensure 
that the system being implemented will be fit for its purpose. 
Take India for example, with a defined purpose to enable the poor to gain access 
to services, was quick to identify welfare organisations as relying parties, while 
also ensuring that individuals’ are able to enrol by devising the appropriate 
authenticity requirements for a target population that suffers from both low 
universality and intimacy. Similarly, the UK, with the focus of the purpose 
resting on the reduction of crime and terrorism, was able readily to identify law 
enforcement agencies as a core relying party, as well as defining strict 
authenticity and uniqueness requirements that would support its security goals. 
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Figure 27 Framework of organisations identity requirements and how it affects 
design 7.5 Summary*and*Discussion*
A case study approach was used to explore organisational concerns and 
requirements when implementing IDMS; specifically, the focus of research was 
on government implementation of N-IDMSs. Using a case study approach, 
research focused on systems implemented in three different countries; Brunei, 
India and Britain. Grounded theory analysis was used to analyse the documents 
and interviews collected from each case study.  
Overall, the analysis showed that the purpose of the system drives the 
organisation’s identity requirements, and thus informs its two main concerns 
when implementing IDMSs: 
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1. Identity Creation that is concerned with the enrolment process, and 
the correctness of the identity instantiated within the system. 
a. Authenticity deals with the truthfulness of an individual’s 
identity. Ensured by collecting and verifying various biographical 
details. Organisations can collect biographical information using 
a document-based or introducer-based approach; this choice is 
affected by: 
i. Universality is percentage of the target population that 
already possesses widely accepted forms of official identity 
that the organisation can then verify against third parties. 
ii. Intimacy captures how much of the targeted population 
is already known to the implementing organisation, and 
can thus vouch for the individual. 
b. Uniqueness ensures that an individual does not enrol within a 
system more than once. This can be done through the use of 
biometrical information; the organisation’s choice of biometric is 
affected by: 
i. Obligations are current requirements that an 
organisation has to implement or consider, such as 
pressure from international standards (international 
obligations, current practices). 
ii. Performance defines the accuracy of the biometric in 
producing matches (accuracy, human readability). 
iii. Population describes the real world human factors that 
can affect the performance of the biometric (size, 
compatibility, geographic diversity). 
2. Identity use is concerned with the process of establishing and defining 
the mechanism that enables relying parties to access and use identities in 
the system.  
a. Purpose describes the situation or problem that the IDMS is 
meant to support. 
b. Relying Parties are the various users and third parties that 
need access to the identity to complete a task (intra-organisation, 
inter-organisation, individual). 
c. Objectives detail the relying parties’ intention and requirements 
to use the identity (enablement, proof). 
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d. Conditions capture the situational factors under which the 
relying parties operate (risk level, timeliness). 
e. Accessibility describes the manner in which the organisation 
will access the identity (information set, locality, direction). 
The findings of this study overlaps and further the current recommendations in 
the field; the codification of the identity requirements into a framework can be 
used to further aid discussions and critiques of IDMSs. For example, Kent & 
Millett (2002) state that attention should be paid to issues of purpose, 
population scope, data scope, and users of the data. The concerns are all 
addressed in the framework in more specific details, while also exposing the 
relationships between the various considerations. Similarly, Whitley & Hosein, 
(2010) describe a short-circuiting of identity debates through the use of 
international obligations, language ambiguity, technological focus, and 
expertise. The framework addresses these concerns by explicitly listing the 
considerations, thus reducing ambiguity, while also highlighting non-
technological decisions such as relying parties, and their unique objectives. 
The uniqueness component of the framework provides another area of 
comparisons to available work in the field. The focus here lies in the biometric 
technology and considerations, which is an area drawing much attention. 
Drawing from Ashbourn's (2000) recommendations for implementing biometric 
systems, organisations should not only pay attention to the False Acceptance 
and Rejection rates, but also outline population considerations such as ease of 
use; these are all present in the framework as sub-dimensions of the 
performance and population constructs. 
7.5.1 Future,Work,
A limitation of the current research is its emphasis on biometric systems; this is 
due to the three different systems chosen for investigation falling under the 
similar design patterns. However, even without biometric systems, uniqueness is 
still an important trait, and will then fall onto other authentication mechanisms. 
Future work will need to address these concerns and further develop the 
framework to be applicable to non-biometric implementations.  
Work will also need to be done to develop guidelines to effectively express 
requirements for uniqueness, authenticity and purpose; doing so will further 
help to increase communication in the field and encourage adoption of the 
framework, this ensuring that IDMSs implemented will be fit-for-purpose. 
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Chapter,8:,Unified,Framework,to,HumanICentred,Identity,
This chapter brings together the findings from the system, individual, and 
organisation studies, synthesising a unified framework that provides a holistic 
view for a human-centred IDMS.  
A result of the research here shows that the organisational identity requirements 
guides the design and implementation of an IDMS, and thus affects the 
individuals lived experience; the identity creation process, influenced by the 
organisation’s authenticity and uniqueness requirements, will have an impact on 
the metrical properties of the system design (Section 8.3.1); while the identity 
use process which determines the information access policies will determine the 
structural properties of the IDMS, dictating the flow of the information within 
the system (Section 8.3.2).  
Additionally, the system design in turn has an influence on individuals’ 
perceptions of identity. The metrical properties affect individuals’ system 
judgement, working through their perception of information quality (Section 
8.4.1). The metrical properties combined with the structural properties 
influence the individuals’ security concerns (Section 8.4.2). 
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8.1 Drawing*Research*Studies*Together*
This chapter provides a holistic view for a human-centred approach to IDMSs, 
that takes a multi-stakeholder approach that covers the organisations' identity 
requirements, individuals' perception of identity systems, as well as the impact 
of system design on the lived experience of the individual; it ties together the 
findings obtained from the previous studies detailed in this thesis (Chapter 5, 
Chapter 6, and Chapter 7), resulting in a unified framework that details the 
various processes and interactions that take place within the development, 
implementation, and use of an IDMS. 
The unified framework presents an integrated narrative of the identity 
ecosystem, providing practitioners and researchers with an in-depth 
understanding of how each element interacts and influences the others.   8.2 Methodology:*Developing*a*Unified*framework*
In analysing the available literature in the field, this thesis puts forward the 
argument that current approaches, such as privacy and trust, are insufficient to 
developing human centred solutions to national identity systems (Section 3.2 
and 3.3). In doing so, an outcome of the literature review was the identification 
of three different perspectives that are central to understanding IDMSs (Section 
3.4) 
1. System 
2. Individual 
3. Organisation 
These perspectives formed the basis of three separate studies, each designed to 
analyse the human aspects that shape and define the development of IDMS. A 
result of each study was a framework that detailed the various constructs and 
relationships that shapes the development and implementation of an identity 
system.  
The system study resulted in a system design framework that accounted for the 
lived experience of identity (Chapter 5). The framework consists of two broad 
sets of system properties that explain how the design of an IDMS affects the 
everyday lives of individuals that are enrolled into the system: 
1. Metrical Properties 
2. Structural Properties 
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On the other hand, the individual study (Chapter 6) sought to identify how 
individuals develop initial intentions to accept IDMS. This resulted in a 
framework that outlines individuals’ perceptions and concerns when faced with 
a new system. The study identified several main concerns that influence 
individuals’ perceptions: 
1. Situation Perception 
2. System Judgement 
3. Security Concerns 
Finally, in contrast to the individual and system studies, the organisation study 
(Chapter 7) looked at organisations identity requirements that influence the 
design and implementation of an IDMS. The resulting framework identifies that 
organisations are focused on the processes of: 
1. Identity Construction 
2. Identity Use 
Although each framework approaches identity from a different perspective, the 
results of the three studies are compatible with one another, as the constructs 
from each framework overlap and influence each other.  These influences 
between each framework identify relationships between the respective 
frameworks, and thus enable the development of a unified theory and narrative 
about the design, acceptance, and implications of identity. Furthermore, the 
overlaps between the different research perspectives also acts as a form of data, 
method, and theory triangulation (Section 4.44.4), thus boosting the robustness 
of the research, extending the validity and reliability of the findings. 
Applying the grounded theory approach that underlies the overall research, this 
thesis went back to re-analyse all the qualitative material gathered from each of 
the studies; the analysis here differs since it brings forward the theoretical 
constructs developed throughout this thesis. Using a basic timeline structure, 
the analysis focused on exploring relationships and causality between the 
frameworks. At an initial stage, the implementation of an IDMS is triggered by a 
problem the organisation wants to address; the organisation assesses the 
situation and designs an IDMS to support their activities in addressing the issue. 
The proposed design then affects individuals’ perceptions and acceptance of the 
IDMS. Finally, over time the true impact of the identity system design on the 
lived experience, as separate from the initial perceptions, emerges. 
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Figure 28 Basic interactions between the organisation, individual, and system 
framework 
 8.3 Organisational*Requirements*to*System*Design*
An implementing organisation is typically a prerequisite to building an officially 
recognised and accepted identity system. An organisation introduces a system to 
aid a specific purpose; therefore, from a high level view, it is straightforward to 
identify that the organisation identity requirements will inform the system 
design. By inspecting these two frameworks, we can identify in greater detail the 
relationships between the organisation framework and the system design 
framework. 
8.3.1 The,Process,of,Creation,and,the,Capturing,of,Identity,
As identified in Chapter 5, the system design has two major sets of properties; 
structural and metrical properties. The metrical properties deal with the type of 
information that makes up the identity within the system. Recall that in 
developing the system, the government is concerned about the creation of 
identity, aiming to ensure the authenticity and uniqueness of all individuals 
enrolled into the system. These concerns will affect the final set of biographical 
and biometric data, and therefore feed directly into the metrical properties of the 
system design. 
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Expert analysis is driven by the final choice of biometrics; the more technical or 
specialised the information collected is, the more specialised training and 
knowledge is required to interpret the information. This is linked to population 
comprehension, as individuals are typically unaware of the way in which 
biometric processes work. Therefore, the level of expert analysis and population 
comprehension is an outcome of the uniqueness requirements; the human 
readability concern is of particular importance. Human readability allows for 
human intervention in the analysis of the identity attribute; the biometric (e.g. 
facial photograph) is easily deciphered or read by a person. Therefore, 
emphasising human readability lowers expert analysis, while at the same time 
increasing population comprehension.  
For example, in an enrolment proof of concept study conducted in India, 
individuals were “often confused” on what they need to do when introduced to 
the iris biometric (Bannur, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, subject coupling is influenced by the authenticity 
requirements of the organisation. Subject coupling is concerned with the 
matching of the identity instantiation to the relevant partial identity. This largely 
deals with the biographical attributes of an identity, where collecting too much 
or too little information reduces subject coupling. Therefore, subject coupling is 
influenced by the authenticity process, which determines the final set of 
biographical details that are required. Requesting a large number of documents 
or requiring too many individuals may reduce subject coupling as it increases 
the risk of collecting information that may be seen as irrelevant to the context in 
which the implementing organisation operates.  
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Expert Analysis 
System Framework 
Population Comprehension 
Organisation Framework 
Performance (human readability) 
Organisation Framework 
Authenticity Outcome 
System Framework 
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In reference to the UK N-IDMS intention to support travel functions, the report 
from the London School of Economics (2005) states that the “UK proposal 
would call for further evidence or information that would appear to be 
contrary to the spirit of the Directive.” Furthermore, the report states “it is 
difficult to see how the requirement for all this information can satisfy the 3rd 
Data Protection Principle by being relevant, adequate, and not excessive for the 
proposed purposes.” 
 
Meanwhile, information stability is influenced by both the authenticity and 
uniqueness outcomes. The biometrics chosen as part of the uniqueness process 
typically have a certain lifespan that lends itself to the stability of the identity 
instantiation; “In the case of facial recognition, it would seem advisable to 
update the templates at least every 10 years. Fingerprints and iris should be 
considerably more stable” (Home Office, 2005). Additionally, the biographical 
information chosen as part of the authenticity requirements can also change and 
vary with time (name, address, marital status, etc.), thus affecting the stability of 
the identity.  
In relation to updating address details stored in the Brunei N-IDMS, the BruNIR 
commented that “some people don’t even do that” (Interview with BruNIR). This 
is further supported by interviews with the LTD stating that authorities tend to 
refer to the information stored on the LTD database, as “it is renewed more 
often” (Interview with LTD).  
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Like subject coupling, information variability is influenced by both authenticity 
and uniqueness. A document-based authenticity scheme can result in the 
collection of information across various contexts that can then be pieced 
together to form a complete identity, allowing new inferences about an 
individual to be made. Similarly, an introducer-based scheme that relies on a 
large number of introducers will mean that the organisations are able to tie 
various individuals together, thus creating an opportunity to build on the 
individual’s social circle. In both these situations, the information variability is 
increased, as the authenticity process requires a large number of documents or 
introducers.  
The LSE report on the UK N-IDMS (London School of Economics, 2005) raises 
these concerns on the potential ease with which various databases can be 
“combined to provide the government with a comprehensive and all pervasive 
database on the lives of its citizens.” The Brunei and India case studies also raise 
similar issues because of the ubiquitous use of unique identity numbers across 
various contexts. 
Information variability is also influenced by the biometric chosen, and 
therefore the organisation's uniqueness requirements. Although this 
relationship is not as clearly defined as the impact of the authenticity process, 
different biometrics lend themselves more readily to other uses, and therefore 
may increase the level of information variability in the process. 
8.3.2 Using,Identity,and,the,Flow,of,Information,
While the identity creation and maintenance process informs the metrical 
properties of system design, identity application determines the structural 
properties of the system. The identity application process revolves around the 
use and accessibility of the identity by the various relying parties; this is 
intimately tied up with the structural properties that focus on the flow of identity 
information within the identity ecosystem.  
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First of all, there is the influence that relying parties have on the number of 
control points. In designing and planning the various uses of the identity system, 
the organisation needs to identify all the third party organisations that require 
access to the system. Thus this can shape the number of control points present; 
the more relying parties identified, the higher will be the number of control 
points.  
The Indian government identified several different relying parties pre-
implementation (PDS, Education Agencies, Public Health Agencies, MGNREGA, 
as well as working with banks to facilitate micro-payments). The UK government 
has identified various relying parties that span private and public bodies. The 
Brunei government did not identify any specific relying parties when upgrading 
its identity system, but carried forward practices where public and private 
agencies rely on the identity number to identify individuals. Thus, every time the 
identity is required, it adds to the overall number of control points. 
 
The relying parties also have an indirect implication on population coverage. 
Each relying party that needs access to the data is likely to be targeting specific 
portions of the population. Therefore, the greater the number of relying parties, 
the greater the targeted population will be. Hence, population coverage would 
increase along with the number of relying parties identified.  
When planning the UK N-IMDS the IPS had plans to change the system from 
being a voluntary to compulsory status, thus enabling all organisations to 
become third parties, which then makes the identity card the de facto proof of 
identity in all situations (Blunkett, 2003).  
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Another relationship is the effect of the accessibility degree of subject 
engagement. Subject engagement is influenced by how active or aware an 
individual is in the use of his/her identity. Therefore, systems that have defined 
remote accessibility options for third parties will lower the subject engagement. 
In contrast, IDMSs that only specify local access to the identity (e.g. through the 
use of a card), will have a high level of subject engagement. 
 
The use of identity also has an impact on identity exposure; it is affected by the 
identity information accessed by a relying party. A relying party that has access 
to a large amount of information will increase the risk of information exposure, 
while relying parties not having access to context information will decrease the 
risk or effects of exposure.  
In highlighting the lack of proper controls after an individual’s information is 
obtained, the LSE report (London School of Economics, 2005) states that it 
could have “a devastating impact on those who have good reasons for avoiding 
the existence of easy means of identification. This would include, for example, 
those in senior government or military positions who may be terrorist targets, 
those who might be subject to harassment or attack from ‘animal rights’ 
activists or from other extremist groups. Those who wish to hide from stalkers 
or from those who wish to harm them will also be at increased risk.” The Indian 
N-IDMS does not release personal information to any relying parties, and 
therefore does not suffer from the same issue.  8.4 System*Design*to*Citizen*Perception*
While the organisational requirements eventually lead to the system design, it 
is the system design that will influence individuals’ initial perceptions. 
However, this needs to be differentiated from the lived experience of the system, 
since the system has not yet been operational. Following the individual 
perception framework (Chapter 6), an individual develops his/her perception of 
the acceptability of an identity system based on considerations of certain aspects 
of the identity system. Therefore, by analysing the individual perception 
framework and the system design framework together, a relationship may be 
established whereby the system design properties have an influence on the 
development of an individual’s perception of the IDMS. 
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8.4.1 Informing,System,Judgement,
At an initial level, the strongest and most identifiable relationship between 
system design and individual perception takes place around the individual’s 
system judgement. System judgement is developed through an assessment of 
the various types of information, how it is collected and used. These are exactly 
the issues that the system design properties are designed to tackle; metrical 
properties deal with the type of information, while structural properties deal 
with the flow of information. In recognising these similarities, a map of 
influences can be developed, linking a specific design property to a particular 
area of individual assessment. 
 
Information accuracy has a direct impact on an individual’s perception of 
information quality; low information accuracy will negatively affect 
perceptions of information quality. Focus group participants were quick to point 
out inaccuracies in the information collection processes, and were concerned 
about the usefulness of the information on the system to information 
organisational decisions. 
In the discussion of Scenario 1 (child abuse), focus group participants were vocal 
about the quality of the notes made by carers regarding their suspicions of 
abuse. From their perspective, the notes had a high chance of being inaccurate, 
as most carers would be quick to attribute any injury to abuse. 
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Perception of information quality is also influenced by identity stability of the 
system; specifically, identity stability may have an effect on the individual’s 
perception of completeness. Based on the individual perception framework, 
individuals may have concerns on the ability of the system to collect all the 
intended information; not being able to do so creates an inaccurate portrayal of 
the individual, thus reducing accuracy. From the focus groups, participants 
readily identify issues with completeness in situations where information is 
constantly changing, as the identity system might not be able to cope with the 
frequency of change. These concerns are captured by the identity stability 
design property; identities that change frequently have low stability, while 
identities that are constant over time have a high level of stability. Therefore, a 
high level of identity stability has a positive impact on an individual's perceived 
information accuracy.  
Focus groups regularly raised issues of completeness in Scenarios 2 (personal 
debt) and 3 (obesity), where new information was constantly generated; the 
system would not be able to capture all the new information that was being 
generated.  
 
Another relationship is that of subject coupling to information relevance. Recall 
that subject coupling deals with how well the identity instantiated within the 
system matches on to the partial identity within its context of use; collecting too 
much or too little information can create an un-representative identity. This 
matches the individuals concerns around the issue of information relevance, 
where too much or too little information may be indicative of the granularity of 
the information collected. Therefore, as the degree of subject coupling decreases, 
the individual’s perception of relevance will decrease along with it.  
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For example, in discussing Scenario 2 (personal debt), focus group participants 
were typically concerned about the collection of specific information on single 
item purchases, stating that identity created does not match the role of the 
individual to the organisation. “Yeah, the government pulls information from 
all stores about purchasing habits, I don’t think what you buy is relevant in the 
least, as long as you are repaying. It is more about your bank accounts, then 
what you are actually buying, that is just not relevant” (Focus Group 5,Brtisih, 
Scenario 2). 
 
Another identifiable relationship is that of expert analysis to information 
accuracy. From the individual study, individuals are highly concerned with the 
subjectivity of the information that is being collected and used; the individual 
perceives this information as being inaccurate. The expert analysis metrical 
property describes the amount of human intervention required to process any 
identity information, thus capturing the subjectivity vs. objectivity dimension of 
the identity. Therefore, the degree of expert analysis should have an impact on 
the perception of information accuracy. The lower the degree of expert 
analysis, the more objective the identity process is, and therefore the higher will 
be the perceived information accuracy. 
 In the analysis of the UK DNA database scheme, experts raised issues of 
accuracy regarding the DNA matches; especially those with samples from crime 
scenes, which may be contaminated, thus requiring human interpretation of the 
results. Focus group participants also raised similar concerns regarding the 
accuracy of the DNA interpretations, as well as the data collection procedures 
that required interpretation from experts such as doctors and teachers in 
Scenario 1 (child safety) or employers in Scenario 2 (benefit fraud); a typical 
suggestion was to reduce the level of interpretation by creating numerical 
weights on certain criteria, thus creating a more objective process. 
System Framework 
Expert Analysis 
Individual Framework 
Information Quality 
(accuracy/subjectivity)
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8.4.2 Fuelling,Concerns,
Aside from system judgement, development of the overall perception is also 
influenced by an individual's concerns about the information within the identity 
system. These concerns appear in the form of general security breaches and 
information leakage, as well as the future unpredictability in how the 
information might be used. Again, these issues stem from the design of the 
IDMS, indicating a relationship between system design framework and 
individual perception framework. 
 
Dealing first with the issue of future unpredictability, these concerns are 
typically raised when individuals do not have confidence in the implementing 
organisation to restrict the use of the identities to the originally specified 
purpose. The type of information being collected influences these concerns. 
Specifically, systems with high information variability are those in which the 
identity lends itself to use beyond its original context. Therefore, IDMS with 
high information variability would raise concerns about future 
unpredictability, while low information variability would serve to reduce such 
concerns. 
 
Number of control points may also play a part in shaping an individual's 
concerns around the security of the system. The individual study revealed that 
individuals had concerns about the abuse of information by insiders, as well as 
the access of information by unauthorised individuals. From a system design 
perspective, the number of control points expresses the frequency of access to 
that information.  
During the focus groups, participants commonly suggested that access to the 
information be controlled by reducing any access to situations that require them, 
thus preventing possible abuse. This in effect reduces the number of control 
points, thus potentially reducing an individual's concerns around security.  
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Finally, subject engagement also drives individuals’ concerns. Focus groups 
participants were constantly wary of situations in which their information is 
constantly accessed without their involvement. Systems with a low subject 
engagement are seen to be more open to abuse and information leakage, as the 
individuals’ believe that they have no control over how it is used. This creates 
situations of uneasiness, which fuels their concerns.  
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Figure 29 Unified Human-Centred Framework 
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8.5 Discussion+and+Summary+
In undertaking research into a human-centred approach to identity 
management systems, this thesis approached the subject from three different 
perspectives; the system, the individual, and the organisation. Separate studies 
were designed around each perspective, resulting in the development of three 
different frameworks that detail their respective issues.  
The research here moved on to synthesising a unified framework of the 
phenomenon, beginning from organisational requirements that inform the 
system design, and which in turn have implications for individual perception 
and acceptance. Continuing on with a grounded theory approach that underlies 
the three different studies, research went back to re-analyse all the available 
material, bringing along with it all the theoretical concepts identified in each 
previous study. This resulted in the discovery of relationships between the 
different frameworks, where: 
1. Organisational Requirements inform System Design 
a. Identity Creation requirements determine the metrical 
properties. 
b. Identity Application requirements determine the structural 
properties. 
2. System Design inform Individual Acceptance 
a. Metrical properties influence Judgements (through perception of 
Information Quality). 
b. Structural and Metrical properties influence Security Concerns. 
  263 
Tying together the outcomes from the three separate studies in this thesis (i.e. 
the system, the individual and organisation studies) has resulted in a framework 
that provides a multi-stakeholder narrative for a human-centric IDMS. 
Comparing this framework to the available literature reveals similarities present 
within the identity policy domain. For example, the policy literature has 
emphasised the importance of finding a purpose, stating that it will have 
ramifications for the underpinning design of the system (Kent & Millett, 2002; 
Whitley & Hosein, 2010). This is reflected in the unified framework where 
purpose forms a key construct that influences organisations authenticity and 
uniqueness requirements. Furthermore, the unified framework also stresses the 
importance in working together with Relying Parties and designing identity 
systems to ensure that their objectives are met; this addresses the shortcomings 
of current approaches to N-IDMS implementation, that does not account for the 
multidisciplinary nature of N-IDMS thus leading to a lack of interaction between 
the organisation and other important stake holders (2010b). 
The unified framework, also illustrates the implications of the organisations 
requirements on the design of the system, and thus its eventual effects on 
individuals' initial perceptions of the system, as well as the effects on individuals' 
overall lived experience. Identity policy makers typically reduce "the societal 
problem [that the IDMS addresses] to a technical problem"(Kubicek & Noack, 
2010b). However, the unified framework stress the relationship between the 
organisation, the technical system, and the individual thus helping to address 
these concerns, encouraging the organisation to think beyond the technical 
details, and thus focus on the relationship of the purpose, the identity 
requirements, the design of the system, as well as individual concerns regarding 
the IDMS. 
Finally, while research was done until theoretical saturation, with respect to the 
research material analysed, there may be other factors or relationships that exist 
but have yet to be uncovered. For example, there may be other system properties 
that exist, and thus other potential relationships between the frameworks. That 
said, given the variety of cases analysed and compared to each study, the factors 
and relationships in the framework represent key core constructs and 
relationships that would be applicable to most IDMS. 
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8.5.1 Future*Work*
The work here would greatly benefit from further description of the 
relationships between the various frameworks and constructs. This holds 
especially true for the relationships between the organisations’ identity creation 
requirements, and the metrical properties of system design. Currently, the 
relationship is expressed at a high level, stating that the choice of biographical 
information will have impact on subject coupling, among other factors.  
The unified framework would also benefit from the suggested improvements 
made to each part of the framework (Section 5.4.1, Section 7.6.1, and Section 
7.5.1); for example, in Section 7.5.1 the suggestion that future work should aim to 
develop proper guidelines to express requirements and outcomes would then 
feed into the unified framework, enabling for finer relationships to be 
established. Furthermore, the relationships between the different perspectives 
can be used as a reference point to further develop each perspective; for 
example, the authenticity requirements or biographical choices can be 
expressed in terms of the metrical properties. 
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Chapter*9:*Evaluation*of*the*Framework*
This chapter discusses the criteria used to judge the quality of the qualitative 
research in this thesis, reflecting on how rigor, and by extension validity, is built 
into the approach taken by this thesis (Section 9.1.1). 
A summative evaluation to test the effectiveness of the framework in the design 
of a real world IDMS implementation is not feasible. Thus, validation of the 
research findings was done through a formative evaluation of the framework, 
using expert reviews to assess completeness and usefulness of the framework 
(Section 9.2). Overall, experts agreed that the constructs and relationships in the 
framework reflected real world concerns, and proved useful to both researchers 
and practitioners. 
However, experts expressed areas for further improvement, including clarity of 
terminology, existence of other system design properties and relationships, the 
need for greater detail of individual perceptions, as well as the addition of an 
attacker perspective to the framework (Section 9.3).  
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9.1.1 Evaluation*of*Research**
While quantitative strands of research have standard measures of validity (the 
covariance matrix) and reliability (cronbach alpha), qualitative research does 
not; indeed the non-numerical nature of the data being analysed does not allow 
for the calculation of such figures (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Combined with the 
variety of data collection and analysis procedures, researchers have put forward 
various different criteria for evaluating qualitative research (Seale, 1999; 
Silverman, 2004); “A review of all the concepts that have been proposed… 
would be a major enterprise with dubious value” (Seale, 1999).  
Within this diversity of qualitative evaluation criteria, Lincoln & Guba (1985) 
provide a basis for the most influential work. In their work, they detailed 4 
characteristics by which to validate research:  
1. Credibility deals with the confidence that the findings of the research 
reflect the ‘truth’ of the situation under inquiry. Lincoln & Guba, (1985) 
state the credibility can be achieved through prolonged exposure in the 
field, triangulation, peer review and negative cases. Additionally, the 
credibility criteria can also be established through the use of member 
checks. This means passing the study materials and reports to the 
individuals who were under study, allowing them to indicate their 
agreement with the findings.  
2. Transferability seeks to answer issues of generalizability that is 
common in quantitative studies. According to pure interpretivists, true 
generalizability cannot be achieved as each situation is unique. This is 
‘solved’ by transferability by providing a detailed description of the 
situation under study. 
3. Dependability attempts to deal with the issue of reliability and 
reproducibility. Since qualitative research settings are difficult to 
recreate, it falls onto the researcher to leave an audit trail of the situation, 
methods, and decisions made. This would allow "auditors" to assess the 
way in which the data has been analysed. 
4. Conformability the auditing process carried out to establish 
dependability also plays a role in assessing conformability. 
Conformability is used to check that the results produced are not 
influenced by the researcher’s bias to the situation. It refers to the degree 
to which the results can be confirmed by other individuals.  
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More recently, in reference to the evaluation of Grounded Theory work, 
(Charmaz, 2006) specifies the following evaluation criteria and questions: 
1. Credibility Has your research achieved intimate familiarity with the 
setting or topic? Is there enough data to support claims? Has enough 
evidence been provided so readers can form independent assessments? 
2. Originality Are your categories fresh and offer new insights? Does the 
research contest or extend current ideas? 
3. Resonance Do the categories describe the completeness of the 
phenomenon? Does the analysis make sense to members who experience 
or share the circumstance? 
4. Usefulness Does your analysis offer interpretations that can be useful 
to the real world? Does the research contribute to knowledge, or spark 
further research? 
Comparing the two sets of criteria, credibility is a core criterion in assessing 
qualitative work. According to (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) credibility focuses on 
the plausibility and believability of the findings; rigor, and therefore validity and 
reliability is built into the research process. Hence the stress on providing 
detailed explanations and documentation about the analytic process taken, so 
other researchers may confirm and understand how new theory was developed. 
This thesis has provided such an audit trail as can be seen in Chapter 5, Chapter 
6, and Chapter 7, thus lending to the credibility, as well as he dependability and 
conformability of the findings. 
The quality of the research findings is further boosted by the use of triangulation 
(Section 4.4). Using method and data triangulation to develop the unified 
framework, significant overlap and relationships were uncovered between the 
organisation, system, and individual studies (Chapter 8). As each study draws 
from different data sources and perspectives, the overlaps identified validate 
each other’s findings, thus increasing “credibility and accountability by 
countering concern that a study’s findings are simply an artefact of a single 
method” (Patton, 2002). 
It should also be noted that the individual study (Chapter 6) also made use of 
more traditional quantitative techniques of validation. As detailed in Section 
7.4.1, a survey study was distributed, where figures for the reliability (Cronbach’s 
Alpha) and validity (Factor loadings and Fit statistics) were produced. 
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9.2 Expert+Evaluation+
To further enhance the quality and credibility of the research findings, it would 
be beneficial to explore the usefulness of the framework in helping to design and 
implement human-centred IDMS. Ideally, this would be done through a 
summative evaluation on the effectiveness of the framework to bring about a 
real world change. However, this approach is unfeasible at this stage due to a 
lack of resources, as well as access to real world implementations that it can 
affect.  
Therefore, this thesis has resorted to a formative evaluation, whereby 
knowledgeable experts assess the contributions and the usefulness of the 
findings; “An external audit by a disinterested expert can render judgement 
about the quality of data collection and analysis” (Patton, 2002). Expert 
reviews have been used within the HCI discipline, whereby experts assess 
systems to identify and highlight any shortcomings that can be improved (see for 
example Usability Evaluation Methods). The use of expert reviews fits in with 
the suggestions of Lincoln & Guba (1985) to use member checks to increase 
credibility, as well as Charmaz (2006) criterion for assessing resonance and 
usefulness. 
A summary of the human centred framework was sent to 6 different experts, 
who were each asked to assess the usefulness and completeness of the findings 
(Anne Adams, 2001) (see Appendix VI for summaries provided to experts, and 
Appendix VII for the feedback received). Experts approached for review were 
chosen based on the criteria that they are either experienced researchers who 
have a well-published body of literature in the identity field (including research 
through the privacy or trust lenses), as well as practioners who are currently 
developing identity systems. It should be noted, that this pool was limited to 
those with whom either primary researcher is aware of. Experts were contacted 
via email, in which the document containing the summary of the findings and 
evaluation criteria were provided.  
In total 4 experts were able to commit to the review, and sent in their 
assessment (Table 17). To ensure that experts were critical of the research, they 
were instructed to answer the following questions when evaluating the findings: 
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1. Do the constructs asserted in the organisation sub-framework 
reflect real world issues that organisations deal with when 
implementing of an IDMS?  
2. Can the design of an IDMS be decomposed and expressed in 
terms of the constructs as asserted by the system sub-
framework?  
3. Can the constructs of the system sub-framework by used to 
narrate the lived experience?  
4. Do the constructs in the individual sub-framework capture 
individuals’ concerns over, and willingness to accept a new 
IDMS? 
5. Do the hypothesised relationships between the various sub-
frameworks within the unified framework have merit?   
6. Are there any other important constructs or relationships that 
are missing from the unified framework and its sub-
frameworks?  
7. Can the framework by used to aid system implementers to 
design human-centred IDMS?  
8. Does the framework help researchers identify potential new 
areas of research?  
9. Does the framework add any value to the identity field?  
10. What improvements can be made to the framework? 
 
Overall experts found the framework to be useful, and that it added value to the 
identity field. The experts also pointed out several areas of 
concern/improvement; these are outlined below, and are addressed according to 
their themes in Section 9.3.  
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Table 18 Experts who reviewed the unified framework 
Name Experience Organisation 
1. Iain Henderson Databases, Identity 
Management Systems 
Mydex 
2. Professor Andrew Adams Social, Legal and Ethical 
Aspects of Computing, 
Computer and Network 
Security  
Meiji University, Tokyo, 
Japan 
3. Dr Lothar Fritsch Information Security, 
Privacy enhancing 
technology (PET), economy 
of PET, IT security, 
electronic signatures, 
information hiding, mobile 
commerce, location-based 
services, design of privacy-
respecting systems 
Norwegian Computing Centre 
4. Dr Seda Gurses Privacy, Social Networks, 
Surveillance, Information 
Systems, Requirements 
Engineering 
Ktholieke Universiteit Keuven 
 
9.2.1 Expert*1*A*Iain*Henderson*
Working with Mydex, a Community Interest Company, whose mission is to “help 
individuals realise the value of their personal data… by providing individuals 
with Personal Data Stores and related services”, this expert found the model to 
be very useful and most detailed he has seen, but has issues with some of the 
terminology.  
9.2.1.1 Completeness.
Expert 1 found no gaps with the completeness of the model, stating that “it is the 
first I have seen prepared to operate at such a detailed level; most attempts 
bail out before the detail”. 
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An issue was raised with the definitions of the system properties, where “greater 
clarity could be added” to the terms information variability and intimacy 
(Concern 1A). 
9.2.1.2 Usefulness.
The framework is “a very useful one, and can be built out in many useful 
directions”. However, encouraging further debate, the expert encouraged further 
work to bring the framework into “operational reality” (Concern 1B).  
9.2.2 Expert*2*A*Professor*Andrew*Adams*
The expert agreed that the framework added much value to the identity field 
stating, “the importance of the lived experience to the design of the identity 
systems cannot be overstated. Any work that highlights these kinds of issues 
well improves the field.” Suggestions were provided to further increase the 
completeness, and concerns were raised with respect to the utility of the 
framework. 
9.2.2.1 Completeness.
The constructs in the system framework, and its impacts on the lived 
experience, reflects real world issues. However, expert 2 also believed that the 
system framework was missing some design properties such as the “ability of the 
organisation to impose the system on the target” (Concern 2A).  
The individual framework would benefit from exploring “some finer grained” 
details such as different types of severity; as an example expert 2 writes that the 
framework should consider “the severity of a failure of the system for an 
individual in both, false positive and false negative terms” (Concern 2B).  
The constructs in the organisation framework also captures real concerns, but 
is found to be lacking of an attacker perspective;“[The Organisation 
Framework] is incomplete in that it ignores any analysis of likely attackers 
(those seeking to suborn the system). Such attackers range from terrorists to 
organised criminals, to individuals seeking anonymity to elements of the 
organisation” (Concern 2C). 
The relationships present in the unified framework were found to have merit. 
Nonetheless, expert 2 feels that there are some missing dependencies, such as 
“links between population comprehension and identity exposure” (Concern 
2D).  
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9.2.2.2 Usefulness.
Overall, the unified framework provides a “useful contribution” in helping 
researchers identify new areas of investigation, but could be further improved by 
providing “a better distinction between the framework and the application of 
the framework” (Concern 2E). 
Expert 2 also agrees that the framework presented “a step in the right direction” 
in helping implementers design human-centred IDMS. 
9.2.3 Expert*3*A*Dr*Lothar*Fritsch*
The framework was found to be interesting, and inspires further research, but 
raised issues with the semantics of the relationships as presented in the 
document. 
9.2.3.1 Completeness.of.system.framework.
“Overall, the system-based properties look usable”, but properties like expert 
analysis are vaguely defined (Concern 3A). Expert 3 also suggests the 
exploration of the framework within large-scale distributed cloud systems that 
have many owners and controllers (Concern 3B); correspondingly in such a 
scenario a new property, “system fuzziness”, was put forward to describe the 
“distributeness of the system and its owners/controllers” (Concern 3C).  
The individual framework could be improved by adding “direct properties such 
as convenience, usability, and cost” (Concern 3D). Expert 3 also felt that 
privacy and business compliance were missing from the system framework 
(Concern 3E). 
Overall, the “3 division diagram [the unified framework]” makes sense. 
However, there was an issue with the semantics of the relationships, “as they 
don’t get defined extensively” within the document provided to experts 
(Concern 3F). 
9.2.3.2 Usefulness.
Overall, the framework proves useful to explore new areas of research; the 
framework is found to accommodate for some of the experts ideas of privacy 
risk, and “might be inspirational for a framework there”.  
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However, the expert found it difficult to assess the usefulness of the framework 
in helping system designers to build human-centred IDMS. On the one hand, 
this is seen to stem from the experts perceived lack of proper semantics in the 
relationships (Section 9.2.3.1). On the other hand, the expert finds that the term 
“human-centred is not obvious”, as a proper definition had not been provided 
(Concern 3G).  
Further, the expert had two suggestions that might increase usefulness. Firstly 
he suggests a “technology-task-fit metric that determines how far an IDM 
solution is compatible with the task it should solve” (Concern 3H). Secondly, 
“some form of corporate risk awareness (how much do we lose on compliance 
breach, or upon security incidents) could be a valuable addition” (Concern 
3I). 
9.2.4 Expert*4*A*Dr*Seda*Gruses**
An expert on privacy, social networks, surveillance, identity management 
systems, and the implementation of data protection principles, Seda found the 
framework useful for both researchers and practitioners. She was however 
concerned on what it means for an IDMS to be human-centred, as well as some 
of the generalisations that were made. 
9.2.4.1 Completeness.
The system framework and the design properties are “rather interesting and 
helpful”, but their definitions should be tightened, as expert 4 found them to be 
imprecise (Concern 4A). The review also expressed a desire for more articulate 
and clear rating mechanisms (low to high) (Concern 4B). A suggestion was put 
forward for the consideration of a new design property that captures “the 
amount of control an individual has once the identity has been disclosed”; i.e. 
“capabilities similar to ‘subject access rights’ as defined in the data protection 
act” (Concern 4C).  
Expert 4 agrees that individual framework covers a number of very important 
concepts. It was put forward that work should examine Solove’s taxonomy to 
capture other concerns, as well as, the consideration of Nissenbaum’s concept of 
contextual integrity (Concern 4D). Furthermore, the expert cites the similarity 
of the work towards “proportionality test of a planned technology”, thus 
encouraging exploration of that field.  
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In the organisation framework, authenticity and uniqueness captured “very 
important criteria”. However, a flag was raised on the generalisations being 
made. Firstly, the expert took issue that high intimacy may not necessarily be 
used by organisations, as in the case where children might be protected from 
parents (Concern 4E). On the other hand, the expert found that the framework 
implies that uniqueness can only be provided for by biometrics, which “is too 
strong of a statement” (Concern 4F).  
 
The expert also suggests exploring and including issues relating to the security of 
biometric; i.e. to prevent vulnerabilities in the system from being “used to abuse 
the identity management system” (Concern 4G). 
9.2.4.2 Usefulness.
The framework is indeed useful for helping researchers identify new areas of 
research; “Absolutely, I really think that the work is a step forward in thinking 
about how to bring the lived experience of users. Future work in this direction 
would benefit from ways of bringing stakeholders into the evaluation of these 
systems, and an elaboration of the evaluation process”.  
However, expert 4 also states that she is unsure “what to think of IDMS and 
human-centeredness”, arguing that organisations implement systems for their 
own gain, while individuals are typically “forced to use identity mechanisms”. 
Nevertheless, the expert still found that the framework to be useful for 
implementers to guide “organisation-centric” IDMS; “it is an important 
contribution, as it puts the users of those systems as important stakeholders. I 
believe further work in this direction may be helpful in guiding the 
implementation process of ‘organisation-centric’ IDMS”.  9.3 Summary+of+Concerns+and+Further+Work+
Overall experts agreed that the finding presented a detailed, unique, and useful 
approach towards developing Human Centred IDMS. However, experts also 
pointed out several areas in which the model can be further improved. These 
concerns are summarised below, along with steps to further develop them in 
future work. 
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9.3.1 Clarity*of*terminology*
Through the evaluation, some of the experts highlighted the lack of a formal 
definition for the concept of a Human-Centred IDMS (concerns 3G and 4I). As 
of the time of writing, this shortcoming was reflected in the thesis. This has now 
been rectified, and a definition for a human-centred system, is provided in the 
initial glossary. 
Experts were also concerned about the lack of clear definitions/explanations for 
the various constructs and relationships within the framework. This however is 
largely due to the space limitations in the document provided to the experts. 
This thesis provides richer definitions that greatly aids understanding. 
Table 19 General themes from the expert reviews, and the corresponding concerns 
Theme Concerns 
Clarity of terminology  Definition of “human-centred” IDMS 
− 3G 
− 4I 
Clarity of constructs/relationships 
− 1A 
− 3A 
− 3F 
− 4A 
Distinction between framework/application 
− 2E 
Expansion of framework New constructs/relationships 
− 2A (system property for impose on target) 
− 2B (individual perception at finer details) 
− 2D (relationships between other constructs) 
− 3C (system property for fuzziness) 
− 3D (individual perception of usability, cost, etc.) 
− 4C (system property for subject access rights) 
− 4D (individual perception from Solove's 
taxonomy) 
Other scenarios  
− 3B (cloud IDMS) 
− 4E (child abuse) 
− 4F (non-biometric IDMS)  
Adding a security 
perspective 
− 2C (attacker perspective) 
− 3E (organisations privacy requirements) 
− 4G (security of biometrics from abuse) 
Operational Reality − 1B (operational reality) 
− 3H (technology task fit metric) 
− 3I (corporate risk awareness, e.g. cost of breach) 
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9.3.2 Expansion*of*framework*
Experts also encouraged further growth of the framework. For example, the 
experts suggested new system design properties, such as subject access rights 
(Concern 4C) or system fuzziness (Concern 3C). However, the analysis in this 
thesis was done until theoretical saturation was reached within the set of cases 
studied, and no new properties were being found. This is likely due to the 
limitation of the cases chosen for study, i.e. traditional N-IDMSs implemented 
by governments.  
Thus while the cases reviewed here reveals core constructs which can be applied 
to any scenario, it is encouraged that further research should investigate other 
scenarios that have not been analysed, such as federated identity schemes and 
the system fuzziness property suggested by an expert review, or perhaps more 
privately owned IDMSs that would highlight the aspect of subject access rights. 
In exploring new designs or application areas of identity, new properties may be 
discovered that may help to better narrate the lived experience. 
Similarly, experts also advised that more finer-grained details pertaining to 
individuals’ perception would be beneficial (Concern 2B). Suggestions include 
the exploration of available taxonomies (Concern 4D), as well as the use of 
conventional terms such as usability, and convenience (Concern 3D). Being an 
exploratory study, this research steered away from traditional approaches to 
uncover individuals’ real concerns when encountering such systems. Future 
work should definitely aim to integrate existing concepts, such as those proposed 
in this thesis that aim to explore the inclusion traditional trust constructs in 
determining individuals intentions to adopt IDMS (Section 6.6.1, Section 
Error! Reference source not found.) 
9.3.3 Adding*a*security*perspective*
Other feedback has called for the inclusion of a security perspective (Concern 
2C, 3E, and 4G). The work here has been done within the mind set of stepping 
away from the dominant security paradigm that has already been addressing 
these issues; the focus is on identity and the individual.  
However, it may be useful to investigate the use of the framework, especially the 
system design properties, and the strategies that attackers might take to suborn 
the system. For example, a high number of control points coupled with low 
subject engagement, might indicate a greater risk from insiders who use the 
system regularly. 
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This avenue of research is a different line of inquiry that should be followed up 
in future research. Care should be taken so as to not undermine the importance 
of the individual, as is currently the case in the field.  
9.3.4 Operational*reality*
Finally, Expert 1 asked if there was any strategy to bring the framework into 
“operational reality” (Concern 1B). This research presents a first phase towards 
a human-centred approach, seeking to describe the phenomenon of interest.  
Ultimately however, it seeks to inform the design of better identity systems. This 
is further explored in the next Chapter. At a high level, the framework can be 
used to inform debates around identity systems, seeking to ensure that 
developers and policy makers consider all the relevant details prior to 
implementing an identity system; the key point is the continuous assessment of 
organisational requirements, its influence on system design, while ensuring that 
individuals concerns are addressed, as well as ensuring that the eventual lived 
experience does not deviate from the overall purpose of the system (Section 10.1) 
At a more detailed level, the next chapter also explores the possible use of the 
human-centred framework within an economic context (Section 10.3). 
Organisations typically attempt to achieve their goals with as little money as 
possible; therefore, by presenting the benefits of a human-centred approach in 
terms of cost savings, the organisation is encouraged to implement human-
centred IDMS. This thus fits in with the suggestion provided by Expert 3 to 
include corporate risk awareness, and how much money may be lost for 
breaches or non-compliance (Concern 3I). 
Future work may seek to develop some kind of technology-task-fit metric as 
suggested by Expert 3 (Concern 3H). Some kind of weighting or scoring 
mechanism can help in ensuring that certain minimum thresholds of 
compliance, thus helping to bring human-centred systems into reality. Caution 
should be taken to ensure that such metrics will not take away from the lived 
experience; the metric should ensure that the lived experience also fits with the 
overall purpose. 
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Chapter*10:*Application*of*Findings*
Chapter 8 brought together the three different strands of research (the system, 
individual, and organisation studies) to describe a unified framework that 
provides a holistic narrative for a human-centric IDMS. 
This chapter builds on the findings of this thesis by exploring its applications to 
influence the implementation of a human-centred IDMS. On the one hand, the 
unified framework provides designers with an implementation roadmap, 
ensuring a systematic evaluation system design and its implications; it ensures 
that the design is fit for purpose, and also includes considerations of individuals 
as stakeholders, while ensuring the lived experience does not derail from the 
overall purpose of the system (Section 10.1). 
Alternatively, the unified framework can also be used to influence higher-level 
organisational decisions by applying the framework towards economic principles 
(Section 10.2). Organisations are driven by financial constraints, typically 
aiming to maximise return on investments, attempting to achieve their 
objectives while minimising costs. Faced with these constraints, it would be 
beneficial for IDMS designers to express human-centred solutions in economic 
terms, hence providing organisations with greater incentives to implement 
them. 
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10.1 Informing+the+IDMS+Design+Process+
The unified model here presents a holistic narrative for the development and 
implementation of a human-centred IDMS. It can be used as a tool to guide 
designers (i.e. those who are involved with the planning and implementation of 
the IDMS) in developing systems that cater for the individual and the lived 
experience, thus maximising its impact.  One possible application of the unified 
framework is illustrated in Figure 30 below. In this instance, the use of the 
framework would take place in three main phases; where organisational 
constructs, are analysed, then followed through to determine its impacts on 
initial acceptance, and finally its effects on the lived experience. 
However, it should be noted that real world applications might require a rapid 
prototyping approach, as opposed to the waterfall model in Figure 29. In this 
case, the investigation continuously shifts back and forth between the various 
frameworks, accounting for new concerns, arguments, and possibly changing 
contextual factors.  
Additionally, the unified framework can also be used to create a checklist type 
tool to aid in decision-making and debates. Appendix VIII provides an example 
of what this may look like; what is distinctive about this checklist, as opposed to 
strictly privacy or trust type of checklists, is the multi-disciplined approach 
taken, where organisations requirements quickly lead into the privacy 
implications of the lived experience, and onto the trust issues in citizen 
perception. Additionally, the checklist contains open-ended questions that 
emphasises the requirement of designers to fully immerse themselves in the 
situation, and think about the problems and implications presented by the 
planning and design of the system. 
However, for the simplicity and to emphasise the relationships present in the 
unified framework, this section will explore its application in discrete steps as 
outlined in Figure 29. 
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Figure 30 Application of unified framework to inform design of IDMS 
 
The first, and most important, phase involves the setting out of the overall 
purpose of the IDMS, and the various tasks that it needs to support. In line with 
recommendations from policy experts and researchers, the initial phase requires 
the organisation to set out clear goals on the purpose of the system (Kent & 
Millett, 2002; Whitley & Hosein, 2010); the purpose should underwrite all 
decisions made about the design of the system. Once the aims and goals of the 
system have been specified, the organisation can then assess individual's 
situation perception on the importance of the issue being addressed; 
organisations want to ensure that individuals agree that the system is addressing 
an important issue, thus boosting the likelihood of acceptance 
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The next phase, involves the specification of the authenticity and uniqueness 
requirements. The purpose defined earlier, along with the relying parties, will 
here dictate the identity requirements; it will define the relevant information 
required to support the various relying parties in achieving their goals. This then 
allows system designers to determine the implications of the requirements on 
the metrical properties of the system; carefully rating each property based on 
the choice of personal information chosen to fulfil the authenticity and 
uniqueness requirements. In turn, this has implications for the individuals' 
system judgement on the usefulness of the system, acting through their 
perception of the overall information quality. System designers should attempt 
to identify and address any concerns raised by tracing and resolving the issue 
back to the system properties. Once all concerns have been addressed, designers 
can then focus on determining the lived experience as defined by the metrical 
properties; designers would carefully consider the impacts of each metrical 
property, as well as the overall combined effects. The lived experience defined is 
then compared with the originally defined purpose to ensure that the impacts of 
the system design do not go against the intentions of the system, or 
unintentionally create new problematic situations.  
Where the second phase focused on the implications of authenticity and 
uniqueness, the third phase is focused on the outcomes of the identity usage and 
access. Again, informed by the purpose of the system, the implementing 
organisation will need to define how relying parties will need to access the 
information, in order to fulfil their goals. This in turn has implications for the 
structural properties, which can then be used to investigate individuals' 
concerns of the system, the aim being to minimise these concerns. System 
designers should then turn their attention to the lived experience as defined by 
the structural properties, building on the metrical properties defined in the 
previous stage. Again, the lived experience should be compared to the purpose, 
making sure that there is a proper fit, and that the IDMS will fulfil its 
requirements without introducing new problematic situations that can be 
counterproductive. 
Finally, once the organisation is satisfied that individuals' would accept and use 
the proposed IDMS, as well as providing a lived experience that fits in with the 
overall purpose, the organisation can proceed to implement the system. 
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A point of clarification should be made regarding the investigation of the lived 
experience after its effects on initial acceptance, as presented here. Effects on 
system judgement are considered first, because it presents the first hurdle to 
acceptance of the system, whereas the lived experience can only come after 
acceptance. Furthermore, in comparison to assessing system judgement, the 
lived experience is a much more time consuming and delicate task; it may 
therefore be more efficient to explore acceptance, then making changes to the 
metrical properties to maximise acceptance, before attempting to define the 
lived experience. Finally, issues raised by individuals' perceptions of the system 
may also help to inform investigations into the lived experience.  10.2 Convincing+Organisations+I+Security+Economics+
Apart from the application in the previous section as an analytic qualitative tool 
(Section 10.1), designers may also be able to apply the unified framework in a 
more mathematical manner through the use of Security Economic framework, 
which also provides the added benefit of providing organisations with financial 
incentives for implementing Human-Centred IDMS. 
Security Economics is a growing discipline whose early work began by 
examining system failures within the context of perverse economic incentives; 
“indeed, security mechanisms are often designed quite deliberately to shift 
liability, which often leads to trouble” (R. Anderson, 2001). For example, 
compared to their European counterparts, US banks tend to spend less money 
more effectively when dealing with fraud (R. Anderson, 1993). This is largely due 
to different liabilities being in place, where US banks bear the responsibility to 
prove customers wrong when faced with fraud claims, while the burden falls on 
individuals within the European context; as a result US banks tend to be more 
diligent when implementing security systems, resulting in less occurrence of 
fraud. 
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10.2.1 Utility*Theory*and*Transfer*Functions*
Later research began to apply economic theories to aid security decision-
making. For example, Gordon & Loeb (2006) investigated the amount of money 
put into security mechanisms, and determined that the optimal upper limit of 
security investment would be approximately 36% of the expected loss. This 
branch of research brings with it microeconomic concepts of trade-offs, cost-
benefit analysis and utility to aid in the decision making process. In particular, 
utility theory as described by Beautement & Pym (2010) provides an expressive 
framework to represent the economic consequences of security managers’ 
preferences and decisions; Beautement & Pym (2010) provide a brief 
explanation of utility within an economic market, and the role of central banks.  
The managers of a central bank are given, by their national governments, 
targets for certain key economic indicators, such as unemployment ( ) and 
inflation ( ) at time t (time can be either discrete or continuous here). Their 
task is to set a (e.g., monthly) sequence of controls, such as their base 
(interest) rates (it) so that the key indicators are sufficiently close to their 
targets,  and , respectively. Typically, using this example, the managers’ 
policy is expressed as a utility function: 
 
together with system equations,  and , expressing the 
dependency (among other things) of u and π on interest rates in terms of 
functions s1 and s2 that describe the (macro) dynamics of the economy. Two 
key components of this set-up are the following: 
 The weights  and  (typically, values between 0 and 1) that 
express the managers’ preference between the components of the 
utility function—that is, which they care about more; and 
 The functions and that express how utility depends on deviation 
from target. A simple version of this set-up would take the f's to be 
quadratic. Quadratics conveniently express diminishing marginal 
returns as the indicators approach target, but make utility 
symmetric around target. More realistically, Linex functions usually 
expressed in the form are used to 
capture a degree of asymmetry that is parameterised by . 
tu
tπ
tu tπ
( ) ( )ttttt fwuufwU ππ −+−= 2211
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α
  284 
The managers’ task, then, is to set a sequence of interest rates  such that the 
expected utility, , remains with an acceptable range, as  and  vary, 
and trade-off against each other, as the sequence of rates it evolves. In 
general, there can of course be as many components as required in a utility 
function. 
This function can then be applied within a security domain, where utility might 
be expressed in terms of security managers’ preferences, and trade-offs between 
various security variables. For example, Beautement & Pym (2010) and 
Beresnevichiene, Pym, & Shiu (2010) express the following utility function: 
1. ; where  
a. C stands for confidentiality 
b. I stands for integrity 
c. A stands for availability  
d. K stands for investment  
Alternatively, one may also describe a utility loss function, which expresses the 
amount of loss that one would seek to minimise. In exploring the utility of 
various user password length requirements, (Arnell et al., 2011) expressed the 
loss in the following utility function: 
2. ; where 
a. B is Breaches; passwords become known to unauthorised 
individual. 
b. P is Productivity Loss; the user’s inability to access the system 
due to forgetting the password. 
c. K is Investment; the provision of Help Desk Support to handle 
resets. 
One caveat of applying the utility function to a security domain is the absence of 
system equations that are used to estimate the dynamics of the key security 
variables in the utility function (Beresnevichiene et al., 2010). Instead, security 
managers can create an executable system model, built around the key security 
variables, which can then be used to simulate the dynamics of the key variables; 
a critical component of such a model is the use of a transfer function that 
calculates the probabilities for certain outcomes (e.g. Breaches, or Productivity 
Losses) (Beautement & Pym, 2010).  
ti
( )tUΕ tu tπ
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )KKfwAAfwIIfwCCfwUt −+−+−+−= 44332211
( ) ( ) ( )KKfwPPfwBBfwUt −+−+−= 332211
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Developing a suitable transfer function requires extensive experimental work 
that is beyond the scope of the work here; instead, the thesis briefly outlines the 
variables that could go into such a transfer function. 10.3 Economic+Impacts+of+HumanICentred+Design+
In order to make a business case for supporting a human-centred identity 
solution, system designers can express the economic impacts of system design, 
in terms of utility offered by various configurations. In particular, the 
proposition here presents a high level overview of a set of utility loss functions, 
based on the organisation and system framework; the individual framework is 
not included, because it captures initial acceptance of the system, as opposed to 
an operational instance of an identity system.  
For clarification, utility functions may take as many key variables as required; 
however, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, especially for any future attempts 
to model the scenario, the thesis presents small separate loss functions that 
captures and describes different economic aspects of human-centred IDMS. 
First and foremost, the organisation’s utility loss function presents a 
straightforward translation into the security economic context. Specifically, the 
organisations identity requirements will affect the overall occurrence of 
breaches, productivity loss, and investments, resulting in the following 
function: 
1. Security Utility Loss Function 
 
a. Breaches (B), is the loss incurred when individuals are wrongly 
given access to the system. The major variable that affects 
breaches is the false acceptance rate, but is also affected by 
population variables; therefore a transfer function to determine 
the probability distribution would look like: 
i. P(B) = F(false acceptance rate, population 
compatibility, population size, geographic 
diversity, trust in authenticity) 
( ) ( ) ( )KKfwPPfwBBfw −+−+−= 332211
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b. Productivity loss (P), which is the loss incurred when 
individuals are wrongly denied access to the system. The major 
variable that affects productivity loss is the false rejection rate. 
Similar to breaches, this is affected by population characteristics, 
as well as the trust in the authenticity of the identity. The 
probability distribution for occurrences of productivity loss is 
determined by the following transfer function: 
i. P(P) = F(false rejection rate, population 
compatibility, population size, geographic 
diversity, trust in authenticity)  
c. Investment (K), which is the amount of money invested into 
the authenticity and uniqueness processes. Note that this may be 
affected by obligations on implementing various technologies, 
where the choice for certain technologies based on currently 
available systems, might reduce costs (Section 8.3.1.2). 
Moving onto the system framework, the economic implications of the lived 
experience must also be considered. From Chapter 5 determining the true 
impacts of the lived experience requires careful consideration of all the design 
properties; for simplicity this thesis reduces the outcomes of the lived experience 
to that of resistance due to a negative impact on everyday life. The system 
designer would therefore have to balance the trade-offs between resistance and 
effectiveness of the IDMS by investing in the various design properties of the 
system; this leads to a formulation of the following function: 
2. Experience Utility Loss Function 
 
a. Resistance (R) is the loss incurred due to individuals’ 
resistance due to a negative lived experience. For example an 
individual might protest if the system is highly invasive (e.g. high 
control points and low subject engagement). R is affected by the 
entire set of structural and metrical properties; a transfer 
function to determine the probability distribution for the 
occurrences of resistance would be: 
i. P(R) = F(set of all structural properties, set of 
all metrical properties) 
( ) ( ) ( )KKfwIIfwRRfw −+−+−= 332211
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b. Ineffectiveness (I) is the loss incurred due to the organisation 
not being able to make use of the identity to fulfil its goals. For 
example, the organisation might not have enough access to the 
information in a timely manner (low control points and high 
subject engagement). Like R, I is affected by the entire set of 
structural and metrical properties; a transfer function to 
determine the probability distribution for the occurrences of 
resistance would be: 
i. P(I) = F(set of all structural properties, set of all 
metrical properties) 
c. Investment (K) is the amount of money invested in the system 
design properties. 
However, despite the simplification of the outcomes to two variables, the above 
utility loss function still presents a complicated model to simulate due to the 
large number of structural and metrical properties present in the transfer 
functions.  
Therefore, the utility function can be further simplified by separating the 
experience of the structural and metrical properties into two separate utility 
loss functions. In doing so, the relationships between the two categories of 
properties are ignored; however, this is acceptable since the structural 
properties largely deal with the flow of information, thus primarily dealing with 
resistance due to privacy breaches; on the other hand, the metrical properties 
deal with the type of information being collected, which is largely concerned 
with resistance due to misuse/misapplication of the identity. The two separate 
utility functions are therefore expressed as: 
3. Structural Utility Loss Function   
 
a. Privacy Breaches (PB) is the loss incurred due to individuals’ 
resistance due to breaches in privacy. PB is affected by the set of 
structural properties; a transfer function to determine the 
probability distribution for the occurrences of resistance due to 
privacy breaches would be: 
i. P(PB) = F(control points, subject engagement, 
population coverage, identity exposure) 
( ) ( ) ( )KSKSfwUAUAfwPBPBfw −+−+−= 332211
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b. Un-accessibility (UA) is the loss incurred due to the 
organisation not being able to access the identity as it needs to. 
UA is affected by the set of structural properties; a transfer 
function to determine the probability distribution for the 
occurrences of un-accessibility would be: 
i. P(UA) = F(control points, subject engagement, 
population coverage, identity exposure) 
c. Investment (KS) is the amount of money being invested into 
the structural design properties. 
 
4. Metrical Utility Loss Function   
 
a. Misapplication (MA) is the loss incurred due to individuals 
stemming from the misapplications of the identity (false 
accusations, use of identity for other purposes, etc.). MA is 
affected by the metrical properties; a transfer function to 
determine the probability distribution for the occurrences of 
resistance due to privacy breaches would be: 
i. P(MA) = F(expert involvement, population 
comprehension, subject coupling, information 
accuracy, information stability, information 
variability) 
b. Ineffectiveness (IE) is the loss incurred due to the 
organisation not having the information it needs to meet its 
objectives. IE is affected by the metrical properties; a transfer 
function to determine the probability distribution for the 
ineffectiveness of the identity information would be: 
i. P(IE) = F(expert involvement, population 
comprehension, subject coupling, information 
accuracy, information stability, information 
variability) 
c. Investment (KM) is the amount of money being invested into 
the metrical design properties. 
( ) ( ) ( )KMKMfwIEIEfwMAMAfw −+−+−= 332211
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Therefore, using the security, structural, and metrical utility loss functions, a 
system designer can present a business case to cater not only for organisational 
requirements, but also those of the lived experience; the utility loss functions 
can be summed together to determine, and therefore minimise, the overall 
losses incurred. Coupled together with the individual framework to determine 
high initial acceptance rates, organisations can be presented with economic 
incentives to implement human-centred IDMS. 
As a simple example to illustrate the trade off, consider an N-IDMS that aims to 
support the battle against crime or terrorism by requiring individuals to carry 
around and produce their identity document in all their daily interactions with 
both public and private organisations. Each use of the identity creates an audit 
trail that is stored on a central database, and is accessed without individuals 
consent. 
The constant use and tracking of identity creates a system that has a high 
number of control points. Therefore, while the organisation will have access to 
abundant information to track and identify potential terrorists, the system 
design also increases the risk of privacy breaches occurring. The structural 
utility loss function will capture this increased risk of privacy breaches, 
expressing in terms of overall financial loss for the organisation (e.g. cost of non-
compliance, court action, etc.). Therefore, the organisation can reduce these 
costs by lowering the number of control points, and thus reducing the 
probability of privacy breaches occurring.  
However, this could create a situation where the organisation is unable to 
identify terrorists because a certain type of interaction is not recorded. The 
structural utility loss function captures this as a financial cost of not being able 
to identify a terrorist (e.g. tracking through other means, damage done, etc.,), 
due to un-accessibility of required information. Organisations thus need to 
balance the potential trade-offs between the costs of privacy breaches vs. the 
costs of un-accessibility.  
It should be noted that this is not necessarily a zero sum game; reducing the 
probability of privacy breaches may not necessarily increase the chances of un-
accessibility. The goal is to design human-centred IDMS that would be to keep 
potential losses to a minimum, while still ensuring that the system remains 
effective.  
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10.4 Summary+and+Discussion+
The unified model presents a unique view into the identity process, which 
provides investigators with a new aid in the implementation of IDMS; the model 
can serve as a guide that can help to inform debate, manage perception and 
expectations of individuals, as well as ensuring that the overall lived experience 
does not derail from the overarching goal that defines the system. The 
application of the model, for these purposes, can be broken down into three 
main phases: 
1. Define Purpose.  
i. Investigate individuals’ Situation Perception based on the 
purpose. 
2.  Based on Purpose, derive and process requirements for 
Identity Creation.  
ii. Process and rate the metrical properties of the system based on 
the outcomes of the Identity Creation process. 
iii. Determine the effect of the metrical properties on the individuals’ 
perception of Information Quality, and how that might affect the 
Judgement and Acceptance of the IDMS. 
iv. Determine the lived experience based on the metrical properties, 
and ensure a match to the overall purpose of the IDMS. 
3.  Based on Purpose, derive and process the requirements for 
Identity Application. 
v. Process and rate the structural properties of the system, based on 
the outcomes and requirements of the Identity Creation process. 
vi. Analyse individual concerns based on the combined structural 
properties, accounting for the metrical properties, and how that 
might affect intentions to accept the IDMS. 
vii. Determine the lived experience based on the combined structural 
properties, accounting for the metrical properties, ensuring a 
match to the overall purpose of the IDMS. 
It should be noted that although the application of the model is presented here 
in discrete steps, the reality of the situation is likely to involve a rapid 
prototyping approach, where all phases may take place in tandem, quickly 
moving back and forth, between each framework, thus informing and 
encouraging debates around the IDMS. 
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An alternative application of the model comes from its use within a security 
economics context. Faced with a limited budget, organisations aim to invest 
their resources so as to get maximum value. Focusing on the trade-offs to the 
lived experience, organisations need to balance the trade-offs between the 
usefulness of the system for the organisations to the negative lived experience 
created. 
By simplifying the outcomes of a negative lived experience to that of 
resistance/rejection, as well as isolating the effects of the metrical and 
structural properties from each other, one can generate utility loss functions 
that encourage organisations to explore truly human-centred approaches to 
IDMS. The utility functions are: 
1. Structural Utility Loss Function    
 
a. Privacy Breaches (PB) is the loss incurred due to individuals’ 
resistance due to breaches in privacy. 
b. Un-accessibility (UA) is the loss incurred due to the 
organisation not being able to access the identity when and where 
it needs to. 
c. Investment (KS) is the amount of money being invested into 
the structural design properties. 
2. Metrical Utility Loss Function   
 
a. Misapplication (MA) is the loss incurred due to individuals’ 
stemming from the misapplications of the identity. 
b. Ineffectiveness (IE) is the loss incurred due to the 
organisation not having the information it needs to meet its 
objectives. 
c. Investment (KM) is the amount of money being invested into 
the metrical design properties. 
  
( ) ( ) ( )KSKSfwUAUAfwPBPBfw −+−+−= 332211
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These can be used in conjunction with a security loss function that is created on 
the basis of the organisational requirements of identity, thus creating an 
interesting dynamic between the various functions: 
3. Security Utility Loss Function 
 
a. Breaches (B) is the loss incurred when individuals are wrongly 
given access to the system. 
b. Productivity loss (P) is the loss incurred when individuals are 
wrongly denied access to the system. 
c. Investment (K) is the amount of money invested into the 
authenticity and uniqueness processes. 
The largest hurdle at this time is to generate the actual transfer functions for 
such an outcome. This is out of the scope of this thesis, but one possible way is to 
build a database of IDMSs, that includes a breakdown of the various system 
design properties as well as occurrences of events of interest (such as Privacy 
Breaches, Un-accessibility, Misapplications, etc.). This can then be used to 
generate a transfer functions that weights the system properties in relation to 
the events.  
Thus when analysing a particular IDMS, one can take the system design rating 
for that particular identity system, and plug them into a Mote Carlo simulation 
along with the transfer function above to produce the probabilities of events 
occurring for that particular IDMS. These can then be feed into the utility 
functions to calculate the economic figures for the utility functions. 
10.4.1 Future*Work*
The economic application of the unified model presents a key platform for 
further improvement and exploration. Work should attempt to focus on 
developing the transfer functions, so that simulations can be run; thus, a 
probability distribution can be developed for each trade-off, which then enables 
a proper quantification of the economic values.  
One approach to develop the transfer functions is to explore different systems, 
breaking them down into the various design properties, and then determining 
the frequencies of privacy breaches, misapplications, ineffectiveness, and 
inaccessibility.  
( ) ( ) ( )KKfwPPfwBBfw −+−+−= 332211
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Furthermore, it may be beneficial to explore a single property as the main 
variable in the transfer functions, with remaining properties acting on that main 
variable. For example, control points might be taken as the central variable for 
the frequency of privacy breaches; the more an identity is accessed the more 
likely it is that a breach will occur. The other properties would then serve to 
increase or decrease the frequency of breaches as dictated by the number of 
control points; for example, low subject engagement would increase the number 
of privacy breaches indicated by the control points. Similarly, information 
accuracy might be taken as a core component for determining the 
misapplications; the other metrical properties would act on the base probability 
distribution as determined by information accuracy. 
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Chapter*11:*Conclusions*
Identity is a core construct that underpins all social interactions. The growth of 
technology-mediated communication has spurred research and development of 
new identity systems that attempt to leverage identity within the digital domain. 
However, there have been cases in which implementation of new N-IDMSs have 
faced resistance from individuals who are the subjects of these systems.  
The review of previous research in Chapter 3 showed that researchers have been 
focused on the periphery constructs of usability, privacy, and trust. While these 
avenues of research have attempted to develop customer/citizen centric IDMS, 
these claims are largely rhetoric, viewing identity as static and utilitarian; they 
also fail to account for the needs of the individuals, and the overall impact of 
identity. The research presented in this thesis has shown that IDMS can be 
designed around individuals, their perceptions, and everyday lives, and that 
doing so is likely to lead to IDMS that are more acceptable, effective, and 
efficient. 
By focusing on the core issue, i.e. identity and its relationship to the individual 
and organisation, this thesis has uncovered the human factors that affect the 
planning, implementation, and use of an IDMS. This has been developed into 
human-centred IDMS framework that provides a holistic overview around the 
development, perception, and impacts of an identity system.  
As a first step in addressing this new focus of human-centred identity research, 
the thesis investigated the lived experience of identity. The results provided by 
this thesis uncovered several practical design aspects of IDMS that can influence 
individuals’ lives. As well as researching long-term lived experience, the thesis 
also investigated factors determining initial acceptance or rejection of an IDMS: 
individuals are swayed by the perceived usefulness of an IDMS in tackling a 
particular problem, and their perception of the severity of that problem for 
society and themselves. Finally, the thesis carried out an investigation into 
organisational requirements of identity that affect the implementation and 
design of an IDMS; these concerns deal with the purpose of the identity system, 
which informs the authenticity and uniqueness requirements for identities 
enrolled within the system.   
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11.1 Research+Question+and+Goals+Revisited+
Identity is a complex area of research that is typically tackled from the aspects of 
security, privacy, and trust. By bringing the focus of the research back onto 
identity itself, the research was guided by the following overall question:  
What are the human factors that define or interact with identity, and 
how do these affect the development, implementation and use of 
identity management systems? 
Guided by this research question, the goals of the thesis were: 
1. Identify the relationship between the individual the IDMS. 
a. How does the collection and use of identity affect individuals? 
b. How do individuals’ perceive or choose to accept an IDMS? 
2. Identify the relationship between the organisation and the 
IDMS. 
a. What are the organisational concerns around the use of an IDMS? 
b. How do organisations determine the attributes of an identity? 
3. To develop a holistic human-centred framework that describes 
the overall relationship between an individual, the system and 
the organisation. 11.2 Overview+of+Studies+and+Results+
The research was conducted in three separate studies that, taken as a whole, 
provide a multi-stakeholder view into the development of a human-centred 
identity system.  
11.2.1 Study*1*
The first study reviewed and analysed 14 different past and present N-IDMSs 
(Chapter 5). The results of the study are a set of system design properties that 
influence individuals’ lived experience; i.e. the impact of the identity system on 
individuals’ everyday lives. The design properties that emerged were 
distinguished into two broad categories; the structural properties and metrical 
properties. 
The structural properties describe the flow of information across the entire 
identity eco-system, and are captured by the following properties: 
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1. Control Points. The number of points at which an individual’s 
identity information is accessed or used. 
2. Subject Involvement. The level of participation that an individual 
across all the various control points. 
3. Population Coverage. The percentage of the general population 
that is actually enrolled into the system. 
4. Identity Exposure. Defines the level of control that an individual 
has in the presentation of his/her identity to other entities that have 
no right to it. 
The metrical properties are concerned with the type of information that is 
collected, stored, and used: 
1. Expert Analysis. The amount of manual expert involvement that is 
required to make an identification or authentication. 
2. Population Comprehension. How well the general population 
understands the identification process and technologies being used. 
3. Information Accuracy. The accuracy of the identity information – 
i.e. the reliability in producing correct matches.  
4. Information Stability. The frequency with which the individual’s 
information being collected changes over time.  
5. Subject Coupling. How well the identity instantiation in the system 
matches the relevant partial identity in the context of use. 
6. Information Variability. Refers to the possibility of the information 
being used for different purposes. 
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11.2.2 Study*2*
The second study explored individuals’ initial acceptance of an IDMS (Chapter 
6). Using focus groups to explore individuals’ perception of identity systems, I 
developed a framework to predict individuals’ initial trusting intention to adopt 
an IDMS. This framework was further refined through the use of a survey 
distributed to all undergraduate students in UCL; 668 responses were received 
and analysed using Structural Equation Modelling. The final version of the trust 
framework shows that individuals’ acceptance of an IDMS depends on 3 main 
constructs, which in turn was dependent on its sub-constructs (and in one 
particular case one of the main constructs was influenced by the other 2 main 
constructs): 
1. Situation Perception describes the individual’s perception of how 
urgently a problem needs to be addressed. 
a. Severity touches on the individual’s perception of how serious 
it would be if one is affected by the problem being addressed. 
b. Extent captures individual’s perception of how many people are 
affected by the problem being addressed. 
2. Security Concerns describes the individuals’ fears over the security, 
safety, and abuse of the identity within the IDMS. 
a. Information Quality which deals with individuals’ perception 
over the accuracy and relevance of the information collected, 
stored, and used. 
3. System Judgement describes the individual’s perception of how 
useful the system will be in helping to address the problem.  
a. Information Quality. 
b. Situation Perception. 
c. Security Concerns. 
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The study also explored the effect of National Culture on individuals’ 
perceptions. Using the cultural values as described by Hofstefe (2001) the study 
found that power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and long-
term orientation influence individuals’ security concerns. Additionally, 
uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation also have a direct effect on 
individuals’ acceptance an IDMS.  
11.2.3 Study*3*
Viewing identity as a strategic resource for the organisation, the third study 
investigated organisations’ identity requirements when implementing an IDMS 
(Chapter 7). Using Grounded Theory analysis, the study collected and analysed 
data on 3 different N-IDMS implementations, each in different countries 
(Brunei, India, and UK). The analysis revealed that the purpose of the identity 
system drives organisations’ identity requirements, informing two major 
activities that affect the eventual design of an IDMS: 
1. Identity Creation describes the enrolment process. This process is 
affected by the requirements for: 
a. Authenticity determines the truthfulness of an individual’s 
identity; i.e. the choice of biographical information which is 
affected by: 
i. Universality is the percentage of the target population 
that already possesses accepted forms of identity 
documents. 
ii. Intimacy captures the percentage of the population that 
is already known to the organisation, and can thus vouch 
for the individual. 
b. Uniqueness ensures that an individual does not enrol within a 
system more than once. Typically done using biometrics, which 
is mediated by: 
i. Obligations. Requirements that an organisation has to 
consider (international obligations, current practices). 
ii. Performance. Accuracy of the biometric in producing 
matches (accuracy, human readability). 
iii. Population. The factors that affect performance of the 
biometric (size, compatibility, geographic diversity). 
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2. Identity use is concerned with the process of establishing the 
mechanism that enables relying parties to access and use identities in 
the system.  
a. Purpose. Describes the problem that the IDMS is meant to 
support. 
b. Relying Parties. The various users that need access to the 
identity to complete a task (organisations, individual). 
c. Objectives. Relying parties’ intention and requirements to use 
the identity (enablement, proof). 
d. Conditions. The situational factors under which the relying 
parties operate (risk level, timeliness). 
e. Accessibility. The manner in which the organisation will 
access the identity (information set, locality, direction) 
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Table 20 Summary of studies, approaches, and results in this thesis 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Chapter 5 6 7 
Focus System Individual Organisation 
Research Goal 1a 1b 2a, 2b 
Methods Historiography 
Thematic Analysis 
Focus Groups 
Grounded theory 
Factor Analysis 
Structural Equation Modelling 
Documents and Interviews 
Grounded theory 
Determinant  Lived Experience Initial Acceptance System Design 
Results/Variables Structural Properties 
 Control Points 
 Subject Engagement 
 Population Coverage 
 Identity Exposure 
Metrical Properties 
 Expert analysis 
 Population Comprehension 
 Subject Coupling 
 Information Accuracy 
 Information Stability 
 Information Variability 
Acceptance 
 Situation Perception 
 Concerns 
 System Judgement 
 Uncertainty Avoidance (culture) 
 Long-Term Orientation (culture) 
Situation Perception 
 Severity 
 Extent 
Concerns 
 Information Quality 
 Power Distance (culture) 
 Individualism (culture) 
 Uncertainty Avoidance (culture) 
 Long-Term Orientation (culture) 
System Judgement 
 Information Quality 
 Situation Perception  
 Concerns  
Authenticity - determines biographical 
information 
 Intimacy / Universality 
Uniqueness - determines biometric 
information 
 Obligations  
(International, Current Practices) 
 Performance  
(Accuracy, Readability) 
o Population 
(Size, Compatibility, 
Geographic Diversity) 
Purpose - determines identity access policies 
 Relying Parties 
 Objective 
 Conditions 
 Accessibility 
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11.3 Contributions+for+Researchers:+From+UserIcentric+to+HumanICentric+Identity+
This research has produced new substantive knowledge on identity. It presents a 
point of departure from the traditional approaches that focus on usability of 
IDMS, and encourages researches to examine the relationship between 
individuals and the identity system. Traditional ‘user-centric’  perspectives of 
identity reduce the individual to a functional component within the 
organisations’ overall ‘work system’; what matters is the system-individual ‘fit’ to 
achieve desired performance (Taylor & Coutaz, 1994; Whitefield, Wilson, & 
Dowell, 1991). Research thus ignores the effect that identity systems have on 
individuals, which means issues such as users’ mental and physical workload 
and sensitivity.  
While IDMS should be usable, it is an insufficient perspective to capture the 
impact of identity on individuals. Researchers are encouraged to take a broader 
view of the problem, and investigate individuals’ overall experience, not just 
functional points of interaction. As opposed to user-centric approaches that 
focus on ease-of-use, identity research needs to take a human-centred approach 
that designs for individuals' concerns, as well as the implications of the system 
on their everyday lives. The implications of this approach for researchers are 
outlined below: 
11.3.1 Privacy*–*from*confidentiality*to*the*lived*experience*
As IDMS by their nature deal with personal information, the privacy literature 
has been dominated by issues of informational privacy, and hence concentrates 
on solutions of confidentiality to ensure privacy.  However, current research 
knows little about how identity can affect individuals in the first place. What 
good are the privacy protections if one does not understand the effects of 
identity? Some researchers have mirrored these concerns stating that "identity 
related issues cannot be dealt with from a privacy-perspective" (Gutwirth, 
2009), or that we "need to move beyond discussions about privacy, and move 
into a full fledge discussion of identity" (Lusili, Maghiros, & Bacigalupo, 2009). 
In exploring the lived experience of identity, this thesis opens up a whole new 
perspective. Moving pass the issues of privacy and confidentiality, the focus is on 
the impact of identity use on individuals' everyday lives, and thus its effect on 
individuals' behaviour and freedoms. The structural and metrical properties, 
when taken together, help us to describe the effect on the lived experience.  
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In the Poor Law system (Section 2.2.1.2 and Section 5.2.1.1), the government 
attempted to control the issue of false begging by requiring individuals to 
register with the government. Upon registration, beggars would be presented 
with an identification badge that they were required to wear on the sleeves at all 
times, signalling to others that they had a right to beg. However, the system 
backfired; true beggars chose not register, and instead lived a life of crime. This 
was because the system design was highly targeted in nature (low population 
coverage), required individuals to wear the badges at all times (high number of 
Control Points and high Subject Engagement), which meant that the identity 
was broadcast for everyone to see (high Identity Exposure). Thus this 
combination of system properties led to the system creating feelings of shame 
for individuals', and hence their reluctance to use it.  
As another example, the assumed infallibility of fingerprint identification, for 
criminal identification, brings with it dangers of false convictions (Cole 2001). 
Fingerprints pulled from crime scenes are typically of low quality (low 
Information Accuracy), and requires experts to make decisions on fingerprint 
matches (high Expert Analysis). In addition, the general population does not 
understand how this process works (low Population Comprehension), relying on 
expert's analysis, while also typically equating a fingerprint match as proof of 
guilt (low Subject Coupling). This leads to a situation where individuals are 
wrongly accused or convicted because of incorrect subjective judgements of 
experts, based on inaccurate information that individuals do not understand. 
This effectively removes an individual's ability to resist such accusations; even 
with safeguards the McKie case (Section 2.2.4.3 and Section 5.2.3.2.2) shows 
how easy it is to subvert the system, when experts make a false positive 
identification of an individual to a crime scene fingerprint sample.   
Therefore, researchers need to look beyond the traditional informational 
privacy dimension. We need to examine how identity and the design of an IDMS 
truly affect individuals' lives. Privacy is important, but is too narrow a concept to 
address these questions. Research needs to look at the lived experience of 
identity, how the concept further, and how it can integrate this into current 
literature and privacy models.  
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11.3.2 Trust*–*From*beliefs*to*risk*perceptions*
With the exception of (Li, 2004), there has been no in-depth investigation on the 
individuals’ trusting intentions towards IDMS. However, as with most other 
trust research in computer science, the emphasis of previous research has been 
on the exploration of trust through individuals’ general attitudes and beliefs. The 
root of all these trust research is largely based on Fishbein & Ajzen's (1975) 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA)  that individuals’ intention to trust is built on: 
1. Attitude. A person’s favourable or “unfavourableness towards an 
action” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). 
2. Subjective norm. An individual’s preconceptions on whether the 
people closest to him/her think that the action should be carried out. 
However, attitude and subjective norms do not provide any information on how 
the specific design details of an identity system influences individuals’ 
perceptions, and thus their trusting intentions; i.e. the TRA constructs are 
focused on individuals’ general feelings, and not their assessments of the 
identity system.  
This is where the research here differs from the traditional approach, focusing 
on how the individuals perceive and judge the details of an identity system. 
Specifically, the research has revealed that individuals’ intention to trust an 
identity system is based on situation perception, system judgement, and 
security concerns. Situation Perception captures individuals’ assessment on the 
importance of addressing the problem situation that the IDMS is targeted at. 
The more severe the problem is perceived to be, and the greater the extent of the 
population perceived to be affected by it, the greater the situation perception 
and thus the greater the willingness to accept the system.  
Meanwhile concerns have a negative influence on trusting intentions. The more 
individuals believe that their identity information is vulnerable to unauthorised 
access (by hackers or insiders), or fearing future unpredictability in how the 
organisation might use their information (e.g. function creep); the less likely 
individuals are willing to trust and adopt an IDMS. Furthermore, concerns are 
also affected by the information quality, which deals with individuals overall 
perception of the accuracy and relevance of the information collected and stored 
in the system. As the perception of information quality decreases, individuals’ 
concerns increases, thus reducing their trusting intentions. 
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Finally, system judgement deals with individuals’ perception on the usefulness 
of the system in tackling the situation. A positive judgement of the system 
implies that individuals’ perceive the system to be a useful tool in addressing the 
problem, and thus increases individuals willingness to trust the system. System 
judgement is positively influenced by situation perception, and negatively 
affected by concerns, and information quality. 
When compared to traditional trust concepts such as attitudes, the findings of 
this research provide more relevant feedback on the relationship between the 
system design and individuals’ trusting intentions.  For example, organisations 
can focus on building individuals’ trust by addressing individuals’ concerns, or 
ensuring that the quality of the identity being collected and stored meets 
individuals’ expectations. Traditional approaches are disconnected from the 
system itself, and as such, provide limited avenues to design trust-worthy 
systems. In order to create more trustworthy IDMS, research needs to identify 
which parts of the system affect the individuals’ risk perceptions, and thus 
intentions to trust/adopt and IDMS. Researchers should therefore, seek to 
explore how the system design contributes to individuals’ perceived risk, and 
thus intentions to adopt an IDMS. 11.4 Contributions+for+Practitioners:+Designing+FitIforIpurpose+IDMS+
The findings of this thesis also have practical contributions that can assist 
organisations in building more effective human-centred IDMSs. Key to these 
contributions is the importance in acknowledging that the implementation of 
successful IDMSs depends on the organisation defining a clear purpose for the 
system.  
Purpose drives everything; as illustrated in the organisation framework, purpose 
dictates the organisation’s identity information requirements (authenticity and 
uniqueness), as well as the way in which relying parties will access the identity. 
Failure to consider the purpose of the system will lead to ineffective 
implementations that either does not meet the requirements needed to achieve 
the desired objectives, or conversely would result in systems that include 
unnecessary functionality or technology. 
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11.4.1 Designing*for*individuals*
As with the contributions for researchers, organisations are encouraged to 
include individuals in the process of designing the IDMS. Organisations should 
not only look at their own identity requirements, but take a more holistic view of 
IDMS. It must be recognised that organisations’ requirements determine the 
system design, which in turn determines individuals’ positive or negative 
perception of the system, as well as the eventual lived experience created. 
To encourage adoption, organisations must create trustworthy IDMSs that 
address concerns of the population. Low trust and acceptance would result in 
more expenses to convince/enforce individuals to use the system, and failing 
that, organisations may be forced to abandon the system altogether.   
Similarly, the design of the system will influence individuals’ lived experience 
over time. IDMS designers are encouraged to map out and determine the 
impacts that the system has on the individuals’ everyday lives during the design 
phase. It must be ensured that the lived experience created matches with the 
objectives of the organisations, and does not derail from the overall purpose of 
the IDMS. 
11.4.2 Identity*Creation:*Verification*of*Authenticity*and*Uniqueness*
In the literature, enrolment of individuals into the system is a key phase in the 
implementation and use of an IDMS. As part of this process, the literature 
typically describes a verification process carried out by the organisation to 
ensure that the individual is who he claims to be.  
The results of this research have uncovered much more detail on the identity 
verification process, outlining the factors that influence organisations’ choice 
and source of information from the individual. Specifically, the framework 
breaks down the traditional identity verification process into authenticity and 
uniqueness that helps organisations better plan the identity creation process, 
and thus the overall information collected and stored.  
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Authenticity is described as the truthfulness of an identity created within the 
IDMS. The authenticity of an individual’s identity is ensured by confirming the 
truthfulness of his/her biographical information (e.g. name, age, address) 
against various different sources. The collection of biographical information can 
be achieved through a document-based or introducer-based approach. The 
document-based approach requires a high level of universality, which refers to 
the percentage of the targeted population who are in possession of widely 
accepted forms of identity documents. Thus, the greater the universality, the 
greater the number of people who have documents that prove their identity (e.g. 
passport, driving license), and thus the more confident the organization can be 
in relying on documentation for proving authenticity of identity.  
On the other hand, low universality implies that an organisation cannot rely on 
documentation for authenticity. In such cases, the organization can turn towards 
an introducer-based approach, provided that there is a high level of intimacy 
with the target population; intimacy captures how much of the targeted 
population is already known to the implementing organisation, and thus 
enrolled individuals can vouch for the other individuals’ identity. A high level of 
intimacy means that the organisation already possess a large set of trusted 
identities, and thus can opt for a transitive trust scheme, whereby a known 
registered individual can vouch for an unknown individual enrolling into the 
system (e.g. parents vouching for children).  
Other than authenticity, organisations also need to ensure uniqueness of 
identities so that an individual cannot enrol more than once. This is usually done 
through the collection of biometrics, the choice of which is mediated by an 
organisation’s obligations (international standards and current practices).Thus, 
for example, an IDMS designed to support individual identification during 
travel, would need to implement the internationally agreed biometric standard, 
thus ensuring interoperability across all countries. 
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Further the organisation must also consider the performance of the biometric in 
producing correct matches (accuracy, and human readability). For example, a 
system designed to support national security functions require a high level of 
accuracy ensuring that there are few false positives. The performance measures 
should also take into account the effect of the real world population (size, 
compatibility, geographic diversity). For example, if the targeted population 
largely consist of individuals that do a lot of manual labour, then there is low 
compatibility with fingerprint biometrics (since manual work wears down the 
fingerprints).   
Therefore, when designing the enrolment process, organisations are encouraged 
to look beyond the simple act of identity verification, and go deeper to explore 
their authenticity and uniqueness requirements, as well as the factors that 
influence the suitability of the biographical and biometric information that 
should be collected, processed, and stored during enrolment. 
11.4.3 Engaging*Relying*Parties*
The framework also highlights the importance of the continuous engagement 
with all the relevant Relying Parties, to ensure that the right infrastructure and 
access protocols are built into the IDMS, thus increasing the uptake and use of 
the system. In the Indian N-IDMS case study (Section 7.2.3), the government 
sought close collaboration with several Relying Parties, to the extent that new 
services such as mobile banking have been planned. Contrast that to the 
Bruneian case study, where the lack of interaction with third parties has meant 
that the multi-purpose function of the N-IDMS has not been realised. Thus 
failure to identify and engage with relying parties will lead to IDMSs that are not 
widely adopted for use by third parties, and are likely to be ineffective 
  308 
 As detailed in the organisation framework, designing around Relying Parties 
also helps organisations to develop better access policies to suit Relying Parties 
needs. For instance, parties that operate in high risk conditions, with the 
objective of disabling individuals from performing actions, would require a high 
degree of accessibility to system and the identity information on it. An anti-
terror unit would need to remotely access individuals' entire history of 
transactions; this would imply the need of a centralised database, as well as a 
networked infrastructure to the system. On the other hand, Relying Parties that 
work in low risk conditions, and whose objective is to enable individuals to carry 
out a simple action, may only need a comparatively low level of access to the 
system. For example, picking up a parcel at a post office would not need to 
access identity remotely, and thus place no such requirements on the design of 
the system.  
Thus identity access policies, as well as overall IDMS design, are influenced by 
relying parties and their need to access identity in pursuit of their respective 
objectives. Establishing a relationship with these relying parties enables the 
organisation to better understand their requirements, working conditions, and 
concerns; these can then be designed into the system, thus ensuring maximum 
take up of the IDMS. Therefore, to ensure the successful implementation of an 
IDMS, organisations are encouraged engage with relying parties, and to design 
identity systems to fill all their requirements. Failure to do so would lead to 
implementation that are not widely adopted by third parties, and will thus likely 
be ineffective. 11.5 Discussion+and+Critical+Review++
While the thesis has produced new and unique insights based on empirical data, 
there are certain areas in which the research here is limited, and can act as 
platforms for further improvement. These are: 
1. The exploratory and descriptive nature of the research 
2. The breadth and complexity of research and findings 
3. The limitation of the research to N-IDMS 
4. The subjectivity required to apply parts of the framework 
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The findings of the research here were produced through a highly descriptive 
and narrative process. It could be argued that the results are too dependent on 
qualitative data, and not sufficiently validated. However, to develop a rich 
picture of the identity, exploration of qualitative material is more suitable than 
testing of predefined hypothesis using quantitative methods. Furthermore, 
grounded theory (the main method of investigation used) presents a scientific 
and structured approach to the collection and analysis of qualitative data, 
leading to a framework that can be subjected to empirical testing. It should also 
be noted that, despite being conducted in an exploratory manner, the individual 
study findings were supported and refined using statistical methods (Section 
6.4.1); this was the case, because the individual study naturally lent itself to the 
exploration of acceptance and perceptions through the use of surveys. The 
research has taken other explicit steps to ensure validity. This includes the use of 
data and method triangulation to show that results from the different studies 
and perspectives are compatible, thus lending the findings validity (Section 4.4 
and Section 8.2). Finally, a formative evaluation of the unified framework was 
also conducted through the use of Expert Analysis (all of which were required to 
be critical of the usefulness and completeness of the unified framework), which 
overall finding it to be a useful contribution to the field (Section 9.2).  
The breadth and complexity of the framework produced may also serve as a 
point of concern. However, identity itself is a complex multidisciplinary and 
multi-stakeholder field. As such, any attempt to truly capture the scene in its 
fullest will undoubtedly be complex; in capturing this complexity, the 
relationships captured between the various perspectives, helps to develop a 
more complete understanding of the field. This also explains the breadth of the 
research undertaken. Taking a new approach towards identity, it was necessary 
for the research to cast a wide net instead of pre-emptively deciding to focus on a 
specific area of study. How do we know what to study, if we don’t know what is 
involved? Thus the research here acts as an initial foundation for the pursuit of 
other research into genuinely human-centred IDMS.  
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The research presented here is largely focused on identity within the context of 
N-IDMS implemented by government agencies, which may imply a narrow 
scope of possible application. However, the findings from the lived experience of 
identity were successfully applied within non-governmental contexts (Section 
5.3.1); providing a narrative that explains the reactions and outcomes within a 
social networking and personalised advertising context, thus illustrating the 
generalizability of the lived experience framework to non N-IDMS scenarios. 
When examining the individual acceptance framework, the constructs appear to 
be general enough to be extended beyond the N-IDMS context. However, the 
organisational requirement framework may present some incompatibilities; 
specifically, the use of biometrics in all three cases under analysis, and its 
inclusion in the framework may restrict its applicability to other contexts. Not all 
organisations might require, or have the resources to implement such a high 
level of assurance for uniqueness; it is also probable that some organisations 
may take the proof of authenticity as a sign of uniqueness. In these cases, the 
factors that determine uniqueness are not relevant. However, the constructs that 
govern the overall biographical information and identity access policies are still 
pertinent in all contexts, and may be applied. 
Finally, a weakness that is specifically borne out of the lived experience 
framework is the subjectivity required to fully utilise the framework and its 
properties. What is a high level of subject engagement? What is a low number of 
control points? While there is an element of rating taking place, one would not 
be able to simply assign weights of importance to each property; there is a 
degree of interpretation required, and different individuals might perceive 
things differently, which can lead to a source of inconsistent results. 
Furthermore, this may be affected by the contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 
2004) where what is considered high or low is affected by the norms of the 
environment into which the system is implemented.  
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Further still, interpreting the effects of each property may require careful 
consideration, as the effects and relationships of one property to another may 
slightly differ according to the contexts. A ‘high’ or ‘low’ of rating for each 
property does not automatically indicate a good or bad outcome. However, while 
the level of subjectivity required may be perceived as a stumbling block, it 
should be seen as a strength; proper application the framework requires that the 
designer immerse him/herself in the situation that the system will be used; 
proper assessment of the various properties requires thought and reflection, 
analysing the system from the point of view of individuals and society that are 
affected by it. This is a breakaway from the administrative-centric perspectives, 
which removes a system implementer from the context. The system properties 
serve to re-embed the design process into the reality of the situation in which the 
IDMS is implemented. 11.6 Future+Work+
While this thesis presents a unique approach to human-centred identity, there is 
more research needed. The system framework would benefit from the 
exploration of new design properties that could further help to develop the lived 
experience. Furthermore, it would be beneficial if a complete mapping of 
between the design properties and various outcomes were to be developed; such 
a mapping would make the application of the framework much more effective 
and useable (Section 5.4.1). 
The individual framework would benefit from a further expansion of the 
quantitative survey study. The survey conducted in this study was exploratory, 
seeking to improve the first proposed individual framework, and a validation 
study is needed. Similarly the effects of culture on the lived experience would 
benefit from a larger quantitative based exploration, as opposed its qualitative 
applications in this thesis. Future work may attempt to incorporate the findings 
into traditional trust models, thus further improving the explanatory power of 
the individual framework (Section 6.6.1).  
The organisation framework would benefit from an investigation of other cases 
that differ from the biometric based N-IDMS analysed here. Thus, future work 
could look towards investigating non-biometric systems, and its impacts on 
organisational uniqueness requirements (Section 7.5.1).  
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Meanwhile, the unified framework would benefit from the exploration of new 
relationships between the different perspectives. Work could also be done to 
investigate the fine grained details of known relationships (Section 8.5.1).  
Other work could further expand the applicability of the unified framework 
through the development of the economic utility functions, and the probability 
distributions that feed into the transfer functions (Section 10.4.1). Alternatively, 
the development of some kind of computing design tool, based on the unified 
framework, could be developed to help ease the application of the research into 
real world scenarios.  
However, above all it would be highly beneficial to take this research beyond just 
exploration. Future work should attempt to apply these findings to influence the 
implementation of new IDMS. Using methods such as Action Research, the 
framework can be further developed, ensuring its on-going relevance to the real 
world, while producing real change through the development of effective 
human-centred IDMS. 
New research should also be open to other perspectives. For example, one of the 
suggestions that came out of the expert evaluation calls for the inclusion of 
attackers in the framework. The inclusion of this perspective in the framework 
can help to identify weak points in the system, and how that is affected by the 
organisation’s identity requirements, as well as the design of the IDMS.  
Ultimately, there needs to be a realisation that identity is a fundamental right to 
all individuals; every social interaction is defined by who we are. As such IDMS 
should be explored, researched, and built around this realisation. In so doing, 
the focus of investigations and discussions should fall upon identity as the 
central theme, and not just as a periphery to other concepts such as trust or 
privacy. This thesis presents an effort to move identity discussions towards this 
viewpoint. Failure to do so will result in highly utilitarian systems that do not 
respect individuals, constantly invade privacy, and may fundamentally 
disempower individuals from living freely. 
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Appendix*II:+Individual+Study+–+Focus+Group+Scenarios+
Scenario 1!
The government is concerned about the safety of children. As such, the government wants several different 
agencies to work together to ensure the safety of children. 
 
Solution  
The government aims to encourage data sharing by creating a comprehensive database that is accessible across 
different private and public organizations. All careers (teachers, doctors, police officers, etc.) that come into 
contact with a child can insert records or comments on their encounter with the child. These careers also have 
access to other comments or records, inserted by other careers, in relation to that particular child. 
 
Use Case Example  
Junior (child) is being treated by Jane (doctor) for recent injuries 
1. Jane suspects this is a case of child abuse  
2. Jane access Junior’s record on the system  
3. Jane inserts a note of her suspicion along with medical records  
4. Jane reviews other notes on Junior made by other careers  
5. Jane does not find any strong evidence to prove abuse and discharges Junior 
 
John (teacher) is concerned about Junior exhibiting worrying behaviour 
1. John access Junior’s record on the system  
2. John makes a note of his concerns  
3. John reviews other notes of Junior made by other careers  
4. John comes across Jane’s note of potential abuse  
5. John thinks that this explains Junior’s behaviour  
6. John notifies the proper authorities, which then investigate the situation and the parents 
 
Potential Extension  
The police are interested in using the health department system to track delinquent behaviour. They believe 
that early signs of troubled behaviour may eventually lead to a life of crime. In using so, they aim to access 
child records to keep a close watch on children who exhibit certain behaviour. 
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Scenario 2 
The government is concerned about the level ofpersonal debt that citizens carry. It has concluded that many 
people are living beyond their means, are in debt and are dependent on loans. 
 
Solution 
The government aims to regulate the application of loans by capping the amount that people can borrow. In 
order to do so, the government intends to pull information from stores and different financial institutions like 
banks and insurance companies. In doing so, the bank can monitor spending and saving habits of citizens 
which will affect the amount that can be borrowed. 
 
Use Case 
John goes to a bank to apply for a loan for a certain amount 
1. John fills in a loan application, specifying the amount and hands it to the bank clerk  
2. The clerk forwards John’s application details to the government system  
3. The government system then pulls information all of John’s various bank accounts to monitor his saving 
habits.  
4. The government system then pulls information from all stores about John’s purchasing habits.  
5. The government system then uses this information to calculate a risk profile  
6. The system uses the risk profile to determine that John cannot get a loan for the amount requested because 
he is unlikely to able to pay back the debt  
7. The system forwards the information to the bank  
8. The bank denies John’s application 
 
Possible Extension  
The government is interested in extending the system to provide individuals with advice to change spending 
and saving habits. This would help to ensure that he is eventually capable of getting a loan for the amount 
needed. Another possible extension is to work closely with stores to dynamically change the pricing of certain 
goods depending on the individual’s profile. It is hoped that this will deter individuals from spending money on 
goods they don’t need reducing the chances of going into debt. 
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Scenario 3 
Health agencies are concerned about the growing problem of obesity. It is a problem that puts individuals at 
great risk and is becoming a burden on the medical system.  
 
Solution 
The health department has proposed to set up a monitoring program that is compulsory for everyone. Under 
this scheme the health department will have a centralized database that will store all medical records. 
Additionally, the system will track individual food habits and exercise habits using CCTV (security cameras) 
and face recognition. All individuals will need to register by providing a digital photograph that can be used for 
facial recognition.  
 
3.2 Use case  
Jane purchases food products from a store  
1. All store counters have CCTV cameras recording at all times  
2. Jane goes to counter and presents her goods for purchase  
3. The CCTV system records everything  
4. Jane pays for her goods  
5. The store forwards its CCTV footage to health department  
6. At the health department, the video passes through facial recognition system  
7. The system identifies Jane  
8. The system analyzes the video to identify the goods that Jane purchased  
9. All purchased goods and the video feed are stored on the database  
 
Jane goes to the gym to exercise  
1. All gyms have CCTV cameras recording the workout area at all times  
2. Jane enters the gym  
3. Jane performs her workout  
4. Jane leaves the gym  
5. The gym forwards its CCTV footage to the health department  
6. At the health department, the video passes through facial recognition system  
7. The system identifies Jane  
8. The analyzes the video to track Jane’s physical activity  
9. The level of activity and the video feed are stored on the database  
 
Identifying Jane at risk for obesity  
1. The health department goes through each record in the database  
2. Individuals whose food purchasing habits might lead to obesity are marked  
3. Jane has been marked  
4. The health department goes through Jane’s activity level  
5. The department thinks that Jane isn’t doing enough  
6. The department calls Jane in for a check up and to give Jane advice 
 
 
3.3 Potential Extension  
The government believes that it spends a major part of its budget on obesity related conditions. Therefore, 
using the system the government would like to charge those who do not follow the advice given with higher 
medical charges.  
 
Another possible extension is to use the video footage to track behaviour or moods of individuals. Any 
behaviour that is out of the normal pattern for each individual alerts the health department of possible mental 
disorders or breakdowns. This will is believed to help control and keep an eye on potentially unstable 
individuals. 
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Scenario 4 
The government is concerned about the rise of benefit fraud (falsely claiming financial support from the 
government). The welfare department in charge of the benefits believes that this is likely due to people 
providing false information and intends to claim benefit for life.  
 
Solution The welfare department proposes a solution that makes use of biometrics (fingerprint, iris, etc.) 
together with a central database connected to other relevant public or private bodies. In order for the system to 
work, all citizens will be enrolled into the system even if they do not claim any benefits  
 
Use Case 
John is unemployed and applies for work (unsuccessfully)  
1. The employer identifies John using a fingerprint system  
2. The employer makes notes on John’s application (job type, suitability, John’s appearance, John’s 
commitment to the process etc.)  
3. The employer forwards all this information including the fingerprint through a network to the welfare 
department for storage in the database  
4. John doesn’t get the job  
5. The employer forwards this information to the welfare department for storage.  
 
John claiming for unemployment benefits 
1. John goes to the welfare department to make a claim  
2. John is asked to present his fingerprint  
3. The system reads John’s fingerprint and pulls all of John’s records stored in the database  
4. The welfare department looks at John’s records and decides if John is actively trying to improve his situation 
where possible  
5. Welfare department decides if John should get benefits  
 
Possible Extension  
The welfare department is interested in introducing a tiered scheme of benefits. Those who appear to be 
sincere in improving their situation will receive more benefits than those who show less initiative. 
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Scenario 5 
The police are concerned about the rising levels of crime in the country. As a result the government hopes to 
make it harder for criminals to escape conviction by implementing a robust identification system.  
 
Solution  
The authorities aim to make use of a DNA database to quickly identify criminals. Under this scheme, DNA 
samples will be collected and stored from all suspects. The police will retain DNA from all suspects including 
ones that have not be proven to be guilty.  
 
Use Case  
Collecting DNA from suspects of a crime  
1. Police identify John and Jane, among others, as a suspect of the crime  
2. Officers confront John and collect his DNA information  
3. Officers confront Jane and collect her DNA information  
4. Officers collect DNA information from other suspects  
5. All collected DNA information is stored in the database  
 
Using DNA from the database  
1. Officers collect DNA from a crime scene  
2. The police process the DNA from the crime scene and attempts to find a match against the database  
3. John’s DNA information does not provide a match  
4. Jane’s DNA information is a match  
5. The police pursue further investigation of Jane and is found guilty  
6. John is dismissed but his DNA remains on the database  
7. Every time the police process DNA John’s information will be included even if he is not a suspect.  
 
Potential Extension  
The authorities are interested in rolling out a national database that would hold DNA sample from everyone. 
The police believe that such a comprehensive system will mean that no criminal could possibly escape 
identification. Additionally, it could serve as a deterrent as the police have information on everyone in the 
country.  
 
The police are also interested in making use of phones to track the location of people in the country. In 
conjunction with service providers the police will track and store where people are throughout the day. In 
doing so, they could link the presence of individuals to the scene of a crime adding weight to DNA 
identification. 
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Scenario 6 
The government is concerned about terrorism, organised crime, illegal immigration, identity fraud and the 
provision of government services online. In order to address these concerns, the government wishes to 
establish a National Identity System.  
 
Solution  
The National Identity Scheme is an easy‐to‐use and extremely secure system of personal identification for 
adults living in the country. Its cornerstone is the introduction of national ID cards for residents over the age of 
16.  
 
Each ID card will be unique and will combine the cardholder’s biometric data with their checked and 
confirmed biographic details. These identity details and the biometrics will be stored on the National Identity 
Register (NIR). Basic identity information will also be held in a chip on the ID card itself. An Information 
Commissioner is in charge of ensuring proper use of the NIR.  
 
Use Case Example  
Picking up a parcel at the post office  
1. Jane goes to the local post office to pickup a delivery  
2. The clerk ask Jane for some form of identification  
3. Jane hands over her ID card  
4. The clerk checks that the card is genuine  
5. The clerk compares the photograph to Jane  
6. The clerk inserts the card into the card reader  
7. Jane enters her pin  
8. The pin along with the card information is sent across the network to the NIR  
9. The system assigns the transaction a unique number and stores it in the system  
10. The NIR system sends back a message confirming that the ID card is valid  
11. The clerk hands the ID card back to Jane  
12. The clerk hands the parcel over to Jane  
 
Information request by other government agencies 
1. A government agency must first have written confirmation from the Information Commissioner to access 
information from the NIR without consent  
2. If the government agency believes that a crime is about to happen  
3. The government agency requests for the relevant information from the NIR  
4. The NIR sends the government agency the information across a network  
6. The agency stores and uses the information as necessary  
 
Possible Extensions What do you think are the likely possible extensions that the government might use the 
system for? 
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Appendix*III:+Individual+Study+–+Survey+Questions+
As part of the Individual-based study, the following questions were distributed online to UCL 
university students. Students were instructed to state their level of agreement with the following 
questions using a 4-point scale (Strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree).  
 
In order to ground respondents to a similar context, they were provided with scenario 1 from the 
focus groups (child abuse), and were asked to rate their response in relation to the proposed 
system. 
 
Situation 
exp01 I am aware or familiar with the problem that the government is trying to tackle 
exp02 I, or someone close to me, have some experience with the stated problem. 
exp03 I have encountered media reports about the stated problem. 
ser01 I think that the government is tackling a very serious issue. 
ser02 If the government does not tackle these problems, it can lead to unwanted consequences. 
ser03 Being affected by the stated problem will negatively affect a person’s life. 
dep01 Most people have been affected by or are affected by the stated problem. 
dep02 The stated problem has an impact on a large part of the population. 
dep03 Many people have concerns about the stated problem. 
sit01 I think that the stated problem is an issue that needs to be addressed urgently. 
sit02 The government must do something to take control of the situation. 
sit03 Tools must be developed as soon as possible, that will allow the government to tackle the 
stated problems. 
 
Information 
rel01 I am comfortable with the type of information that the system will collect 
rel02 The system is collecting information that is irrelevant to its purpose. 
rel03 The system is collecting too much information. 
acc01 The system will collect and store a large amount of inaccurate information. 
acc02 The system will enable the government to develop an accurate representation of a person 
in relation to the stated problem. 
acc03 The system will hold a lot of wrong information. 
use01 The system will allow the government to make better decisions. 
use02 The government will be make a lot of mistakes, when using the information stored on the 
system. 
use03 The system will increase the ability of government to tackle the stated problems. 
use04 The government will become too reliant on the information collected by the system. 
 
Acceptance 
acc01 I would have no objections to the government implementing the proposed system. 
acc02 I would willingly enroll and make use of the proposed system. 
acc03 I would prefer to the government to use the proposed system, when compared to its 
current information collection practices. 
acc04 I would accept the introduction of the proposed system 
 
Judgment 
out01 The proposed system will create an unfair society. 
out02 The proposed system will expose individuals to society. 
out03 The proposed system will increase the amount of unnecessary citizen tracking. 
out04 The proposed system will reduce efficiency when interacting with organizations. 
con01 The information stored within the proposed system will leak out. 
con02 Insiders working with the proposed system will abuse the information. 
con03 The information stored in the system will be held securely. 
con04 The personal information collected will eventually be used for some other purpose than 
the one currently specified. 
jud01 I think that the proposed system will be a useful tool for the government. 
jud02 I think that the proposed system will be effectice in tackling the stated problem. 
jud03 I think that the proposed will take too many resources (cost, time, etc.) to implement and 
run. 
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Appendix*IV:+Individual+Study+–+Survey+Analysis+
!
All!survey!question!items.!Criteria:!Eigenvalue!>=!1!
Extraction!Method:!Principal!Component!Analysis.!!Rotation!Method:!Varimax!with!Kaiser!Normalization.!!
All!survey!question!items.!Criteria:!Eigenvalue!>=!1!
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
  
 Component!
1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8!
exp1! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! .759!
exp2! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! .766!
exp3! !! .458! !! !! !! !! !! .533!
sev1! !! .637! !! !! !! !! !! !!
sev2! !! .714! !! !! !! !! !! !!
sev3! !! .664! !! !! !! !! !! !!
ext1! !! !! !! !! !! !! .769! !!
ext2! !! !! !! !! !! !! .767! !!
ext3! !! .576! !! !! !! !! !! !!
per1! !! .757! !! !! !! !! !! !!
per2! .418! .661! !! !! !! !! !! !!
per3! .521! .645! !! !! !! !! !! !!
rel1! .593! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
rel2! !! !! .447! !! !! .437! !! !!
rel3! !! !! .443! !! !! !! !! !!
acu1! !! !! .765! !! !! !! !! !!
acu2! .405! !! O.469! !! !! !! !! !!
acu3! !! !! .733! !! !! !! !! !!
use1! .417! !! !! !! .474! !! !! !!
use2! !! !! .649! !! !! !! !! !!
use3! !! !! !! !! .613! !! !! !!
use4! !! !! .545! !! !! !! !! !!
acc1! .679! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
acc2! .678! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
acc3! .755! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
acc4! .721! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
out1! !! !! !! !! !! .445! !! !!
out2! !! !! !! !! !! .542! !! !!
out3! !! !! .460! .416! !! !! !! !!
out4! !! !! !! !! !! .498! !! !!
con1! !! !! !! .647! !! !! !! !!
con2! !! !! !! .498! !! .553! !! !!
con3! !! !! !! O.667! !! !! !! !!
con4! !! !! !! .776! !! !! !! !!
jud1! !! !! !! !! .726! !! !! !!
jud2! !! !! !! !! .651! !! !! !!
jud3! !! !! !! !! !! .463! !! !!
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 Component!
1! 2! 3! 4! 5! 6! 7! 8! 9! 10! 11!
exp1! !! !! !! !! !! !! .794! !! !! !! !!
exp2! !! !! !! !! !! !! .736! !! !! !! !!
exp3! !! !! !! !! !! !! .572! !! !! !! !!
sev1! !! .718! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
sev2! !! .762! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
sev3! !! .592! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
ext1! !! !! !! !! !! .785! !! !! !! !! !!
ext2! !! !! !! !! !! .777! !! !! !! !! !!
ext3! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! .843!
per1! !! .745! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
per2! !! .681! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
per3! .499! .670! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
rel1! .652! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
rel2! !! !! !! .442! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
rel3! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
acu1! !! !! !! .740! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
acu2! .527! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
acu3! !! !! !! .824! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
use1! .500! !! !! !! .434! !! !! !! !! !! !!
use2! !! !! !! .479! !! !! !! !! !! .407! !!
use3! .482! !! !! !! .564! !! !! !! !! !! !!
use4! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! .604! !!
acc1! .737! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
acc2! .734! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
acc3! .753! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
acc4! .750! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
out1! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! .618! !! !! !!
out2! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! .819! !! !! !!
out4! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
con1! !! !! .754! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
con2! !! !! .638! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
con3! !! !! O.727! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
con4! !! !! .701! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !!
jud1! !! !! !! !! .712! !! !! !! !! !! !!
jud2! .496! !! !! !! .603! !! !! !! !! !! !!
jud3! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! .840! !! !!
!
All!survey!questions.!Criteria:!number!of!factor!=!11!
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Appendix*V:+Coding+Frames+Used+for+Qualitative+Analysis+
Individual Study 
Code Coding Rules 
Problem 
Evaluation 
Expressions about how important the problem needs to be solved 
Exposure                 
(Media) 
Mention of information obtained from some media outlet (TV, news, etc.); “I read that…”; 
Discussion of current events. 
Exposure 
(Personal) 
Mention of having work in the field; being affected by the (similar) problem; knowing 
someone who has been affected by the (similar) problem. 
Extent Talk about the number of people being affected by the problem; the size of the problem 
(“it’s a huge problem”); Comparison about how the system might be more relevant in 
certain geographical areas because the problem is more frequent there. 
Severity Discussions on the impacts or outcomes of the problem; comparisons to various “levels” of 
the problem (serious crime vs. non-serious crime); discussions about limiting the use of the 
system to certain conditions; comparisons about importance of the particular problem to 
other problems. 
System 
Assessment 
Expressions that describe the usefulness or effectiveness of the system in addressing the 
problem that the identity system is supposed to address. 
Info. Relevance 
(Granularity) 
Issues around the amount of information being collected; suggestions to reduce amount of 
information collected; recommendations to limit information collecting to a higher level 
(e.g. general broad categories as opposed to specific items). 
Info. Relevance 
(Sensitivity) 
Suggestions to tightly control the flow of information; discussions about having the right to 
the information (e.g. teachers having access to medical records); access controls.  
Info. Accuracy 
(Completeness) 
Discussions around the inability of the system to collect all the intended information; gaps 
in data set specified by the government; not collecting all the information required; gaps in 
the data collection strategy; constantly changing information. 
Information 
Accuracy 
(Visibility) 
Thoughts on how accessible the information is to the system; difficulty in reading, 
perceiving, or assigning value to the information collected; difficulty in correctly parsing the 
information; attributing information to the wrong individual. 
Information 
Accuracy 
(Subjectivity) 
Issues about the generation of information by person other than the individual; mentions of 
the information collected being rumours or notes; variability of information based on 
attributes of the information producer (employers mood, etc.); discussions about 
introducing objective measures, or quantification of information.  
Information 
Reliance 
(Dependence) 
Discussions about a decrease in the job performance of the organization using the system; 
indications that the organization will ignore cases not flagged up on the system; 
organizations willingness to support information; discussions to limit the use of 
information as preliminary investigations. 
Information 
Reliance 
(Challenge) 
Thoughts on the ability of the individual to question what the information says about 
him/her; being able to provide insecticidal evidence; being able to argue decisions; being 
prematurely judged. 
Outcomes 
(Freedom) 
Limitations placed on everyday life; mentions of impacts on personal choice; suggestions to 
use voluntary schemes rather than being forced into a system; suggestions to use reactive 
approaches rather than proactive approaches; tracking; big brother. 
Outcomes 
(Fairness) 
Issues around discrimination of individuals in society; being judged wrongly; being singled 
out. 
Security 
Concerns 
Breaches in the system; hackers; abuse of information; insiders. 
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System Study 
Code Coding Rules 
Control Points Discrete events or processes that involve individuals’ identity. It should be emphasized that 
this is any interaction with the identity, not just points where information is read. A control 
point can therefore be events where the identity is created, accessed, used, or modified in 
some way; these events or processes can either involve humans, or may be completely 
automated (e.g. automated DNA matching procedures). 
Subject 
Engagement 
Any description of individuals’ involvement during events or processes that involve his/her 
identity (i.e. at control points). Particularly we are interested if individuals are aware of 
his/her identity is being created, accessed, used, or modified. We are also interested in 
where individuals’ are during these events; does he/she need to be present during these 
events; does he/she need to begin the process; does he/she need to be present at some 
point, so that the event can continue or come to an end. 
Population 
Coverage 
Any description of the individuals’ who are targeted for involvement. There should be some 
indication of the amount of discrimination happening within that context; i.e. we need to 
identify all the people that participate within the context of the implementation, then be 
able to identify what percentage of those people are actually individuals who are enrolled 
within the system. 
Identity 
Exposure 
Any account of the identity ‘leaking’ out of the IDMS operating context. Is the system falling 
into the hands of unauthorized individuals? Is it falling into the public domain? Are 
individuals’ being judged, based on their identity, by people who operate in a completely 
different context? 
Expert Analysis Statements that point out interpretation of identity, or its attributes, require some sort of 
training or technical expertise. Need to keep an eye out for any occurrences of some form of 
subjectivity when reading or writing the identity. Note that this is not in relation to the 
technical mechanisms that may be complicated, but the actual use or creation of the 
information. 
Population 
Comprehension 
Details about how the general populations mental model of the IDMS. In contrast to expert 
analysis, this covers not only the interpretation of the identity and its information, but also 
the technical mechanisms behind it; e.g. do they understand how an identity matching 
procedure takes place? Do they know what is happening in the background? Need to 
capture how well laymen understand how the IDMS as a whole works, and what the identity 
or an identity match means. Do they thoughts of the identity and IDMS match reality? 
Information 
Accuracy 
Descriptions of the accuracy of the identity attributes collected, and stored within the 
system. Is the information being attached to an identity correct?  
Information 
Stability 
Descriptions of how often the identity attributes changes over time. The frequency with 
which the relevant information changes. This is distinct from accuracy, as the information 
may be accurate, but out of date. 
Subject Coupling Any indications that the identity created or used does not fully capture the individual within 
that context. Look out for situations where individuals’ are being prematurely judged based 
on a particular bit or set of information, instead of taking a complete account of the 
individual. Also need to keep an eye out for situations where individuals are being judged by 
information that is not relevant to the context in which he/she is being judged. 
Information 
Variability 
Warnings/statements of concern, especially from experts, regarding the use of identity or 
its attributes for purposes other than the one stated. 
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Organisation Study 
Code Coding Rules 
Purpose Mention of what the IDMS is supposed to be used for. What problem is it suppose to 
support? What organisation processes is the identity supposed to inform?  
Relying Parties Any mention of the parties that will access the identity to carry out a task. 
Objective 
(Enablement) 
Statements about what the identity information will be used for. Is the focus of the 
identity on making it easier for individuals’ to perform tasks? Or is the focus on 
making it more difficult to abuse resources? i.e. is the identity being used as a tool to 
gain access to new services or encourage uptake of existing services, or is it used to 
add another layer of security to existing resources?  
Objective 
(Proof) 
Statements about how the identity will be related across different contexts or 
organisations. Is the identity being used in such a way so as to be able to easily 
create an ‘identity net’ over the individual? Or is the identity only being used as an 
authentication mechanism, implying there is no way to connect the current use of 
identity at a later stage. 
Accessibility 
(Information Set) 
Mentions over what identity attributes each relying party requires to carry out its 
task.  
Accessibility 
(Locality) 
Specifications over how relying parties will gain access to the identity and its 
attributes. Will it take place remotely over a network or some backend process? Or 
can the relying party only gain access to the identity when the individual presents it, 
i.e. only local access is provided?  
Accessibility 
(Readability) 
 
Accessibility 
(Direction) 
Specifications over what relying parties can do with the identity. Is it only a one-way 
read access? Or can the relying party write or modify the identity or system in some 
way. 
Conditions 
(Risk Level) 
Indications over the danger levels under which the relying party may operate. Is the 
relying party dealing with high security issues, and is the identity critical to its task, 
thus implying a high risk level? Or is the relying party non-critical in nature, 
implying more relaxed requirements.  
Conditions 
(Timeliness) 
Indications over the time sensitive nature of relying parties. What are the 
consequences of not getting access to the identity immediately? Could it be 
potentially disastrous, in which case access should be given immediately, or is a 
slight delay non disastrous.  
Authenticity Mention of the organisation attempting to enroll the true identities of individuals. 
Look out for points on collecting documentation or confirming biographical 
information against some third party. 
Uniqueness Mention of the organisation working to ensure that each individual only has one 
identity in the system. Pay attention for instances of biometric use. 
Obligations 
(International) 
Any mention, debates, or consideration, about requiring to confirm to international 
standards. 
Obligations 
(Current Practices) 
Any mention, debates, or consideration, about previous identifying practices or 
current practices (by the organisation or related organisations) that influence the 
organisations choices. 
Performance 
(Accuracy) 
Any mention of accurately producing matches of the individual against the identity. 
Any mention of not being able to do so as well.  
Performance 
(Human Readability) 
Any mention of the requirement to have human intervention when interpreting or 
matching biometrics to an individual. 
Population 
(Size)  
Any concerns raised about the number of people that are enrolled or need to be 
enrolled onto the system. Especially look out for concerns on how that may affect 
accuracy. 
Population 
(Compatibility) 
Any concerns raised about how well the biometric performs against the target 
population. Are there any characteristics or patterns within the population that 
negatively affects the accuracy.  
Population 
(Geographic diversity) 
Any concerns raised about the geographical landscape that the IDMS has to operate 
in. Pay attention for remoteness of locations the IDMS has to operate in. Look out 
for the unavailability of technical equipment. 
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Appendix*VI:+Hofstede’s+Value+Survey+Module+
See Overleaf. Taken from http://www.geerthofstede.nl/vsm-08 
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INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE (VSM 08)- page 1 
 
Please think of an ideal job, disregarding your present job, if you have one. In choosing an 
ideal job, how important would it be to you to ... (please circle one answer in each line 
across): 
 
1 = of utmost importance 
2 = very important 
3 = of moderate importance 
4 = of little importance 
5 = of very little or no importance 
 
 
  01. have sufficient time for your 
        personal or home life   1 2 3  4      5 
 
02. have a boss (direct superior) 
          you can respect   1 2 3  4      5 
 
  03. get recognition for good performance 1 2 3 4       5 
 
  04. have security of employment   1 2 3  4      5 
 
  05. have pleasant people to work with  1 2 3  4      5 
 
  06. do work that is interesting   1 2 3  4      5 
 
  07. be consulted by your boss 
        in decisions involving your work   1 2 3  4      5 
 
  08. live in a desirable area   1 2 3 4       5 
 
  09. have a job respected by your 
family and friends   1 2 3  4      5 
  
  10. have chances for promotion   1 2 3  4      5 
 
   
In your private life, how important is each of the following to you: (please circle one answer in 
each line across): 
 
  11. keeping time free for fun   1 2 3 4 5 
 
  12. moderation: having few desires   1 2 3 4 5 
 
  13. being generous to other people   1 2 3 4 5 
 
  14. modesty: looking small, not big   1 2 3 4 5  
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INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE (VSM 08) – page 2 
 
15. If there is something expensive you really want to buy but you do not have enough 
      money, what do you do? 
  1. always save before buying 
  2. usually save first 
   3. sometimes save, sometimes borrow to buy 
   4. usually borrow and pay off later 
   5. always buy now, pay off later 
 
16. How often do you feel nervous or tense? 
  1. always 
  2. usually 
  3. sometimes 
  4. seldom 
  5. never 
 
17. Are you a happy person ? 
  1. always 
  2. usually 
  3. sometimes 
  4. seldom 
  5. never 
 
18. Are you the same person at work (or at school if you’re a student) and at home? 
  1. quite the same 
  2. mostly the same 
  3. don’t know 
  4. mostly different 
  5. quite different 
 
19. Do other people or circumstances ever prevent you from doing what you really want to? 
  1. yes, always 
  2. yes, usually 
  3. sometimes 
  4. no, seldom 
    5. no, never 
 
20 . All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? 
   1. very good 
   2. good 
  3. fair 
  4. poor 
  5. very poor 
 
21. How important is religion in your life ? 
1. of utmost importance 
2. very important 
3. of moderate importance 
4. of little importance 
5. of no importance 
 
22. How proud are you to be a citizen of your country? 
1. not proud at all 
2. not very proud 
3. somewhat proud 
4. fairly proud 
5. very proud 
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INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE (VSM 08) – page 3 
 
23. How often, in your experience, are subordinates afraid to contradict their boss (or 
students their teacher?) 
  1. never 
  2. seldom 
  3. sometimes 
  4. usually 
  5. always 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (please 
circle one answer in each line across): 
 
  1 = strongly agree 
   2 = agree 
   3 = undecided 
   4 = disagree 
   5 = strongly disagree 
 
24. One can be a good manager 
without having a precise answer to  
every question that a subordinate 
may raise about his or her work   1 2 3  4      5 
 
25. Persistent efforts are the  
surest way to results   1 2 3  4      5 
 
26. An organization structure in 
which certain subordinates have two 
bosses should be avoided at all cost   1 2 3  4      5 
 
27. A company's or organization's 
rules should not be broken -  
not even when the employee  
thinks breaking the rule would be  
in the organization's best interest   1 2 3  4      5  
 
28. We should honour our heroes  
from the past   1 2 3  4      5 
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INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONNAIRE (VSM 08)- page 4 
 
Some information about yourself (for statistical purposes): 
 
  29.   Are you: 
   1. male 
   2. female 
 
  30.   How old are you? 
   1. Under 20 
   2. 20-24 
   3. 25-29 
   4. 30-34 
   5. 35-39 
   6. 40-49 
   7. 50-59 
   8. 60 or over 
 
  31. How many years of formal school education (or their equivalent) did you complete 
(starting with primary school)? 
   1. 10 years or less 
   2. 11 years 
   3. 12 years 
   4. 13 years 
   5. 14 years 
   6. 15 years 
   7. 16 years 
   8. 17 years 
   9. 18 years or over 
 
  32.  If you have or have had a paid job, what kind of job is it / was it? 
   1.   No paid job (includes full-time students) 
   2.   Unskilled or semi-skilled manual worker 
   3.   Generally trained office worker or secretary 
  4.   Vocationally trained craftsperson, technician, IT-specialist, nurse, artist or 
            equivalent 
   5.   Academically trained professional or equivalent (but not a manager of people) 
   6.   Manager of one or more subordinates (non-managers) 
   7.   Manager of one or more managers 
 
33. What is your nationality? 
 
                                                                                                         
 
34.   What was your nationality at birth (if different)? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
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Appendix(VII:"Document"provided"for"Expert"Evaluation"
See Overleaf 
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A"Human!Centred'approach'to'
Identity(Management(Systems"
The!research!presented!here!breaks!away!from!the!traditional!functionalist!view!of!identity,!and!presents!a!framework!for!a!human<centred!approach!to!identity!management!systems!(IDMS).!Research!is!based!on!a!qualitative!exploration!of:!!1. the!identity!system!2. the!individuals!that!are!enrolled,!and!!3. the!organisations!that!implement!them.!!The! aim! of! this! document! is! to! allow! experts! to! evaluate! the! validity! of! the!framework!(see!Figure'2).!When!reviewing!the!framework,!experts!are!asked!to!consider!and!provide!answers!for!the!following!questions:!1. Do!the!constructs!asserted!in!the!organisation!sub<framework!reflect!real<world!issues!that!organisations!deal!with!when!implementing!of!an!IDMS!(Section'1.3'2)?!!2. Can!the!design!of!an!IDMS!be!decomposed!and!expressed!in!terms!of!the!constructs!as!asserted!by!the!system!sub<framework!(Section'1.1)?!! 3. Can!the!constructs!of!the!system!sub<framework!by!used!to!narrate!the!lived!experience?!(Section'1.1)?!! 4. Do!the!constructs!in!the!individual!sub<framework!capture!individuals’!concerns!over,!and!willingness!to!accept!a!new!IDMS!(Section'1.2)?!! 5. Do!the!hypothesised!relationships!between!the!various!sub<frameworks!within!the!unified!framework!have!merit!(Section'1.4)?!! 6. Are!there!any!other!important!constructs!or!relationships!that!are!missing!from!the!unified!framework!and!its!sub<frameworks!(Section'
1.4)?!! 7. Can!the!framework!by!used!to!aid!system!implementers!to!design!human<centred!IDMS?!! 8. Does!the!framework!help!researchers!identify!potential!new!areas!of!research?!! 9. Does!the!framework!add!any!value!to!the!identity!field?!! 10. What!improvements!can!be!made!to!the!framework?!
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Glossary()(The(Identity(Ecosystem(This! section! provides! a! brief! overview! of! the! terms! used! throughout! this!document.!
!
Figure'1'Identity'Ecosystem'! !
General Population
Target Population
Individual
Identity Ecosystem
Organisation
Relying 
Party
IDMS
Implements
Access / Uses
Access / Uses
Identity
Personal 
info
Enroll
Identity
Identity
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Table'1'Glossary!of!terms!in!the!Identity!Ecosystem'
Term' Definition'
Identity' A!set!of!information!and!attributes!about!an!individual!that!is!collected!and!stored!within!a!particular!context;!linked!to!an!identifier(s)!that!sufficiently!identifies!the!individual!within!as!set!of!individuals.!
Identity'Management'
System''(IDMS)'
A!mechanism!that!allows!for!the!creation,!administration,!access,!and!use!of!identity.!
General'Population' All!the!people!that!act!within!the!context!of!the!IDMS;!this!includes!people!who!operate!in!the!context,!but!may!not!be!enrolled!within!the!IDMS.!
Target'Population' The!section!of!the!general!population!is!required!to!enrol!with!the!IDMS,!so!as!to!continue!to!operate!within!the!context.!
Individual' A!single!person!from!the!target!population!that!has!enrolled!with!the!IDMS.!
Organisation' The!entity!that!is!in!charge!of!the!planning,!developing,!running,!and!maintaining!a!particular!IDMS.!
Relying'Party' An!entity!that!requires!access!to!the!IDMS.!
!!
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1((The(Identity(Framework(This! research! represents! a! first! attempt! towards! building! a! human<centred!IDMS.!!Traditional!approaches!to!IDMS!tend!to!be!functionalist;!the!far<reaching!impacts! of! the! identity! on! individuals! are! ignored,! reducing! human6centred!discussions! to! technological! issues! surrounding! data! collection,! and!administrative!benefits!for!organisations.!!This!is!in!part!driven!by!the!traditional!organisational!view!of!identity!as!a!mechanism!to!access!resources,!and!ignores!that!identity!itself!has!become!the!strategic!resource!that!is!accessed.!Hence,!the!individual! is! reduced! to! a! functional! component,! thus! eliminating! debates!around!the!perceptions!and!consequences!of!identity.!Our!research!approaches!the!issue!of!human<centred!identity!through!a!holistic!understanding! of! the! identity! ecosystem! (see! Figure! 1).! The! result! of! this!research! is!a!unified! identity! framework!that!provides!a!narrative!of! the!entire!ecosystem,!thus!providing!practioners!with!a!new!tool!to!guide!the!development!of!human<centred!IDMSs,!while!also!identifying!further!areas!of!research.!!The!research!consisted!of!three!main!studies,!each!of!which!focused!on!a!major!construct!within!the!identity!ecosystem:!1. SystemCBased'Study!2. IndividualCBased'Study!3. OrganisationalCBased'Study!Below! is! a! very!brief! overview!of! the! findings! from!each! study.!This! is! further!explained!and!clarified!in!the!next!chapter,!where!the!findings!are!applied!within!the!context!of!a!hypothetical!IDMS!implementation.!!
1.1 System)Based(Study(This!study!focused!on!the!practical!design!of!an!IDMS,!and!how!it!can!affect!the!lives! of! individuals.! Results! from! this! study! asserts! that! IDMSs! can! be! broken!down! into! set! of structural' and' metrical' design' properties,! which! taken!together!can!be!used!to!develop!a!narrative!for!the!lived!experience;!i.e.!how!the!design! of! an! IDMS! can! affect! individuals’! everyday! lives! (see' Appendix' II' for'
details'of'the'study).!The! structural' properties! describe! the! flow! of! an! individual’s! information!within!the!identity!ecosystem.!It!is!captured!by!the!following!properties:!!!!!
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!
Structural'Property' Definition' '
Control'Points' The!number!of!points!where!identity!is!accessed.!
Subject'Engagement' The!degree!to!which!an!individual!is!active!at!each!control!point.!!
Population'Coverage' The!percentage!of!the!general!population!that!is!enrolled;!a!ratio!between!the!target!population!and!the!general!population.!
Identity'Exposure' The!degree!of!control!that!an!individual!has!in!the!presentation!of!his/her!identity!to!the!rest!of!society!at!each!control!point.!The!metrical' properties! are! concerned! with! the! type! of! information! that! is!captured,! and! the!way! it! is! interpreted!or!used.! It! is! captured!by! the! following!properties.!!
Metrical'Properties' Definition'
Subject'Coupling! The! degree! of! representativeness! between! the! information! collected,!and!the!relevant!partial!identity.!
Population'
Comprehension''
The!degree!to!which!general!population!understands!the!entire!identity!process!and!the!technologies!used!to!support!it.!
Expert'Analysis' The!level!of!user! involvement!or!expertise!that! is!required!to! interpret!identity.!!
Information'Accuracy' The!level!of!accuracy!of!the!identity!information.!
Information'Stability' The!level!of!frequency!with!which!the!identity!information!changes.!
Information'
Variability'
The!degree!to!which!the!identity!information!may!be!used!for!purposes!beyond!those!for!which!it!is!collected,!irrespective!of!preventative!laws!that!may!be!enacted!to!prevent!it.!
1.2 Individual)Based(Study(This!study!focused!on!individuals’!perception!of!IDMS,!and!how!that!affects!the!acceptance! of! such! systems.! Findings! from! this! study! found! that! individuals’!decision!to!accept!an!IDMS!is!driven!by!their:!!
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1. Situation'perception'–'an'individual’s!perception!on!the!importance!of!finding!a!solution!to!the!problem!that!the!IDMS!supports.!It!depends!on:!a. Severity'–'an!individual’s!perception!of!how!serious!it!would!be!for!a!person!to!be!affected!by!the!problem.!b. Extent'–'an!individual’s!perception!about!the!number!of!people!that!are!affected!by!the!problem.!!2. System'judgement'–'an!individual’s!thoughts!on!the!effectiveness!of!the!proposed!IDMS!in!supporting!the!organisation!to!tackle!the!problem.!It!depends!on:!a. Information'quality'–'an!individuals’!perception!of!the!accuracy!and!relevance!of!the!information!being!collected,!stored!and!used.!!!3. Concerns!–!an!individual’s!concerns!over!any!negative!consequences!of!implementing!the!IDMS!(eg.!security!of!the!information,!attacks!on!freedom).!
1.3 Organisational)Based(Study(This!study!investigated!the!effect!of!organisations’!identity!requirements!on!the!design! and! implementation! of! IDMSs.! The! results! show! that! organisational!identity!requirements!are!driven!by!purpose.!What'is'the'goal'of'the'system,'and'
what'task'is'it'supporting?'It! is!this!purpose!that!drives!the!two!main!processes!that!the!organisation!is!concerned!with;!identity'construction!and!identity'use.!!When! implementing! a!new! IDMS,! organisations! seek! to! ensure! the! integrity! of!identities!in!the!system.!This!study!has!found!that!organisations!fall!back!on!two!main! identity! requirements! during! the! identity' construction! process,! both! of!which!influence!the!information!set!attached!to!an!identity!created!in!the!IDMS:!1. Authenticity'–!to!ensure!that!the!identity,!and!hence!the!information,!about!an!individual!is!true.!This!is!done!by!collecting,!verifying,!and!storing!individuals’!biographical!information.!The!choice!and!source!of!this!information!is!influenced!by:!a. Universality!–!the!percentage!of!the!target!population!that!already!possesses!accepted!form!of!identity!documents.!The!higher!the!number,!the!more!the!organisation!can!rely!on!other!organisations!verifying!the!identity!of!new!individuals.!!b. Intimacy'–!the!percentage!of!the!target!population!that!is!already!enrolled!within!in!the!system.!The!higher!the!number,!the!more!organisations!can!rely!on!individuals!as!introducers!of!new!individuals.!For!example,!parents!can!vouch!for!their!children.!!!!2. Uniqueness'–!to!ensure!that!an!individual!does!not!enrol!into!the!system!more!than!once.!This!is!done!by!collecting!and!checking!individuals’!biometric!information.!The!choice!of!this!information!is!influenced!by:!a. Obligations'–'technology!standards!that!the!IDMS!must!conform!to;!these!can!manifest!itself!in!the!forms!of!international!standards!and!current!practices.!
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b. Performance'–'the!operational!requirements!of!the!biometric!in!terms!of:!
 Accuracy'–'how!accurate!the!biometric!is!in!producing!correct!matches.!!
 Human'readability!–!can!the!biometric!be!easily!read!and!matched!manually?!!c. Population'–'the!real!world!population!level!characteristics!that!can!affect!the!performance!of!the!biometric;!expressed!as:!!
 Size'–'the!size!of!the!population.!
 Compatibility'–'any!characteristics,!customs,!or!habits!that!might!reduce!the!accuracy!or!usability!of!the!biometric!(e.g.!burka!and!face!recognition,!labour!workers!and!fingerprints).!!
 Geographic'diversity'–!how!widely!spread!the!population!across!the!context!of!implementation.!Apart! from! enrolment,! organisations! also! need! to! define! the!manner! in!which!identity!will!be!used;! this!will!have! implications!on! the! identity!access!policies!that! are! implemented.! There! are! several! factors! that! need! to! be! considered!during!the!identity'use!process:!1. Relying'Party'–!the!parties!that!need!access!to!the!identity!so!as!to!achieve!the!goal!of!the!system.!2. Objective'–!a!relying!party’s!intention!of!accessing!the!identity;!expressed!as:!
 Enablement'–!the!dominant!intention!of!the!relying!party!to!either!enable!the!individual!to!carry!out!tasks,!or!to!prevent!individuals!from!carrying!out!certain!actions.!
 Proof!–!the!intention!of!the!relying!party!to!either!use!the!IDMS!as!a!proof!of!individuals!identity,!or!as!a!tracking!mechanism.!3. Conditions'–!the!circumstances!under!which!a!relying!party!accesses!identity;!expressed!as:!
 Risk'level'–'the!security!sensitive!conditions!under!which!the!relying!party!will!access!the!information.!For!example,!situations!that!affect!national!security!would!be!seen!to!have!a!high!risk!level.!
 Timeliness'–!the!time!constraints!under!which!the!access!will!take!place,!so!as!to!enable!the!relying!party!to!effectively!fulfil!its!objective.!4. Access'Requirements'–!what!kind!of!access!the!relying!party!will!need!to!fulfil!its!objective;!expressed!as:!
 Information'set'C'what!personal!information!does!the!relying!party!need!to!access!or!modify.!
 Direction'–'captures!the!push!or!pull!nature!of!the!identity!access,!which!in!turn!defines!the!read!(including!authentiction!procedures)!or!write!rights!of!the!third!party.'!
 Locality'–'refers!to!the!spatial!mode!of!access!to!the!identity!system.!This!can!either!happen!locally!where!the!authentication!only!takes!place!face<to<face,!or!remotely!where!an!identity!is!authenticated!against!an!entry!on!a!database.!
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Finally,! while! the! identity' enrolment' and' use! processes! were! modelled!separately,! they! are!not!mutually! exclusive.! Each! exerts! some! influence! on! the!other;!the!purpose'of!the!IDMS!is!the!key!factor!that!links!the!two!models.!On! the! one! hand,! the!purpose! of! the! overall! system! informs! the authenticity'
and' uniqueness' requirements;! for! example,! a!purpose! that! is!more! inclined!towards! security! sensitive! operations! would! have! stricter! authenticity' and'
uniqueness'requirements,!when!compared!to!non<security!applications.!On!the!other!hand,! the' choice' of' biographical' and' biometric' information! can! also!influence! further! expansion! on! the! purpose! of! the! IDMS;! different! activities!require!different!information!sets.!For!example,!a!system!that!only!collects!facial!photographs! cannot! later! support! a! system! that! requires! a! high! degree! of!assurance!through!the!use!of!fingerprints.!!
1.4 Unified(Framework(Bringing! the! findings! of! the! three! studies! together,! the! research! developed! a!unified! framework!that!provides!a!detailed!narrative!of! the! identity!ecosystem.!On!the!one!hand,!the!organisational!requirements!will!affect!the!system!design,!and!hence!the!lived!experience.!This!in!turn!affects!individual!perceptions!of!the!system.!These!relationships!are!illustrated!in!Figure!2,!and!are!further!discussed!in!the!application!of!the!framework!to!a!scenario.!!! !
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!
Figure'2'Unified'framework'(the'numbered'items'in'the'diagrams'serve'as'place'marks'that'the'writing'in'Section'3'will'refer'to)
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2""Application"of"the"Unified"Identity"Framework"The! unified!model! can! be! used! as! a! tool! to! guide! system!designers! in! developing!human:centred! IDMS! that! cater! for! the! individual! and! the! lived! experience,! thus!maximising!its!probability!of!success.!Application!of!the!model!takes!place!in!3!main!phases:!
1. Organisational-identity-requirements-are-specified-
2. Design-of-the-IDMS-is-assessed,-along-with-the-offered-lived-experience-
3. Initial-perception-and-acceptance-is-explored-This! section! demonstrates! a! very! simple! application! of! the! framework! within! a!hypothetical!scenario;!a!UK!government!organisation!seeks!to!introduce!a!National!Identity!Management!System!(N:IDMS).!Using!smart!identity!cards!and!a!centralised!database,!the!aim!of!the!N:IDMS!is!to:!
1. Provide-individuals-with-a-single-trusted-proof-of-identity-
2. Countering-Terrorism-
-
It# should# be# noted# that# the# UK# N1IDMS# here# is# loosely# based# on# the# recently#
decommissioned# identity# system# in# the# country.# The# system# here# represents# a#
simplified#version#that#is#being#used#for#illustrative#purposes#only.##
2.1 Background"in"formation"on"the"UK"The!United!Kingdom!has!implemented!and!managed!two!different!identity!systems!in!the!past;!both!were!implemented!during!times!of!war!and!uncertainty,!World!War!I! and!World!War! II! respectively! (Agar,! 2001),! and! both! systems! were! ultimately!scrapped!soon!after!each!war.!!The!World!War! I! system!was! used! as! an! aid! to! conscription.! Facing!much! public!opposition,!the!system!fell!into!disuse!once!it!had!fulfilled!its!purpose.!The!identity!system!established!in!WWII!was!set!to!aid!in!the!distribution!of!rations!to!the!public.!However,! the! system! faced! much! resistance! from! the! public! who! rejected! the!
Prussian!qualities!of!an!N:IDMS.!This!all!culminated!in!the!case!of!John!Wilcock!who!was! arrested! when! he! refused! to! present! his! identity! card! to! the! police! upon!request;!backed!by!the!court!and!the!public,!Mr.!Wilcocks!case!was!taken!to!court,!where! the! judge! presiding! over! the! case! sided!with!Wilcock.! This! resulted! in! the!decommissioning!of!the!WWII!identity!system.!Initial!proposals!for!a!new!N:IDMS!were!spurred!by!the!July!2007!bombings,!which!killed!56!people.!!This!proposal!also!coincided!with!government!discussions!on!the!creation! of! a! nation:wide! citizen! identification! system;! it! is! believed! that! such! a!system!would! greatly! increase! efficiency! and! reduce! the! costs! of! both! public! and!private!institutions.!It!is!within!this!context,!that!the!system!is!being!introduced.!
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2.2 Defining"the"organisations"identity"requirements"An!IDMS!is!always!implemented!for!a!particular!purpose;! it! is!designed!to!support!an!organisation!in!tackling!a!particular!problem.!Therefore,!defining!a!purpose!is!a!crucial!first!step!in!ensuring!that!the!development!of!the!system!is!fit!for!purpose.!!
What-is-the-purpose-of-the-NGIDMS,-and-how-can-it-help-the-situation?!-
Individuals# currently# lack# a# single# widely# acceptance# proof# of# identity.# Individuals#
currently# have# to# use# several# identity# documents# to# prove# identity# across# various#
contexts# (bank# statements,# bills,# etc).# Implementing# an# N1IDMS# will# eliminate# this#
hassle,#provide#a#more#seamless#experience,#and#provide#various#relying#parties#with#a#
single#trusted#form#of#identity.##
#
The#country#is#also#under#threat#from#terrorist#activities.#The#N1IDMS#will#help#tackle#
the# issue# of# terrorism# by# providing# the# counter1terror# unit# with# access# to# personal#
information# about# individuals# that# they# suspect.# Additionally,# the# use# of# identity# by#
individuals#to#access#various#services#can#serve#as#a#deterrent#for#terrorists,#and#if#not,#
may# provide# authorities# with# some# useful# information# that# may# be# recorded# (e.g.#
location,#use#patterns).##
#
Problem- Aim- Mechanics-
Lack#of#a#standard#identity#
document#means#that#individuals#
are#burdened#with#varying#
identity#proof#requirements.##
Reduce#hassle#of#proving#
identity.##
Providing#everyone#with#a#single#
widely1accepted#and#trusted#
identity#document.#
Threats#of#terrorist#attack.# Counter#terrorist#threats.# Provide#the#counter1terrorist#unit#
with#information#about#an#
individual#that#can#aid#them#in#
identifying#suspects.#
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Armed!with!a!specific!purpose,!the!organisation!can!then!begin!to!define!how!will!be!used,!after!which!the!required!personal!information!to!enable!its!use!will!be!defined.!!
Which-relying-parties-will-need-to-use-or-access-the-identities-on-the-system?-
Basic#Services#and#Utilities#(Post#office,#Banks,#etc)#
Counter1terrorist#Unit#
What-is-the-objective-of-the-basic-services/utilities-relying-party?-
Compared# to# current# identification# practices,# these# relying# parties#would# use# the#N1
IDMS#to#provide#individuals#with#more#seamless#access#to#their#services#(enablement).#
Their#main#intention#would#be#to#ensure#individuals#are#who#they#claim#to#be#(proof).#
Enablement:- Enablement# # Disablement-
Proof:- - Proof# # # #Tracking#
#
Under-what-conditions-will-the-basic-services/utilities-relying-party-access-the-
NGIDMS?-
These# relying#parties# typically#don’t#work#under# situations# that#do#not#pose#a#direct#
threat# to#national# security#or# their#operations# (low# to#medium#risk# level).#They#may#
operate#under#mild#time#pressures#to#ensure#a#seamless#service#(medium#timeliness).#
Risk-Level:- Low! ! Medium! High-
Timeliness:- Low! ! Medium! High-
What- information- set- do- the- basic- services/utilities- relying- parties- need- to-
access-from-the-IDMS-to-fulfil-its-objective?-
These#relying#parties#only#need#individuals’#basic#personal#information#to#provide#their#
services;#therefore#the#relying#parties#only#need#access#to:#
 Name#
 Address#
 Date#of#Birth#
-
What-accessibility-options-will-the-basic-services/utilities-relying-party-
require-to-fulfil-its-objective?--
Depending#on# the#risk# level,# these#relying#parties#may#need#varying# levels#of# identity#
authentication.#In#low#risk#situations#(picking#up#a#parcel#at#the#post#office),#a#simple#
visual# check#of# the# identity# card#may# suffice# (local# authentication).#However,# higher#
risk# situations# (opening#a# bank#account)#may# require# a# higher# level# of# assurance;# a#
remote# authentication# against# the# identity# database# would# be# necessary# (remote#
authentication).#
#
As#these#relying#parties#only#need#access#to#individuals’#basic#personal#information,#it#
has#no#need#to#access#information#on#the#database.#All#the#required#information#would#
be#contained#on#the#identity#card#(local#read#access).#
#
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Based# on# the# counter# terrorism# purpose,# it# would# be# useful# to# store# information#
(location,# time# of# access,# etc.)# about# any# remote# authentication# onto# the# database#
(remote#write#access).##
Authentication:--- Local## # Remote# None-
Read-Access:-- - Local# # Remote# None-
Write-Access- - Local# # Remote# None-
What-is-the-objective-of-the-counterGterrorist-unit-relying-party?-
The# counter1terrorist# unit# is# focused# on# finding# individuals# who# are# terrorists,# and#
preventing# them# from#carrying#out# terrorist#activities# (disablement).#Their# intention#
will#be#in#tracking#activities#of#individuals#across#various#contexts#(tracking).##
Enablement# # Disablement-
Proof# # # #Tracking#
-
Under-what-conditions-will-the-counterGterrorist-unit-relying-party-access-the-
NGIDMS?-
The# counter1terrorist# unit# deals# with# situations# that# can# have# severe# negative#
consequences#for#the#whole#country#(high#risk#level),#and#typically#work#under#extreme#
time#pressures#to#prevent#terrorist#activities#(high#timeliness).#
Risk-Level:- - Low! ! Medium! High-
Timeliness:- - Low! ! Medium! High-
What- information- set- do- counterGterrorist- unit- relying- party- need- to- access-
from-the-IDMS-to-fulfil-its-objective?-
The#counter1terrorist#unit#will#need#to#access#all#individuals’#information#stored#on#the#
identity#system:#
 Name#
 Address#
 Date#of#Birth#
 Father#
 Mother#
 Religion#
 Fingerprint#(forensic#use#to#match#fingerprints#pulled#from#scenes)#
 Facial#Portrait#
 Passport#number#
 Birth#certificate#number#
 Audit#Trail#(location#and#time#of#identity#use)#
-
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What-accessibility-options-will-the-counterGterrorist-unit-relying-party-require-
to-fulfil-its-objective?--
The# counter1terrorist# unit# does# not# deal# with# a# party# in# everyday# situations,# and#
therefore#has#no#need#for#authentication#procedures.##
#
Working#under#high#risk#and#timeliness#situations,#the#counter1terrorist#unit#will#need#
to# have# quick# access# to# individuals’# identity# without# their# knowledge# (remote# read#
access).#
#
The#counter1terrorist#unit#does#not#provide#the#N1IDMS#with#any#information#about#an#
individual.#Additionally,#since#it#operates#covertly,#any#access#by#the#counter1terrorist#
unit#should#not#be#recorded#(no#write#access).##
Authentication:--- Local## # Remote# None-
Read-Access:-- - Local# # Remote# None-
Write-Access- - Local# # Remote# None-!
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Having! specified! the! purpose,! and! the! objectives! of! all! the! relying! parties,! the!organisation! can! then! define! what! information! they! require! to! ensure! fit! for!purpose.!
What- biographic- information- is- required- to- ensure- that- identities- are-
authentic,-and-will-support-the-purpose-of-the-NGIDMS?-
As# the# UK# government# has# had# no# recent# on1going# experience#with# an# N1IDMS,# the#
organisation#does#not#know#the#target#population;#it#has#low$levels$of$intimacy,#and#
therefore#cannot#rely#on#introducer3based$scheme$ to#ensure#authenticity.#However,#
most#individuals#already#possess#widely#accepted#identity#documents;#the#high$ levels$
of$ universality# imply# that# the# organisation# can# make# use# of# a# document3based$
scheme#to#ensure#authenticity#during#enrolment.#
#
As#a#simple#proof#of#identity,#the#N1IDMS#only#requires#basic#information#such#as#name,#
address,#and#date#of#birth#is#required.#However,#as#part#of#an#counter1terrorist#tool,#the#
N1IDMS#may#need#to#hold#other#information,#such#as#relatives,#that#could#prove#to#be#
useful.#
#
Information-Item- Source- Universality-/-
Intimacy-
Trustworthine
ss-
Name# Document#1#Passport## Medium## Medium#
# Document#–#Birth#certificate# High# Low#
# Introducer#–#Relative# Low## Low#
Date#of#Birth# Document#1#Passport## Medium## Medium#
# Document#–#Birth#Certificate# High# Low#
# Introducer#–#Relative# Low## Low#
Address# Document#–#
Electric/Gas/Water#bill#
High## Medium#
Father# Document#–#Birth#certificate# High# Low#
# Introducer#–#Relative# Low## Low#
Mother# Document#–#Birth#certificate# High# Low#
# Introducer#–#Relative# Low## Low#
Religion# Document#1#Passport# Medium# Medium#
Passport#Number# Document#1#Passport# Medium# Medium#
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What-biometric- information- is-required-to-ensure-that- identities-are-unique,-
and-will-support-the-purpose-of-the-NGIDMS?-
Organisations# typically# can# choose# between# various# different# biometrics.# In# this#
example,# the# organisation# is# considering# the# use# of# two# of# the# following# three#
biometrics;#fingerprint,#iris,#or#face.##
#
During# enrolment# the# organisation# focus# on# using# biometric# information# is# on#
preserving#uniqueness#of#identities;#to#ensure#that#no#individuals#enrol#more#than#once.#
This# is# largely# affected# by# the# accuracy$ of# the# biometric# under# a# one1to1many#
matching# procedure# (matching# new# biometrics# to# those# already# stored# in# the#
database).# The# purpose# of# the# N1IDMS# also# states# that# it# will# be# used# as# a# proof# of#
identity,#implying#that#the#biometric#will#also#be#affected#by#the#accuracy#a#one1to1one#
authenticator#(matching#the#biometric#against#a#specific#entry).#This#is#typically#done#
by#specifying#the#False#Rejection#and#Acceptance#rate,#which#is#out#of#the#scope#of#the#
current#work.##
#
Performance# of# the# biometrics# will# also# need# to# hold# under# real# world# population#
considerations.#Large#population$sizes,#such#as#those#in#the#UK,#can#have#a#negative#
effect#on#performance#of#certain#biometrics#(finger#print#and#face).#Similarly,#certain#
biometrics# may# be# sensitive# to# environmental# conditions,# and# therefore# would# be#
negatively#affected#by#geographically$diverse$populations,#such#as#those#in#the#UK#
(face).The# organisation# should# also# pay# attention# to# the# compatibility# of# the#
population# to# the# biometric.# For# example,# countries#with# a# large# amount# of#manual#
labourers#would# have# a# negative# effect# the# performance# of# fingerprint# biometric,# as#
the#fingerprints#of#individuals#would#be#worn#out#from#their#work#(the#UK#population#
presents#no#compatibility#issues#with#any#of#the#biometrics).#
#
The# organisation# needs# to# consider# if# it# needs# to# fall# the# biometric# to# be# human$
readable.# This# can# form# a# safety# net# during# enrolment;# if# an# individual# is# falsely#
flagged# as# having# already# registered,# staff# can# then#manually# match# the# biometric.#
Face# biometrics# adds# human# readability# as# staff# can# just# compare# photographs;# iris#
and#fingerprints#do#not.#So#the#organisation#favours#facial#recognition#technology#
#
Finally,#the#organisations#choice#is#also#influenced#by#its#obligations.#As#the#biometric#
is#only#intended#to#be#used#internally,#there#are#no#international#obligations.#However,#
current#practices#of#related#organisations#or#relying#parties#may#exert#some#influence.#
Counter1terrorist# units# already#make# use# of# fingerprints,# and# so# the# organisation# is#
inclined#to#choose#fingerprints#over#iris.#
# #
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Information-
Item-
Accuracy- Population-
Size-
Population-
Geographic-
Diversity-
Population-
Compatibility-
Human-
Readability-
Fingerprint# Medium# Negative#effect# No#effect## No#effect# No#
Facial#portrait# Low# Negative#effect# Negative# No#effect# Yes#*It# should# be# noted# that,# for# the# purposes# of# simplicity,# this# document# only# uses# a#
general#measure#for#accuracy.#Any#real#world#application#would#need#to#use#available#
accuracy#figures.#
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2.3 Describing"the"Lived"Experience""Having!specified! their! identity!requirements,! the!organisation!can! then!attempt! to!describe!the! implications!on!the!design!of! the!system,!and!its! impacts!on!the! lived!experience.! It!should!be!noted!that,!at! this!stage!the!rating!exercise! is!a!subjective!procedure!(this!is!acknowledged!in!the!final!chapter).!
-
Based-on-the-organisational-identity-requirements,-rate-the-metrical-design-
properties-of-the-IDMS-on-a-scale-of-low,-medium,-or-high.-
-
Metrical-
Properties-
Description- Rating-
Expert#
Evaluation#
Biographical# information# typically# lends# itself#well# to#being# easily# interpreted#
without#any#specialised#knowledge.#
#However,# the# inclusion# of# biometric# systems,# especially# fingerprints# requires#
expert# training.# This# is# especially# so# in# its# forensic# use# by# the# counter1terror#
unit.#
Medium#
Population#
Comprehension#
Similar# to# expert# evaluation,# this# is# highly# influenced# by# the# fingerprint#
biometric,# The# general# population# typically# have# little# understanding# of# the#
biometric,#and#assumes#that#it#is#infallible,##
Furthermore,#a# large# section#of# the#general#public#might#not#understand#how#
the#N1IDMS#truly#works,#especially#in#the#covert#use#of#their#information#by#the#
counter1terror#unit.#
Low#
Subject#
Coupling#
Individuals#may#raise#concerns#as# to#why# information#on#parents#and#religion#
are# collected# and# stored.# It# may# be# perceived# as# irrelevant# especially# if# they#
mainly#perceive#the#system#as#a#tool#to#prove#identity#to#basic#services/utilities.#
The# use# of# the# system# by# the# counter1terror# unit# may# also# raise# concerns.#
Fingerprints# carry# a# large# amount# of# weight# within# traditional# law#
enforcement# circles.# Should# this# trend# continue# here,# and# decisions# be# made#
solely# on# the# fingerprint,# then# the# relying# party# would# be# acting# on# an#
incomplete#picture#of#the#partial#identity.#
Low#
Information#
Accuracy#
Relying# on# trusted# sources# for# authenticity# implies# that# the# information#
collected# and# stored# will# be# accurate.# Additionally,# the# biometric# collected#
during#enrolment#will#be#of#high#quality#as#it#takes#place#in#control#conditions.#
However,#the#forensic#use#of#the#fingerprint#by#the#counter1terror#unit#serves#to#
reduce#the#accuracy.#Extracting#fingerprints#from#the#real#world#contaminates#
the#information#pool,#and#reduces#the#overall#accuracy#of#identifications#made.##
Medium#
5-
! 383!
Metrical-
Properties-
Description- Rating-
Information#
Stability#
The# basic# personal# information# set# being# collected# during# enrolment# remains#
relatively# stable,# but# may# be# open# to# some# change.# Name# and# address# for#
example#can#change#over#time.#
However,# the# stability# of# the# identity# within# the# system# is# reduced# when#
considering#the#audit#trail#that#is#collected#over#the#life#time#of#the#identity.#New#
information#is#constantly#being#generated,#thus#creating#low#levels#of#stability.##
Low#
Information#
Variability#
Fingerprints# easily# lend# themselves# to# other# uses.# Specifically,# it# may# be#
tempting#to# the#police# force,#who#would# like# to#use# the# identity# to# track#down#
criminals#(as#opposed#to#terrorists).#
Similarly,# the# identity# audit# trail# can# easily# be# reused# for# other#purposes# that#
again# include# being# used# by# the# police# force,# to# other# purposes# that# sorts# the#
population#based#on#this#information.#
Religion# is# also# something# to# be# wary# of,# as# it# could# possibly# be# used# to#
discriminate#against#certain#segments#of#the#population#at#a#later#date.#
High#
-
Based-on-the-organisational-identity-requirements,-rate-the-structural-design-
properties-of-the-IDMS.-
-
Structural-
Properties-
Description- Rating-
Control#Points# The#N1IDMS#has#specified#a#large#number#of#relying#parties.#Any#access#to#even#
the#most#basic#of#services#will#require#the#presentation#of#identity.#This#indicates#
a#high#number#of#control#points.#
High#
Subject#
Engagement#
On# the# one# hand,# the# organisation# has# specified# that# the# individual# will# be#
present# in# the# access# of# identity# by# basic# services/utilities.# Authentication# for#
example# is# triggered# by# the# individual,# and# read# access# only# happens# locally.#
This#implies#that#the#individual#is#active#when#his/her#identity#is#used,#pointing#
to#a#high#level#of#subject#engagement.#
However,# there# is# also# the# access# of# identity# by# the# counter1terrorist# unit.#
Working#under#high#risk#and#high#timeliness#conditions,#this#access#of# identity#
needs# to# take# place# quickly# and# covertly.# As# a# result,# all# access# happens#
remotely,# without# any# authentication# procedures# triggered# by# the# individual;#
the# individual# is# in# a# passive# stated,# and# is# unaware# of# the# access# and# use# of#
his/her#identity.#This#drives#down#the#level#of#subject#engagement.##
Medium#
Population#
Coverage#
Like#control#points,#this#property#is#influenced#by#the#number#of#relying#parties#
specified.#Typically,#the#more#relying#parties#identified,#the#greater#the#context#
in# which# identity# will# be# used,# thus# increasing# the# scope# of# the# target#
population.# In# this# case,# the# identity# will# be# used# to# access# all# kinds# of# basic#
services,#implying#that#the#whole#population#will#be#covered#by#the#N1IDMS.#
High#
6-
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Structural-
Properties-
Description- Rating-
Identity#
Exposure#
The#manner#in#which#the#identity#is#accessed#and#used#will#influence#the#degree#
of# identity# exposure.#The#use#by#basic# services/utilities# typically#happens#on#a#
one1to1one#basis#in#an#environment#that#the#individual#has#a#large#control#over.#
Additionally,# the# use# of# the# information# by# the# counter1terror# unit# happens#
covertly,# and# will# unlikely# be# broadcast# to# the# public# to# prevent# panic# or#
hysteria.#Identity#remains#un#exposed.#
Low#
-
Based- on- the- design- properties,- what- kind- of- lived- experience- can- be-
expected?-How-is-the-individual-affected-by-the-collection-and-used-of-his/her-
identity?-
Narrating#the#lived#experience#requires#for#the#qualitative#analysis#and#exploration#of#
the#various#design#properties,#how#they#influence#each#other,#and#its#potential#negative#
impacts#on#individuals’#lives,#which#can#derail#the#success#of#the#system.##
#
Below#are#several#impacts#that#have#been#identified:#
#
Lived-Experience- Design-properties- Description-
Burden# High#number#of#control#
points#
Medium#degree#of#subject#
engagement#
The#individual#needs#to#actively#produce#his/her#identity#
frequently.#Failing#to#do#so#will#lead#to#the#lock#out#of#the#
individual#from#accessing#even#the#most#basic#of#services.#
#This#can#create#problems#of#fatigue#where#the#individual#
feels#burdened#to#constantly#carry#and#present#his/her#
identity#document.#
Privacy#and#
freedom#concerns#
High#number#of#control#
points#
Medium#degree#of#subject#
engagement#
Low#level#of#information#
stability#
High#level#of#information#
variability#
The#identity#is#also#accessed#frequently#without#his/her#
knowledge.#This#can#create#feelings#of#paranoia#where#the#
individual#feels#like#he/she#is#being#constantly#watched,#
and#therefore#cannot#act#freely.#
The#low#level#of#information#stability#contributes#to#the#
feeling#of#being#watched,#as#the#information#is#constantly#
changing#and#being#updated.#Individuals#are#being#
tracked,#and#thus#are#further#restricted#from#acting#freely#
Furthermore,#the#other#potential#uses#of#the#information#
fuels#privacy#concerns,#and#therefore#increases#the#
paranoia.#
False#accusations# Low#level#of#subject#
coupling#
Low#level#of#information#
Identifying#terrorists#based#only#on#fingerprints,#may#
result#in#the#possibility#of#false#accusations;#a#fingerprint#
does#not#equate#with#guilt.##
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Lived-Experience- Design-properties- Description-
accuracy#
High#level#of#expert#
analysis#
Low#level#of#population#
comprehension#
The#possibility#of#false#accusations#happening#is#increased#
as#the#system,#used#in#this#forensic#context,#uses#
inaccurate#fingerprints#that#are#extracted#from#the#real#
world.#
Furthermore,#the#expert#analysis#introduces#a#level#of#
subjectivity#in#the#identification#process,#increasing#the#
likelihood#of#false#accusations.#
Finally,#as#the#general#population#does#not#understand#
the#identification#process,#the#individual#losses#the#ability#
the#resist#such#false#accusations.#He/she#does#not#possess#
the#knowledge#to#argue#his/her#innocence,#and#the#
general#population#believes#in#its#infallibility.#
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2.4 Determining"the"general"populations’"perception"of"the"problem"Once! the!purpose! and!design!has! been!defined,! the! government! should! then! seek!out! to! understand!how! the! general! population! perceives! the! situation.! In! the! real!world! this! should!be!done!by!distributing! surveys!developed! from! the! individual:based! framework,! and! using! quantitative! techniques! to! identify! willingness! to!accept!the!system!(e.g.!likert!scales,!and!statistics).!!However,! for! illustrative!purposes,! this!document!will!walk! though!the! individual:based!framework!qualitatively,!briefly!touching!upon!the!relationship!to!the!system:based!framework.!
What-is-the-individuals’-perception-of-the-overall-purpose-of-the-IDMS?--
Not#being#able#to#prove#identity#to#access#services#is#typically#seen#to#be#a#severe#issue#
as#individuals#will#be#locked#out#from#participating#in#society.#However,#the#extent#of#
the#population#affected#by#the#problem#is#low;#most#people#have#the#needed#documents#
to#prove#identity#(bank#statements,#bills,#etc).#
#
Similarly,# the# general# population# tends# to# view# terrorism# as# a# severe# problem.#
However,# the# lack# of# recent# terrorist# activity# within# the# population# has# dulled#
individuals’# perception# of# the# extent# of# the# general# population# is# affected# by# the#
problem.##
#
Overall,# the#high$ severity$ positively$ influences$ situation$ perception,# but# the# low$
extent$ negatively$ influences$ the$ situation$ perception,# and# hence# importance#
placed#on#introducing#a#new#system#to#tackle#the#problems.#
Severity:- - - Low# Medium# High$
Extent:- - - Low# Medium# High$
Situation-Perception:- Low# Medium# High$
-
Does-the-design-of-the-system-raise-any-concerns-for-individuals?-
These# concerns# may# arise# in# terms# of# security$ concerns# and# impacts# on# general$
freedom.# The#high$ number$ of$ control$ points$ and$ the$ medium$ level$ of$ subject$
engagement,# offered# by# the# use# of# a# centralised# database,# fuel# these# concerns.#
Individuals# will# be# concerned# about# the# ability# of# the# organisation# to# secure$ the$
database,#and#hence#the#identities.#
#
The# covert#access# of# the# identity,# remotely# through# the#database,#creates$ paranoia#
among# individuals# of# always# being# watched,# and# thus# creates# concerns# of# freedom.#
Additionally,# the#high# level#of# information#variability# introduces#unpredictability$ in$
future$use,#raising#concerns#over#individuals’#freedom.#
Security:--- - Low# Medium# High-
Freedom:-- - Low# Medium# High$
Concerns:- - Low# Medium# High-
7-
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What-is-the-individuals’-perception-of-the-information-being-collected,-and-
how-useful-do-they-believe-it-will-be-to-supporting-the-purpose-of-the-IDMS?-
Individuals’# perceptions# here# are# influenced#by# the#metrical# design#properties# of# the#
system.# First# of# all# the#medium$ degree$ of$ information$ accuracy,# will# negatively#
influence#perception#of#information#quality.#Similar#for#the$low$level$of$information$
stability,# as# it# introduces# concerns# over# the# ability# of# the# system# to# capture# all# the#
information#that#is#constantly#changing.#
#
The# medium$ level$ of$ expert$ analysis# further# reduces# the# overall# perception# of#
information#quality,#as#it#is#seen#to#introduce#subjectivity.#Additionally,#the#low$level$of$
subject$coupling#also#serves#to$decrease$perception$of$information$quality,#as#the#
system#is#seen#to#collect#irrelevant#information.#
#
Overall,# perception#of# information$ quality$ is$ low,# implying# that# individuals# system#
judgement# perception# would# be# negative;# individuals# don’t# believe# that# the# system#
would#be#useful#for#its#purpose.#
Information-Quality:- - Low# Medium# High$
System-Judgement:- - Low# Medium# High-
-
How-likely-are-individuals-willing-to-accept-the-IDMS?-
Individuals#don’t#see#the#system#as#being#useful#(low$ level$of$ system$ judgement)#to#
solving#a#potentially#unimportant#problem#(medium$level$of$situation$perception).#
Coupled#with#the#high$ levels$ of$ concerns# created,# it# is#unlikely# that# individuals#will#
accept#the#system.#
Acceptance:- - - Low# Medium# High#
#
9-
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2.5 Discussion"and"implication"of"the"unified"identity"framework"on"IDMS"Based!on!the!organisations!identity!requirements,!and!the!resulting!design!of!the!N:IDMS,! the! individual! is! not!willing! to! accept! the! system! (see! Section! 3.3;! again! it!should!be!noted!that!in!a!real!world!implementation,!this!would!be!done!on!a!wide!scale!using!surveys).!On!the!one!hand,!individuals!do!not!believe!that!the!purpose!of!the!system!is!important.!As!such,!it!may!be!more!useful!for!the!organisation!to!tackle!other!pressing!matters!that!are!perceived!to!be!serious,!and!impact!a!large!section!of!the!population.!Furthermore,! the! analysis! of! the! lived! experience! reveals! that! the! system! poses!significant! threats! to! privacy! and! freedom!due! to! tracking,! as!well! as! introducing!serious!risk!of!innocent!individuals!being!wrongly!convicted!(see!Section!3.2).!!Should!the!organisation!choose!to!proceed!with!such!a!system,!it!should!attempt!to!maximise! initial! acceptance,! and! improve! the!overall! lived!experience.!This!would!be!done!by! tweaking! the!various!properties!of! the!system!design.! In! this!example,!the! organisation! may! focus! on! increasing! information- accuracy,- information-
stability,- and- subject- coupling.! This! would! help! to! positively! influence! the!perception!of!information-quality.!Furthermore,!the!organisation!may!also!seek!to!reduce! the! number! of! control- points,! which! posses! a! low! level! of! subject-
engagement.!Doing!so!can!address!some!of! the!concerns! that! individuals!posses,!and!hence!generate!higher!rates!of!acceptance.!Tweaking!these!design!properties!may!create!a!better!lived!experience.!The!higher!level!of!subject- coupling-and- information-accuracy!would!reduce!the!likelihood!of!false!accusations!being!made.!Additionally,!the!lower!number!of!passive-control-
points-would!reduce!the!feelings!of!paranoia!and!restricted!freedom.!Above!all!these!changes!would!feed!back!into!the!organisations!requirements.!Any!changes!to!the!metrical!design!properties!would!have!an!impact!on!the!biographical!and! biometrical! requirements.! Changes! done! to! the! structural! would! have!implications!for!the!accessibility!and!objectives!of!the!relying!parties.!These!in!turn!may!require!the!organisation!to!reformulate!the!use!and!purpose!of!the!IDMS!(see!Section!3.1)!!It! should! be! noted! that! while! the! application! of! the! model! here! is! presented! in!discrete!steps,! it! is! likely!that!these!phases!will!overlap,!and!occur!in!tandem.!Real!life!applications!may!require!a!rapid!prototyping!approach!where!the!investigation!continuously! shifts! back! and! forth! between! the! various! frameworks,! constantly!informing!debates,!as!well!as!accounting!for!new!concerns,!arguments,!and!possibly!changing!contextual!factors!(see!Figure!3).!
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!!
Figure-3-Application-of-framework-in-a-rapid-prototyping-approach-!Additionally,! although! it! has! not! been! done! here,! it!may! be! useful! to! explore! the!lived! experience! and! individuals’! perceptions! on! a! use! case! basis.! In! the! example!here,! it! may! be! useful! to! explore! the! impacts! of! the! identity! use! by! the! basic!services/utilities,!as!separate!from!the!use!of!the!system!by!the!counter:terror!unit.!This!may!help!to!target!and!reveal!specific!problem!areas!that!need!attention.!!
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3""Future"work"With! the!exception!of! the! individual:based! framework,!which!was! supported!by!a!small!survey!study,!the!work!here!has!been!developed!using!qualitative!techniques.!It! may! be! beneficial! to! take! a! more! quantitative! approach,! or! apply! the! unified!framework! to! guide! a! real!world! implementation;! doing! so! can! lend! the! research!greater! validity,!while!providing! strong! evidence!of! the! relationships!between! the!various!sub:frameworks.!It!would!also!be! incredibly!beneficial! to! further!develop!the!system!framework.!At!this! point,! describing! the! lived! experience! is! a! very! subjective! task.! While! it!encourages!the!designer!to!embed!the!development!of!the!IDMS!within!its!context!of!use,!the!lack!of!proper!guidance!can!hamper!efforts.!Therefore,!it!would!be!useful!to!develop! a! mapping! between! the! various! properties,! and! the! potential! impacts! it!might!have!on! the! lived!experience.! Similarly,! guidance!on!how! to! rate! the!design!properties!would!further!reduce!barriers!to!its!use.!Furthermore,! future!work!may!wish! to! expand!upon! the! individual! framework!by!including! trust! constructs! that! can! help! to! further! explain! decisions! to! accept! an!IDMS.! It! may! also! be! useful! to! expand! upon! the! organisation! framework,! by!developing!guidelines!that!help!organisations!specify!the!identity!requirements.!
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Appendix"I"–"Alternate"scenario"based"on"recommendations"Based! on! the! analysis! in! Section! 3,! the! organisation! has! decided! to! redefine! the!purpose! of! the! N:IDMS,! by! eliminating! the! purpose! of! counter:terrorism.! This!requires!a!re:analysis!of! the!system!ensuring!that!a!new!design! is!developed!to! fit!the!new!purpose.!
3.1 Specifying"the"organisations"identity"requirements"
What-is-the-purpose-of-the-NGIDMS,-and-how-can-it-help-the-situation?!-
Individuals#currently#lack#a#single#widely#acceptance#proof#of#identity.#Individuals#are#
currently# forced# to# come# to# terms#with# varying# identity# requirements#when# proving#
identity# across# different# contexts# (bank# statements,# bills,# etc).# Implementing# an# N1
IDMS#will#eliminate#this#hassle,#providing#a#more#seamless#experience,#while#providing#
various#relying#parties#with#a#trusted#form#of#identification.##
#
Problem- Aim- Mechanics-
Lack#of#a#standard#identity#
document#means#that#individuals#
are#burdened#with#varying#
identity#proof#requirements.##
Reduce#hassle#of#proving#
identity.##
Providing#everyone#with#a#single#
widely1accepted#and#trusted#
identity#document.#
Which-relying-parties-will-need-to-use-or-access-the-identities-on-the-system?-
Basic#Services#and#Utilities#(Post#office,#Banks,#etc)#
What-is-the-objective-of-the-relying-party?-
Enablement:- - Enablement# # Disablement-
Proof:- - - Proof# # # #Tracking#
#
Under-what-conditions-will-the-relying-party-access-the-NGIDMS?-
Risk-Level:- - Low! ! Medium! High-
Timeliness:- - Low! ! Medium! High-
What$ information$ set$ does$ the$ relying$ party$ need$ to$ access$ from$ the$ IDMS$ to$
fulfil$its$objective?#
 Name#
 Address#
 Date#of#Birth#
-
What-accessibility-options-will-the-basic-services/utilities-relying-party-
require-to-fulfil-its-objective?--
Authentication:--- Local## # Remote# None-
Read-Access:-- - Local# # Remote# None-
Write-Access- - Local# # Remote# None-
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What- biographic- information- is- required- to- ensure- that- identities- are-
authentic,-and-will-support-the-purpose-of-the-NGIDMS?-
#
Information-Item- Source- Universality-/-
Intimacy-
Trustworthine
ss-
Name# Document#1#Passport## Medium## Medium#
# Document#–#Birth#certificate# High# Low#
# Introducer#–#Relative# Low## Low#
Date#of#Birth# Document#1#Passport## Medium## Medium#
# Document#–#Birth#Certificate# High# Low#
# Introducer#–#Relative# Low## Low#
Address# Document#–#
Electric/Gas/Water#bill#
High## Medium#
What-biometric- information- is-required-to-ensure-that- identities-are-unique,-
and-will-support-the-purpose-of-the-NGIDMS?-
#
Information-
Item-
Accuracy- Population-
Size-
Population-
Geographic-
Diversity-
Population-
Compatibility-
Human-
Readability-
Fingerprint# Medium# Negative#effect# No#effect## No#effect# No#
Facial#portrait# Low# Negative#effect# Negative# No#effect# Yes#
3.2 Describing"the"Lived"Experience""
-
Based-on-the-organisational-identity-requirements,-rate-the-metrical-design-
properties-of-the-IDMS-on-a-scale-of-low,-medium,-or-high.-
-
Metrical-
Properties-
Description- Rating-
Expert#
Evaluation#
Biographical# information# typically# lends# itself#well# to#being# easily# interpreted#
without#any#specialised#knowledge.#
#There#is#not#forensic#use#of#fingerprints#in#this#case.#Any#use#of#the#fingerprints#
is#automated,#and#therefore#no#expert#that#needs#to#match#fingerprints.#
Low#
Population#
Comprehension#
The# inclusion# of# fingerprints# still# presents# a# small# barrier# for# individuals# to#
understand#what#is#happening..#
Medium#
3-
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Metrical-
Properties-
Description- Rating-
Subject#
Coupling#
Only# basic# personal# information# relevant# to# proving# identity# is# collected# and#
stored.#
High#
Information#
Accuracy#
Relying# on# trusted# sources# for# authenticity# implies# that# the# information#
collected# and# stored# will# be# accurate.# Additionally,# the# biometric# collected#
during#enrolment#will#be#of#high#quality#as#it#takes#place#in#control#conditions.#
High#
Information#
Stability#
The# basic# personal# information# set# being# collected# during# enrolment# remains#
relatively# stable,# but# may# be# open# to# some# change.# Name# and# address# for#
example#can#change#over#time;#however#this#change#is#not#very#frequent.#
High#
Information#
Variability#
Fingerprints# easily# lend# themselves# to# other# uses.# Specifically,# it# may# be#
tempting#to# the#police# force,#who#would# like# to#use# the# identity# to# track#down#
criminals#(as#opposed#to#terrorists).#
High#
-
Based-on-the-organisational-identity-requirements,-rate-the-structural-design-
properties-of-the-IDMS.-
-
Structural-
Properties-
Description- Rating-
Control#Points# The#N1IDMS#has#specified#a#large#number#of#relying#parties.#Any#access#to#even#
the#most#basic#of#services#will#require#the#presentation#of#identity.#This#indicates#
a#high#number#of#control#points.#
High#
Subject#
Engagement#
The#organisation#has#specified#that#the#individual#will#be#present#in#the#access#
of#identity#by#basic#services/utilities.#Authentication#for#example#is#triggered#by#
the# individual,# and# read# access# only# happens# locally.# This# implies# that# the#
individual#is#active#when#his/her#identity#is#used.#
High#
Population#
Coverage#
Like#control#points,#this#property#is#influenced#by#the#number#of#relying#parties#
specified.#Typically,#the#more#relying#parties#identified,#the#greater#the#context#
in# which# identity# will# be# used,# thus# increasing# the# scope# of# the# target#
population.# In# this# case,# the# identity# will# be# used# to# access# all# kinds# of# basic#
services,#implying#that#the#whole#population#will#be#covered#by#the#N1IDMS.#
High#
Identity#
Exposure#
The#manner#in#which#the#identity#is#accessed#and#used#will#influence#the#degree#
of# identity# exposure.#The#use#by#basic# services/utilities# typically#happens#on#a#
one1to1one#basis#in#an#environment#that#the#individual#has#a#large#control#over.#
Low#
-
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Based- on- the- design- properties,- what- kind- of- lived- experience- can- be-
expected?-How-is-the-individual-affected-by-the-collection-and-used-of-his/her-
identity?-
#
Lived-Experience- Design-properties- Description-
Burden# High#number#of#control#
points#
High#degree#of#subject#
engagement#
The#individual#needs#to#actively#produce#his/her#
identity#frequently.#Failing#to#do#so#will#lead#to#the#
lock#out#of#the#individual#from#accessing#even#the#
most#basic#of#services.#
#This#can#create#problems#of#fatigue#where#the#
individual#feels#burdened#to#constantly#carry#and#
present#his/her#identity#document.#
Future#unpredictability# High#level#of#information#
variability#
Some#slight#paranoia#on#the#potential#use#of#
fingerprints#by#law#enforcement.#
3.3 Determining"the"general"populations’"perception"of"the"problem"
What-is-the-individuals’-perception-of-the-overall-purpose-of-the-IDMS?--
Not#being#able#to#prove#identity#to#access#services#is#typically#seen#to#be#a#severe#issue#
as#individuals#will#be#locked#out#from#participating#in#society.#However,#the#extent#of#
the#population#affected#by#the#problem#is#low;#most#people#have#the#needed#documents#
to#prove#identity#(bank#statements,#bills,#etc).#
Severity:- - - Low# Medium# High$
Extent:- - - Low# Medium# High$
Situation-Perception:- Low# Medium# High$
-
Does-the-design-of-the-system-raise-any-concerns-for-individuals?-
The#system#does#not#present#any#significant#security#concerns,#and#there#are#no#issues#
of#tracking,#reducing#concerns#over#ones#freedom.#
Security:--- - Low# Medium# High-
Freedom:-- - Low# Medium# High$
Concerns:- - Low# Medium# High-
-
What-is-the-individuals’-perception-of-the-information-being-collected,-and-
how-useful-do-they-believe-it-will-be-to-supporting-the-purpose-of-the-IDMS?-
Influenced#by#the#high# level#of# information#accuracy,#and#stability,# individuals#would#
have#a#positive#view#of#the#information#quality.#Furthermore,#the#high#level#of#subject#
coupling# means# that# the# information# collected# and# stored# should# be# seen# as# being#
relevant.# As# a# result,# system# judgement# would# be# positively# influenced# by# the#
perception#of#high#information#quality.#
Information-Quality:- Low# Medium# High$
System-Judgement:- Low# Medium# High-
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-
How-likely-are-individuals-willing-to-accept-the-IDMS?-
Acceptance#is#likely#to#be#high,#as#the#situation#is#perceived#to#be#somewhat#important,#
the#system#judged#to#be#useful,#while#concerns#are#kept#to#a#minimum.#
Acceptance:- - Low# Medium# High#
3.4 Discussion"and"implication"of"the"unified"identity"framework"on"IDMS"Based! on! the! new! purpose,! and! the! resulting! redefinition! of! the! organisation!requirements,! the! new! design! of! the! N:IDMS! has! resulted! in! a! system! that!individuals!are!willing! to!accept.!Furthermore,! the! lived!experience!has!drastically!reduced! the! negative! lived! experience! as! previously! introduced.! Therefore,! the!system!presented!here!will!likely!be!more!successful!than!the!original!proposal.!!
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Appendix"II"–"SystemMBased"Study"Using!Thematic Analysis,! a! set! of! 14! past! and! present!N:IDMS!were! reviewed! (see!Appendix!I),!with!the!aim!of!tying!the!outcomes!of!each!IDMS!to!their!specific!design!aspects.! Each! system!was! treated! as! a! unique! case! study,! and! a! corpus!of!written!work!(largely! from!secondary!sources!that!review!the!entire!situation)!centred!on!each!identity!scheme!was!collected!for!analysis.!!
Table-2-IDMS-reviewed-in-the-systemGbased-study-
System Country Purpose 
Poor Laws and Badges Untied Kingdom To provide members of organisations proof of association 
Criminal ‘Wanted’ Lists - To provide for accurate identification of individuals especially criminals 
Internal Passports Russia To track movement of locals in the country  
Passports Netherlands To prevent or monitor the entry of dangerous foreign radicals into the country 
French Nomad Law France Identification and monitoring of unwanted members of the population 
National ID Cards United Kingdom 
Germany 
To provide unique identities to individuals allowing easy identification of the entire 
population. 
Bertillonage France To identify recidivists enabling enforcement of severe punishment  
Dactyloscopy Argentina To identify recidivists enabling enforcement of severe punishment 
US Visit Programme United States To identify criminals and terrorists entering or leaving the country 
UAE Iris Scan United Arab 
Emirates 
To accurately identify known individuals against captured Iris scans (e.g. criminals) 
Criminal DNA Database United Kingdom To accurately identify individuals against DNA samples 
Contact Point United Kingdom To identify children in need of protection services before serious harm is caused 
PKI and Digital 
Signatures 
Austria To provide individuals access to services in a virtual environment 
! 397!
Appendix"III"–"IndividualMBased"Study"A! total! of! 15! focus groups! were! conducted,! with! an! average! of! 3! participants! per!focus! group.! A! set! of! 6! different! scenarios! were! developed! to! help! stimulate!discussion!within!focus!groups!(Appendix!II).!Each!scenario!outlined!a!hypothetical!implementation! of! an!N:IDMS;! the! scenarios! provided! details! of! a! problem! that! a!government!agency!was!trying!to!solve,!a!proposed!identity!system,!and!a!use!case!scenario! that! described! how! the! system! might! work.! Focus! group! participants!consisted!of!university!students.!
Grounded Theory!was!used!to!analyse!the!focus!group!discussions,!which!uncovered!several! different! constructs! that! had! an! impacted! on! an! individual’s decision to 
accept an IDMS.!These!were!used!to!develop!a!hypothesised!framework,!which!was!then!validated!using!a!small!survey!study!(excluding the cultural constructs).!A!survey!was!developed!and!distributed!to!668!university!students.!Keeping!in!line!with!the!exploratory!approach!of!the!thesis,!Exploratory Factor Analysis,!along!with!Structural 
Equation Modelling! was! used! to! develop! a! good! fitting! model;! this! was! done! by!collapsing! constructs! that! loaded! highly! onto! each! other,! as! well! as! a! careful!iterative! process! to! eliminating,! and! introducing! theoretically! valid! relationships!into!the!framework!as!indicated!by!the!Structural Equation Modelling!process.!!
Table-3-Hypothetical-scenarios-discussed-in-focus-groups-
Scenarios Situation Solution 
Scenario 1 Child Abuse Any suspicions of child abuse would be noted into a centralised identity system 
by carer’s that came into contact with a child (e.g. doctors and teachers). 
Scenario 2 Personal debt More government control of loaning practices. Centralised government system to 
collect of personal spending and saving information from stores and across all 
bank accounts. Information used to calculate risk profile each time a loan is 
requested.  
Scenario 3 Obesity 
 
Use of CCTV and facial recognition to record food purchases at stores and 
activity levels at gyms. Information routed to central agency, to determine risk of 
obesity. Advice provided to those who may be at risk. 
Scenario 4 Benefit fraud Employers would enter details of all individuals who are interviewed for a job 
(commitment, appearance, suitability, etc.), into a centralised system. Information 
matched to individuals using fingerprints, and used by government agency to 
assess if individuals are trying to improve their situation. 
Scenario 5 Crime Collection of DNA from all suspects of a crime, including those who are proven 
innocent. All recorded DNA is used by authorities to match to crime scene 
evidence. 
Scenario 6 Terrorism 
Illegal 
immigration 
Introduction of identity cards and a national database for the whole population. 
Cards required to prove identity in various situations from picking up parcel, to 
accessing government services. Interactions with cards recorded into a centralised 
database. Law enforcement can access database to investigate security issues. 
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Appendix(IV(–(Organisation3Based(Study(Using!a!Case Study!methodology,!the!study!focused!on!the!implementation!of!N9IDMSs!in!3!different!countries;!Brunei,!India!and!Britain!(Appendix!III).!Grounded Theory!was!used!to!analyse!publicly!available!documentation!on!each!of!the!systems;!with!the!exception!of!the!Bruneian!case!study!which!relied!on!interviews,!as!documentation!was!not!readily!available.!!!
Table&4&Cases&analysed&in&the&organisation3based&study&
 Brunei India United Kingdom 
Date Implemented  2000 – today  2010 – today  2008 – 2010 (abolished) 
Purpose Multi-function smart card Support poor in accessing 
services 
Prevent terrorism, crime, benefit fraud, 
travel card 
Mandatory 18 and above All citizens Voluntary (mandatory for high risk 
personnel) 
Unique ID Number Yes Yes Yes 
Identity Card Yes No  Yes 
Smart Chip Yes No Yes 
Centralised Database Yes Yes Yes 
Authentication  Against Card Against Database Against Card and Database (record 
authentication on database) 
Information Read Third Parties can access 
biographical info on card and 
chip. 
Third parties can confirm the 
accuracy of info (yes/no 
response only). 
Third parties can access biographical 
info on card and chip. 
Info can be pushed from the database to 
third parties.  
Security organisations may access info 
on the database  
Information Write Third parties can write to  the 
smart card 
None Info can be pushed from third parties to 
the database. !
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Appendix(VIII:"Feedback"from"Experts"
 
Professor Andrew Adams 
1. Do the constructs asserted in the organisation framework reflect real world issues that 
organisations deal with when implementing of an IDMS? 
It does, but it is incomplete in that it ignores any analysis of likely attackers (those seeking to suborn the 
system). Such attackers range from terrorists to organised criminals to individuals seeking anonymity to 
elements of the organisation. Consider the allegations of Israeli government mis-use of foreign passports for a 
severe example. 
 
2. Can the design of an IDMS be decomposed and expressed in terms of the constructs as 
asserted by the system sub-framework? 
Again, the biggest weakness of this approach is the lack of concept of attacker. 
 
3. Can the constructs of the system sub-framework by used to narrate the lived experience? 
There are some missing elements here, such as the ability of the Organisation to impose the system on the 
target population, which would appear to be a major structural property. 
 
4. Do the constructs in the individual sub-framework capture individuals’ concerns over, and 
willingness to accept a new IDMS? 
Some finer grained elements would seem to be needed here. For example, there are a number of types of 
severity - the severity of a failure of the system for an individual in both false positive and false negative terms. 
Consider the difference between failed identity checking for payments. Where the individual who is 
impersonated is liable for the costs then individuals want stronger identity checking. When the whole system is 
liable then checking is seen as an inconvenience. What is the severity of false negative (payment refused 
because of identity checking failure for the legitimate subject) compared to the severity of false positive 
(impersonation)? 
 
5. Do the hypothesised relationships between the various sub- frameworks within the unified 
framework have merit? 
They do, but there are missing dependencies in the graph such as links between population comprehension 
and identity exposure. Apparent identity exposure and actual identity exposure are different, but related to 
each other. 
 
6. Are there any other important constructs or relationships that are missing from the unified 
framework and its sub-frameworks? 
Perception/reality differences for some of the elements. The position of attackers and the modeling of 
cost/benefit models for likely attackers. 
 
7. Can the framework by used to aid system implementers to design human-centred IDMS? 
It is certainly a step in the right direction. 
 
8. Does the framework help researchers identify potential new areas of research? 
It is a useful contribution to the debate. As presented, there is something of a problem with distinguishing 
between the views of the researcher and the views of the example subject (the UK IDPA) on the utility of the 
proposed and now mostly dropped UK ID cards. A better distinction between the framework and the 
application of the framework to an example case would be needed to help researchers evaluate its contribution. 
 
9. Does the framework add any value to the identity field? 
The importance of the lived experience to the design of identity systems cannot be overstated. Any work that 
highlights these kinds of issues well improves the field. 
10. What improvements can be made to the framework? 
See earlier comments about attackers and distinguishing between actualities and perceptions, as filtered 
through comprehensions. 
 
 
Iain Henderson 
In overall terms, I think this framework is a very useful one, and can be built out in many useful directions. It is 
the first I have seen prepared to operate at such a detailed level; most attempts bail out before the detail (where 
the devils are...). 
 
I had two specific thoughts on terminology where I felt some improvement could be made; the terms below are 
where I think greater clarity could be added. 
 
Information' Variability - The degree to which the identity information may be used for purposes beyond those 
for which it is collected, irrespective of preventative laws the may be enacted to prevent .... 
 
Intimacy – the percentage of the target population that is already enrolled within in the system. The higher the 
number, the more organisations can rely on individuals as introducers of new..... 
 
Great work, are there any views on how to take this framework into operational reality down the track? 
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Lothar Fitsch 
1. Do the constructs asserted in the organisation sub-framework reflect real-world issues that 
organisations deal with when implementing of an IDMS? 
1.3.2 seems to blend security considerations with business case parameters. Is this intentional? In addition, we 
feel that compliance management is missing, e.g. privacy compliance. Compliance could be hidden somewhere 
under “requirements”, or under “concerns” at the end of your process diagram. However, for businesses, 
compliance is a major issue. Cost of ownership of a particular technology, and its potential for future reuse or 
network effects could be mentioned. I interpreted 1.3.1b (“Intimacy”) as “potential for network effects”, but I 
might be wrong here? Generally, some form of corporate risk awareness (how much do we lose on compliance 
breach, or upon security incidents) could be a valuable addition. Last, not least, a technology-task-fit metric 
that determines in how far a IDM solution is compatible with the task it should solve would be useful. 
 
2. Can the design of an IDMS be decomposed and expressed in terms of the constructs as 
asserted by the system sub-framework? 
Overall, the system-based properties look usable. Some are vaguely defined, such as “Expert Analysis”. It might 
be worthwhile to look at the “structural property” table, and think of could services and web services. Is your 
model fit for large-scale distributed could systems with many owners and controllers? I suspect a property of 
“system fuzziness” indicating the distributedness of the system and its owners/controllers might provide useful 
additions! 
 
3. Can the constructs of the system sub-framework by used to narrate the lived experience? 
What is the sub-system framework? The word doesn’t exist in the section 1.1. 
 
4. Do the constructs in the individual sub-framework capture individuals’ concerns over, and 
willingness to accept a new IDMS? 
Direct properties such as convenience, and usability, and cost of use seem to be missing from your individual 
framework. They might fit under “concerns”, however. 
 
5. Do the hypothesised relationships between the various sub-frameworks within the unified 
framework have merit? 
Difficult to say. Generally, the 3-division of the diagram makes sense. However, the semantics of the arrows is 
not clear, as there is no introductory text to the diagram. Is this a flow chart? A sequence? A class diagram? 
Some of the boxes seem misplaced (however, as they don’t get defined extensively, that might just be my 
subjective judgment). 
An important issue is the weighting of factors, e.g. box 8 (Concerns) is a decisive one, which is not clear from 
the diagram, as it is one of three equal arrows into “Acceptance”. 
 
6. Are there any other important constructs or relationships that are missing from the unified 
framework and its sub-frameworks? 
The “business model” of the target system is supposedly hidden in 1) “Purpose”? I can’t find a place to put the 
compliance topic into the diagram. Possibly on the arrow from 1) to 7)? 
 
7. Can the framework by used to aid system implementers to design human- centred IDMS? 
The definition of “Human-centered” is not obvious to me. The “human factors” seem solely represented in box 
8 “concerns”. 
 
8. Does the framework help researchers identify potential new areas of research? 
The framework seems to accommodate some of our ideas of privacy risk sources in IDM from the PETweb II 
project. It might be inspirational for a framework there (see attached article) 
 
9. Does the framework add any value to the identity field? 
Hard to say, as the semantics & definitions for all the boxes are not given. 
 
10. What improvements can be made to the framework? 
You need better to add definitions of the boxed concepts, and a description of how they relate to specification 
and prototyping. 
 
Does your work base on some requirements engineering or usability engineering process? There should be a 
number of references in your text, e.g. about rapid prototyping, requirements engineering, and “human –
centered design. 
 
The evaluation case studies that follow the framework are interesting. However, there is little introduction to 
them, and no explanation how they are related to the framework model. Possibly you could sketch a “process 
diagram” where you show and explain how the questionnaires and the framework model are used together to 
make decisions about IDM deployment? The diagram in Fig. 3 is a good start, however its semantics are not 
quite clear, as e.g. there are two arrows leaving the start box where I was not sure what I should do next. 
Following the process, I noticed that the “concerns” box comes rather late – after most things are defined. In 
my experience, in such a late phase of development, user feedback will, most likely be ignored. Concerns 
should be evaluated long before the “system design” phase. 
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Seda Gruses 
1. Do the constructs asserted in the organisation sub-framework reflect real world issues that 
organisations deal with when implementing an IDMS? 
Authenticity and uniqueness seem like very important criteria from an organizational perspective for an 
identity scheme. I am less sure about some of the assumptions that are embedded into those paragraphs: 
a) assumptions that parents can vouch for children: this really depends on the context, there are systems where 
the objective is the opposite: to provide children some protection from their parents. This assumption is 
negligible and not central to the validity of the rest of your model, however, it does give a normative feeling to 
the text. This normativity may be the objective of the author, in which case, it should be made more explicit in 
the beginning of the document. 
 
b) to ensure that an individual does not enroll into the system more than once, you need to collect and check 
individuals' biometric information: this is a very strong statement. It is true that biometrics do increase 
uniqueness in an identity system (assuming that the biometric used provides unique results. Uniqueness has 
been questioned even for DNA databases, but ok, let's hold on to that assumption). However, it is something 
else to say that they are the pre-condition for uniqueness. For example, my birth certificate has no biometrics 
on it. There are a reasonable number of identification schemes where organizations do not make use of 
biometrics. I read the definition of the author for biometrics not to be limited to digital biometrics (i.e., 
including analog biometrics), but given the context, suggesting that there can be no uniqueness without 
biometrics throws out all those identification schemes which do not rely on biometrics (in the digital/discretely 
measured sense of the word). I believe this is a bit too strong of a statement. 
 
Finally, I would expect that the security of biometrics would also play a role for the organization. Let us assume 
a world where biometrics have been put to use intensively. Let us also assume that there were a number of 
accidents and these biometric databases were leaked to the public, the biometrics hence become widely 
available. It is no longer very viable to use these biometrics, as the likelihood of abuse increases. Further, the 
biometrics themselves have to be secured properly. Otherwise, vulnerabilities of the biometric system could be 
used to abuse the identity management system (e.g., by replacing the biometric templates of individuals). 
These are important and costly matters for any organization. 
 
2. Can the design of IDMS be decomposed and expressed in terms of the constructs as asserted 
by the system sub-framework? 
The constructs are rather interesting and helpful. The shortcomings are in their definitions, which are not 
always very precise. For example: 
 
a) Identity exposure: the degree of control that an individual has in the presentation of her identity to the rest 
of society... what do you mean by presentation of the identity to the rest of society? do you mean making the 
identity publicly accessible? 
 
b) Information variability: ...irrespective of preventative laws that may be enacted to prevent it... there seems 
to be a circular argument here, it is also not clear what is being prevented? :) 
 
A general tightening of the definitions may also increase the readability of the rest of the text. An additional 
concept to consider is how much control an individual has once the identity has been disclosed? I am talking 
about the possibility to make use of capabilities similar to "subject access rights" as defined in the data 
protection legislation, e.g., to ask for transparency, corrections, as well as deletion of data. Further, there are 
aspects of complaints, things going wrong, and mismatches etc., which are mentioned by the author at 
different points of the text. It would be nice to have a concept that captures those issues as a separate concern. 
 
3) Can the constructs of the system sub-framework used to narrate the lived experience?  
see (2). 
 
4) Do the constructs in the individual sub-framework capture individuals' concerns over, and 
willingness to accept a new IDMS?  
I believe that a number of very important aspects of the lived experience and the resulting willingness to accept 
are covered by the concepts. However, it seems that the author uses further concepts later on in the paper 
which are not mentioned in section 1.2: i.e., burden, privacy and freedom concerns, false accusations. It may be 
better to introduce these concepts in Section 1.2. 
 
There are also further aspects: 
profiling and discrimination: I believe this is always appearing in the author's evaluation of the lived 
experience and easily can be made more explicit. The author may also want to look at Solove's taxonomy of 
privacy violating activities to see if there are further concerns that you may want to capture. Nissenbaum's 
concept of contextual integrity may also be relevant to see if further concepts of information flow (what 
happens to information after identity is disclosed) may be formally integrated into the framework. Currently, 
the model seems to neglect the life cycle of identity information beyond what is on the tokens, e.g., profiling 
and tracking over time by linking transactions across contexts using the identity as a basis. The author also 
mentions paranoia as a concern. This might be the discourse in the U.K., but usually this is referred to as the 
"chilling effect". You might want to describe the privacy and freedom concerns in those terms without 
psychologizing individuals, i.e., suggesting they become paranoid. :) 
 
Finally, I believe that what the author is doing is very close to a proportionality test of a planned technology. 
You may want to look at: Giovanni Iachello and Gregory D. Abowd. Privacy and proportionality: Adapting 
legal evaluation techniques to inform design in ubiquitous computing. In International Conference for Human-
Computer Interaction, pages 91 – 100, 2005. In this article further relevant concepts may be of interest. The 
article nicely shows that there are matters of acceptability that are beyond the acceptance of systems by 
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individuals, i.e., is the system acceptable for the society. This is likely to be outside of the scope of framework, 
but will hopefully be mentioned in the thesis as a necessary element of evaluation of the acceptability of 
systems. 
 
5) Do the hypothesized relationships between the various sub- frameworks within the unified 
framework have merit? 
I am not sure how to best evaluate the model proposed in Figure 2. I think the text would benefit from a more 
explicit definition of these relationships. My main problem with the figure is that some entities refer to 
stakeholders of the system (e.g., relying parties) while others are requirements. I believe that the model would 
benefit from the introduction of all stakeholders (relying party, organisations (I would prefer to call them 
identity providers), and individual users) and then you can use those stakeholders' positions to identify the 
relationships between the elements in the framework. This may of course lead to a more complicated 
framework, which will have to be balanced with the necessity to keep your framework simple and readable. A 
challenging work, indeed! I would also imagine that more elements of the framework are related to the 
concerns of the individuals, currently it reads as if individuals would only have concerns with respect to 
information variability. 
 
6) Are there any other important constructs or relationships that are missing from the unified 
framework and its sub-frameworks?  
I believe I mentioned them under the different questions above. One thing that is missing in the framework, 
but it is important to Figure 1: the Identity Ecosystem. Here the figure is assuming a very specific architecture 
for Identity Management systems. This may be the popular model that is used in the different Identity 
Management systems the author studied. However, this model has been diversified technologically, and 
depending on the technical architecture, the roles of the stakeholders as well as the concerns change. I would 
very much like to see how your evaluation changes not only based on the purpose of the system and user 
perception, but also based on the type of architecture that is implemented. Specifically, I am thinking of the 
PRIME/PRIME-LIFE architecture of anonymous credentials, attribute based identity management systems 
(where it is not necessary to identify the individual but have her prove certain claims etc.) for a short non-
technical overview, the author may want to look at the following paper (I apologize for the self-reference): A 
critical review of 10 years of privacy technology George Danezis and Seda Gürses Surveillance Cultures: A 
Global Surveillance Society?, April 2010, UK section on privacy as control. 
 
7) Can the framework be used to aid system implementers to design human-centered IDMS? 
I am not sure what to think of IDMS and human-centeredness. Unfortunately, most IDMS are constructed to 
manage populations and are not concerned with user interests. Further, a lot of the problems in the IDMS 
context occur because the implementers neglect rights that individuals (should) have, e.g., see the case of the 
U.K. biometric I.D. which has not been scrapped but is only applied to individuals with less rights 
(immigrants). Making these systems "acceptable" may lead to a further neglect of those rights. Most of the 
time, individuals are forced to use identity mechanisms if they want to have access to resources, e.g., food, 
travel, health etc. I would imagine, human-centricity, a so-far undefined concept, to be something else. 
 
However, I believe your framework manages to point to ways of understanding the lived experience of the 
individuals who have to participate in such systems. In that sense it is an important contribution, as it puts the 
users of those systems as important stakeholders. I believe further work in this direction may be helpful in 
guiding the implementation process of "organization-centric" IDMS. 
 
8) Does the framework help researchers identify potential new areas of research? 
Absolutely, I really think that the work is a step forward in thinking about how to bring in the lived experience 
of users. Future work in this direction would benefit from ways of bringing other stakeholders into the 
evaluation of these systems and an elaboration of the evaluation process, as discussed in Figure 3. 
 
9) Does the framework add any value to the identity field? 
see (7) and (8) 
 
10) What improvements can be made to the framework? 
The document would benefit from a longer introduction. It took me a long time to figure out where the journey 
was going. here are some more specific points:  
- Figure 1 needs to be revised. According to the figure, an organisation implements IDMS, suggesting that the 
Relying Party is not an organisation. There are some buildings on the top right hand side, but I am not sure 
who they stand for? Not all IDMS systems look like this, so the author should document which IDMS system he 
has in mind. 
- the definitions in Table 1 need revising. Again, they assume a type of IDMS in which there is a unique identity 
across all contexts. If these definitions are based on the 14 systems that the author studied, then this should be 
made explicit. Otherwise, the author may benefit from studying glossaries coming out if IDM projects for 
improving the definitions of some of the concepts (see deliverables from PRIME, PRIME Life, FIDIS, GINI, 
TAS3 in the EU context). 
 
- there are a number of grammatical and spelling mistakes. Taking care of these would improve the text. - part 
of what the author is doing is technically known as threat and risk analysis. For example, there are also risks 
with respect to the relationship between the identity providing organization and the relying parties, e.g., the 
relying party may abuse the identity system in various ways, the relying party also needs to authenticate, audits 
and other accountability concerns. The author may want to capture these issues more formally, as they are also 
of interest to the individuals. - the rating used in the evaluation of IDMS is not very articulate. For example, on 
page 19, when the author evaluates subject engagement, one issue is found to be "high", the other "low", the 
outcome is hence "medium". It is not clear to me, what the rating in each case refers to, e.g., high impact, high 
risk, high probability of occurrence, and how high + low = medium? :) 
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Appendix(IX:"Example"Checklist"for"Human:Centered"IDMS"
!
!
1. What is the purpose of the IDMS, and what problem is it supposed to help tackle? 
          
           
2. Who will require use or access the identities on the system? 
 
List all relying parties (including individuals, i.e. public). 
 
For Each Relying Party         
3. What is the objective of the Relying Party? 
          
           
3.1. Service:  Enablement  Disablement 
3.2. Function:  Authentication   Link individual between contexts 
 
4. What set of information does the Relying Party need to access from the IDMS to fulfil its 
objective? 
 
List each item of information required. 
 
5. What accessibility options will the third party require to fulfil its objective? 
5.1. Authentication:   Local  Remote 
5.2. Identity Access:   Local Remote 
5.3. Write Access  Local Remote 
 
6. Under what conditions will the third party access the identity information? 
6.1. Risk Level:  Low  Medium High 
6.2. Timeliness:  Low  Medium High 
 
7. Who is the target for cnrollment, and what role/partial identity is relevant to the 
organisation and IDMS?  
          
           
8. Are there any organisations that can claim the authenticity of an individual?  
8.1. Universality:  Low  Medium High  
8.2. Trustworthiness: Low  Medium High 
 
9. Are there known and enrolled individuals on the IDMS who can vouch for un-enrolled 
individuals? 
9.1. Intimacy:  Low  Medium High 
9.2. Trustworthiness: Low  Medium High 
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10. What information is being collected to ensure the authenticity of the relevant identity?  
List each item of information being collected or attached to identity. 
 
Information Item Source Universality / Intimacy Trustworthiness 
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
11. How will the uniqueness of the identity be ensured and preserved? 
          
           
12. What are the performance metrics required for authentication? 
12.1. False Rejection Rates:   
12.2. False Acceptance Rate:   
12.3. Human Readability: Required Not Required 
 
13. Under what environmental conditions will the uniqueness information be collected? 
          
           
13.1. Spread:  Low  Medium High 
13.2. Control:  Low  Medium High 
 
 
14. Are there any requirements to adhere to biometric standards? 
14.1. International:       
14.2. Current Practices:      
 
 
 
 
15. What information is under consideration to preserve uniqueness, along with performance 
metrics? 
 
Information 
Item 
False 
Rejection 
Rate 
False 
Acceptance 
Rate 
Population 
Effect 
Environmental 
Effect 
Human 
Readability 
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16. Based on all the information in Q1 to Q15, assess and rate system level design properties of 
the system.  
 
Structural Properties Rating Metrical Properties Rating 
Control Points  Expert Analysis  
Subject Engagement  Population Comprehension  
Population Coverage  Subject Coupling  
Identity Exposure  Information Accuracy  
  Information Stability  
  Information Variability  
 
 
17. Based on the design properties, what kind of lived experience can be expected? How is the 
individual affected by the collection and used of his/her identity? 
          
           
18. What is the individuals’ perception of the overall purpose of the IDMS? 
18.1. Extent:   Low  Medium High 
18.2. Seriousness:  Low  Medium High 
18.3. Overall Importance: Low  Medium High 
 
19. What is the individuals’ perception of the information being collected, and how useful do 
they believe it will be to supporting the purpose of the IDMS? 
19.1. Information Quality: Low  Medium High 
19.2. System Usefulness: Low  Medium High 
 
20. What is the individual perception of the overall purpose of the IDMS? 
20.1. Extent:   Low  Medium High 
20.2. Seriousness:  Low  Medium High 
20.3. Overall Importance: Low  Medium High 
21. Do individuals’ have any concerns about the security of the information and any 
implications on their overall freedoms? 
21.1. Corruption:  Low  Medium High 
21.2. Insider Abuse:  Low  Medium High 
21.3. Hackers/Attacks: Low  Medium High 
21.4. Freedom:  Low  Medium High 
 
 
22. How likely are individuals’ willing to accept the IDMS? 
22.1. Acceptance:  Low  Medium High 
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Appendix(X:"Description"of"System"Based"Properties"
The following (see overleaf) provides an alternate reading to the System Study (Chapter 5). 
It is the article published in the IDIS 2010 journal, and is written differently, which may further aid 
understanding. 
 
While Chapter 5, describes the findings, it does so in the context of the overall analysis procedure. On the other 
hand, the following article focuses wholly on the findings of the research, i.e. the article is structured in such a 
way that each design property is introduced, explained, and exemplified atomically, and thus provides further 
clarity if needed. 
A framework for the lived experience of identity
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the framework within the contexts of two non-government identity platforms—
Facebook and Phorm. Practitioners and researchers would make use of this framework
by analysing an identity system in terms of the various properties, and the interactions
between these properties within the context of use, thus allowing for the development
of the potential impacts that the system has on the lived experience.
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Introduction: identity systems today
Identity is a construct that underlies the mechanisms which enable or prevent an
individual from performing certain actions in a social environment. Many
organisations seek to obtain—explicitly or implicitly—reliable proof of individuals’
identities, to ensure effective policing of their rules and policies. Ashbourn (2000)
describes how administrators in ancient Egypt used anthropometric techniques to
identify workers claiming their food rations, to prevent them collecting rations more
than once. Anthropometric techniques were used in France as a means of identifying
recidivists, so authorities could give them harsher sentences than first-time offenders
(Caplan and Torpey 2001). With the increasing use of IT systems, there is a growing
disembodiment of identity processes; interactions that were previously conducted
face-to-face, and using physical documents as evidence, are now mediated through
information and communication technology (Giddens 1991; Lyon 2002). There has
been a flurry of research in how to best represent and manage identities in this
context, and a number of different schemes and technologies have been proposed,
designed and implemented.
In the private sector, the eagerness to identify individuals and collect information
about them is driven by the promise of new revenue streams through the provision of
‘customer-centric’ personalized services. Recommender and social networking systems
rely on the aggregation of various types of information about individuals—the resulting
identity profiles allow third parties to judge the trustworthiness and the authenticity of
each respective individual (O’Donovan and Smyth 2005). The public sector wants to
harness similar approaches to reduce the costs of service delivery and increase
convenience through ‘citizen-centric’ services and data-sharing (Silcock 2001).
There is however, a risk that the labels ‘customer-centric’ or ‘citizen-centric’
remain a statement of intent, because the needs and wishes of individual customers
and citizens, and the impact of identity systems on their lived experience, are rarely
considered during the design process. The concept of lived experience increases the
scope of human-centred design beyond traditional usability concepts, which are
“directed more toward functional accounts of computers and human activities”
(McCarthy and Wright 2004). Designing for the lived experience requires an
understanding of “the relationship between people and technology in terms of felt
life and the felt or emotional quality of action and interaction” (McCarthy and
Wright 2004). Current approaches to human-centered identity do not consider the
impact on lived experience. For example, in a report sponsored by the Information
Commissioner’s Office (Workgroup on User-Centric Identity Management 2008),
discussions on empowering individuals were focused on the 3 traditional pillars for
human-centred design:
1) Usability—Making identity systems simple and easy to use reduces barriers to
adoption.
2) Privacy—Privacy concerns are a major factor in the adoption of identity
systems. These systems can involve the transfer of sensitive information
between different parties. Protecting privacy is important so as to prevent
personal information from falling into the wrong hands which can erode
autonomy and freedom.
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3) Trust—The degree of trust that individuals have in the organisation collecting
identity information mediates their concerns about privacy. High trust will
increase adoption of an identity system (Adams and Sasse 2001).
The discussions of the three aspects of identity systems are utilitarian—essentially
seeking to enable organisations to obtain individuals’ consent for collection and
sharing of information. It does not consider the more far-reaching impact of the use
of identity information on individuals, reducing the ‘human-centred’ discussion to
the technological issues surrounding data collection, and administrative benefits for
organisations. Not considering citizens’ needs and perceptions can affect the
adoption of such systems. Inglesant and Sasse (2007) conducted a series of case
studies on e-government systems commissioned to improve public transport in
London, and found that design and implementation decisions led to systems that did
not match citizen requirements, and often prompted citizen behaviour that under-
mined the policy those systems were supposed to support. This affects adoption rates
systems, and even in situations where citizens have little choice but adopt them—
creates an adversarial stance between the citizens and the owner-organisation, which
in turn increases the operational cost of such systems. Given that many e-
Government systems are commissioned to reduce cost, systems that create an
adversarial stance are counter-productive.
While citizens and customers have accepted some of the new identity systems,
they have also voiced their disagreement in other cases. Facebook users protested
when profile updates were broadcast (Hoadley et al. 2009), and there have been
campaigns against the introduction of national identity systems (Greenleaf and
Nolan 1986; The Register 2002; Davies 2005). In other cases, such as the Austrian
Citizen Card (Meints and Hansen 2006), there has been a lack of adoption. The
problem is that—despite claims that these technologies provide human-centred
identity solutions—most systems have been based on what is technically feasible,
and convenient from an administrative point of view. The needs and concerns of
citizens or customers are often assumed by those commissioning and designing the
identity solution, rather than researched (Lips et al. 2005). The impact on the lived
experience of different citizen groups is rarely considered during design, or
monitored after implementation.
In this paper, we present a framework that can be used to assess the design of an
identity system from the perspective of individuals, accounting for the potential
affects of the system on the lived experience. An individual here is defined as the
person whose identity and information is collected, stored and used within the
system. Current approaches to the development and analysis of identity systems lack
understanding of how identity systems practically affect individuals in their day-to-
day interactions within a society, and how this can affect them. The proposed
framework expands beyond these traditional boundaries by shifting focus onto the
identity ecosystem as a whole, recognizing the relationships that exist between the
individual, the system and society.
In “Human-centred identity: related models”, we present a critical review of
existing identity management frameworks and systems that claim to be human-
centred. “A new framework: discovering the lived experience of identity” describes
how the framework emerged as a result of a thematic analysis of 15 past and present
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national identity systems. The core elements of the framework are presented in
“Structural properties” and “Metrical properties”. “Combining properties” discusses
how those properties relate to each other, and how certain combinations within an
identity system can impact individuals’ lived experience.
“Applying framework to non-government identity systems” applies the properties
to non-government systems—Facebook and Phorm. This serves to illustrate the
generalizability of these properties and also acts as a form of validation. “Discussion
and conclusion” serves as a conclusion and discussion point for the proposed
framework. The strengths and weaknesses of the framework are examined, and
scope for further work and improvements is provided.
Human-centred identity: related models
There is a growing body of research on identity management that focuses on the
human element in identity systems. Much of the research is focussed on making
identity systems easier to use (Cameron 2005; Bramhall et al. 2007; Jøsang et al.
2007), issues of privacy (Bramhall et al. 2007; Cavoukian 2009; Camenisch et al.
2005; Berthold and Köhntopp 2001) and trust (Xin 2004; Backhouse and Halperin
2007) but does not consider the impact on an individual’s lived experience.
The 7 laws of identity
Developing the concept of the identity metasystem, Kim Cameron (Cameron 2005)
put forward 7 rules of identity. An identity metasystem is a unifying framework that
enables the integration of different underlying identification technologies, enabling
different identity platforms to work through a standardized interface. These rules
have become an accepted standard for identity systems. The rules that have been
defined are:
1. User Control and Consent
2. Minimal Disclosure for a Constrained Use
3. Justifiable Parties
4. Directed Identity
5. Pluralism of Operators and Technologies
6. Human Integration
7. Consistent Experience Across Contexts
These 7 rules represent a foundation for eliminating the “patchwork of identity
one-offs that is currently available on the internet” (Cameron 2005). However, they
focus on individuals as users of the system, and tackle usability issues that
individuals encounter when using identity systems; the aim is to give users control
and allow them to make decisions that reflect their preferences. For example,
individuals should understand which organisations will receive their information,
and agree to the uses that the organisation makes of their personal information.
While Cameron’s 2nd and 3rd laws on constrained use and justifiable parties
address certain non-interaction issues on the use of information by the consuming
party, the aim is to ensure that the individual is aware of how the information is used,
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and by whom. It does not consider why an individual might be reluctant to provide
certain information to certain parties. While the laws provide a useful set of user-
centred design principles, they do not examine the impact of the system beyond the
point of interaction.
Privacy
Privacy is a multi-dimensional concept that incorporates the physical, psychological,
interactional and information domain (Burgoon 1982; Davies 1997; Decew 1997).
Privacy assessments of identity systems typically fall into the informational privacy
domain (Smith et al. 1996). This results in a set of best use practices, which are
integrated into the development of new Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs)
(Goldberg 2003), or as guidelines for the development of laws that aim to minimise
threats to privacy. Various privacy laws and standards exist: the UK Data Protection
Act (DPA), the FTC Fair Information Practices (FIP), or the more recent Global
Privacy Standard (GPS). The GPS has been proposed as a “single harmonized set of
universal privacy principles”. The GPS consists of 10 privacy principles (Cavoukian
2010):
1. Consent
2. Accountability
3. Specific Purposes
4. Collection Limitation (Data Minimization)
5. Use, Retention and Disclosure Limitation
6. Accuracy
7. Security
8. Openness
9. Access
10. Compliance
These principles provide a foundation for an individual’s rights over the collection
and use of his/her personal information by organisations. However, these codes of
conduct also seek to promote business through the “free and uninterrupted (but
responsible) flow and uses of personal data” (Cavoukian 2009). While there is a need
to balance individual and organisational needs, these principles are focused on the
practices of the organisation, and not on the impact to the individual. For example, the
collection of information for a specific purpose does not account for the individual’s
perception of that purpose. In systems where participation is voluntary, the principle of
consent allows individuals to act on their perceptions. However, the privacy principles
do not help us to understand why individuals would not consent. While privacy
principles can restrict organisational usage of an individual’s data, they do not help to
generate consent from the individual to provide his/her information. Individuals are
considered as customers instead of actors in the identity ecosystem.
Xin’s trust model
Xin (2004) developed a comprehensive model of trust that aims to predict individual
trust intentions towards National Identity Systems, determining the likely adoption
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of the system (Fig. 1). This approach can be seen as being more human centric when
compared to the 7 laws of identity and the privacy approaches seen previously.
While the trust model lacks grounding in large empirical studies, its development is
based on existing recognized models, such as the Theory of Reasoned Action
(Fishbein 1975) and Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1985).
An individual’s trusting intention towards identity system depends on 3 assess-
ments that the individual makes about the context:
1) the individual’s positive/negative Attitude towards the trusting action
2) his/her judgment on the Subjective Norms
3) the individual’s Perceived Behavioural Control
Each judgement, in turn, is determined by a set of behavioural, normative and
control beliefs. Beliefs are the “subjective probability of a relation between the
object of belief and some other object, value, concept or attribute” (Fishbein and
Ajzen 1975). The beliefs influence the judgements:
1) Behavioural Beliefs influence Attitude
2) Normative Beliefs influence Subjective Norm
3) Control Beliefs influence Perceived Behavioural Control
Finally, beliefs are built on specific contextual properties. Building on other trust
literature, Xin’s (2004) developed a set of context-specific variables for National
Identity Systems. These variables called ‘bases’ consist of the personality, cognitive,
calculative and institutional base. Through empirical research, it was established
that:
1) Cognitive Base determined behavioural and Normative Beliefs
2) Calculative Base affected the Normative Beliefs
3) Personality Base influenced the Institutional Base
Fig. 1 Xin’s trust model towards national IDMS
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4) Institutional Base influenced an individual’s Perceived Behavioural Control.
While the model is comprehensive, it does not support designers aiming to
build a human-centred identity system since the trusting bases, attitudes and
beliefs are only an individual’s opinions about performing the trusting action,
e.g. signing up for the National Identity System. It does not link the trust model
to the actual design of the system. The contextual variables are not connected to
any specific implementation details. The framework can help implementers
understand an individuals’ general thought processes in the development of
trusting intentions, thus enabling the creation of more trusting situations. For
example, recommendations to increase trust based on this model include the use
of focus groups to generate positive feedback that can be publicised to
manipulate the perceived reputation of the system (Xin 2004). Effectively, these
recommendations are limited to the manipulation of the situational constructs that
the system is implemented in, as opposed to detailing how the system itself can
influence the lived experience, and hence trust.
Table 1 Definitions of construct’s in Xin’s trust model
Construct Definition
Attitude People’s evaluation of trusting in NID systems when the government implements
them nationwide in the near future.
Subjective Norm How the people important to you think you should or should not make yourself
vulnerable to NID systems when the government implements them nationwide
in the near future.
Perceived Behavioural
Control
Peoples perceived internal/external opportunities and constraints on being
vulnerable to NID systems when the U.S. government implements them
nationwide in the near future.
Behavioural Beliefs Peoples perceptions and information about the consequences of trusting NID
systems.
Normative Beliefs Peoples perceptions and information about the others’ opinions on NID systems.
Control Beliefs Peoples perceptions of their ability, their knowledge about the recourses,
opportunities, and constraints of trusting in NID systems.
Personality Base Peoples general tendency to trust an object
○ Faith in humanity
○ Trusting stance
Cognitive Base Various cognitive cues and impressions on which people form their trusts
○ Reputation
○ Stereotyping
○ Illusion of Control
Calculative Base Refers to some calculative processes involving perceived cost and benefit of
performing the trusting behaviour.○ Benefits vs. Costs
Institutional Base The impersonal structures that are inherent in a specific circumstance and
facilitate trust building in this circumstance○ Situational
Normality
○ Structural Assurance
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A new framework: discovering the lived experience of identity
Analyzing identity schemes from the traditional usability, privacy and trust
perspective abstracts the identity system from the specific consequences that it has
on individuals’ lives and the various coping strategies that might be adopted. We talk
about ‘data minimisation’ or ‘ease of use’, but what does it mean to an individual?
How does it affect an individual’s relationship with the organisation and society?
The current frameworks have been useful for the development of better systems, but
in applying these principles we lose sight of the entire context of implementation, i.e.
the identity ecosystem that recognizes the relationships that exist between the
individual, system and society. Therefore, the claim that an identity system is
human-centred is largely rhetorical; we assume that individuals want better controls
and collection of less data, but we have no idea as to how and under what conditions
it affects their perceptions. For example, the advertising platform Phorm was
deployed by Internet Service Providers with the intention to serve personalised
advertisements, based on an individual’s online browsing habits. Although privacy
experts had given the system their approval, Phorm still raised privacy concerns for
customers leading to protests and vigorous opposition (BBC, 2008b).
Practitioners and researchers require a way of analysing the lived experience that
results from participating in an identity ecosystem. We require a framework that will
allow them to assess how the designs of an identity system might influence an
individual’s perception of the context, and therefore how the system can shape an
individual’s reactions when encountering such systems.
Methodology
A tool aiming to assess the impact of an identity system design should be expressed
as a set of configuration properties into which any such system can be decomposed.
We have identified these properties through a review of past and present National
Identity Systems. The scope of that review was limited to National Identity Systems
in the Western world, largely focusing on a timeframe extending from the medieval
periods to the present day, as these countries have been leading the development and
adoption of modern identity systems (Torpey 2000).
The systems that formed the focus of the review (see Table 2) were
implementations of Identity Systems that supported the development of Nation
States, its control over migration and crime, and the provision of welfare and
services. The aim of the analysis was to tie the known outcomes of each system to
specific design aspects. Each system was treated as a unique case study, and a
corpus of written work (largely from secondary sources that review the entire
situation) centred on each identity scheme was collected for analysis.
Thematic Coding (Marks and Yardley 2004; Flick 2002) was used to identify
similarities across the narratives of the various past and present national-scale
identity schemes. Thematic coding is a qualitative research method the makes use of
a constant comparison paradigm between several case studies, attempting to identify
patterns that relate to the phenomena of interest. The method enables the
identification of themes across different contexts from large volumes of data. Our
analysis treated each national identity system as a separate case, and identified
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features of each system that led to the documented responses from the various
stakeholders. The analysis took place in three main phases:
1. Reviewing an authoritative and recognized documentation of each implemen-
tation, determining the degree of adoption, and the various reactions towards the
system implementation. Did individuals sign up to a voluntary system? Did they
attempt to evade non-voluntary systems? Did they change their habits as a result
of being part of the system?
2. Discover the arguments that lead individuals to react in the manner identified-
how did they feel about the system?
3. Code the basic features, i.e. the design properties of the system that brought
about the identified reactions of individuals.
As a brief example, the analysis of the use of badges under the Poor Laws in 17th
century England began by identifying the theme of rejection among the individuals who
were to enroll into the system (Caplan and Torpey 2001; Carroll 1996). Analysing the
main documentation, and where required accompanied by relevant support material,
we found that rejection stemmed from feelings of shame that arose from being
registered in the scheme. We can then identify the characteristics of the system that
Table 2 National identity systems analyzed
System Country Purpose
Poor Laws and Badges United Kingdom To provide members of organisations proof
of association
Criminal ‘Wanted’
Lists
– To provide for accurate identification of individuals
especially criminals
Internal Passports Russia To track movement of locals in the country
Passports Netherlands To prevent or monitor the entry of dangerous foreign
radicals into the country
French Nomad Law France Identification and monitoring of unwanted members
of the population
National ID Cards United Kingdom
Germany
To provide unique identities to individuals allowing
easy identification of the entire population.
Bertillonage France To identify recidivists enabling enforcement of severe
punishment
Dactyloscopy Argentina To identify recidivists enabling enforcement of severe
punishment
US Visit Programme United States To identify criminals and terrorists entering or leaving
the country
UAE Iris Scan United Arab Emirates To accurately identify known individuals against
captured Iris scans (e.g. criminals)
Criminal DNA
Database
United Kingdom To accurately identify individuals against DNA samples
Contact Point United Kingdom To identify children in need of protection services
before serious harm is caused
PKI and Digital
Signatures
Austria To provide individuals access to services in a virtual
environment
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triggered these emotions the feelings of shame were triggered by the constant wearing
of the badges, which exposed a small set of individuals to the rest of the population.
These system characteristics formed the basis of the coding procedure in the analysis.
The codes were developed to express basic design aspects of an identity system. Using
the above example, we code ‘the need to constantly wear badges’ as a design property
that is expressed asControl Points; Control Points capture the number of places where
identity is required to proceed with some action. The exposure of the identity to the
rest of society is captured by the code Identity Exposure; this property expresses how
much control an individual has in the presentation of the identity to the rest of society.
Finally, the small set of individuals enrolled in the system is captured by the concept
of Population Participation; the ratio of individuals enrolled into the system to the rest
of the population that are not enrolled.
The codes have been developed to express a measure of the amount of relevant
affordances that the system can provide for each property. Therefore, the Poor Laws
with the badges would have a high number of Control Points, a high degree of
Identity Exposure and a low level of Population Coverage. It is the interaction of
these design properties that brings about the feelings of shame that were identified as
the cause of rejection.
Further analysis of all the codes, revealed that the design properties can be
distinguished into two main categories: structural properties and the metrical properties
(see Table 3). Structural properties focus on the design aspects that capture the flow
and relationship of an individual’s information within the identity ecosystem created.
Metrical properties are based on the qualities that are affected by the type and amount
of information that is being collected and used in the identity system.
Setting the context
In this section, we introduce two identity systems that were used in the thematic
coding process—UK DNA Database and the Austrian Citizen Card. An outline of
the basic implementation details and the eventual outcomes is provided for both
identity systems. This section does not touch on any of the properties that have been
uncovered, but serves as a base for contextualising the properties when they are
introduced in the following sections. Doing so is useful, as it allows the later
introduction of each property to be discussed and elaborated upon within a particular
context.
Table 3 System properties
Structural properties Metrical properties
Control Points Population Comprehension
Subject Engagement Expert Interpretation
Identity Exposure Information Accuracy
Population Coverage Information Stability
Subject Coupling
Information Polymorphism
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The UK criminal DNA database is an identity system consisting of a central
database that stores an individual’s DNA sample, and creates an identifier by
analyzing 10 different regions of randomly repeating DNA sequences (Short Tandem
Repeat Sequences) that differ among individuals (Parliamentary Office of Science
and Technology 2006a). Such systems are typically accessed by law enforcement
agencies to identify suspects, by matching crime scene DNA samples to those in the
database. The DNA database can be considered an extreme form of identity
management. For example, DNA identification has become a highly deterministic in
that judgements are made solely on DNA identification—irrespective of other
evidence—even though experts warn of the dangers this harbours (2009). The
system contains not only the DNA of convicted criminals, but of all suspects, and
persons who gave DNA for purposes of being eliminated from an investigation.
There has been a public debate on the way in which the system is operated, and legal
challenges which resulted in a recent ruling that the system violates Article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights (BBC 2008b).
The second identity system covers digital identities in an online environment. Austria
is regarded as a leading implementer of e-government among the European countries. To
facilitate its vision for the provision of online services, the government concluded that it
required a system to support the identification and interaction of services in a digital
environment. The concept of the Austrian Citizen Card was defined to fill this role
(Leitold and Posch 2004). Even though the name ‘Citizen Card’ suggests otherwise, it is
not a single physical card—rather, it is a concept for a set of standards and requirements
that have been developed to support digital identification and authentication (Arora
2008). The Citizen Card outlines mechanisms for secure digital identity and digital
signatures. Individuals can obtain Citizen Cards from a number of providers. For
example, digital signatures are automatically loaded onto official government eCards,
where individuals will need to voluntarily activate the digital signatures in order to use
it. Alternatively, individuals can choose to load and activate the digital signatures onto
Bank ATM cards and even mobile phones (Meints and Hansen 2006).
Rollout of the Austrian Citizen Cards to the entire population was completed by
the end of 2005, but by early 2009, only 74,000 individuals had activated their
digital identities and signatures (Martens 2010). This represents 0.9% of the overall
Austrian population, with a very slight increase of about 0.2% from the year ending
2005 (Meints and Hansen 2006). A-Trust, an Austrian certification service provider,
attributes the lack of adoption to the complexity, cost and lack of benefit from an
individual’s point of view (Sokolov 2006a, b).
Structural properties
This section introduces the structural properties of the framework. Each individual
property will be applied to the UK DNA Database and the Austrian Citizen Card
contexts (see “Privacy”). The structure of an identity system refers to the manner in
which an identity ecosystem is constructed—these are key choices system owners
and designers can make about the identity system, which directly impact an
individual’s lived experience. These properties seek to capture the flow of
information inside the web of identity that is established. The structure of an
identity scheme will define how the interaction between individual and society is
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shaped by the identification system, affecting the possible outcomes that an
individual will face.
Control Points
One of the main structural properties of any identity system can be expressed in
terms of the number of Control Points, which represents the situations in which an
individual’s identity is required in order to proceed with a particular function. This
includes situations where identity and personal information are being consumed for
the purpose of identification and authorisation, as well as situations where the
information is being captured for the purpose of enrolment or updating. A simple
example would be the need to show proof of age when purchasing alcohol. Without
the proof, the individual would not be able to proceed with the purchase. When an
identity ecosystem contains a large number of Control Points, the identity is
frequently accessed by the relying party. A low number of Control Points implies
that an individual’s identity is not used or requested frequently.
In the context of the DNA Database, each time a DNA sample is extracted from a
crime scene or taken from an individual it is checked against every single identity
entry in the database. According to the official statistics (National Policing
Improvement Agency 2010) in 2008/09, a total of 14,452 crime scene samples
have produced a match from the DNA database, with a total of 410,589 matches
since 1998. This means that every single identity within the system has been
accessed, at the very least, 14,452 times in 2008/2009—a high number of Control
Points. In contrast, the Austrian Citizen Card system is designed as a voluntary
system to support eGovernment services. However, the average number of
interactions between individuals and the public sector has been roughly estimated
to be “1.7 contacts per year” (Aichholzer and Strauß 2010). This represents a low
number of Control Points. Furthermore, for a majority of these online services can
be accessed without the use of an Austrian Citizen Card (Aichholzer and Strauß
2010). As the Citizen Card does not have to be used in these contexts, they are not
true Control Points, further reducing this number.
How does the number of Control Points affect the lived experience? A high or
low number of Control Points in itself is not positive or negative. A high number of
Control Points in the DNA database implies that an individual’s identity is
constantly being accessed. This means the DNA Database becomes a surveillance
tool that authorities use to deter individuals in the database from committing crimes
(2007; Science and Public Protection 2009). Situations where individuals are
“constantly watched” can create feelings of paranoia, which can limit individual
freedom. The low number of Control Points in the Austrian system indicates a lack
of opportunity to make use of the identity, creating perceptions that there is little
benefit in using the system (Aichholzer and Strauß 2010).
Subject Engagement
This property captures whether an individual is an active or passive participant in the
use of the identity. A system with a high level of Engagement gives individuals an
active role in the presentation of their identity, usually meaning an individual needs
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to be present, or is at least aware, when their identity is used. On the other end of the
spectrum, individuals can be completely passive members of an identity scheme.
Systems with a centralized database that stores information usually have low levels
of Subject Engagement, as records stored on the database can be accessed by the
organisation without the individual being present, and be unaware that the identity is
being accessed.
Forensic criminal identification systems—by their nature—do not directly involve
individuals, because there is an assumption that criminals will attempt to evade
authorities if they are aware that they have been identified as suspects of a crime.
The DNA database is no exception; an individual is only involved during the initial
DNA collection, and following positive identification. Any other access of the
information happens without the individual’s involvement or knowledge. Therefore,
as an individual assumes a very passive role, the DNA database has a low degree of
Subject Engagement. In contrast, the Austrian Citizen Card is a voluntary system
that requires individuals to take initiative in the activation and use of their digital
signature (Aichholzer and Strauß 2010). It has a high degree of Subject Engagement.
If there is a low level of Subject Engagement, individuals may not be aware when
their identity is being used. This can create concerns about who might be accessing
the identity, what they may be doing with the information and the consequences this
might have for the individual. In the case of the DNA Database, DNA profiles have
been handed out to private firms for research purposes, such as the development of
familial searching (identifying relatives through DNA), without the respective
individual’s knowledge (Hope 2008). A high level of Subject Engagement minimises
this risk for privacy invasions, but introduces the possibility of the system becoming
an unacceptable burden for an individual, as he or she is now required to exert effort
to make use of the identity. The activation process for the Austrian Citizen Cards is
cumbersome. The actual usage of the digital signatures has a high learning curve,
and problems can still occur during use (Aichholzer and Strauß 2010). Therefore, the
system requires a large amount of effort in relation to the potential benefits, helping
to explain the resistance in the form of non-adoption of the system.
Identity Exposure
An individual is typically enrolled into an identity system to determine his/her
respective rights, privileges and/or the necessary course of action—this involves the
presentation and use of individual identities at various Control Points. The process
of the identity being accessed and used by a relying party carries with it the risk of
the identity being exposed to other, non-reliant parties. Uncontrolled disclosure of
information can be expressed as the degree of Identity Exposure; it refers to the
degree of control that individuals have over the presentation of his/her identity to the
rest of society, highlighting issues around social perceptions, values and acceptance
of such identities. A system with a high degree of exposure constantly reveals the
identity information to third parties that have no rights or permission to obtaining the
identity. Identity systems that allow an individual to preserve the integrity of the
identity from other parties have a low degree of Identity Exposure.
In the case of the DNA database, individuals have no control over the
presentation of their (“criminal”) identity to the rest of society. This is especially
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true in connection with serious crimes, where a positive DNA match is seen as an
indication of guilt, and can trigger a man-hunt via media channels. The Austrian Citizen
Card has been designed as an identification and authentication mechanism, and
therefore does not provide the identity of the individual to anyone but the relying parties
the individual is interacting with. The use of sectoral identifiers—which are unique
identification numbers that differ within different contexts of use—further protects
individuals from exposure; there are 26 sectors (such as tax, health, education, etc.) that
each use a different identifier per individual. This prevents the connection of different
identities across separate contexts (Aichholzer and Strauß 2010).
A high degree of Identity Exposure potentially means an individual cannot evade
judgement by third parties based on the revealed identity. Shortly after the European
Court ruling on the database being a “breach of rights” (BBC 2008b), a police chief
at the time defended the database stating that “the public expectation now is that
crime will be solved, not by the presence of witnesses, but because there will be
DNA...” (O’Neill 2008). Although not a directly associated with the UK DNA
Database, the events following the disappearance of Madeline McCann in Portugal
illustrate public perceptions of the connotations of a DNA match. When Madeline’s
DNA was found in the boot of the car that her parents had hired, initial sympathy
over the disappearance of their daughter quickly turned to “defamatory comments”
because the presence of DNA was seen as proof of their involvement in her
disappearance (The Independent 2007). A low degree of Identity Exposure means
there is a low risk of uncontrolled exposure of an individual’s identity. In the
Austrian Citizen Card Scheme, an individual’s digital identity and signature is
loaded onto his/her personal device, such as the government eCard. The device and
therefore, the identity is under the individual’s control ensuring that the identity
doesn’t leak out without the individuals knowledge (Leitold et al. 2002).
Furthermore, the use of the identity takes place in a digital medium that makes
use of encryption and secure digital channels for communication. This provides the
system with a low degree of Identity Exposure ensuring that the individual remains
in control of the identity.
Population Coverage
Population Coverage describes the number of individuals that are registered in and
interact with the system, in relation to the size of the total population (which are not
enrolled in the system, but are still able to act in the context of which the identity
system operates). A system with a low level of Population Coverage would be
highly targeted—the number of individuals that are registered on the system consists
of a small part of the entire population that are able to act in that context. On the
other hand, a system where all or most individuals are automatically enrolled has a
high level of population participation.
While the UKDNA database is currently the world’s largest DNA database, it holds
about 4.8 million individual DNA samples; representing only 7.39% of the total UK
population (Hayles 2009). This implies a low level of Population Coverage, i.e. a
highly targeted form of identification. In contrast, the Austrian Citizen Card system
was designed as a universal identity scheme. Given that the eCards has been
distributed to the entire population, it has a high level of Population Coverage.
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Low levels of Population Coverage can be linked to issues of discrimination.
Individuals are identified simply by being part of the system—and are more likely to
be unfairly scrutinised by authorities in comparison to those who are not. In its
review of the UK DNA Database, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled
the retention of the DNA of un-convicted individuals as unlawful (BBC 2008b).
Significantly, the inventor of DNA fingerprinting, Sir Alec Jeffreys, has called for
DNA of non-convicted individuals to be removed stating that “there is a
presumption not of innocence but future guilt” (Whitehead 2009). There are also
systematic biases in terms of population selection—the DNA of 40% of young black
males is in this database—which led a judge to suggest that all citizens’ DNA should
be captured (Orr 2007; BBC 2007a). The Austrian Citizen Card has a high level of
Population Coverage. The universality of the system over the entire population,
removes the possibility of distinctions being made against those who are enrolled
against those without an identity. Therefore the issue of possible discrimination
based on the enrolment into the Citizen Card scheme has been eliminated.
Metrical properties
This section introduces the metrical properties that were coded in the thematic
analysis. Each metrical property will also be discussed within the context of the UK
DNA database and the Austrian Citizen Card (see “Privacy”). The metric of an
identity system refers to the techniques, methods and technologies that are used to
capture and present an individual’s identity. The metrical properties defined here
capture the implication that the type of information has on the lived experience of
the individual.
Expert Interpretation
The first metrical property is the level of Expert Interpretation, which captures the
amount of human activity required to collect and use identity information. Systems
with a high level of expertise require specially trained staff to handle the identifying
metric at various stages throughout the lifecycle of the identity. Systems that require
a high level of Expert Interpretation, as opposed to systems where anyone can
interpret the identifiers, involves subjective judgements, where the determination of
identity depends on the examination of information by human experts. Automated
systems serve to decrease the amount of expert analysis involved, providing systems
with an objective approach to processing identity.
DNA identification works by matching specific DNA markers obtained from two
separate samples (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology 2006b). If the two
samples contain all of the same markers, a match is made (positive identification).
Specific equipments are required as part of this process, but it is not an automated one,
as several steps require interpretation to determine if there is a match. The decisions to
ignore, accept or to reason about the absence or presence of certain markers brings a
degree of subjectivity into the identification process, creating a system with a high
degree of Expert Interpretation. On the other hand, digital signatures are built on
mathematical models of encryption, offering an implementation that is completely
objective and automated. The process of identification does not require human beings
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to interpret an individuals identifying or authenticating information. Therefore, the
Austrian Citizen Card system has a low degree of Expert Interpretation.
A high degree of Expert Interpretation implies a reliance on subjective decisions
about an individual. It creates a non-transparent situation, where non-experts cannot
assess the reliability of the identification process, leading to an assumed infallibility
of the expert decisions. This leads to the possible implication that an individual can
be wrongly identified, and in the case of a criminal system he/she might be wrongly
accused of a crime. The 1993 case of Timothy Durham in Oklahoma (W. C
Thompson et al. 2003) illustrates the potential consequences of such mistakes.
Timothy Durham was found guilty of raping an 11 year old girl, based on the alleged
victim’s eyewitness identification, a hair sample from the scene that was similar to
Durham’s hair, and most importantly the DNA test of semen—which matched
Durham. The guilty verdict was passed despite 11 witnesses placing Durham in
Dallas at the time of the rape. Durham was eventually set free in 1996, after further
testing revealed that the semen could not have come from him and highlighted the
error in the initial DNA test that “arose from misinterpretation” (W. C Thompson et
al. 2003). A low degree of Expert Interpretation, such as the Austrian Citizen Card,
eliminates the risk and the dangers of subjectivity as the identification process is an
objective process free of human error. Objectivity creates a predictable process that
provides a level of transparency in assessing the correctness of identifications.
Population Comprehension
Another metrical property is the general level of understanding that the population at
large has of the techniques and technologies used for identification. In a system with
a low level of Population Comprehension, citizens have little to no knowledge on
how the metrics are used to identify them. This typically happens when a large
number of the general population cannot interpret the significance of an
identification being made, why it may be wrong, or how the identity system works.
On the other hand, systems with high levels of understanding are those in which an
individual has a good mental representation of the entire process in which the
identity metrics are used.
Whilst there is a high level of awareness that DNA is used for identification, most
individuals do not understand the process by which identifications are made, nor can
they easily grasp the implications behind the probabilities attached to DNA matching—
such as a “one in trillions” probability of a chance match occurring between two
unrelated individuals (E. Graham 2007). A recent study (Ley et al. 2010) found that
perceptions of the entire DNA process have been shaped by a “CSI effect”, in which
the inaccurate media portrayal of DNA applications has distorted perceptions of the
entire identification process. As such, the DNA database has a low level of Population
Comprehension. Similarly, the Austrian Citizen Card also suffers from a low level of
Population Comprehension. Digital Signatures are not a technology that is easily
understood by laymen (Garfinkel et al. 2005a). A study of merchants trading through
Amazon (Garfinkel et al. 2005b) found that only 54% of those understood how the
digitally signed receipts they were receiving worked. 59% of merchants thought it was
important to use encrypted and signed mail, yet 59% also admitted to not knowing
whether their eMail client supported it.
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Low levels of Population Comprehension indicates the possibility that individuals
cannot challenge identification decisions, as people in general do not understand
how the information is processed, nor do they know how to interpret related figures.
In the case of Madeleine McCann (see “Identity Exposure”), traces of her DNA was
found in the boot of the car hired by her parents. For many people reading this in the
press, and members of the Portuguese police, the presence of Madeleine’s DNA
implicated her parents (Rayner et al. 2008). However, DNA can be easily transferred
via her clothes and toys that had been transported in the boot. Another issue brought
by low levels of Population Comprehension arises in voluntary use systems. If
individuals do not understand how to use the identification technologies, such as
digital signatures, they may not be able to identify themselves when they need to,
and/or be fooled by fake credentials. In this context, the low levels of Population
Comprehension can indicate potential confusion on how to make use of the identity
and therefore the system. This can be linked to the issue of complexity that has been
raised in the Austria Citizen Card scenario, contributing to the situation where
individuals are not using the digital signatures resulting in low rates of adoption
(Sokolov 2006a, b).
Information Accuracy
Information Accuracy is the property that defines the reliability of the information
that is collected, stored and used in the identity system. Systems with high degrees
of Information Accuracy are more likely to produce correct identifications. However,
this accuracy must not be based solely on the theoretical possibilities—accurate
“measurement” of Information Accuracy needs to take into account the implemen-
tation specific details that can affect the theoretical probability. The inconsistencies
and practical limitations of the real world will need to be reflected in the Information
Accuracy property of the system.
DNA identification can offer high degrees of accuracy if the samples being
compared are of high quality (Graham 2007). In law enforcement, however, DNA
samples are not only collected from individuals, but also from the crime scenes.
Such samples may be contaminated by other DNA present at the scene, or might
have degraded over a period of time before it is captured and stored. Although it is
difficult to measure the effects of contamination or degradation, it is important to
note that this decrease in the degree of Information Accuracy reduces the probability
of a correct identification being made (Thompson et al. 2003). Austria’s Citizen Card
scheme offers a high degree of Information Accuracy. The system is designed
around unique identification numbers and digital signatures that are issued to each
individual in the population (Leitold et al. 2002). If implemented correctly, the use of
digital signatures should leave no doubt as to its authenticity.
The impact of a low degree of Information Accuracy on the lived experience is
that individuals are at risk of false positives (falsely matching someone to a DNA
sample), resulting in individuals being wrongly accused. In the recent case of the
Omagh bombing, the judge called into question the reliability of the Low Copy
Number (LCN) DNA identification technique, which makes use of minute DNA
samples for matching purposes (2007). The merit of the technique is still being
debated in the scientific community (Graham 2008). As a result of the case, the
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police suspended the use of the LCN technique, which up to that point had already
been used in 21,000 different cases (Hope 2007). In the case of Timothy Durham see
“Expert Interpretation”. (Thompson et al. 2003), the misinterpretation of the DNA
was a result of the failed separation of the contamination between the male and
female DNA during extraction of the semen stain. When an individual first activates
an Austrian Citizen Card, an “identity link” is created based on unique citizen
identification (H. Leitold et al. 2002). The identity link also contains name, date of
birth, and an individual’s public key that is used to support digital signature
functions. This identity link is then digitally signed by a government authority,
which prevents tampering, and provides high levels of assurance that the
identification information held on the card is accurate—minimizing the danger of
erroneous identification of an individual caused by inaccurate information.
Information Stability
The chosen metric for an identification system will also have an impact on the
stability of the registered identity. Information Stability refers to the rate with which
the information stored in an identity system changes over time, and thus supports
reliable identification—long after it was first recorded. A system with low
Information Stability means the identity information has the potential to fluctuate
greatly over short time frames. Identity systems that make a large use of biographical
information typically have low levels of stability as the information can potentially
change at any given time (e.g. address, profession, etc.). Some biometrics can seem
to be stable over the lifetime of an individual (e.g. iris), whereas others change over
time, or can be altered by the individual (e.g. face recognition).
An individual’s genetic makeup does not change over time, and offers a high
degree of “permanence” (Jain et al. 1999). This means that regardless of the time
between collection and identification, an individual’s DNA sample will always
produce a match with that particular individual. As such, the DNA database offers a
high level of Information Stability. The information used to establish an individual’s
identity in the Austrian Citizen Card scheme (i.e. identification number, name, date
of birth and public key) does not tend to fluctuate greatly over time. For example, an
individual cannot change his/her date of birth, and is usually tied to a single
identification number over a lifetime. Therefore, the Austrian Citizen Card has a
high level of Information Stability.
A high level of Information Stability potentially threatens individual freedom, as an
individual is unable to redefine his/her personal identity to evade detection if the DNA is
used for different purposes. Austrian Citizen Cards also have a high level of Information
Stability, and are subject to the same potential issues. Even though an individual can
change his/her name or be issued with a new public key, the unique identification
number and the centralization of such change processes allows the government to
maintain a link of the “new” identity to the original identity that was first created.
Subject Coupling
Identification systems do not only vary in terms of the stability of the information
collected, but the amount of information that is collected and used for a particular
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purpose. This property of the system is known as Subject Coupling, i.e. the degree of
representativeness between the captured identity and the relevant “partial identity”
(Pfitzmann and Hansen 2008) of the individual in relation to the purpose and
context. A tight coupling suggests that the captured identity metrics faithfully
represents an individual’s partial identity at the various Control Points that it is
applied. On the other hand, a system that collects too much or too little information
about an individual is said to have a low Subject Coupling, since the identity that is
captured and presented does not accurately represent the ‘complete’ individual in
that situation. While this property may seem like an easy aspect to establish,
ensuring that Subject Coupling is accurately assessed depends on more subtle
nuances about the information around the identity and the context.
While a lack of information to represent an individual means that there is a low
Subject Coupling, the inverse is not always true. Subject Coupling occurs when the
identity created does not represent the individual in the context. Collecting ‘too
much’ information also results in low levels of Subject Coupling. When too much
information is known about an individual, the consumer of that identity might then
judge the individual based on information that is not relevant for the particular
purpose (Fig. 2). An example of having too much information would be the use of
branding to enable authorities to identify recidivists (Caplan and Torpey 2001).
When released, the physical marks were clearly visible to everyone, all the time.
This removed any chance of re-integration into society.
Consideration of this property requires designers and implementers to account for
an individual’s own perception of the relevant partial identity. As such this property
should not only be considered from the organisations point of view, but must also
consider how each individual perceives their role with respect to the organisation.
The focus is on the relationship between the individual and the implementer,
influencing the information that the individual assumes is relevant to the instantiated
identity. Therefore, Subject Coupling must also ensure that there is a good mapping
between the individual’s perception of the relevant identity and the organisation’s
perspective of the relevant identity.
The DNA database is meant to identify people connected to crime—either to
pursue further investigation, or to eliminate a potential suspect from it. If the identity
is limited to just the elimination of suspects, the system would have a high degree of
Subject Coupling. However, the faith that many individuals put into such systems
means DNA has become a highly deterministic form of identification: a positive
DNA match can greatly influence the perception of an individual’s identity, causing
other relevant information to be discarded or distorted in light of the match.
Furthermore, in relation to keeping DNA of non-convicted individuals, a recent
report from the Home Office (Science and Public Protection 2009 has stated that the
“risk of offending following an arrest which did not lead to a conviction is similar to
the risk of reoffending following conviction.” This can be interpreted as an
assumption of guilt through association with the DNA database, where the view
becomes that “innocent people who have been arrested are more likely to commit a
crime” (Goldacre 2009). The system can therefore be said to posses a low level of
Subject Coupling. The Austrian Citizen Card system is designed as a digital
identification and authentication scheme. Its purpose is to provide individuals with
mechanisms to securely and accurately identify themselves to other organisations.
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Therefore, the identity link created, based on the unique id number, the name, the
date of birth and public key (H. Leitold et al. 2002), seems to fit its purpose and does
not collect or make use of other information beyond what is needed. It provides a
high level of Subject Coupling.
A low level of Subject Coupling indicates the potential dangers where individuals
may be judged on an unrepresentative form of identity. Raymond Easton was
charged with burglary when his DNA sample was matched to a crime scene (BBC
2007b). However, Mr Easton was in advanced stages of Parkinson disease, and
could not have committed the crime. While he was eventually released and the
charges dropped, this only came after an advanced DNA test was made. In a separate
case from 1997, George Ellis was sentenced to 14 years in prison for robbery (BBC,
1999) Despite claims that it was planted, he was convicted solely on the DNA
evidence. Two years later, criminal charges were brought against detectives involved
in George Ellis’s case, calling into question the validity of the DNA evidence. An
appeal court came to the conclusion that it could not uphold the conviction since the
“DNA evidence was the most damning piece against him” (1999). As such, having a
low level of Subject Coupling, the DNA database introduces situation where
decisions to be made based solely on the positive DNA match. Offering a high level
of Subject Coupling, individuals in the Austrian Citizen Card system are not unfairly
Low Subject Coupling due to a lack of
information.
The identity consumer cannot come to
an informed decision based on the
information available.
 
Irrelevant
Information  
Relevant
Information  
Collected
Information  
Uncollected
Information
Low Subject Coupling due to the
availability of too much information.
The identity consumer runs the risk of
passing judgement based on information
unrelated to the context.
 
Fig. 2 Low levels of Subject Coupling
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judged based on the identity created. The information used in the scheme is
sufficient just for purpose of identification. Its use in different contexts (health, tax,
etc.) will then be supplemented with other personal information that will need to be
collected and stored by each relying party, whose information systems remain
independent of the Citizen Card system (H. Leitold et al. 2002).
Information Polymorphism
Depending on the chosen metric, an individual’s identity may be more or less likely
to being used for different purposes. The likelihood that the identity may be used for
a different purpose increases with the various meanings that can be attributed,
extracted or interpreted from the type of information held about individuals. This is
captured by the term Information Polymorphism. This property is derived from the
quality of the information itself, and therefore needs to be assessed irrespective of
any laws that are put in place to prevent such abuse of the collected information.
Such safeguards are easily circumvented, especially if the required information has
already been collected and stored. In systems with a high level of Information
Polymorphism, an individual’s identity information can be easily taken out of
context of the original scheme, and applied to other systems that use this information
for different purposes. Such systems are more likely to lead to what is commonly
described as function-creep. A low degree of Information Polymorphism means that
an individual’s identity is safe from being exploited for other functions.
DNA can be used not only for individual identification purposes, but also for a
number of other purposes such as identifying racial heritage and familial linkages
(paternity), or the likelihood of developing certain illnesses. The DNA database
therefore has a high level of Information Polymorphism since information can
potentially be used for completely different purposes. The identity created in the
Austrian Citizen Card system relies on information that does not lend itself to
various uses. For example, the public key can only be used to support authentication
or digital signing procedures. Furthermore, each service that an individual interacts
with will make use of different sectoral identifiers preventing the combination of
information across various contexts (Meints and Hansen 2006), reducing the
possibility of information being joined together for other purposes. The Austrian
Citizen Cards therefore offers a low level of Information Polymorphism.
A high level of Information Polymorphism potentially threatens individuals’
privacy. The DNA stored in the UK DNA database is currently governed by law that
states it can only be used to investigate crime. However, the Chief Constable in
charge of the database regularly receives requests for matching to be performed for
paternity cases; even though these are refused, the risk of paternity suits has been
cited as a reason why police officers do not want their DNA to be stored for
elimination purposes (Bennetto 2000)—something that is done with fingerprints.
Furthermore, there is the issue of unpredictable future governments and how they
might potentially change laws around the collection and use of DNA information.
For example, when the DNA Database was first implemented in 1995, the law stated
that only the DNA of convicted individuals would be stored in the Database. This
was later changed when the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 allowed the
government to collect and store DNA of non-convicted individuals.
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At first glance, the use of unique identification numbers in the Austrian Citizen
Cards might imply a high level of Information Polymorphism, as these identification
numbers typically allow for the linkage of information across different contexts of
use. Unique identification numbers allows for the creation of detailed user profiles
that can invade an individual’s privacy. For example, (Lyon 2003) mentions how
insurance companies in the United State use increasingly intrusive methods to
collect personal information based on an individual’s Social Security Number. The
Austrian Citizen Card has been designed to minimise risk, by creating unique
sectoral numbers. In a particular context of interaction, the unique identification
number goes through an irreversible cryptographic hash to produce a new sectoral
identification number that is then be used to identify the individual within that
particular context (H. Leitold et al. 2002). This prevents an individual’s identity from
being linked up across different contexts, containing an individual’s information to
use within each scenario. This creates a low level of Information Polymorphism,
minimising the possibility of privacy invasions and function creep.
Combining properties
Looking at the various properties individually—as we have in the preceding sections—
can help researchers and practitioners to understand the possible impact of an identity
system on the lived experience. In certain configurations, such as an identity system a high
number of Control Points, the system might be perceived as being—‘too controlling’,
and would thus might be met with resistance. A system that needs to be up-to-date, but
makes use of a metric that has a low level of Identity Stability, may be seen as a burden
upon individuals, who continuously have to report when information changes.
However, reactions to identity systems are rarely brought about by any single
property alone. It is the combination of these various properties and their interactions
that allows for the proper assessment of the lived experience. In doing so, one can
then construct the possible narratives and therefore the potential outcomes while
paying attention to the various contextual elements and social norms. For example,
consider a system with a low level of Population Coverage, a high level of Subject
Engagement, and a high number of Control Points. The resulting identity system is a
highly targeted one, indicating that certain criterion needs to be met for inclusion
into the system. The majority of the population that is acting in that particular
context is able to bypass the system. Additionally, as individuals play an active role
at a large number of Control Points, some might decide that the burden of the system
is unbearable. As such, in cases where it is possible to do so (e.g. identification
systems based on religion), one can analyse the situation and deduce that a number
of individuals might avoid the identity system altogether, by abandoning his/her
‘identity’ and constructing a new one.
With the Austrian Citizen Card, there was lack of adoption and use of the digital
signatures (Sokolov 2006a, b). Putting the system in the context of the properties, we
can link the low uptake of the system to the low benefit for individuals, as there are
few instances where they can make use of their identity (low number of Control
Points), and the fact that digital signatures are not understood by many people (low
levels of understanding), As such, being individuals that play an active role (high level
of Subject Engagement), they are not motivated to make use of their digital signatures.
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For the DNA database, most of the properties introduced here are relevant to
interpreting the various reactions towards the system. The initial set of privacy
concerns stem from the constant access of the identity (high number of Control
Points) of which the individual is unaware (low levels of Subject Engagement). This
is further amplified by the possibility that the identity information can be easily
reused for other purposes in completely different contexts (high level of Information
Polymorphism), again potentially without the individual being aware.
Issues of fairness and freedom also come into play when considering the highly
targeted nature of the DNA database (low level of Population Coverage), especially in
light for the lack of control that an individual has over the presentation of the identity to
the rest of society (high level of Identity Exposure). Furthermore, the lack of control is
substantially worsened by the incomplete yet deterministic nature of such identification
(low degree of Subject Coupling), that takes places in a subjective process (high levels
of Expert Interpretation) based on potentially inaccurate information due to
contamination and degradation (low levels of Information Accuracy).
Based on this narrative for the DNA database, it is not surprising that the system
is surrounded by privacy concerns and controversy. These concerns are given
strength, perhaps non-intuitively, by the broadening of the Population Coverage as it
includes not only convicted criminals but suspects as well. This can perhaps be
explained by the fact that it is still a highly targeted system, just slightly broader in
scope, Additionally, from the point of view of innocent suspects, they do not belong
on the database at all, meaning the partial identity created goes against the
relationship between the individual and the state, thus further driving down the level
of Subject Coupling.
Applying framework to non-government identity systems
The system properties introduced in this paper were developed through an
investigation of past and present National Identity Systems, and we have explained
them in the context of two such schemes. To illustrate the applicability of the
properties to different contexts, the properties will be used to investigate identity and
information systems that have been implemented in completely different environ-
ments. In the following, we apply the properties to a social networking system, and a
personalized advertising platform.
Social networking
Online Social Network Sites (SNS) have experienced significant growth over the
past few years. It has become an increasingly popular medium for individuals to
connect with each other and share a high degree of personal information. From our
point of view, an SNS can be viewed as an Identity Management System. This
makes such sites a prime candidate by which we can apply the codes that the
research has uncovered. Specifically, we will be looking at the Facebook platform.
With over 200 million registered individuals, Facebook is arguably the most
popular social platform today. It has also been the centre of some controversies. Just
recently Facebook has been accused of breaching Canada’s Privacy Laws (BBC
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News 2009). More relevant to our considerations is a change that Facebook made to
its website that brought out negative reactions among its community.
In 2005, Facebook introduced new features that affected the way in which
information was distributed to an individual’s network on the site. Prior to these
changes, information that was inserted or updated on an individuals profile was only
visible when another party visited his/her profile page. Facebook then added the
Newsfeed feature, which essentially aggregated all these information changes and
broadcast them to an individual’s friends. This turned a process from a ‘pull’ operation
to a ‘push’. Individuals reacted against this and established resistance groups to voice
their opinions. The Facebook CEO eventually responded, stating that no privacy
options were taken away, and that the information was visible only to the same people
who has access as before. “Nothing you do is being broadcast; rather it is being
shared with people who care about what you do” (Hoadley et al. 2009). Nevertheless,
Facebook took down the Newsfeed, and re-released it with various privacy controls.
In their study of the situation, (Hoadley et al. 2009) attributed the resistance to
individuals’ perception of “information access” and “illusion of control”. Individuals
viewed the Newsfeed as increasing the ease with which their information can be
accessed by others, and the absence of controls reduced the perceived level of
control that individuals had. While this point of view is certainly justified, the
properties that have been uncovered here might be able to shed more light on the
situation and better relate the changes in the system to the reactions.
The most relevant properties for this scenario are the Control Points and Subject
Engagement. Pre-Newsfeed, information was only accessible when the individual’s
page was visited by another party. One can technically view this as a single Control
Point. Post-Newsfeed, the number of Control Points increased dramatically; every
party that the information was pushed to represents a Control Point, where the
individual’s information is consumed.
In addition, the Newsfeed can be interpreted as a reduction in the level of
subject involvement. In the ‘pull’ model, visiting an individual’s page was a
requirement. The page is a representation of the individual on the platform,
whom has spent time to create a profile that represents him/her to others.
Therefore, accessing the individual’s profile page can be seen as a Control Point
that has a high level of Subject Engagement. The Newsfeed represents a loss of
involvement, as the information is taken from the individual’s controlled profile
and broadcast to the other Control Points that individuals are not aware of or have
no control over.
Targeted advertising
Targeted advertising has proved to be an extremely lucrative way to increase
revenues. This form of advertising involves the tracking of an individual’s identity
across various services. It could be something as simple as contextual targeting
(using keywords based on the content of the current page), or based on individuals’
browsing history across one or more sites. These browsing histories and
identification details are typically handled in a decentralized manner, making use
of cookies stored on the user’s computer. These tracking methods have raised issues
among privacy advocates.
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A recent study found that a significant number of the US population object to the
tracking of behaviour. Turow et al. (2005) found that 86% of young adults reject
targeted advertising that tracks behaviour across different websites. Advertisers,
however, say that individuals—especially the younger generation—do not mind
having their habits tracked. Recent developments in targeted advertising have taken
the tracking to new levels.
Phorm is a company that developed a targeted advertising platform that is tied
directly to an individual’s Internet Service Provider (ISP). Every subscriber to the
ISP’s network is enrolled into the Phorm System. Every website that an individual
visits is passed through the system, and is checked against a list of advertising
categories. If a match is found, the category is marked in a cookie and stored on the
user’s computer. This cookie is then used to provide targeted advertisement on any
websites through the use of a widget. The European Union has recently proceeded
with legal proceedings in light of the controversial use of Phorm (Guardian 2009).
The arguments are usually tackled from a high level law based view of privacy
rights. Phorm’s arguments claim that people do not understand the technology and
how it works, claiming that it actually provides anonymity.
Applying the structural properties from the proposed framework, the items of
interest are Subject Involvement, Identity Disclosure, and the level of Control Points.
With every website passing through the system, Phorm presents individuals with a
high number of Control Points resulting in a very restrictive environment for the
individual. This situation is exacerbated by low subject involvement at the Control
Points. The individual’s information is taken in a covert manner, without the
individual being involved in the process. Phorm also provides individuals with a
high level of Identity Exposure. The tracked information is stored on a cookie on the
user’s computer. In a multi-user environment, the same computer will be used by
various individuals that Phorm will not be able to differentiate amongst. When
serving customized ads, the system is constantly at risk of revealing an individual’s
preference by presenting customized content to the “wrong” individual.
From a metrical standpoint, the properties of interest are Subject Coupling, and
Information Stability. Phorm is a platform used by a user’s ISP to deliver targeted
advertisements. The relationship between the user and the ISP is that of a consumer
paying fees to gain access to the network. This relationship calls for the sharing of
certain general and financial information. This is the relevant partial identity of the
individual in the subscriber role. By making use of Phorm, ISP’s expand beyond this
boundary by tracking an individual’s habits in depth. This results in low Subject
Coupling in the ISP-subscriber relationship. Additionally, an individual’s browsing
habits are constantly growing and producing a very dynamic data set that results in
low levels of Information Stability. Therefore, in order to keep an accurate
representation of the individual, large volumes of up to date records are required.
This raises concerns of privacy due to the tracking nature of such a system.
Discussion and conclusion
Whilst the use of modern identity management systems has increased rapidly,
the understanding of what constitutes appropriate use of identity lags behind.
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The disembodiment of people from transactions has increased the perceived
need to capture the identity of individuals, and developments of systems have
largely been driven by what is technically feasible, and the administrative
convenience of the organisations that commission the systems. Whilst the
rhetoric of human-centred identity has been plentiful, little research has been
carried out to understand the human experience of identity in technology-
mediated interactions. This paper presents a first proposal for a set of properties
to understand the need of individuals when it comes to identity systems, and
what constitutes acceptable use.
Strengths and weaknesses
The main strength of framework is that it fills a gap in the current approaches
to identity systems, as it links design of an identity system directly to the
potential lived experience. It enhances our understating of the impact of such
systems on individuals, beyond the traditional views of privacy and trust. As an
example, what does it mean to claim that a system invades an individual’s
privacy? The problem here is privacy can mean so many things; it becomes
difficult to state what the exact issue is. A typical system implementer would
find it difficult to link the privacy concern to the state of system itself.
However, by using these properties as a support mechanism, a researcher or
practioner can conduct a proper analysis of the system, communicate clearly on
the potential problem areas and suggest practical design changes to reduce the
privacy concern.
Another benefit of the proposed framework is that proper use of these properties
encourages the designer to immerse herself in the situation that the system will be
used. Proper assessment of how each property interacts with another requires
thought and reflection, looking at the system from the point of view of the individual
and society that is affected by it. This is a breakaway from other methods that might
take a highly administration-centric point of view, or a solution that might rely on a
set of checklists, that removes a system implementer from the context. The proposed
properties serve to re-embed the design process into the reality of the situation in
which it is implemented.
However, the subjectivity required to fully utilize the framework can also be seen
as a potential weakness. While there is an element of rating taking place, one would
not be able to simply assign weights of importance to each property. Each context
differs from the next and each property can play a slightly different role in relation to
every other property. A high level or low level of rating for each property does not
automatically indicate a good or bad outcome. There is a degree of interpretation
required, and different individuals might perceive things differently, which can lead
to a source of inconsistent results.
Furthermore, in its current state, the predictive power of the framework remains
untested. The analysis of systems using these properties has taken place post-
implementation. We are fully aware of the outcomes that a particular identity system
has brought about. This hindsight proves to be an advantage, as it is easier to link
known outcomes to the system properties than it is to link system properties to
unknown outcomes.
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Further research
The human-centred framework has been developed through a grounding of
previously implemented nation-wide IDMS, and has been shown to be useful in
different contexts from social networking systems to personalised advertising
platforms. However, it still needs to be further tested and elaborated upon. By
exposing this work to the community, we hope to be able to build a robust model
that can prove to be a useful tool in the quest for human-centred identity. Potential
areas for further development are provided below.
The properties of the framework here have been brought about through the
analysis of a specific set of identity systems. Therefore, a continuous application of
these properties to other implementations can serve to discover refinements to the
uncovered properties. As an example, it may be beneficial to break down the Control
Point property into Read-Only Control Points, where an individual’s information is
only consumed, as opposed to a Write-Only Control Point where the individual’s
identity entry is updated with new information. Another possible break down is a
distinction between mandatory and voluntary Control Points.
Alternatively, new properties can be developed to cover design issues that
were not present in the analysis. An example of a new property, and one that is
currently under consideration, is that of Information Salience. This property
focuses on the impact of certain metrics in other contexts. Religion for example is
a very influential attribute and therefore has a high degree of salience. However,
this Information Salience property might cause confusion and overlap with that of
Subject Coupling. It is important to consider the relationship of the new property to
the current properties, ensuring that there is no overlap or contradiction.
Furthermore, new properties should be valid across different implementations of
identity systems.
Another area for further development is the creation of a complete mapping
between the individual properties and the potential outcomes that it can bring
about. As an example, the analysis here has not identified how high levels of
population comprehension might affect the lived experience, and therefore its
impacts on the acceptance or rejection of an identity system. One could theorise,
and seek proof of a situation where individuals might reject an identity system
on the grounds that the population has a complete understanding of that system,
thus enabling them to make more informed decisions on what may or may not
acceptable. A complete mapping of the properties to potential outcomes would
increase the effectiveness of the model in describing the lived experience.
However, a degree of subjectivity is still needed. The mapping would only serve
as potential indicators and would need to be judged in relation to the other
properties, as well as the context of implementation.
Lastly, it would be beneficial to create an integrated framework that pulls in the
various different approaches to create a complete human centred model. The aim of
this proposed framework is not to replace the current approaches, but to supplement
them aiding in a better understanding of how concepts of privacy and trust can be
evaluated in terms of the system design. A comprehensive model that can be applied
to various identity contexts would be highly beneficial to both practioners and
researchers alike.
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Conclusion
Identity is a pivotal construct in the interaction of an individual in a social space.
Current approaches to designing human-centred solutions typically focus on the area
of usability, privacy and trust. However, these approaches are utilitarian in nature
seeking to create mechanisms that make it easier for organizations to collect an
individual’s information. They are abstracted from the reality of the situation in
which the identity system is implemented. While these traditional approaches are
important, we must be aware of their shortcomings, and acknowledge that the reach
of identity beyond these realms.
It is an individual’s identity that determines what he/she can or cannot do when
interacting with others. Viewing identity as such extends the impact of identity
beyond the point of interaction and data collection, shifting focus towards the
practical impacts that identity has on an individual’s life. Failure to acknowledge this
effect of identity results in systems that can claim to be usable, privacy sensitive or
trust worthy, but still result in systems that face rejection or systems that can have
negative impacts for an individual. We need to take a step back from the identity
system itself, and focus on the underlying relationships that are present in the
identity eco-system. We need to consider the identity system in its context of
operation, to analyse the system as a whole and determine its impacts on the lived
experience. The framework proposed here aims to fill this gap, and act as a starting
point for a genuinely human-centred approach to identity.
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